JUDGMENT : 1. The matter has been taken up through Video Conferencing with the consent of learned counsel for the parties. They have no complaint whatsoever regarding audio/visual quality. 2. The instant intra-court appeal is under Clause-10 of Letters Patent directed against the order/judgment dated 12.03.2019 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. (S) No. 5348 of 2017, whereby and whereunder, the claim of the writ petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground has been rejected refusing to interfere with the order dated 09.07.2016, passed by the respondent authority. I.A. No. 1575 of 2021 3. Admittedly, the instant intra-court appeal has been preferred after inordinate delay of 687 days, as per the office report. However, in the instant application, the prayer has been sought for to condone the delay of 699 days. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant, at the outset, has submitted that the reference of delay of 699 days, in place of 687 days, as pointed out by SR dated 26.02.2021, is due to inadvertence and therefore, the instant interlocutory application may be construed to consider for condoning the delay of 687 days on the basis of the ground stipulated therein. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has further submitted that the matter may be heard on merit also for consideration of condoning the delay. 5. But a serious objection to such submission has been made by Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel appearing for the respondent CCL by making submission that when the appeal is barred by limitation of 687 days and as such, before entering into the merit, the consideration may be given to the delay condonation application. 6. This Court, after considering the aforesaid submission, is of the view that before entering into the merit of the issue, it would be appropriate for this Court to consider the delay condonation application and in order to see the sufficient cause to condone the delay and in case of condonation of such delay, it would be appropriate to look into the merit of the issue. 7. Mr. 7. Mr. Ratnesh Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant writ petitioner has submitted that the delay of the period of 687 days may be condoned for the reason explained in the instant interlocutory application, wherein, it has been stated that the writ petitioner could not apply for certified copy of the impugned order in time due to communication gap and also due to Covid-19 from 18.03.2020 to 25.02.2021. The certified copy has finally been obtained on 17.02.2021. The writ petitioner, since is poor and illiterate person and as such, he could not arrange money to file instant appeal in time and after arranging the money, the aforesaid appeal has been filed after delay of 687 days, therefore, according to the learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner, the aforesaid ground as has been referred in the interlocutory application is sufficient ground to condone the delay and therefore, prayer has been made to allow the instant interlocutory application by condoning the delay, so that, the matter may be heard on merit. 8. On the other hand, Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel appearing for the respondent CCL has submitted that the application filed for condoning the delay is not fit to be allowed rather it is fit to be dismissed on the ground that no sufficient ground has been mentioned, rather, no ground is there for consideration to treat the ground sufficient to condone the delay. He submits that a vague statement has been made by making a statement as under paragraph-4 thereof, that due to communication gap, certified copy of the impugned order could not have been obtained. He further submits that so far as the ground taken about Pandemic Covid-19 is concerned, that is also not tenable rather it is misleading statement as because the order impugned has been passed on 12.03.2019 which is much prior to spread of Covid-19 which was in the month of March, 2020. 9. In the backdrop of the aforesaid ground, submission has been made that the instant interlocutory application for condoning the delay, is fit to be dismissed. 10. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the reason assigned in the interlocutory application which has been field for condoning the delay of 687 days in filing the appeal. 11. 10. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the reason assigned in the interlocutory application which has been field for condoning the delay of 687 days in filing the appeal. 11. There is no dispute about the fact that generally the lis is not to be rejected on the technical ground of limitation but certainly if the filing of appeal suffers from inordinate delay, then the duty of the Court to consider the application to condone the delay before entering into the merit of the lis. It requires to refer herein that the Law of limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time, as has been held in the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Brijesh Kumar & Ors. vs. State of Haryana & Ors. (2014) 11 SCC 351 . The Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation Ltd. vs. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, (1939-40) 67 IA 416, relied upon the writings of Mr. Mitra in Tagore Law Lecturers, 1932, wherein, it has been said that: “A Law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party as the Judge cannot, on equitable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognized by law.” In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556 , the Apex Court while considering a case of condonation of delay of 565 days, wherein no explanation much less a reasonable or satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay had been given, held at paragraph-6 as under: “6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.” While considering the similar issue, this Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649 , wherein, it has been held as under: “21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.9. (ix) the conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go-by in the name of liberal approach. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.” 12. It is settled position of Law that when a litigant does not act with bona fide motive and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part, the period of limitation for filing the appeal expires, such lack of bona fide and gross inaction and negligence are the vital factors which should be taken into consideration while considering the question of condonation of delay, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in State of Gujarat through Secretary & Anr. vs. Kanubhai Kantilal Rana, 2013 SCC Online Guj. 4202, wherein, at pargraph-17, it has been held that “Law having prescribed a fixed period of limitation of 30 days for preferring the appeal, the Government cannot ignore the provisions of the period of limitation as it was never the intention of the legislature that there should be a different period of limitation when the Government is the appellant.” In the case of Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. vs. Bhutnath Banerjee & Ors. AIR 1964 SC 1336 , wherein, it has been held at paragraphs 9 and 10 as under: “9. Section 3 of the Limitation Act enjoins a court to dismiss any suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made, after the period of limitation prescribed therefor by the I Schedule irrespective of the fact whether the opponent had set up the plea of limitation or not. It is the duty of the court not to proceed with the application if it is made beyond the period of limitation prescribed. The court had no choice and if in construing the necessary provision of the Limitation Act or in determining which provision of the Limitation Act applies, the subordinate court comes to an erroneous decision, it is open to the court in revision to interfere with that conclusion as that conclusion led the court to assume or not to assume the jurisdiction to proceed with the determination of that matter. 10. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, on the other hand, empowers the court to admit an application, to which its provisions are made applicable, even when presented after the expiry of the specified period of limitation if it is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not presenting it within time. The court therefore had jurisdiction to determine whether there was sufficient cause for the appellants not making the application for the setting aside of the abatement of the suit in time and, if so satisfied, to admit it.” The Hon’ble Apex Court in Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. (1962) 2 SCR 762 , has held that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of the given case, there is no right to the appellant who have delay condoned, wherein, at paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder: “12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the court is dealing with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section 14. In the present case there is no difficulty in holding that the discretion should be exercised in favour of the appellant because apart from the general criticism made against the appellant's lack of diligence during the period of limitation no other fact had been adduced against it. Indeed, as we have already pointed out, the learned Judicial Commissioner rejected the appellant's application for condonation of delay only on the ground that it was appellant's duty to file the appeal as soon as possible within the period prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a valid ground. Indeed, as we have already pointed out, the learned Judicial Commissioner rejected the appellant's application for condonation of delay only on the ground that it was appellant's duty to file the appeal as soon as possible within the period prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a valid ground. Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay condonation application, the Court of Law is required to consider the sufficient cause for condonation of delay as also the approach of the litigant as to whether it is bona fide or not as because after expiry of the period of limitation, a right is accrued in favour of the other side and as such, it is necessary to look into the bona fide motive of the litigant and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part. It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning of sufficient cause. The consideration of meaning of ‘sufficient cause’ has been made in Basawaraj & Anr. vs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 , wherein, it has been held at paragraphs 9 to 15 which read hereunder as: “9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive.” However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. [See: Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee, AIR 1964 SC 1336 , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953 , Parimal v. Veena, (2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150 and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629 ]. 10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993 this Court explained the difference between a “good cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of “sufficient cause.” 11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. [Vide: Madanlal v. Shyamlal, (2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100 and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao, (2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201 ]. 