ORDER : 1. This revision petition is filed against the orders in Memo (SR).No. 3335 of 2011 and Memo (SR).No.3623 of 2011 in I.A.No.60 of 1989 in O.S.No.276 of 1983 on the file of VII Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. 2. The revision petitioner is the plaintiff. The Memo is filed by the plaintiff before the trial Court in O.S.No.276 of 1983, contending that the said suit is for partition and an ex parte preliminary decree was granted by the Court. Thereafter, an application i.e. I.A.No.60 of 1989 was filed under Order 26 Rule 13 seeking appointment of Advocate Commissioner for partition of the suit schedule property. Respondent No.8 in the I.A. was impleaded as petitioner as per the orders in C.R.P.No.3653 of 2003, dated 29.07.2003. 3. Initially, respondent No.8 filed an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC seeking direction not to evict or dispossess her from mulgi No. 11-1-1202, which is one of the items of suit schedule property and also sought for stay of all further proceedings in the final decree. The said petition was dismissed for default on 08.12.2000. Later, respondent No.8 filed another two petitions, one for restoration of the petition dismissed for default along with application for condonation of delay of 50 days in filing the restoration petition. The trial Court dismissed the delay condonation petition on 07.08.2001. Being aggrieved by the said order, respondent No.8 filed C.R.P.No.3653 of 2001 before this Court and the same was allowed on 29.07.2003. Basing on the directions issued in the said CRP, respondent No.8 was impleaded in I.A.No.60 of 1989. It is also pertinent to mention that though C.R.P.No.3653 of 2001 was filed by respondent No.8 being aggrieved by the dismissal of the delay condonation petition, the High Court has allowed the CRP by giving a finding that I.A.Nos.273 of 2001 and 100 of 1991 are allowed and the ex parte decree passed by the trial Court is set aside with a further direction to the trial Court to dispose of the main suit itself on merits after giving notice and reasonable opportunity to the parties concerned in accordance with law. 4. Heard learned counsel for both the parties and perused the record. 5. 4. Heard learned counsel for both the parties and perused the record. 5. It is the contention of the learned counsel for revision petitioner that he has filed the Memo before the trial Court contending that the preliminary decree passed in O.S.No.276 of 1983 cannot be set aside by the High Court and there is no prayer on the part of respondent No.8 to implead her as a party and the C.R.P. is only relating to the condonation of the delay. It is also the contention of the learned counsel for petitioner that as merely a preliminary decree is passed by the Court, the suit in 0. 5.No.276 of 1983 is still pending in view of pendency of the final decree proceedings in I.A.No.60 of 1989 and the Court below shall continue the suit from the stage prior to filing of C.R.P.No.3653 of 2001 and the Court has to proceed with I.A.No.60 of 1989 by adding respondent No.8 as party to the final decree proceedings, as I.A.No.100 of 1991 is the petition filed by respondent No.8 under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC requesting the trial Court to receive the fair copy of the petition in I.A.No.60 of 1989 by adding the proposed party in view of the orders of the High Court dated 29.07.2003 in C.R.P.No.3653 of 2001. Learned counsel for petitioner contended that by mistake, the High Court passed the order by allowing the other I.As. also and the High Court has also set aside the ex parte decree and this mistake can be rectified by way of allowing this C.R.P., permitting the parties to determine their rights in the final decree. In support of her contentions, the learned counsel for petitioner has relied on the judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gram Panchayat of Village Naulakha v. Ujagar Singh & others, (2000) 7 SCC 543 in S. V.Matha Prasad vs. Lalchand Meghraj & others, (2007) 14 SCC 772 and in Khushro S. Gandhi & others v. N.A.Guzder (dead) by his legal representatives & others, AIR 1970 SC 1468 . 6. 6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for respondents contended that C.R.P.No.3653 of 2001 was disposed of only after hearing both the parties and Section 152 CPC gives scope to rectify the mistakes by the Court either by its own motion or on the application preferred by the parties and finally contended that the orders of the High Court in C.R.P.No.3653 of 2001, dated 29.07.2003 have become final, and therefore, this C.R.P. has to be dismissed as it is devoid of merits. 