JUDGMENT (Prayer: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus, directing the respondents to accord the benefit of rehabilitation of recruitment to the petitioner by providing job in accordance with B.P.(Per) (FB) No.3 dated 25.1.1990 and G.O.Ms.No.656 issued by Labour and Employment Department dated 29.6.1978.) 1. The Writ of Mandamus has been filed to direct the respondents to accord the benefit of rehabilitation of recruitment to the petitioner by providing job in accordance with B.P.(Per)(FB)No.3, dated 25.01.1990 and G.O.Ms.No.656, Labour and Employment Department, dated 29.06.1978, within a stipulated time. 2. The petitioner states that the agricultural land owned by the family of the writ petitioner was acquired for development of Thermal Power Station. The family of the writ petitioner lost the agricultural land and consequently, they were living in penurious circumstances. The similarly placed affected persons approached the Government and the respondents made a promise that employment will be provided to the land losers on account of the said Thermal Power Project. Though an assurance was provided to the land losers during the relevant point of time, the case of the writ petitioner was not considered and many other similarly placed persons were also left out. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously contended that the respondents have not provided any intimation to the land losers regarding the opportunity of employment to be provided. The petitioner is an illiterate person and she was not aware of the developments occurred subsequently in the matter of providing employment to the families of the land losers. Thus, she could not able to approach the respondents immediately and even now, she is in indigent circumstances and therefore, her case is to be considered for appointment under priority category of land losers, as per the assurance given by the respondents during the acquisition of land for developing the Thermal Power Project. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner mainly contended that the delay cannot be held against the writ petitioner as she approached the respondents by submitting representations. The other similarly placed persons earlier filed Writ Petitions in W.P.No.13789 of 2011, etc., and this Court has directed the the District Collector to commence enumeration process and accordingly consider their cases. Pursuant to the said order, enumeration process was conducted and appointments were granted. The other similarly placed persons earlier filed Writ Petitions in W.P.No.13789 of 2011, etc., and this Court has directed the the District Collector to commence enumeration process and accordingly consider their cases. Pursuant to the said order, enumeration process was conducted and appointments were granted. Thus, the same benefit is to be extended to the petitioner also. 5. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents 1 to 3 objected the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner by stating that the Writ Petition is liable to be rejected on the ground of laches. The land was acquired in the year 1992 and the land losers were considered for providing employment and appointments were given in the year 1999 itself. The petitioner, if at all eligible, ought to have approached the respondents during the relevant point of time. The learned counsel reiterated that the petitioner submitted a representation through her counsel only on 23.12.2014, after a lapse of about 22 years from the acquisition of the land. Thus, the case of the writ petitioner cannot be considered. Even the records cannot be verified now after a lapse of many years. Therefore, the Writ Petition is liable to be rejected. 6. Subsequent to the order passed in W.P.No.13789 of 2011, other similarly placed persons filed Writ Petitions based on the directions issued by this Court to conduct the enumeration process. The said order was followed and thereafter a Writ Appeal was filed, wherein an interim order was granted. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner replied by stating that as far as the order dated 22.09.2011 is concerned, it became final. 7. Considering the arguments, this Court is of the opinion that regarding the delay and laches in the present case, it is relevant to consider the judgments of the three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Chairman/Managing Director, U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. and others Vs. Ram Gopal reported in (2020) SCC Online SC 101, wherein it has been held as follows:- "15. Seen from a different perspective also, it is clear that the Respondent has shown little concern to the settled legal tenets. Even a civil suit challenging termination of services, if filed by the Respondent, would have undoubtedly been barred by limitation in 1990. Ram Gopal reported in (2020) SCC Online SC 101, wherein it has been held as follows:- "15. Seen from a different perspective also, it is clear that the Respondent has shown little concern to the settled legal tenets. Even a civil suit challenging termination of services, if filed by the Respondent, would have undoubtedly been barred by limitation in 1990. In a similar situation where the appellant belatedly challenged the promotion of his junior(s), this Court in P.S. Sadasivaswamy vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 1 SCC 152 held as follows: "2. ... if the appellant was aggrieved by it he should have approached the Court even in the year 1957, after the two representations made by him had failed to produce any result. One cannot sleep over the matter and come to the Court questioning that relaxation in the year 1971. ... In effect he wants to unscramble a scrambled egg. It is very difficult for the Government to consider whether any relaxation of the rules should have been made in favour of the appellant in the year 1957. The conditions that were prevalent in 1957, cannot be reproduced now. ...It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters......" 16. Whilst it is true that limitation does not strictly apply to proceedings under Articles 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India, nevertheless, such rights cannot be enforced after an unreasonable lapse of time. Consideration of unexplained delays and inordinate laches would always be relevant in writ actions, and writ courts naturally ought to be reluctant in exercising their discretionary jurisdiction to protect those who have slept over wrongs and allowed illegalities to fester. Consideration of unexplained delays and inordinate laches would always be relevant in writ actions, and writ courts naturally ought to be reluctant in exercising