JUDGMENT : 1. These Criminal Writ Petitions have been preferred claiming the following reliefs:- In S.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 462/2018:- “In the facts and circumstances stated hereinabove, it is most humbly and respectfully prayed that this criminal writ petition may kindly be allowed and by an appropriate, writ, order or direction:- a. the respondents may kindly be directed to place on record the ECIR No. JPZO/09/2015 and the same may be ordered to be quashed in so far as it relates to the petitioner, its partners and its employees with all consequential directions; b. all proceedings initiated by the respondents consequent upon the registration of ECIR against the petitioner, its partners and its employees may kindly be quashed; c. any other appropriate order or direction which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may kindly be passed in favour of the petitioner. d. costs of the writ petition may kindly be passed n favour of the petitioner.” In S.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 18/2018:- “In the facts and circumstances stated hereinabove, it is most humbly prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be graciously pleased to- a. issue appropriate writ quashing the ECIRs and all incidental proceedings initiated thereto; b. issue orders that no coercive action is taken by the Respondents against the Petitioner till final disposal of this Writ Petition; and c. issue orders or directions for any other appropriate relief in favour of the Petitioner which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 2. At the outset, a preliminary objection was taken on behalf of the petitioners that since review petitions as against the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. v. Union Of India and Ors. Special Leave Petition (Criminal No. 4634/2014) decided on 27.07.2022, therefore in view of the present controversy being akin to the one therein, no adjudication ought to be made by the High Court, at this stage. 3. Brief facts of this case, as placed before this Court by Mr.K.T.S. Tulsi, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Faraz Khan, Mr. MS Husain, Mr. Anup Kumar Pandey & Mr. Farman Bilal Rayeeni on VC; Dr. Shamshuddin on VC & Mr. S.Tabrez on VC, appearing on behalf of petitioner-M/s. Sky Light Hospitality LLP (in short, ‘Sky Light’); Mr. 3. Brief facts of this case, as placed before this Court by Mr.K.T.S. Tulsi, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Faraz Khan, Mr. MS Husain, Mr. Anup Kumar Pandey & Mr. Farman Bilal Rayeeni on VC; Dr. Shamshuddin on VC & Mr. S.Tabrez on VC, appearing on behalf of petitioner-M/s. Sky Light Hospitality LLP (in short, ‘Sky Light’); Mr. Vikas Balia, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Abhishek Mehta, appearing on behalf of petitioner-Mahesh Nagar, are that in the year 2007, land admeasuring 31.61 hectares (125 Bigha) situated in Village Gajner, Tehsil Kolayat, Bikaner was allotted to one Natha Ram (12.65 hectares i.e. 50 bighas) s/o Kesha Ram and Hari Ram (18.96 hectares i.e. 75 bighas) s/o Luna Ram, whereafter on 19.11.2007, Natha Ram sold his portion of land to one Mr. Rajendra Kumar Swami s/o Gopal Das Swami; mutation No.120 was duly recorded in regard to such sale. Hari Ram acting through Power of Attorney (in short, ‘POA’), namely, Gugangar, sold his portion of land to one Mr. Kishore Singh. 3.1 On 04.01.2010, Rajendra Kumar and Kishore Singh, acting through their POA, namely, Ashok Kumar sold the aforementioned lands to petitioner-Sky Light, acting through his authorized representative, namely, petitioner-Mahesh Nagar. 3.2 On the same date i.e. 04.01.2010, land admeasuring 37.94 hectares was purchased by petitioner-Sky Light from Satish Goel, Baburam Goel, Ghanshyam Bansal, Rajendra Prasad Agarwal and Kailash Agarwal, for a consideration of Rs.42,00,000/-. 3.3 On 23.01.2012, petitioner-Sky Light sold the above-mentioned lands, admeasuring 31.61 hectares (12.65 + 18.96) and 37.94 hectares to M/s. Allegeny Finlease Private Limited for a consideration of Rs.2,81,13,540/-. 3.4 On 08.08.2014, the Colonization Commissioner informed the concerned Collector regarding certain forged pattas upon the basis of which, the aforementioned lands were allotted, and thus, suggested cancellation of the concerned mutation entries in the revenue record(s). 3.5 In the aforesaid factual backdrop, four FIRs bearing Nos.104, 106, 114 & 115, of 2014, came to be registered at Police Station, Gajner, Tehsil Kolayat, Bikaner, for the offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 & 120-B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) against the original allottees of the lands in question. 3.6 On 03.02.2015, civil suits were instituted by petitioner-Sky Light against the persons from whom it purchased the lands in question. 3.7 On 04.08.2015, after investigation, charge-sheets were filed by the concerned police authorities, in relation to the aforementioned FIRs. 3.6 On 03.02.2015, civil suits were instituted by petitioner-Sky Light against the persons from whom it purchased the lands in question. 3.7 On 04.08.2015, after investigation, charge-sheets were filed by the concerned police authorities, in relation to the aforementioned FIRs. 3.8 On 17.09.2015, Enforcement Case Information Report (for short ‘ECIR’) No.JPZO/09/2015 was recorded by the respondent-Enforcement Directorate. 3.9 On 15.06.2016, summons was issued to Mahesh Nagar, to appear before the Enforcement Directorate. Again, fresh summons bearing dates 28.06.2016, 14.07.2016, 26.07.2016, 18.08.2016, 30.08.2016, 29.09.2016 were issued to him, for the same. 3.10 Similarly, on 15.06.2016, summons was issued to petitioner-Sky Light, directing its authorized representative(s) to appear before the Enforcement Directorate along with certain documents. Again, fresh summons bearing dates 28.06.2016, 14.07.2016, 26.07.2016, 25.08.2016, 29.09.2016 and 27.10.2016, were issued to the petitioner-Sky Light, for the same. 3.11 As a consequence of the same, Mahesh Nagar preferred S.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 72/2016 and Sky Light preferred S.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 73/2016 before this Hon’ble Court. 3.11.1 On 26.10.2016, the proceedings, under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (in short, ‘PML Act’), as initiated against the petitioners, were stayed by this Hon’ble Court and on 16.12.2016, the petitioners were directed to appear before the Enforcement Directorate. 3.12 On 27.03.2017, the above-mentioned writ petitions were disposed of by the Hon’ble Court, with the direction to the respondents to decide the objections of the petitioner-Sky Light, regarding the issue of jurisdiction, in regard to the proceedings in question. And, the objections so raised by the petitioners, came to be rejected by the respondents vide letter dated 02.06.2017. 3.13 On 20.08.2017 & 24.08.2017, the investigations in question were transferred to the Central Bureau of Investigation (for short ‘CBI’). 3.14 Petitioner-Mahesh Nagar preferred the instant S.B. Criminal Writ Petition No.18/2018, and on 21.02.2018, this Hon’ble Court directed that no coercive action shall be taken against the said petitioner. 3.15 On 13.11.2018, partner of the petitioner-Sky Light, namely, Robert Vadra was summoned by the Enforcement Directorate alongwith certain documents. Again on 26.11.2018 & 07.12.2018, summons were issued afresh to Robert Vadra, for the same. 3.16 The petitioner-Sky Light filed the instant S.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 462/2018 before this Hon’ble Court, challenging the issuance of summons by the Enforcement Directorate and on 19.12.2018, this Hon’ble Court directed that no coercive action shall be taken against the said petitioner. 4. Again on 26.11.2018 & 07.12.2018, summons were issued afresh to Robert Vadra, for the same. 3.16 The petitioner-Sky Light filed the instant S.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 462/2018 before this Hon’ble Court, challenging the issuance of summons by the Enforcement Directorate and on 19.12.2018, this Hon’ble Court directed that no coercive action shall be taken against the said petitioner. 4. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner-Sky Light made his submissions on the following grounds; 4.1 Neither the petitioner-Sky Light, nor any of its partners/employees were named in any of the impugned FIRs, nor were they named in the charge-sheets so filed, either as accused or witnesses, nor were they named in the supplementary charge-sheets, so filed in FIR Nos.114/2014 & 115/2014. 4.1.1 That the petitioners have not been accused of offences of money laundering under Sections 3/4, nor have they been accused of a predicate/scheduled offence as under the PML Act. 4.1.2 That after thorough investigation by the concerned police authorities of the State, nothing emerged against the present petitioners. And thereafter, the investigation was transferred to the CBI; after due investigation into the matter at hand, the CBI also did not find any material against the petitioners. 4.1.3 In this regard, learned Senior Counsel placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. (supra), and drew the attention of this Court to Paragraph 33 of the said judgment. For the sake of brevity, the same is reproduced hereunder:- “33. Tersely put, it is only such property which is derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence can be regarded as proceeds of crime. The authorities under the 2002 Act cannot resort to action against any person for money-laundering on an assumption that the property recovered by them must be proceeds of crime and that a scheduled offence has been committed, unless the same is registered with the jurisdictional police or pending inquiry by way of complaint before the competent forum. For, the expression “derived or obtained” is indicative of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence already accomplished. For, the expression “derived or obtained” is indicative of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence already accomplished. Similarly, in the event the person named in the criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence is finally absolved by a Court of competent jurisdiction owing to an order of discharge, acquittal or because of quashing of the criminal case (scheduled offence) against him/her, there can be no action for money-laundering against such a person or person claiming through him in relation to the property linked to the stated scheduled offence. This interpretation alone can be countenanced on the basis of the provisions of the 2002 Act, in particular Section 2(1)(u) read with Section 3. Taking any other view would be rewriting of these provisions and disregarding the express language of definition clause “proceeds of crime”, as it obtains as of now.” (emphasis supplied) 4.1.4 Learned Senior Counsel also placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in the case of Harish Fabiani & Ors. v. Enforcement Directorate & Ors. (W.P.(CRL) 408/2022, along with other connected matters) decided on 26.09.2022, and drew the attention of this Court to Paragraphs 3, 16, 17 and 24 of the said judgment. For the sake of brevity, the same is reproduced as hereunder:- “3. The immediate concern of the petitioners relates to prayers in the nature of para 1 (ii) – (vi), whereby the petitioners are concerned about the continuation of proceedings in relation to the ECIR No. ECIR/07/HIU/2021 (“the said ECIR”) issued by the Directorate of Enforcement (“ED”) despite the predicate offence registered under FIR No. 129/2021 (“the said FIR”) having been quashed by the judgment dated 4th May, 2022 of the High Court of Bombay. The petitioners pray for issue of a writ of certiorari setting aside summons issued by the ED to various petitioners in respect of the said ECIR, the Look Out Circular (“LOC”) and any other consequential proceedings emanating out of the said ECIR, and quash the same in view of the predicate offence having been quashed by judgment dated 4th May, 2022 passed by the High Court of Bombay in relation to the said FIR. The thrust of the petitioners contention is based upon the conclusion of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) in para 467 (v)(d) which reads as under: “(v)(d) The offence under Section 3 of the 2002 Act is dependent on illegal gain of property as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. It is concerning the process or activity connected with such property, which constitutes the offence of money-laundering. The Authorities under the 2002 Act cannot prosecute any person on notional basis or on the assumption that a scheduled offence has been committed, unless it is so registered with the jurisdictional police and/ or pending enquiry/trial including by way of criminal complaint before the competent forum. If the person is finally discharged/acquitted of the scheduled offence or the criminal case against him is quashed by the Court of competent jurisdiction, there can be no offence of money-laundering against him or any one claiming such property being the property linked to stated scheduled offence through him.” 16. As per the petitioners, the above named persons are various employees of Indiabulls Housing Finance Limited and related companies and have been roped in by the respondents in the said ECIR without there being any underlying predicate offence registered against them. In light of the conclusion and finding of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) this Court finds no reason for the said ECIR to be sustained against them, without there being any evidence of a predicate offence or an FIR against them which is in existence or is legally alive. 