7. At this juncture, it is relevant to mention the sequence of events/ developments which took place before the trial Court. The suit for partition i.e. O.S.No.276 of 1983 was decreed on 17.02.1986 and it is an ex parte decree. I.A.No.74 of 1988 is the petition filed by the plaintiffs for passing final decree. I.A.No.60 of 1989 is filed for appointment of Advocate Commissioner for partition of suit schedule property. It is pertinent to mention that respondent No.8, who is the third party to the suit, has filed two I.As. i.e. I.A.No.100 of 1991 and I.A.No.273 of 2001. I.A.No.100 of 1991 was filed under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC to implead her as party respondent No.8. The said I.A. was dismissed for default on 08.12.2000. I.A.No.273 of 2001 was filed under Section 5 of Limitation Act to condone the delay of 50 days in filing the petition for setting aside the dismissal for default order dated 08.12.2000. The said I.A. was dismissed on 07.08.2003. Aggrieved by the said orders, respondent No.8 has filed C.R.P.No.3653 of 2001, which was allowed by this Court on 29.07.2003 with the above said observations i.e. condoning the delay, impleading respondent No.8 as a party to I.A.No.60 of 1989 and also setting aside the ex parte preliminary decree dated 17.02.1986. 8. It is the contention of the revision petitioner that the High Court have committed a mistake in setting aside the order of preliminary decree though there was no prayer in C.R.P.No.3653 of 2001. Therefore, they filed the Memo before the trial Court seeking direction to add respondent No.8 in the final decree application and not in the main suit, for which an ex parte decree was passed. 9. Admittedly, no review has been filed against the orders in C.R.P.No.3653 of 2001, dated 29.07.2003 and said order in CRP has become final. Therefore, they filed the Memo before the trial Court seeking direction to add respondent No.8 in the final decree application and not in the main suit, for which an ex parte decree was passed. 9. Admittedly, no review has been filed against the orders in C.R.P.No.3653 of 2001, dated 29.07.2003 and said order in CRP has become final. Moreover, the original suit i.e. O.S.No.276 of 1983 was dismissed for default on 26.11.2012 and interim stay was granted by this Court on 29.11.2012. The parties to the suit are to be vigilant and they cannot sleepover the matter for years together. In this connection, it is apt to refer to the legal maxim “Vigilantibus Non Dormientibus Jura Subveniunt” i.e. the law assists only those who are vigilant, and not those who sleep over their rights. The maxim refers to the obligation of individuals to not only be aware of their rights under the law, but also to be vigilant while exercising or using the same. The legal process only benefits those who have been careful enough with their rights, instead of being ignorant. This maxim expands upon through the Limitation Act of 1963, which entails that if the suffered/aggrieved party does not file a suit for relief within the stipulated period, for the breach of his rights, then it cannot be claimed at a later stage. Any suit of legal right infringement will automatically be considered invalid if filed beyond the limitation period, prescribed by law. In the practical sense, other than the common civil suit actions, the special legislation on various subject matters specifically provides for a period of limitation. Such a maxim with supporting provisions, is primarily to ensure that the legal system provides justice for those who realize legal damage. In a case of Nacinchandra N.Majithia v. State of Maharashtra & others (2000), the Hon’ble Supreme Court made a key observation with respect to the application of this maxim. Given the aphorism that ‘to err, is human’, could practically lead to unintentional situations despite being vigilant, which could attract the commission of an offence. The Courts should not always find means to pull down the shutters of adjudication before a party seeking justice, instead should take measures to entertain all possible cases of grievances, if it is genuine. Given the aphorism that ‘to err, is human’, could practically lead to unintentional situations despite being vigilant, which could attract the commission of an offence. The Courts should not always find means to pull down the shutters of adjudication before a party seeking justice, instead should take measures to entertain all possible cases of grievances, if it is genuine. In the case of Vanka Radhamanohari v. Vanke Venkata Reddy & others [1993 (2) BLJR 875], an exception to this maxim was observed in the said case, which involved a criminal case of cruelty to a woman under Section 498-A of IPC. The Court observed that, given the gravity of the offence committed and with respect to the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the maxim would not be applicable in this case and the case will be admitted in case of offences relating to cruelty against women. 