their discretionary jurisdiction to protect those who have slept over wrongs and allowed illegalities to fester. Fencesitters cannot be allowed to barge into courts and cry for their rights at their convenience, and vigilant citizens ought not to be treated alike with mere opportunists. On multiple occasions, it has been restated that there are implicit limitations of time within which writ remedies can be enforced. In SS Balu vs. State of Kerala, (2009) 2 SCC 479 this Court observed thus: "17. It is also well-settled principle of law that "delay defeats equity". ...It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment." (emphasis supplied) 17. Similarly, in Vijay Kumar Kaul vs. Union of India, (2012) 7 SCC 610 this Court while considering the claim of candidates who, despite being higher in merit, exercised their right to parity much after those who were though lower in merit but were diligently agitating their rights, this Court observed that: "27. ...It becomes an obligation to take into consideration the balance of justice or injustice in entertaining the petition or declining it on the ground of delay and laches. It is a matter of great significance that at one point of time equity that existed in favour of one melts into total insignificance and paves the path of extinction with the passage of time." ..... 19. It is also pertinent to mention that neither has it been pleaded nor is it apparent from the material on record that the Respondent was unable to approach the court-of-law in time on account of any social or financial disability. Had such been the case, he ought to have availed free legal aid and should have ventilated his grievances in a timely manner." 8. Likewise, in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and others Vs. Had such been the case, he ought to have availed free legal aid and should have ventilated his grievances in a timely manner." 8. Likewise, in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and others Vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava and others reported in (2015) 1 SCC 347 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held as follows:- "23) The legal principles which emerge from the reading of the aforesaid judgments, cited both by the appellants as well as the respondents, can be summed up as under: (1) Normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the Court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. (2) However, this principle is subject to well recognized exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the Court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim. (3) However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the Court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the Court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated person. Such a situation can occur when the subject matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma & Ors. v. Union of India (supra). With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated person. Such a situation can occur when the subject matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma & Ors. v. Union of India (supra). On the other hand, if the judgment of the Court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the Court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence. 24) Viewed from this angle, in the present case, we find that the selection process took place in the year 1986. Appointment orders were issued in the year 1987, but were also cancelled vide orders dated June 22, 1987. The respondents before us did not chalelnge these cancelleation orders till the year 1996, i.e. for a period of 9 years. It means that they had accepted the cancellation of their appointments. They woke up in the year 1996 only after finding that some other persons whose appointment orders were also cancelled got the relief. By that time, nine years had passed. The earlier judgment had granted the relief to the parties before the Court. It would also be pertinent to highlight that these respondents have not joined the service nor working like the employees who succeeded in earlier case before the Tribunal. As of today, 27 years have passed after the issuance of cancellation orders. Therefore, not only there was unexplained delay and laches in filing the claim petition after period of 9 years, it would be totally unjust to direct the appointment to give them the appointment as of today, i.e. after a period of 27 years when most of these respondents would be almost 50 years of age or above." 9. The petitioner slept over her right during the relevant point of time. Even presuming that certain representations were submitted by the writ petitioner, the said representations were also submitted belatedly and more so, the petitioner had not pursued the same for many years. The petitioner slept over her right during the relevant point of time. Even presuming that certain representations were submitted by the writ petitioner, the said representations were also submitted belatedly and more so, the petitioner had not pursued the same for many years. The petitioner cannot watch the proceedings of the other similarly placed persons and send a representation in the year 2014 based on the orders passed in other Writ Petitions after a lapse of about 22 years from the date of land acquisition. Now, 30 years lapsed and at this length of time, this Court cannot issue any direction to the respondents to provide employment under the priority category. Even as per the respondents, the scheme was implemented in the year 1999 and appointments were provided to the eligible candidates. Atleast, the petitioner should have approached the respondents during the relevant point of time when the appointments were provided to other land losers, in the year 1999. The petitioner sent a representation through her lawyer only in the year 2014 and thereafter, the writ petitioner relied on the order passed in the year 2011. 10. The learned counsel for the respondents made a submission that based on the enumeration process, no person was appointed in the Board and the subsequent order passed in another Writ Petition was taken by way of an Appeal before the Division Bench and an interim stay was granted and therefore, no appointment was granted to the other persons. This being the factum established, this Court is of an opinion that the writ petitioner has slept over her right and she cannot wake up one fine morning and knock the doors of the Court for redressal. 11. Thus, the Writ Petition deserves no further consideration and accordingly, the same stands dismissed, both on the grounds of laches and merits. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.