17. In all these cases therefore, both of the employees against whom no complaint was ever filed for the scheduled offences and those against whom it was filed and has been quashed subsequently by a Court of competent jurisdiction, it would only be appropriate that the said ECIR against them under PML be quashed and all proceedings consequent thereto undertaken or directed by the Respondents or any authority are set aside. Conclusion 24. In light of the above analysis and discussion this Court concludes as under: a) The relief sought regarding constitutionality or vires of various provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is infructuous having been decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 929. In light of the above analysis and discussion this Court concludes as under: a) The relief sought regarding constitutionality or vires of various provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is infructuous having been decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 929. b) The ECIR no. ECIR/07/HIU/2021 registered by the Directorate of Enforcement, Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, under FIR No. 129/2021 dated 13th April, 2021 registered by P.S. Wada, Dist. Palghar, Maharashtra stands quashed. c) All proceedings arising from the ECIR No. ECIR/07/HIU/2021 are set aside and there would be no further coercive action or search and seizure or summons arising from the said ECIR. d) The Look out Circulars issued by respondents pursuant to the ECIR No. ECIR/07/HIU/2021 are also set aside.” 4.1.5 Reliance was also placed upon the judgments rendered; by the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in the cases of Mahanivesh Oils & Foods Pvt. Ltd. v. Directorate of Enforcement (W.P. 1925/2014) decided on 25.01.2016, M/s Ajanta Merchants Pvt. Ltd. v. Directorate of Enforcement (Crl. M.C. No. 5581/2014) decided on 09.04.2015 and Arun Kumar Mishra v. Directorate of Enforcement (Crl. M.C. 5508/2014) decided on 09.04.2015, by the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka in the case of Obulapuram Mining Company Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Joint Director, Directorate of Enforcement [Writ Petition No. 5962/2016 (GM-MM-C)] decided on 13.03.2017. 4.2 Neither was the petitioner-sky light nor any of its partners named in the prosecution complaint, that came to be filed in pursuance of the aforementioned ECIR. And that the prescribed statutory time limit for filing the same, under the provisions of law contained in the PML Act, is over. 4.2.1 That despite investigation by more than one investigating agency, nothing was found against the petitioners and yet the respondent-Enforcement Directorate sought custodial interrogation of the partners of the petitioner-Sky Light has been sought. 4.2.2 That the statutory time limit for filing the prosecution complaint as provided under Section 8 (3) (a) of the PML Act was of 90 days in the present case, which stood expired on 15.05.2019. And that therefore, the attachment of properties in the said case stands lapsed. 4.2.2 That the statutory time limit for filing the prosecution complaint as provided under Section 8 (3) (a) of the PML Act was of 90 days in the present case, which stood expired on 15.05.2019. And that therefore, the attachment of properties in the said case stands lapsed. Reliance in this regard was placed on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana in the case of Seema Garg v. Dy. Director, Directorate of Enforcement [PML No. 1 of 2019 (O&M) and connected matters] decided on 06.03.2020. And that the same was upheld by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dy. Director, Directorate of Enforcement v. Seema Garg (Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos. 14713-14715/2020), vide order dated 30.04.2021. 4.2.3 That Section 45 of the PML Act was struck down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India & Anr. (Writ Petitions (Crl.) No. 67/2017 with Nos. 103,144 and 152 of 2017 and connected matters) decided on 23.11.2017. 4.2.4 That merely because the partners of the petitioner have not confessed to any wrongdoing, the same cannot be tantamount to non-cooperation on their behalf. Reliance in this regard was placed upon the judgment rendered in the case of Santosh v. State of Maharashtra (Criminal Appeal No. 1759/2017) decided on 10.10.2017, and the attention of this Court was drawn towards Paragraph 7 of the said judgment. Relevant portion of the same is reproduced hereunder:- “7. It appears, the IO was of the view that the custody of the appellant is required for recording his confessional statement in terms of what the co-accused had already stated in the Statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The IO was of the opinion that the appellant was not cooperating because he kept reiterating that he had not purchased the food-grains. The purpose of custodial interrogation is not just for the purpose of confession. The right against self-incrimination is provided for in Article 20(3) of the Constitution. It is a well settled position in view of the Constitution Bench decision in Selvi and others v. State of Karnataka, that Article 20(3) enjoys an “exalted status”. This provision is an essential safeguard in criminal procedure and is also meant to be a vital safeguard against torture and other coercive methods used by investigating authorities. It is a well settled position in view of the Constitution Bench decision in Selvi and others v. State of Karnataka, that Article 20(3) enjoys an “exalted status”. This provision is an essential safeguard in criminal procedure and is also meant to be a vital safeguard against torture and other coercive methods used by investigating authorities. Therefore, merely because the appellant did not confess, it cannot be said that the appellant was not cooperating with the investigation. However, in case, there is no cooperation on the part of the appellant for the completion of the investigation, it will certainly be open to the respondent to seek for cancellation of bail.” 4.3. Statements of the partners of the petitioner-Sky Light, recorded by the respondent-authorities under Section 50 of the PML Act cannot be used as confessional statement. 4.3.1 It was submitted that statement recorded under Section 67 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short “NDPS Act”) cannot be used as a confessional statement; analogous to the provision of law as contained in Section 50 of the PML Act, and is therefore, hit by the bar contained in Section 161 CrPC. Reliance in this regard was placed upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu (Criminal Appeal No. 152/2013 with other connected matters) decided on 29.10.2020. And that, the said law is a good law, and drew the attention of this Court to the paragraph 173 of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra). For the sake of brevity, the same is reproduced hereunder:- “173. We may note that the learned Additional Solicitor General was at pains to persuade us to take the view that the decision in Tofan Singh is per incuriam. For the reasons already noted, we do not deem it necessary to examine that argument.” 4.3.2 It was thus submitted that even if officials of the Enforcement Directorate are not police officers, they discharge police duties within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, 1872, and permitting the same would tantamount to a violation under Articles 14, 20 (3) and 21 of the Constitution of India. 5. Summons issued under Section 50 of the PML Act are non-est and suffer from want of jurisdiction. 5. Summons issued under Section 50 of the PML Act are non-est and suffer from want of jurisdiction. 5.1 The petitioner-Sky Light is entitled to be supplied a copy of the ECIR, in order to defend himself and that Chapter XII of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short ‘CrPC’) has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court to be applicable in all cases; irrespective of the investigating agency, and unless there is a provision to the contrary in the statute. 6. The practice of not supplying the copy of the ECIR is only to carry on with a roving and fishing inquiry against the present petitioners. 7. Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that in compliance of the order dated 16.12.2016 passed by this Hon’ble Court, the petitioners have duly made their appearance before the Enforcement Directorate, through their authorized representative(s), and fully cooperated with the investigation. 7.1 It was further submitted that the summons so issued by the Enforcement Directorate to Robert Vadra were misconceived as the documents that were demanded from him, were already submitted on behalf of the petitioner-Sky Light through its authorized representative at an earlier date. And that despite the same, a detailed reply was submitted twice on his behalf, wherein all the documents were again submitted before the Enforcement Directorate, in response to each of the summons so issued to him. 7.2 It was also submitted that the last summons, bearing date 07.12.2018 issued by the Enforcement Directorate was not received by the petitioner-Sky Light or on its behalf by anyone. 7.3 And that the petitioner is a bonafide purchaser of the lands in question, and is a victim of fraud, played by the other accused persons, against whom cognizance has been taken by the concerned Court for scheduled offences under the PML Act. 8. Dr. Shamsuddin, learned counsel who is also appearing for the petitioner-Sky Light, stressed upon the definition, as under Section 2 sub-section (1) clause (u) of the PML Act, which defines ‘proceeds of crime’. For the sake of brevity, the same is reproduced hereunder:- “2. 8. Dr. Shamsuddin, learned counsel who is also appearing for the petitioner-Sky Light, stressed upon the definition, as under Section 2 sub-section (1) clause (u) of the PML Act, which defines ‘proceeds of crime’. For the sake of brevity, the same is reproduced hereunder:- “2. Definitions.- (1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,- (u) “proceeds of crime” means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property 2[or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country] 3[or abroad];” (emphasis supplied) 8.1 He further drew the attention of the Court to Section 8 sub-sections (5) and (6) of the PML Act, and submitted that the said Section covers both; civil proceedings i.e. attachment proceedings, and criminal proceedings i.e. confiscation. 8. Adjudication.- (1) … (2) … (3) … (4) … (5) Where on conclusion of a trial of an offence under this Act, the Special Court finds that the offence of money-laundering has been committed, it shall order that such property involved in the money-laundering or which has been used for commission of the offence of money-laundering shall stand confiscated to the Central Government. (6) Where on conclusion of a trial under this Act, the Special Court finds that the offence of money-laundering has not taken place or the property is not involved in money-laundering, it shall order release of such property to the person entitled to receive it. (7) … (8) … 8.2 It was further submitted that there must be some material, which points towards ‘criminal activity’, to proceed against the present petitioners, and that the respondent authorities cannot proceed against them on a mere assumption. 8.3 It was also submitted that the petitioner has been subjected to over 80 hours of interrogation, and it would be an abuse of power to permit the same to continue, and that the petitioner cannot be held liable for the forgeries committed at the time of allotment of the sale deeds of the lands in question by the original allottees. 8.4 The attention of this Court was also drawn to Paragraph 187 (v) (d) of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), which reads as under: CONCLUSION 187. 8.4 The attention of this Court was also drawn to Paragraph 187 (v) (d) of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), which reads as under: CONCLUSION 187. In light of the above analysis, we now proceed to summarise our conclusion on seminal points in issue in the following terms: - (v) (d) The offence under Section 3 of the 2002 Act is dependent on illegal gain of property as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. It is concerning the process or activity connected with such property, which constitutes the offence of money laundering. The Authorities under the 2002 Act cannot prosecute any person on notional basis or on the assumption that a scheduled offence has been committed, unless it is so registered with the that confiscation can take place only at the time of conclusion of trial jurisdictional police and/or pending enquiry/trial including by way of criminal complaint before the competent forum. If the person is finally discharged/acquitted of the scheduled offence or the criminal case against him is quashed by the Court of competent jurisdiction, there can be no offence of money-laundering against him or any one claiming such property being the property linked to stated scheduled offence through him. It was further submitted that the burden of proof, to prove his innocence, under Section 24 of the PML Act, is not on the petitioner-Sky Light, as the petitioner does not fall within the ambit of sub-section (a), but falls under sub-section (b), of the said Section. And that, it would be upon the Court to presume that proceeds of crime, if any, are involved in money-laundering. For the sake of brevity, the said Section is reproduced hereunder:- 24. Burden of proof.- In any proceeding relating to proceeds of crime under this Act,- (a) in the case of a person charged with the offence of money-laundering under section 3, the Authority or Court shall, unless the contrary is proved, presume that such proceeds of crime are involved in money-laundering; and (b) in the case of any other person the Authority or Court, may presume that such proceeds of crime are involved in money-laundering. 8.6 It was also clarified that the reason behind praying for quashment of the ECIR in question, is that the ECIR is the starting point of an investigation, and that an attachment order has been issued to the petitioner pursuant to the ECIR in question. 