10. As on today, no suit is pending before the trial Court. The orders of C.R.P.No.3653 of 2001, dated 29.07.2003 were also not challenged by way of review for the reasons best known to the revision petitioner, if at all there was an error apparent on the face of record. In view of the dismissal of the suit, all the I.As. pending before the Court are closed. The trial Court has come to a conclusion that the orders passed by the High Court are binding on it, and therefore, all the applications which are pending along with the final decree are found to be nullified and the Court cannot take them into consideration, and therefore, proceeded with the main suit by giving reasonable opportunity to the parties. Admittedly, these orders are passed in the Memo dated 12.06.2012. As there was no representation on behalf of the plaintiff, the trial Court was constrained to dismiss the suit for default on 26.11.2012. It is also relevant to mention that the orders in C.R.P.No.3653 of 2001 were passed on 29.07.2003 and the Memo was filed before the Court in the year 2011 i.e. on 11.11.2011, after a span of 8 years. 11. It is recorded by the trial Court that, “the suit was pending since long time for carrying out amendment to implead the party and to file a neat copy of plaint. The plaintiff and his counsel did not take any steps even after ample opportunities given by this Court. 11. It is recorded by the trial Court that, “the suit was pending since long time for carrying out amendment to implead the party and to file a neat copy of plaint. The plaintiff and his counsel did not take any steps even after ample opportunities given by this Court. It seems the plaintiff is not interested in proceeding with suit subject matter. Therefore, the suit is dismissed for default”. It is further observed that, “the High Court in CRP.No.3653 of 2001, dated 29.07.2003, by allowing the CRP, set aside the ex parte decree passed by the Court and further directed to dispose of the main suit itself on merits after giving notice and the reasonable opportunity to the parties concerned in accordance with law. Hence, this memo is returned.” 12. In the judgments relied on by the learned counsel for revision petitioners, in the case of Gram Panchayat of Village Naulakha v. Ujagar Singh & others (supra), wherein, it is held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that a fraudulent or collusive judgment can be challenged in a later suit or proceedings. In S.V.Matha Prasad v. Lalchand Meghraj (supra), wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court upheld the finding of the High Court in declining the application for impleadment on the ground of delay. Both these judgments are not applicable to the facts of the present case. 13. In the other judgment relied on by the learned counsel for petitioner in Khushro S.Gandhi’s case (supra), it is held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the High Court cannot in revision, try other issues arising in the case, even if the parties conceded and it has to remand the matter to the trial Court. This judgment also is not applicable to the facts of the present case, as in the present case, this revision was filed on 07.11.2012 and interim stay was granted on 29.11.2012, but the suit before the trial Court was dismissed on 26.11.2012 i.e. three days prior to granting of interim orders by this Court. As on today there is no suit is pending before the Court. The revision petitioner has neither challenged the orders of CRP.No.3653 of 2001, dated 29.07.2003 nor the orders dismissing the suit for default. Therefore, nothing remains in this revision petition for adjudication. 14. For the aforesaid reasons, this revision petition is devoid of merits and it is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. The revision petitioner has neither challenged the orders of CRP.No.3653 of 2001, dated 29.07.2003 nor the orders dismissing the suit for default. Therefore, nothing remains in this revision petition for adjudication. 14. For the aforesaid reasons, this revision petition is devoid of merits and it is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. 15. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.