12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: “605. Policy of the Limitation Acts - The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.” An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. [See: Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. (2005) 7 SCC 510 , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh, (1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537 and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907]. 14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830 : AIR 2002 SC 1856 this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93 : AIR 1992 SC 1701 . 15. 15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted deliberately” or “remained inactive.” However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The Court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover the ulterior purpose as has been held in Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. vs. Bhutnath Banerjee & Ors. (supra), Lala Matadin vs. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770 , Parimal vs. Veena @ Bharti, (2011) 3 SCC 545 and Maniben Devraj Shah vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 . (supra), Lala Matadin vs. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770 , Parimal vs. Veena @ Bharti, (2011) 3 SCC 545 and Maniben Devraj Shah vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 . It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. vs. Gobardhan Sao & Ors. (2002) 3 SC 195, wherein, at paragraph-12, it has been held which reads as hereunder: “12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute “sufficient cause” or not will be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hyper-technical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way.” 13. This Court, on the basis of the proposition laid down, as referred hereinabove, has considered the grounds as referred in the interlocutory application for condonation of delay of 687 days and in order to test the grounds shown in delay condonation application, paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the interlocutory application are required to be referred which read as hereunder: “4. That the petitioner could not applied for certified copy of said impugned order in time due to communication gap and also due to Covid-19 from 18.03.2020 to 25.02.2021 and lastly obtained the certified copy on 17.02.2021. 5. That, it is humbly stated that petitioner is poor, illiterate person. He could not arrange money to file instant appeal in time and lastly after arranging the money, he has filed instant appeal after delay of 687 days. 6. That it is stated that in above mentioned circumstances, it was not willful delay on the part of the petitioner/appellant but rather due to unavoidable circumstances beyond control of appellant, he could not move before this Hon’ble Court in time.” It is, thus, evident that the ground of communication gap in communicating the impugned order has been made. The ground of spread of Covid-19 from 18.03.2020 to 25.02.2021 has also been made. The writ petitioner has been said to be poor and illiterate person, as such, he could not arrange money. 14. The ground of spread of Covid-19 from 18.03.2020 to 25.02.2021 has also been made. The writ petitioner has been said to be poor and illiterate person, as such, he could not arrange money. 14. The question is that whether such ground i.e., the communication gap in communicating the impugned order, the spread of Covid-19 from 18.03.2020 to 25.02.2021, illiteracy and paucity of money can be treated to be sufficient cause or not? 15. So far as the ground of communication gap is concerned, since according to the writ petitioner, the order impugned has not been communicated but such ground cannot be said to be sufficient cause for condoning the inordinate delay, coupled with the fact of spread of Covid-19 from 18.03.2020 to 25.02.2021 as admittedly, the order impugned was passed on 12.03.2019, the date when there was no spread of Covid-19, rather, the Pandemic Covid-19 has been surfaced only in the month of February-March, 2020 and as such, the ground of spread of Covid-19 from 18.03.2020 to 25.02.2021 cannot be construed to be a sufficient cause, rather, according to our considered view, such statement is misleading one, since one year ago from the time of spread of Covid-19, the impugned order was passed on 12.03.2019. 16. So far as the ground of illiteracy and poorness of the writ petitioner as also paucity of the money are concerned, that can also not be considered to be a sufficient ground for condoning the delay, rather it is a vague ground as it is not stated anywhere as to how after 687 days he managed to get sufficient fund to file the appeal belatedly. 17. Thus, the grounds referred in the delay condonation application, in our considered view, cannot be a sufficient cause to condone the inordinate delay of 687 days in filing the appeal. 18. This Court, therefore, applying the ratio laid by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgments referred as above, is of the considered view that the ground shown in the delay condonation application, cannot be said to be considered sufficient to condone such inordinate delay in filing the appeal, for the reason that the appellant has not disclosed the delay on day to day basis rather the vague statement has been made to that effect. 19. Accordingly, the instant interlocutory application being I.A. No. 1575 of 2021 is dismissed. 20. 19. Accordingly, the instant interlocutory application being I.A. No. 1575 of 2021 is dismissed. 20. In consequence thereof, the instant appeal also stands dismissed.