8.7 Reliance was placed upon the judgments rendered; by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Parvathi Kollur & Anr. v. State By Directorate Of Enforcement Criminal Appeal No. 1254/2022 (Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) No. 4258 of 2021) decided on 16.08.2022, and it was submitted that the ECIR therein was quashed as there was no incriminating material available against the petitioners therein. 9. Mr. Vikas Balia, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner-Mahesh Nagar, reiterated the submissions made on behalf of petitioner-Sky Light. However, he additional submitted that the first summons so issued to petitioner-Mahesh Nagar, on 23.06.2016, was issued after the lapse of one year from date of filing of charge-sheet against the other accused persons, wherein neither the petitioner-Sky Light nor the petitioner-Mahesh Nagar were named, as submitted by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner-Sky Light. And that, despite due replies in time, being filed to each of the summons so issued to Mahesh Nagar, summons were issued in quick succession. 10. Mr. R.D. Rastogi, learned Senior Advocate & Additional Solicitor General of India assisted by Mr. Akshay Bhardwaj, Mr. B.P. Bohra, Sr. CGS, Mr. Pukhraj Servi and Mr. Pooshan, appearing on behalf of the respondents in response to the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the petitioners submitted that although the review is pending, there is no stay on the operation of the said judgment. Thereafter, he sought to briefly recapitulate the facts of the case and drew the attention of this Court to the following; 10.1 That the property in question pertains to 31.61 hectares (125 bighas) of land situated at Village Gajner, Tehsil Kolayat, Bikaner. Thereafter, he sought to briefly recapitulate the facts of the case and drew the attention of this Court to the following; 10.1 That the property in question pertains to 31.61 hectares (125 bighas) of land situated at Village Gajner, Tehsil Kolayat, Bikaner. That the said land, of 50 bighas (12.65 hectares) and 75 bighas (18.96 hectares) was originally allotted to two fictitious and non-existent persons, being Natha Ram S/o Kesha Ram and Hari Ram s/o Luna Ram; both the lands, were then subsequently sold by Gugangar, the power of attorney of the aforementioned two persons; the said power of attorney holder, namely Gugangar also allegedly is a fictitious and non existent person, to Rajendra Kumar S/o Gopal Das Swami and Kishore Singh S/o Ram Singh respectively. 10.2 It was further submitted that the said lands were then subsequently sold to one Ashok Kumar s/o Hukam Singh, the driver of petitioner-Mahesh Nagar, who in turn, sold the same, as a power of attorney holder, on 04.01.2010, to the petitioner-Sky Light LLP, of which Robert Vadra and his mother, Maureene Vadra were partners. 10.3 It was further submitted that petitioner-Sky Light LLP, through power of attorney-Mahesh Nagar sold the lands in question to M/s. Alegany Finlease Pvt. Ltd. on 21.02.2012. 10.4 It was also submitted that the cheque issued for the lands in question were issued by Robert Vadra for an amount of Rs. 30 lakhs on 22.12.2009, in favour of Ashok Kumar (Driver of petitioner-Mahesh Nagar), which was credited to his account on 29.12.2009, whereas the POA in question was executed in favour of Ashok Kumar only on 31.12.2009. Moreover, Ashok Kumar withdrew the said amount of Rs.30 lakhs on 01.01.2010 and returned the same to petitioner-Mahesh Nagar. 11. In the aforesaid factual backdrop, the Commissioner, Settlement vide letter dated 08.08.2014, informed the original allottees about the cancellation of allotment of lease in view of the wrongful allotment thereof. 11.1 It was also submitted that on 26.08.2014, two FIR’s bearing Nos. 114/2014 and 115/2014, were lodged at Tehsil Gajner, Bikaner against Natharam and Hariram alleging that original allottees had connived with the revenue authorities and obtained forged documents. 11.2 It was also submitted that vide orders dated 31.10.2014 (Nos. 01/2014 and 03/2014) passed by SDO (Civil), Kolayat, the allotments were cancelled and the land in question was transferred back to vest in the State. 11.2 It was also submitted that vide orders dated 31.10.2014 (Nos. 01/2014 and 03/2014) passed by SDO (Civil), Kolayat, the allotments were cancelled and the land in question was transferred back to vest in the State. 11.3 It was further submitted that on 04.08.2015, on the basis of investigation conducted by the concerned police authorities, first sets of charge-sheets were filed for the offences under Sections 120B, 201, 204, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 471A of the IPC against the various persons. 11.4 It was also submitted that on 17.09.2015, ECIR bearing No. JPZO/09/2015 was recorded by Enforcement Directorate, Jaipur Zonal Office on the basis of FIR registered for the offences under Sections 420, 467, 471, 120-B of Indian Penal Code. 11.5 It was further submitted that the summons were issued by Enforcement Directorate to Mahesh Nagar on various occasions i.e. 14.07.2016, 26.07.2016, 18.08.2016, 30.08.2016 and 29.09.2016; even thereafter, he did not appear before the concerned authorities. 12. That the petitioner-Mahesh Nagar filed a Writ Petition bearing Criminal Writ Petition No. 72/2016 challenging the issuance of summons under Section 50 of the PML Act by the E.D. Criminal Writ Petitions No.74/2016 and 73/2016 were preferred before this Hon’ble Court, by Ashok Kumar and Sky Light on 04.11.2016; both the said petitions came to be disposed of by this Hon’ble Court on 27.03.2017, with liberty to the petitioners to move before the competent authority for the purpose of raising the issues pertaining to jurisdiction and competent authority was directed to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. 12.1 That on 24.04.2017, Ashok Kumar sent a representation to the E.D. raising issues with regard to the jurisdiction, and that on 02.06.2017, the E.D. wrote a letter to Shri S. Tabrej and Associates stating that the E.D. has the complete jurisdiction to investigate the matter. And, in the above mentioned factual backdrop, the present petitions came to be preferred. 13. Vide order dated 19.12.2018 in the instant petition bearing S.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 462/2018 passed by this Court, the respondents were directed not to take any coercive action against the petitioner-Sky Light. The said order was modified vide order dated 21.01.2019 passed by this Court, directing the petitioner to appear before the respondent authorities, for the purpose of the necessary investigation, as required under the PML Act; the partners were however, granted protection from arrest. The said order was modified vide order dated 21.01.2019 passed by this Court, directing the petitioner to appear before the respondent authorities, for the purpose of the necessary investigation, as required under the PML Act; the partners were however, granted protection from arrest. 13.1 Vide order dated 21.02.2018 in the instant petition bearing S.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 18/2018 passed by this Court, the petitioner was directed to appear before the respondent authorities, and cooperate with the concerned investigating agency, while also directing that no coercive action be taken against him; the same interim protection is still in vogue. 13.2 That on 09.12.2020, an application for custodial interrogation was preferred in S.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 462/2018, alleging that the petitioner-Mahesh Nagar at the time of recording of statements under Section 50 of the PML Act. A similar application was also preferred by the respondents, in S.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 18/2018. 13.3 It was further submitted that the persons were arrayed as accused, namely Jai Prakash Bagrwa, Uma Charan, Mahaveer Prasad, Fakir Mohammed, Deepa Ram, Ranjeet Singh, Kishore Singh, Gugangar and Rajendra Kumar Shandilya and Madan Gopal, after prima facie finding them guilty of commission of predicate offences. That the a prosecution complaint, under Section 45 (1) of the PML Act, was filed against the said accused persons, and presented before the concerned Special Court; whereupon cognizance was taken by the concerned Court against them, and the trial against them is pending, at the stage of framing of charges. 13.4 It was also submitted that, with respect to the present petitioners, they were merely summoned by the respondents authorities with the intention to complete the investigation in question. 14. Learned A.S.G. stressed that the law as it stands today, in the form of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) the position is clear as crystal that a copy of the ECIR cannot be made available to the petitioners at the present stage and vehemently submitted that the offence of money laundering is an independent and standalone offence from that of a predicate/scheduled offence. Relevant portion of the said judgment, as relied upon, is reproduced hereunder:- “51. We may also note that argument that removing the necessity of projection from the definition will render the predicate offence and money-laundering indistinguishable. This, in our view, is ill founded and fallacious. Relevant portion of the said judgment, as relied upon, is reproduced hereunder:- “51. We may also note that argument that removing the necessity of projection from the definition will render the predicate offence and money-laundering indistinguishable. This, in our view, is ill founded and fallacious. This plea cannot hold water for the simple reason that the scheduled offences in the 2002 Act as it stands (amended upto date) are independent criminal acts. It is only when money is generated as a result of such acts that the 2002 Act steps in as soon as proceeds of crime are involved in any process or activity. Dealing with such proceeds of crime can be in any form - being process or activity. Thus, even assisting in the process or activity is a part of the crime of money-laundering. We must keep in mind that for being liable to suffer legal consequences of ones action of indulging in the process or activity, is sufficient and not only upon projection of the ill-gotten money as untainted money. Many members of a crime syndicate could then simply keep the money with them for years to come, the hands of the law in such a situation cannot be bound and stopped from proceeding against such person, if information of such illegitimate monies is revealed even from an unknown source. 52. The next question is: whether the offence under Section 3 is a standalone offence? Indeed, it is dependent on the wrongful and illegal gain of property as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. Nevertheless, it is concerning the process or activity connected with such property, which constitutes offence of money-laundering. The property must qualify the definition of “proceeds of crime” under Section 2(1)(u) of the 2002 Act. As observed earlier, all or whole of the crime property linked to scheduled offence need not be regarded as proceeds of crime, but all properties qualifying the definition of “proceeds of crime” under Section 2(1)(u) will necessarily be crime properties. The property must qualify the definition of “proceeds of crime” under Section 2(1)(u) of the 2002 Act. As observed earlier, all or whole of the crime property linked to scheduled offence need not be regarded as proceeds of crime, but all properties qualifying the definition of “proceeds of crime” under Section 2(1)(u) will necessarily be crime properties. Indeed, in the event of acquittal of the person concerned or being absolved from allegation of criminal activity relating to scheduled offence, and if it is established in the court of law that the crime property in the concerned case has been rightfully owned and possessed by him, such a property by no stretch of imagination can be termed as crime property and exconsequenti proceeds of crime within the meaning of Section 2(1)(u) as it stands today. On the other hand, in the trial in connection with the scheduled offence, the Court would be obliged to direct return of such property as belonging to him. It would be then paradoxical to still regard such property as proceeds of crime despite such adjudication by a Court of competent jurisdiction. It is well within the jurisdiction of the concerned Court trying the scheduled offence to pronounce on that matter.” 15. The learned A.S.G. also produced before this Court the supplementary charge-sheets, bearing Nos.76A and 77A, both dated 07.03.2017, filed in FIR Nos. 114/2015 and 115/2015, and submitted that the same clearly state that the investigation as under Section 173 (8) CrPC is being sought to be continued. 16. The learned A.S.G. also submitted that the concerned authorities of the C.B.I. have filed a chargesheet against the accused persons. It was further submitted that Ashok Kumar is a conduit in the conspiracy, also having being named in the aforementioned supplementary chargesheets and that his statements on the record reveal that he is a poor person incapable of purchasing the lands in question of his own accord. 17. The learned A.S.G. fairly admitted that Mahesh Nagar, had appeared before the concerned authorities of the Enforcement Directorate, but that the same was not satisfactory to conclude the investigation, and he was not cooperative and that further investigation was required in the said matter. 18. 17. The learned A.S.G. fairly admitted that Mahesh Nagar, had appeared before the concerned authorities of the Enforcement Directorate, but that the same was not satisfactory to conclude the investigation, and he was not cooperative and that further investigation was required in the said matter. 18. The learned A.S.G. sought to mete out the contentions made on behalf of the present petitioner, by making the following submissions:- 18.1 It was admitted, as contended on behalf of the petitioners that the present petitioners, are not accused of commission of any predicate offences yet. 18.2 It was further submitted that the charge-sheet in question was filed by another investigating agency, and that the offence of money laundering under the PML Act, is a standalone and independent offence. It was also submitted that it is not disputed that the inquiry conducted by the concerned police authorities of Rajasthan, whereby no offence(s) against them were found to be made out; however it was pointed out that the ECIR as drawn against them, which exists as on date, did not exist during that time. It was further submitted that the case with regard to the controversy in question was transferred from the Rajasthan Police to the C.B.I. and that the investigation in the same has not been completed yet. 18.3 On being asked by this Court, as to how multiple agencies could prosecute the petitioners, the learned A.S.G. stated that the F.I.R.s and the ECIR stood on a different footing, while the first was instigated by the concerned police authorities in the State, the latter was instituted by the E.D. Further reliance was placed on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Chowdhury (supra) which held that the PML Act cannot be classified as a penal statute. Relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced hereunder”- 1. “176. As per the procedure prescribed by the 1973 Code, the officer in-charge of a police station is under an obligation to record the information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, in terms of Section 154 of the 1973 Code. There is no corresponding provision in the 2002 Act requiring registration of offence of money laundering. As noticed earlier, the mechanism for proceeding against the property being proceeds of crime predicated in the 2002 Act is a sui generis procedure. There is no corresponding provision in the 2002 Act requiring registration of offence of money laundering. As noticed earlier, the mechanism for proceeding against the property being proceeds of crime predicated in the 2002 Act is a sui generis procedure. No comparison can be drawn between the mechanism regarding prevention, investigation or trial in connection with the scheduled offence governed by the provisions of the 1973 Code. In the scheme of 2002 Act upon identification of existence of property being proceeds of crime, the Authority under this Act is expected to inquire into relevant aspects in relation to such property and take measures as may be necessary and specified in the 2002 Act including to attach the property for being dealt with as per the provisions of the 2002 Act. We have elaborately adverted to the procedure to be followed by the authorities for such attachment of the property being proceeds of crime and the follow-up steps of confiscation upon confirmation of the provisional attachment order by the Adjudicating Authority. For facilitating the Adjudicating Authority to confirm the provisional attachment order and direct confiscation, the authorities under the 2002 Act (i.e., Section 48) are expected to make an inquiry and investigate. Incidentally, when sufficient credible information is gathered by the authorities during such inquiry/investigation indicative of involvement of any person in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime, it is open to such authorities to file a formal complaint before the Special Court naming the concerned person for offence of money-laundering under Section 3 of this Act. Considering the scheme of the 2002 Act, though the offence of money-laundering is otherwise regarded as cognizable offence (cognizance whereof can be taken only by the authorities referred to in Section 48 of this Act and not by jurisdictional police) and punishable under Section 4 of the 2002 Act, special complaint procedure is prescribed by law. This procedure overrides the procedure prescribed under 1973 Code to deal with other offences (other than money-laundering offences) in the matter of registration of offence and inquiry/investigation thereof. This special procedure must prevail in terms of Section 71 of the 2002 Act and also keeping in mind Section 65 of the same Act. In other words, the offence of money-laundering cannot be registered by the jurisdictional police who is governed by the regime under Chapter XII of the 1973 Code. This special procedure must prevail in terms of Section 71 of the 2002 Act and also keeping in mind Section 65 of the same Act. In other words, the offence of money-laundering cannot be registered by the jurisdictional police who is governed by the regime under Chapter XII of the 1973 Code. The provisions of Chapter XII of the 1973 Code do not apply in all respects to deal with information derived relating to commission of money-laundering offence much less investigation thereof. The dispensation regarding prevention of money-laundering, attachment of proceeds of crime and inquiry/investigation of offence of money-laundering upto filing of the complaint in respect of offence under Section 3 of the 2002 Act is fully governed by the provisions of the 2002 Act itself. To wit, regarding survey, searches, seizures, issuing summons, recording of statements of concerned persons and calling upon production of documents, inquiry/investigation, arrest of persons involved in the offence of money-laundering including bail and attachment, confiscation and vesting of property being proceeds of crime. Indeed, after arrest, the manner of dealing with such offender involved in offence of money-laundering would then be governed by the provisions of the 1973 Code -as there are no inconsistent provisions in the 2002 Act in regard to production of the arrested person before the jurisdictional Magistrate within twenty-four hours and also filing of the complaint before the Special Court within the statutory period prescribed in the 1973 Code for filing of police report, if not released on bail before expiry thereof. 2. 177. Suffice it to observe that being a special legislation providing for special mechanism regarding inquiry/investigation of offence of money-laundering, analogy cannot be drawn from the provisions of 1973 Code, in regard to registration of offence of money-laundering and more so being a complaint procedure prescribed under the 2002 Act. Further, the authorities referred to in Section 48 of the 2002 Act alone are competent to file such complaint. It is a different matter that the materials/evidence collected by the same authorities for the purpose of civil action of attachment of proceeds of crime and confiscation thereof may be used to prosecute the person involved in the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime for offence of money-laundering. It is a different matter that the materials/evidence collected by the same authorities for the purpose of civil action of attachment of proceeds of crime and confiscation thereof may be used to prosecute the person involved in the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime for offence of money-laundering. Considering the mechanism of inquiry/investigation for proceeding against the property (being proceeds of crime) under this Act by way of civil action (attachment and confiscation), there is no need to formally register an ECIR, unlike registration of an FIR by the jurisdictional police in respect of cognizable offence under the ordinary law. There is force in the stand taken by the ED that ECIR is an internal document created by the department before initiating penal action or prosecution against the person involved with process or activity connected with proceeds of crime. Thus, ECIR is not a statutory document, nor there is any provision in 2002 Act requiring Authority referred to in Section 48 to record ECIR or to furnish copy thereof to the accused unlike Section 154 of the 1973 Code. The fact that such ECIR has not been recorded, does not come in the way of the authorities referred to in Section 48 of the 2002 Act to commence inquiry/investigation for initiating civil action of attachment of property being proceeds of crime by following prescribed procedure in that regard. 3. 178. The next issue is: whether it is necessary to furnish copy of ECIR to the person concerned apprehending arrest or at least after his arrest? Section 19(1) of the 2002 Act postulates that after arrest, as soon as may be, the person should be informed about the grounds for such arrest. This stipulation is compliant with the mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution. Being a special legislation and considering the complexity of the inquiry/investigation both for the purposes of initiating civil action as well as prosecution, non-supply of ECIR in a given case cannot be faulted. The ECIR may contain details of the material in possession of the Authority and recording satisfaction of reason to believe that the person is guilty of money-laundering offence, if revealed before the inquiry/investigation required to proceed against the property being proceeds of crime including to the person involved in the process or activity connected therewith, may have deleterious impact on the final outcome of the inquiry/investigation. So long as the person has been informed about grounds of his arrest that is sufficient compliance of mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution. Moreover, the arrested person before being produced before the Special Court within twenty-four hours or for that purposes of remand on each occasion, the Court is free to look into the relevant records made available by the Authority about the involvement of the arrested person in the offence of money-laundering. In any case, upon filing of the complaint before the statutory period provided in 1973 Code, after arrest, the person would get all relevant materials forming part of the complaint filed by the Authority under Section 44(1)(b) of the 2002 Act before the Special Court. 179. Viewed thus, supply of ECIR in every case to person concerned is not mandatory. From the submissions made across the Bar, it is noticed that in some cases ED has furnished copy of ECIR to the person before filing of the complaint. That does not mean that in every case same procedure must be followed. It is enough, if ED at the time of arrest, contemporaneously discloses the grounds of such arrest to such person. Suffice it to observe that ECIR cannot be equated with an FIR which is mandatorily required to be recorded and supplied to the accused as per the provisions of 1973 Code. Revealing a copy of an ECIR, if made mandatory, may defeat the purpose sought to be achieved by the 2002 Act including frustrating the attachment of property (proceeds of crime). Non-supply of ECIR, which is essentially an internal document of ED, cannot be cited as violation of constitutional right. Concededly, the person arrested, in terms of Section 19 of the 2002 Act, is contemporaneously made aware about the grounds of his arrest. This is compliant with the mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution. It is not unknown that at times FIR does not reveal all aspects of the offence in question. In several cases, even the names of persons actually involved in the commission of offence are not mentioned in the FIR and described as unknown accused. Even, the particulars as unfolded are not fully recorded in the FIR. Despite that, the accused named in any ordinary offence is able to apply for anticipatory bail or regular bail, in which proceeding, the police papers are normally perused by the concerned Court. Even, the particulars as unfolded are not fully recorded in the FIR. Despite that, the accused named in any ordinary offence is able to apply for anticipatory bail or regular bail, in which proceeding, the police papers are normally perused by the concerned Court. On the same analogy, the argument of prejudice pressed into service by the petitioners for non-supply of ECIR deserves to be answered against the petitioners. For, the arrested person for offence of money-laundering is contemporaneously informed about the grounds of his arrest; and when produced before the Special Court, it is open to the Special Court to call upon the representative of ED to produce relevant record concerning the case of the accused before him and look into the same for answering the need for his continued detention. Taking any view of the matter, therefore, the argument under consideration does not take the matter any further.” 18.4 It was submitted that the ECIR is akin to a fact finding report generated as an internal document, and upon the basis of which the investigation is conducted by the officials of the E.D. And that if the offences are found to be made out against the accused then the prosecution complaint is filed. It was also submitted that the copy of the E.C.I.R. is produced given to the accused persons only after the same is produced before the concerned Special Court and the concerned Court takes cognizance against the accused, but not a stage prior to that. 18.5 And that, with respect to the accused persons, as above mentioned, they were supplied copies of the ECIR therein, at the stage wherein cognizance, vide order dated 26.10.2018, was taken against them by the concerned Special Court. And that, should such a stage arise in the present case, that such request for a copy of the ECIR would be valid, but certainly not at the present stage. 18.6 Learned A.S.G. also sought to draw a clear distinction between the present case and the precedent law of Harish Fabiani & Ors. (supra) as cited on behalf of the petitioners, and submitted that in the said case the FIR therein had already been quashed, upon the basis of which the ECIR therein was quashed; which is not the position in the instant case. (supra) as cited on behalf of the petitioners, and submitted that in the said case the FIR therein had already been quashed, upon the basis of which the ECIR therein was quashed; which is not the position in the instant case. 18.7 It was also submitted that under Section 44 of the PML Act, offence(s) of money laundering under Section 3/4 of the PML Act, and the trial for scheduled/predicate offence(s) are not tried jointly, but simultaneously, even though the same Court will try the person(s). For the sake of brevity, the said Section is reproduced hereunder:- 44. Offences triable by Special Courts.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),- (a) an offence punishable under section 4 and any scheduled offence connected to the offence under that section shall be triable by the Special Court constituted for the area in which the offence has been committed: Provided that the Special Court, trying a scheduled offence before the commencement of this Act, shall continue to try such scheduled offence; or; (b) a Special Court may, 2 *** upon a complaint made by an authority authorised in this behalf under this Act take 3 [cognizance of offence under section 3, without the accused being committed to it for trial]; Provided that after conclusion of investigation, if no offence of money-laundering is made out requiring filing of such complaint, the said authority shall submit a closure report before the Special Court; or] (c) if the court which has taken cognizance of the scheduled offence is other than the Special Court which has taken cognizance of the complaint of the offence of money-laundering under sub-clause (b), it shall, on an application by the authority authorised to file a complaint under this Act, commit the case relating to the scheduled offence to the Special Court and the Special Court shall, on receipt of such case proceed to deal with it from the stage at which it is committed. (d) a Special Court while trying the scheduled offence or the offence of money-laundering shall hold trial in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(2 of 1974) as it applies to a trial before a Court of Session.] Explanation.-For the removal of doubts, it is clarified that,- (i) the jurisdiction of the Special Court while dealing with the offence under this Act, during investigation, enquiry or trial under this Act, shall not be dependent upon any orders passed in respect of the scheduled offence, and the trial of both sets of offences by the same court shall not be construed as joint trial; (ii) the complaint shall be deemed to include any subsequent complaint in respect of further investigation that may be conducted to bring any further evidence, oral or documentary, against any accused person involved in respect of the offence, for which complaint has already been filed, whether named in the original complaint or not. (2) Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to affect the special powers of the High Court regarding bail under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and the High Court may exercise such powers including the power under clause (b) of subsection (1) of that section as if the reference to “Magistrate” in that section includes also a reference to a “Special Court” designated under section 43. 19. It was further submitted that the present petitions are misconceived, as on date, only summons under Section 50 of the PML Act, have been issued to the petitioners and it was argued that the petitioners have approached this Court at a premature stage. With respect to the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners, that the summons issued by the respondents herein is time barred and has gone beyond the prescribed statutory time period, that of 90 days (which was the statutory prescription then, which was only subsequently amended to be 365 days), the learned A.S.G. vehemently argued that such arguments were baseless and without merit, as under the PML Act, there are two types of proceedings, civil; with respect to the attachment proceedings wherein certain statutory time limitations are placed, and criminal; upon which Chapter III of the PML Act has no bearing and as such no statutory time limits are placed upon criminal proceedings. Reliance in this regard was placed upon the judgment rendered in the case of Kavitha G. Pillai v. The Joint Director (M.F.A. No. 11/2016) decided by the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala on 26.07.2017. Relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced hereunder:- “59. Another adjudicatory safeguard commanding attention is that any ambiguity in the penal provisions should be resolved in favour of the accused, for his life, liberty, and reputation are at stake. And the penal provisions must be construed strictly, too. The question here is whether the attachment and the forfeiture under Sections 5 and 8 are civil or criminal proceedings. As we shall see, they are civil : the Adjudicatory Authority's conclusions do not prove the guilt of an accused, nor are they a step-in-aid to the accused's conviction. The conviction depends on the prosecution's proving the predicate offence-attachment or no attachment.” 20. The learned A.S.G. also submitted that reliance was incorrectly placed upon the judgments rendered in the cases of Mahanivesh Oils & Foods Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and Obulapuram Mining Company (supra), as the same was no longer good law. 21. The learned A.S.G. also submitted that the argument advanced in passing, on behalf of the petitioners, that the E.D. did not have jurisdiction, is also without merit as a representation was ordered to be given to the respondents by this Court and the petitioners on complying with the same were duly served a reply to the same, wherein it was clearly notified to them that the E.D. has pan India jurisdiction. 22. It was also submitted that the learned Senior Counsel erred in highlighting only Paragraph 33 of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), as the judgment ought to read in its entirety and appreciated in toto. 23. It was further submitted that the present petitioners have only approached the Court for orders of ‘no coercive action’ and that the High Courts in their jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are not the appropriate forums for the same. Reliance in this regard was placed upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (Criminal Appeal No. 330/2021) decided on 3.04.2021 and the case of Dr. Anand Rai Vs. State of M.P. & Anr. Reliance in this regard was placed upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (Criminal Appeal No. 330/2021) decided on 3.04.2021 and the case of Dr. Anand Rai Vs. State of M.P. & Anr. (Writ Petition No. 7744/2022) decided on 04.04.2022 by the Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh. Relevant portions of the said judgments, as relied upon, are reproduced hereunder:- In Dr. Anand Rai (supra):- “5. Placing reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra and others reported in 2021 SCC Online SC 315, wherein after detailed analysis the Hon'ble Supreme Court has framed certain guidelines and conclusions for consideration of the matters by all the High Courts in the country that what steps are to be taken while considering the applications for quashment of FIR under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is argued that the powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the First Information Report is to be exercised in a very sparing manner and is not to be used to choke or smother the prosecution that is legitimate. Placing reliance upon the judgment in the case of State of Telangana Vs. Habib Abdullah Jeelani reported in (2017) 2 SCC 779 , it is submitted that the counsel appearing for the State was not even supplied with the copy of the petition then also an order not to take any coercive steps against the petitioner was passed by this Court. It is argued that within three days of registration of an FIR, the writ petition was filed. Notices under Section 91 of Cr.P.C. dated 28.03.2022 and 30.03.2022 were issued to the petitioner for appearance along with all the relevant documents with respect to the aforesaid complaint for carrying out the proper investigation, but the petitioner has not complied with aforesaid notices and has chosen to file a present petition before this Court. He has not appeared before the authorities at any point of time. He has not appeared before the authorities at any point of time. Thus, on one hand the petitioner is not cooperating with the investigation and on the other hand, he has filed a petition directly before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for quashment of FIR being not maintainable. 6. It is submitted that various High Courts have gone to the extent that the proceedings for quashment of the FIR should be exercised sparingly and in the rare cases. The investigation which is to be carried out by the Authority generally should not be interfered. In the case of State of Tamilnadu Vs. S. Martin reported in (2018) 5 SCC 718 , it was held that during investigation the High Court ought not to have interfered in investigation and investigating agency ought to have been permitted to continue the investigation and come to a logical conclusion. It is argued that the investigation is yet to be carried out and it cannot be said at this stage whether the State Authorities are filing a charge sheet against the petitioner or filing a closure report looking to the contents of the complaint made by the respondent No.2 in the FIR. He has further placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in Nivedita Sharma Vs. Cellular Operators Association of India reported in (2011) 14 SCC 337, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the party must exhaust statutory remedy available under the law before resorting to writ jurisdiction for a relief. The petitioner is having statutory remedy available under Section 438 of Cr.P.C. seeking an anticipatory bail, but instead of the same he has directly filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The provision of Section 482 of Cr.P.C. being inherent in nature are available to the petitioner seeking quashment of an FIR, but bypassing the legal statutory provisions which are available to the petitioner, the petitioner has directly filed a writ petition before this Court which is itself is not maintainable. It is further submitted that the case of the petitioner does not fall under the category of guidelines framed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana Vs. It is further submitted that the case of the petitioner does not fall under the category of guidelines framed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that power of quashing criminal proceedings should be exercised sparingly and with circumspection that too in rare of the rarest cases. In such circumstances no case for interference is made out in the present writ petition. 17. The aforesaid aspect was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Neeharika Infrastructure (supra) wherein after a detailed analysis of various provisions of criminal law and various judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court has drawn conclusion in para 80 of the judgment which reads as under:- “80. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, our final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether the High Court would be justified in passing an interim order of stay of investigation and/ or “no coercive steps to be adopted”, during the pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in what circumstances and whether the High Court would be justified in passing the order of not to arrest the accused or “no coercive steps to be adopted” during the investigation or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under: i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence; ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences; iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on; iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ‘rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty). v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint; vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage; vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule; viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere; ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping; x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences; xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice; xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure; xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court; xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint; xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR; xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted” and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/ or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/ or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order. xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by “no coercive steps to be adopted” as the term “no coercive steps to be adopted” can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied.” 18. It is seen that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case has gone to an extent that no such orders not to arrest or no coercive steps either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed or till the final report or charge sheet is being filed under Section 173(3) of Cr.P.C. while dismissing or disposing of the quashing of petition shall be passed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further observed that even in a case where the High Court is prima face of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation after considering the broad para meters then also the reasons are required to be recorded while passing an interim order so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the learned Court. It is seen from the order dated 01.04.2022 that an order has been passed not to take any coercive action against the petitioner but no reasons have been assigned in the impugned order. It is seen from the order dated 01.04.2022 that an order has been passed not to take any coercive action against the petitioner but no reasons have been assigned in the impugned order. Even in the contention of the learned Solicitor General and learned Advocate General of the State of Madhya Pradesh, it is pointed out that copy of the petition along with annexrues are not even supplied to them to argue on the issue and they have only prayed for an adjournment on that date but the Court has passed an interim order in the matter. In such circumstances, when clearly a case of cognizable offence is made out no such blanket orders can be passed. The authorities are required to complete an investigation into the matter and person showing himself to be an innocent person can take a recourse under the relevant provisions of criminal law that is under Section 438 of Cr.P.C. for seeking an anticipatory bail in the matter. 20. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Nivedita Sharma (supra) has held that "where hierarchy of appeals was provided by the statute, a party must exhaust the statutory remedies before resorting to writ jurisdiction for relief, but inspite of having alternative remedy the writ petition has been preferred seeking multiple reliefs, therefore, the petition was not entertained being devoid of merits is not maintainable and is dismissed.” In the present case, without exhausting the remedy of seeking anticipatory bail under Section 438 of Cr.P.C. or approaching this Court by way of filing a petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. petition seeking quashment of an FIR or a criminal proceedings, he has taken a recourse to file a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 21. Looking to the contents of the FIR, a prima facie case is made out against the petitioner, which requires a detailed investigation to be carried out by the Authorities. In such circumstances, the case does not fall under the category of rarest of the rare cases, therefore, the relief praying for quashment of FIR and for interim relief not to take any coercive action, without adhering to the statutory provisions of criminal jurisprudence, this relief cannot be extended to the petitioner.” 24. In such circumstances, the case does not fall under the category of rarest of the rare cases, therefore, the relief praying for quashment of FIR and for interim relief not to take any coercive action, without adhering to the statutory provisions of criminal jurisprudence, this relief cannot be extended to the petitioner.” 24. It was further submitted that no writ petition can lie against a summons, reliance was placed upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of Customs, Calcutta & Ors. Vs. M.M. Exports & Anr. (Civil Appeals Nos. 82-83/2002) decided on 01.03.2007. Relevant portion of the said judgment, as relied upon, is reproduced hereunder:- “1. By consent the impugned order is set aside. However, we wish to make it clear that as far as possible the High Court should not interfere at the stage when the Department has issued the summons. This is not one of those exceptional cases where the High Court should have interfered at the stage of issuance of the summons. It may be mentioned that all other questions on merits are expressly kept open. We have not examined the merits of the case. The Department is entitled to proceed in accordance with law. The appeals are accordingly disposed of.” 25. It was further submitted that while the sale of the lands in question, to the petitioner-Sky Light, was made on 04.01.2010, the cheque in question is issued by Robert Vadra, partner of petitioner-Sky Light, as consideration against the same bears date 31.12.2009. It was thus submitted that the said cheque predates the execution of the POA, which reveals that the transactions in question pertaining to the lands in question are fictitious, false and fabricated, only carried out with the intention to create a paper trail. 26. In this regard, the learned A.S.G. drew the attention of this Court to the statements of Rajendra Kumar, which were recorded by the concerned authorities of the Enforcement Directorate under Section 50 of the PML Act, wherein he stated that he did not sign any POA nor was aware of anything of the sort. It was also contended to be admissible in evidence as officials of the Enforcement Directorate are not ‘police officers’ and would therefore not be hit by the bar contained in Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 27. It was also contended to be admissible in evidence as officials of the Enforcement Directorate are not ‘police officers’ and would therefore not be hit by the bar contained in Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 27. It was also submitted that the statements, recorded by the concerned officials of the E.D. under Section 50 of the Act of 2002, petitioner-Mahesh Nagar stated that he acted on the behalf of instructions received from Robert Vadra, and also stated that he is in his employment. 28. It was also contended that the argument raised on behalf of the petitioners, that the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Tofan Singh v. The State Of Tamil Nadu (Criminal Appeal No.152/2013) decided on 29.10.2020, has been categorically dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra). 29. In this regard, it was further submitted that in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), it has been clearly held that Toofan Singh (supra) dealt with offences under the NDPS Act, 1985 whereas under the PML Act, officials of the E.D. are not ‘police officers’. It was also submitted that an exception was carved out by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Tofan Singh (supra). Relevant portion of the said judgment as relied upon is reproduced as hereunder:- “168. The petitioners, however, have pressed into service exposition of this Court in the recent decision in Tofan Singh, which had occasion to deal with the provisions of the NDPS Act wherein the Court held that the designated officer under that Act must be regarded as a police officer. The Court opined that the statement made before him would be violative of protection guaranteed under Article 20(3) of the Constitution. This decision has been rightly distinguished by the learned Additional Solicitor General on the argument that the conclusion reached in that judgment is on the basis of the legislative scheme of the NDPS Act, which permitted that interpretation. However, it is not possible to reach at the same conclusion in respect of the 2002 Act for more than one reason. In this decision, the Court first noted that the Act (NDPS Act) under consideration was a penal statute. In the case of 2002 Act, however, such a view is not possible. However, it is not possible to reach at the same conclusion in respect of the 2002 Act for more than one reason. In this decision, the Court first noted that the Act (NDPS Act) under consideration was a penal statute. In the case of 2002 Act, however, such a view is not possible. The second aspect which we have repeatedly adverted to, is the special purposes and objects behind the enactment of the 2002 Act. As per the provisions of the NDPS Act, it permitted both a regular police officer as well as a designated officer, who is not a defined police officer, to investigate the offence under that Act. This has resulted in discrimination. Such a situation does not emerge from the provisions of the 2002 Act. The 2002 Act, on the other hand, authorises only the authorities referred to in Section 48 to investigate/ inquire into the matters under the Act in the manner prescribed therein. The provision inserted in 2005 as Section 45(1A) is not to empower the regular police officers to take cognizance of the offence. On the other hand, it is a provision to declare that the regular police officer is not competent to take cognizance of offence of money-laundering, as it can be investigated only by the authorities referred to in Section 48 of the 2002 Act. The third aspect which had weighed with the Court in Tofan Singh is that the police officer investigating an offence under the NDPS Act, the provisions of Sections 161 to 164 of the 1973 Code as also Section 25 of the Evidence Act, would come into play making the statement made before them by the accused as inadmissible. Whereas, the investigation into the same offence was to be done by the designated officer under the NDPS Act, the safeguards contained in Sections 161 to 164 of the 1973 Code and Section 25 of the Evidence Act, will have no application and the statement made before them would be inadmissible in evidence. This had resulted in discrimination. No such situation emerges from the provisions of the 2002 Act. Whereas, the 2002 Act clearly authorises only the authorities under the 2002 Act referred to in Section 48 to step in and summon the person when occasion arises and proceed to record the statement and take relevant documents on record. This had resulted in discrimination. No such situation emerges from the provisions of the 2002 Act. Whereas, the 2002 Act clearly authorises only the authorities under the 2002 Act referred to in Section 48 to step in and summon the person when occasion arises and proceed to record the statement and take relevant documents on record. For that, express provision has been made authorising them to do so and by a legal fiction, deemed it to be a statement recorded in a judicial proceeding by virtue of Section 50(4) of the 2002 Act. A regular police officer will neither be in a position to take cognizance of the offence of money-laundering, much less be permitted to record the statement which is to be made part of the proceeding before the Adjudicating Authority under the 2002 Act for confirmation of the provisional attachment order and confiscation of the proceeds of crime for eventual vesting in the Central Government. That may entail in civil consequences. It is a different matter that some material or evidence is made part of the complaint if required to be filed against the person involved in the process or activity connected with money laundering so as to prosecute him for offence punishable under Section 3 of the 2002 Act. The next point which has been reckoned by this Court in the said decision is that in the provisions of NDPS Act, upon culmination of investigation of crime by a designated officer under that Act (other than a Police Officer), he proceeds to file a complaint; but has no authority to further investigate the offence, if required. Whereas, if the same offence was investigated by a regular Police Officer after filing of the police report under Section 173(2) of the 1973 Code, he could still do further investigation by invoking Section 173(8) of the 1973 Code. This, on the face of it, was discriminatory.” 30. It was vehemently submitted that all of the financial transactions with respect to the lands in question is a fabrication, and that it a conspiracy to launder money. This, on the face of it, was discriminatory.” 30. It was vehemently submitted that all of the financial transactions with respect to the lands in question is a fabrication, and that it a conspiracy to launder money. It was further submitted that the same is clear as Kishore Singh S/o Ram Singh is a witness to the POA, with respect to the transaction of land of 50 bighas (12.65 hectares), executed by Rajendra Kumar in favour of Ashok Kumar; while Rajendra Kumar is a witness to the POA executed, with respect to the transaction of land of 75 bighas (18.96 hectres), by Kishore Singh in favour of Ashok Kumar. 31. The learned A.S.G. in support of his submissions also placed reliance upon the following judgments; 31.1 Shyam Sunder Singhvi v. Union of India (S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 273/2019) with connected matters; passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court on 24.01.2020. Relevant portion of the said judgment, as relied upon, is reproduced hereunder:- “44. The submission of learned Senior Advocate Mr.Rajendra Prasad that the petitioner Tamanna Begum cannot be punished for the scheduled offences and as such she cannot be made accused under the provisions of PML, 2002 and her no activity can become an offence either under the PML, 2002 or under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, this court finds that for the purpose of Sections 3 and 4 of the PML, 2002, a person accused under the PML, 2002 may not have committed the scheduled offence and such person can be prosecuted for the offence of money laundering even if such person is not guilty of the scheduled offences. 47. This court finds that position of law which emerges is that offence of money laundering under Section 3 of the PML, 2002 is an independent offence and money laundering is a stand alone offence under the PML, 2002.” 31.2 Anandrao Vithoba Adsul. Vs. Enforcement Directorate, Government of India & Anr. (Criminal Writ Petition No. 3418/2021), decided on 14.10.2021 by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court. Relevant portion of the same is reproduced hereunder:- “18. The prayer by the Petitioner that Respondent No.1 be restrained from taking the Petitioner in custody is nothing but prayer for a grant of anticipatory bail. Vs. Enforcement Directorate, Government of India & Anr. (Criminal Writ Petition No. 3418/2021), decided on 14.10.2021 by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court. Relevant portion of the same is reproduced hereunder:- “18. The prayer by the Petitioner that Respondent No.1 be restrained from taking the Petitioner in custody is nothing but prayer for a grant of anticipatory bail. The contention of the Petitioner that without having copies of the ECIRs, the Petitioner cannot approach the competent court with a prayer for anticipatory bail under section 438 of Cr.P.C. is misplaced. The Petitioner apprehends his arrest, and section 438 of Cr.P.C. provides a statutory remedy for such a contingency. In the case of Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt.Ltd., the Apex Court has observed that when the entire material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing any interim order not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted” and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under section 438 of CrP.C. to the competent court. At this stage, we refer to the argument mentioned earlier that Respondent No.1 demonstrated what material is against the Petitioner since the Petitioner is the one who has filed the FIR regarding predicate offence. The learned ASG has shown the file containing the statements recorded in furtherance of ECIRs. Considering that the Petitioner has a statutory remedy under section 438 of Cr.P.C. and any observation by us on the merits of the matter against the Petitioner will prejudice the Petitioner in case the Petitioner approaches the competent court for anticipatory bail; we refrain from elaborating the same in this order. However, since this point was argued before us, all we state is that it cannot be said that there is no material against the Petitioner. Furthermore, having concluded after examining the facts that exercise of jurisdiction under section 226 of the Constitution of India and 482 of Cr. P.C is not warranted. There is no question of granting any such relief as sought for by the Petitioner as it would be contrary to the observations made by the Supreme Court in paragraph 23(xvi) of the decision in the case of M/s.Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt.Ltd. 19. P.C is not warranted. There is no question of granting any such relief as sought for by the Petitioner as it would be contrary to the observations made by the Supreme Court in paragraph 23(xvi) of the decision in the case of M/s.Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt.Ltd. 19. To conclude, therefore, having considered the grounds urged by the Petitioner in the invocation of 226 of the Constitution and 482 of Cr.P.C., we do not find that the Petitioner has failed to make out a case for interference. As regards the protection from arrest is concerned, the Petitioner has a remedy under the Cr.P.C. In these circumstances, the Writ Petition is rejected. 20. Needless to state that if the Petitioner approaches the competent court under section 438 of Cr.P.C., the court will decide the matter on its own merits and in accordance with the law.” 31.3 P.Rajendran Vs. The Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement (Criminal Original Petition No.19880 of 2022) and connected matters; decided on 14.09.2022 by the Hon’ble High Court of Madras. Relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced hereunder:- “9. Mr.Sharath Chandran, learned counsel, contended that when the accused in the predicate offence is discharged, acquitted or the proceedings against him are quashed, the prosecution under the PML cannot be maintained, which means that if a person is not prosecuted in the predicate offence, his position being far better than the former, cannot be prosecuted under the PML. 10. At the first blush, this argument did appear convincing. However, the fallacy in the aforesaid submission was highlighted by Mr.N.Ramesh, learned Special Public Prosecutor [ED], who brought to our notice that paragraph Nos.253 and 467(d) of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal's case [supra] deal with only the cases of persons named as accused in the predicate offence against whom the prosecution in the predicate offence is quashed or he is discharged/acquitted. This benefit cannot be extended to a person, who has not been arrayed as an accused in the predicate offence because the offence under the PML is a stand alone offence and is different and distinct from the predicate offence. 11. This benefit cannot be extended to a person, who has not been arrayed as an accused in the predicate offence because the offence under the PML is a stand alone offence and is different and distinct from the predicate offence. 11. Learned Special Public Prosecutor submitted that for generating "proceeds of crime", a "scheduled offence" must have been committed, after the commission of the scheduled offence and generation of proceeds of crime, different persons can join the main accused either as abettors or conspirators for committing the offence of money laundering by helping him in laundering the proceeds of crime; such persons may not be involved in the original criminal activity that had resulted in the generation of "proceeds of crime", therefore, just because they were not prosecuted for the predicate offence, their prosecution for money laundering cannot be said to be illegal. There appears to be much force in the aforesaid submission, especially, in the light of paragraph 271 of the judgment in Vijay Madanlal's case [supra], which is extracted below: "271. As mentioned earlier, the rudimentary understanding of ‘money-laundering’ is that there are three generally accepted stages to money-laundering, they are: (a) Placement : which is to move the funds from direct association of the crime. (b) Layering : which is disguising the trail to foil pursuit. (c) Integration : which is making the money available to the criminal from what seem to be legitimate sources." 32. In his rejoinder arguments, Mr. Vikas Balia, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner-Mahesh Nagar submitted that the offence of money laundering, as contended by the learned A.S.G. to be a standalone and independent offence has been incorrectly placed before this Court. It was submitted that the offence of money laundering is always dependent on predicate offence(s) and that the PML Act envisages that only once predicate offence(s) is/are established then can the trial be separated, and may be seen independently for he said purpose alone. 33. Arguendo, it was submitted that there may be certain issues/defences available to the accused with respect to predicate offence(s) which may not be applicable/available to offence(s) of money laundering, and the differentiation and separation between predicate offence(s) and money laundering offence(s) is to be taken at such stage once predicate offence(s) is/are established against the accused, and not at any stage before that. 34. 34. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that it was contended by the learned A.S.G. that the judgment rendered in the case of Harish Fabiani (supra), as relied upon on behalf of the petitioners, is distinguished from the factual matrix of the present case as in that case the FIR impugned therein had already been quashed; he submitted that keeping the same analogy in mind, there must be no ECIR if there no FIR for a predicate offence(s) against any person. 35. It was further submitted that looking into Section 3 of the PML Act, it a clear departure from such jurisprudence that has evolved around fiscal and taxation statutes; that the element of mens rea is of no consequence, and that in the lack of the same the accused may be prosecuted and penalty be automatically levied. However, he sought to distinguish the PML Act from the same by stressing upon the fact that the words, ‘knowingly assists or knowingly is’ which have been inserted into the Statute by the Union Legislature, which, he submitted to be a clear departure from the jurisprudence as aforementioned. And that, in the present case, such mens rea or consensus ad idem is absent and has not been attributed to the petitioners by the respondent authorities. In order to fortify such submission, he submitted that had it been the case, the charge for the offence under 120-B IPC would have been levelled against the petitioner, which is not the case herein. 3. Offence of money-laundering.-Whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the 1[proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming] it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering. 36. Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that if the person(s) are finally acquitted of the charge for the offence(s) under the PML Act, what would be the effect on the property so attached under the PML Act. 36.1 He further stated that cooperation cannot be connoted to have an ambit as wide as has been argued on behalf of the respondents, and that just because the present petitioners did not confess or admit to wrongdoing; the same cannot amount to non cooperation. 36.1 He further stated that cooperation cannot be connoted to have an ambit as wide as has been argued on behalf of the respondents, and that just because the present petitioners did not confess or admit to wrongdoing; the same cannot amount to non cooperation. Taking a step further, it was further argued that if the petitioner(s) did not know the answer to a particular question, then an answer stating that he/she/they does/do not know, cannot be construed as non-cooperation. That, whatever the outcome of such interrogation, the investigating agency i.e. the Enforcement Directorate ought to either proceed with the investigation to the next logical step, or stop and refrain from issuing unwarranted summons to the petitioners and harassing them. While all the respondent-Enforcement Directorate has done is to keep the case at the stage of investigation, as it has remained for the past 7 odd years. 36.2 It was also submitted that the onus of proof of the twin conditions of bail as laid down in the case of Nikesh Tarachand (supra) cannot be applied mutatis mutandis to prosecuting the petitioners. 36.3 Pointing to the language used in the judgment rendered in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), it was argued that there is no absolute bar on providing a copy of the ECIR to person(s), situated as the present petitioners. Going a step further, learned counsel argued that for any kind of criminal action instituted against a person(s), a copy of the ECIR ought to be given. And, a reasoning that the ECIR is merely an internal document for the purposes of record, relating to a stage prior to that stage of investigation, as submitted by the counsel for the respondents in the reply so filed by them; reveals that they are bound to provide such person(s) with a copy of the ECIR when the stage of investigation has been crossed, as in the present case, and that confidentiality cannot be a valid ground for denial of the same. 36.4 It was also argued that if such copy of ECIR is not provided, then such person(s) cannot avail of their right to seek anticipatory bail, and that of the two review petitions pending before the Hon’ble Apex Court, one petition speaks to such anomaly, which has risen as a consequence of the judgment rendered in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), as essentially the non-providing of a copy of the ECIR would be tantamount to the taking away the right to anticipatory bail of person(s), directly weakening and hitting the fundamental liberties of individual(s). 36.5 Learned Senior Counsel drew the attention of this Court to the Paragraph 187 of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) the same is reproduced hereunder:- “CONCLUSION 187. In light of the above analysis, we now proceed to summarise our conclusion on seminal points in issue in the following terms: - (xviii) (a) In view of special mechanism envisaged by the 2002 Act, ECIR cannot be equated with an FIR under the 1973 Code. ECIR is an internal document of the ED and the fact that FIR in respect of scheduled offence has not been recorded does not come in the way of the Authorities referred to in Section 48 to commence inquiry/investigation for initiating “civil action” of “provisional attachment” of property being proceeds of crime. (b) Supply of a copy of ECIR in every case to the person concerned is not mandatory, it is enough if ED at the time of arrest, discloses the grounds of such arrest. (c) However, when the arrested person is produced before the Special Court, it is open to the Special Court to look into the relevant records presented by the authorised representative of ED for answering the issue of need for his/ her continued detention in connection with the offence of money-laundering. 37. In his rejoinder, learned ASG further clarified that the stand of the respondents is not that the present petitioners are not named as accused, but that the investigation with regard to their involvement in the crime in question is under contemplation. 37.1 The learned ASG again drew the attention of this Court to Section 3 of the PML Act and stated that the element of mens rea, as contended on behalf of petitioner-Mahesh Nagar to be an essential element for the offence under the said Section to be made out, is a fallacious argument. 37.1 The learned ASG again drew the attention of this Court to Section 3 of the PML Act and stated that the element of mens rea, as contended on behalf of petitioner-Mahesh Nagar to be an essential element for the offence under the said Section to be made out, is a fallacious argument. As per Mr. Rastogi, a bare perusal of the said Section 3 of the PML Act would reveal, that mens rea is not an element absolutely essential for the offence of money laundering to be made out. Relevant portion of the said Section as emphasized upon, is again reproduced as hereunder, for ready reference: 3. Offence of money-laundering.-Whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering. Explanation.-For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that,-- (i) a person shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering if such person is found to have directly or indirectly attempted to indulge or knowingly assisted or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in one or more of the following processes or activities connected with proceeds of crime, namely:-- (a) concealment; or (b) possession; or (c) acquisition; or (d) use; or (e) projecting as untainted property; or (f) claiming as untainted property, in any manner whatsoever; (ii) the process or activity connected with proceeds of crime is a continuing activity and continues till such time a person is directly or indirectly enjoying the proceeds of crime by its concealment or possession or acquisition or use or projecting it as untainted property or claiming it as untainted property in any manner whatsoever. 38. Dr. Shamsuddin, learned counsel also appearing for petitioner-Sky Light, interjected and submitted that the above-referred explanation to Section 3, came into effect only on 01.08.2019, while the ECIR in question was recorded much prior thereto, i.e. in the year 2015. 38.1 He also submitted that the judgments rendered; by the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in case of Mahanivesh Oils & Foods Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and by the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka in the case of Obulapuram Mining Company (supra), were not overruled. 39. 38.1 He also submitted that the judgments rendered; by the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in case of Mahanivesh Oils & Foods Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and by the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka in the case of Obulapuram Mining Company (supra), were not overruled. 39. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the record of the case, alongwith the judgments cited at the Bar. 40. At the outset, this Court observes that the judgment as rendered in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) has not been stayed, holds the field as on today and is a complete law binding on all the Courts in the country, and thus in the interest of judicial discipline no deviation from the same can be made owing to mere pendency of the review petitions filed against the said judgment, more particularly when the said precedent law has already laid down exhaustive directions. 41. This Court further observes that the present petitions have been preferred with the prayer that the ECIR in question be brought on the record, and the same, alongwith all the proceedings emanating therefrom, be quashed qua the present petitioners, and, pending consideration of the present petitions, no coercive action shall be taken against petitioner-Mahesh Nagar, in pursuance of the ECIR in question. 42. This Court observes that two issues arise for the consideration in the present petitions; 42.1 Whether the copy of the ECIR in question may be given to the petitioners, 42.2 Whether the ECIR in question may be quashed and if so, on what grounds. 43. This Court observes that with regard to the first issue, the law has been crystallized in the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) and therefore is no more res integra. Relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced hereunder:- “177. Thus, ECIR is not a statutory document, nor there is any provision in 2002 Act requiring Authority referred to in Section 48 to record ECIR or to furnish copy thereof to the accused unlike Section 154 of the 1973 Code. 179. … Suffice it to observe that ECIR cannot be equated with an FIR which is mandatorily required to be recorded and supplied to the accused as per the provisions of 1973 Code. … CONCLUSION 187. 179. … Suffice it to observe that ECIR cannot be equated with an FIR which is mandatorily required to be recorded and supplied to the accused as per the provisions of 1973 Code. … CONCLUSION 187. In light of the above analysis, we now proceed to summarise our conclusion on seminal points in issue in the following terms: - (xviii) (a) In view of special mechanism envisaged by the 2002 Act, ECIR cannot be equated with an FIR under the 1973 Code. … (b) Supply of a copy of ECIR in every case to the person concerned is not mandatory, it is enough if ED at the time of arrest, discloses the grounds of such arrest.” 43.1 This Court therefore observes that it is at the discretion of the Enforcement Directorate whether to give a copy of the ECIR to persons seeking the same. The copy of the ECIR in question thus cannot be given to the petitioners. The first issue thus stands answered in the aforesaid terms. 44. This Court deems it appropriate to make the following observations with respect to the factual matrix of the instant case, before moving onto the second issue; 44.1 While the present petitioners have not been named as accused or witnesses in the FIRs registered for predicate offences against the accused persons; namely Jai Prakash Bagrwa, Uma Charan, Mahaveer Prasad, Fakir Mohammed, Deepa Ram, Ranjeet Singh, Kishore Singh, Gugangar and Rajendra Kumar Shandilya and Madan Gopal, and in the charge-sheets so filed, as was contended on behalf of the petitioners, a perusal of the supplementary chargesheets bearing Nos.76A and 77A, both dated 07.03.2017, filed in FIR Nos. 114/2015 and 114/2015, mention that the permission was sought to continue with the investigation as under Section 173 (8) Cr.P.C. against the present petitioners. 114/2015 and 114/2015, mention that the permission was sought to continue with the investigation as under Section 173 (8) Cr.P.C. against the present petitioners. Relevant portion of the same is reproduced as hereunder: Supplementary Charge-sheet No.76A: ^^---v'kksd dqekj ds fo:) vkjksi i= varxZr /kkjk 299 lhvkjihlh es is'k djus ,oa eSllZ LdkbZykbV gksLihVhfyVh izk-fy o vU; ds fo:) vUos”k.k varxZr /kkjk 173¼8½ lhvkjihlh esa tkjh j[kus ds vkns'k izkIr fd;sA^^ Supplementary Charge-sheet No.77A: ^^v'kksd dqekj ds fo:) vkjksi i= varxZr /kkjk 299 lhvkjihlh es is'k djus ,oa eSllZ LdkbZykbZV gksLihfyVh izk-fy- o vU; ds fo:) vUos"k.k varZxr /kkjk 173¼8½ lhvkjihlh es tkjh j[kus ds vkns'k izkIr fd;sA^^ 44.2 The learned A.S.G. also made a statement at Bar that the investigation with relation to the crime in question is still pending and that the same has not reached its logical conclusion. 45. Moving onto the second issue, this Court observes that an ECIR is not akin to an FIR, and the contentions made on behalf of the petitioners that they ought to be provided a copy of the same as a matter of right does not hold water. In arriving at this conclusion, this Court derives strength from the judgment rendered in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), which has made the legal position amply clear; that an ECIR is merely an internal document created by the Enforcement Directorate upon the basis of which an investigation is conducted. It is equated to a fact finding report, a copy of which cannot be demanded by any persons, unless the competent Court, on the basis of such ECIR, proceeds to take cognizance against any such person(s) under the PML Act. 46. However, it was contended on behalf of the petitioners that this is a fit case for the Court to interfere, and it was argued that the exercise of executive power in the instant case was arbitrary. 47. This Court, on an analysis of the catena of judicial precedent cited on the behalf of the petitioner, in order to fortify the said contention, makes the following observations; 47.1 In the judgment rendered in the case of Parvathi Kollur & Anr. 47. This Court, on an analysis of the catena of judicial precedent cited on the behalf of the petitioner, in order to fortify the said contention, makes the following observations; 47.1 In the judgment rendered in the case of Parvathi Kollur & Anr. (supra), the learned Trial Court had already discharged the persons therein of the offences with which they were charged, under the PML Act, and aggrieved by the order of the Hon’ble High Court whereby such order of discharge was quashed, they had approached the Hon’ble Apex Court. The said case thus stands on a different footing than the instant case, as it is was at the stage of discharge, wherein the learned Trial Court upon appreciating evidence before commencement of trial had already discharged the persons therein, and thus the same, does not render any assistance to the case at hand. 47.2 The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Directorate of Enforcement v. M/S Obulapuram Mining Company Private Limited (Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 4466/2017) vide order dated 24.07.2017 has stayed the operation of the judgment rendered in the case of Obulapuram Mining Company (supra) in the following terms:- “Leave granted. In the meantime, the impugned judgment and order will not operate as a precedent. ...” 47.3 The judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Harish Fabiani (supra) also stands on a different footing than the instant case, as the FIR impugned therein, lodged for the predicate i.e. scheduled offence(s) was already quashed by a Court of competent jurisdiction, and therefore, the ECIR therein was quashed by the Hon’ble Court. 47.4 The judgment rendered in the case of Arun Kumar Mishra (supra) was challenged before the Hon’ble Apex Court in Directorate of Enforcement v. Arun Kumar Mishra (Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 10018/2015) and tagged with the case file of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), and the same are to be decided, while taking into consideration the view as taken in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra). Similar is the status in respect to the judgment rendered in the case of M/s Ajanta Merchants Pvt. Ltd. (supra), which is pending consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in Directorate of Enforcement v. M/s Ajanta Merchants Pvt. Ltd. Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 009987/2015). Similar is the status in respect to the judgment rendered in the case of M/s Ajanta Merchants Pvt. Ltd. (supra), which is pending consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in Directorate of Enforcement v. M/s Ajanta Merchants Pvt. Ltd. Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 009987/2015). 47.5 The Hon’ble Apex Court dismissed the challenge laid to the judgment rendered in the case of Seema Garg (supra) and dismissed the same vide order dated 30.04.2021 passed in the case of Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement (supra) with the following observation:- “In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we see no reason to exercise our jurisdiction under Article 136 (1) of the Constitution of India. The Special Leave Petitions are, accordingly, dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.” 47.5.1 A bare perusal of judgment rendered in the case of Seema Garg (supra) reveals that the ECIR therein was quashed because upon looking into the facts and circumstances therein it could not be ascertained that the property in question, alleged to be proceeds of crime were directly or indirectly obtained or derived from the scheduled offence. Furthermore, the Hon’ble Apex Court refused to interfere in the said case owing to the peculiar facts therein. 47.5.2 Therefore, as is clear from the above discussion, the said case is distinguishable from the factual matrix of the present case. Furthermore, such a determination of the property in question, as was made in Seema Garg (supra) cannot be made in the instant case at the present stage. 47.6 This Court further observes that in the case of Santosh (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court while dealing with the appeal therein was seized of a matter pertaining to the CrPC and not the PML Act. And that, therefore, the same cannot be applied mutatis mutandis to the present case. 47.7 The judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Nikesh Tarachand Shah (supra) is not applicable to the issues before this Court, and therefore, does not require any deliberation. 48. This Court further observes that the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners that since they have not been named in the prosecution complaint, the same ought to be considered as a ground for quashment of the ECIR in question cannot be accepted, as the same is an irrelevant consideration for quashment of ECIR in question, for reasons already stated hereinabove. 49. 49. It was also contended on behalf of the present petitioners that the officers of the Enforcement Directorate are also not categorized as police officers and therefore, the bar under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 does not apply to them, however, the same cannot be accepted for reasons already stated hereinabove. 50. This Court finds force in the submissions of the learned ASG that the criminal and civil proceedings under the PML Act are independent and separate from each other, and may run simultaneously. In arriving at such a conclusion, this Court derives strength from the language of the provision of law as contained in Section 8 of the PML Act, further clarified by the view taken by the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala in the case of Kavitha G. Pillai (supra). 51. Needless to say, and as has already been observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), the PML Act was brought in with a special legislative intention, and therefore, it prevails over the provisions of Cr.P.C., in case of any conflict. Moreover, this Court is inclined agree with the view taken by the Hon’ble High Court of Madras in the judgment rendered in the case of P. Rajendran (supra), wherein it was observed that the offence of money laundering under Section 3 read with Section 4 of the PML Act is an independent and standalone offence, and as such is a criminal act independent from that of predicate offence(s). 52. In the present case, FIRs have been registered against the accused persons, with respect to offences under the PML Act, whereby they have been chargesheeted for predicate offence(s), and the same upon having been presented before the concerned Special Court; cognizance has been taken against them, and the case against them is currently at the stage of framing of charge. 53. Moreover, in the instant case, the present petitioners have not been arrayed as accused, and at the given stage, seeking the intervention of this Court for quashment of the ECIR in question, is pre-mature. 54. 53. Moreover, in the instant case, the present petitioners have not been arrayed as accused, and at the given stage, seeking the intervention of this Court for quashment of the ECIR in question, is pre-mature. 54. At the cost of repetition, this Court observes that the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), has settled the legal position, that at a stage, akin to the one prevailing the case at hand, the scope of interference by the Courts is limited and narrow, more so, looking into the attendant facts and circumstances of the case at hand. 55. This Court also does not find any force in the submission made on behalf of the petitioner-Mahesh Nagar that the element of mens rea is a pre-requisite for the offence under Section 3 of the PML Act, to be made out. 56. The Courts must certainly step in and thwart any and all kinds of injustice, malafide and/or arbitrary exercise of executive power on the liberty of the citizens of this country; however, in absence of the same, any judicial interference in the domain of the executive, would be unwarranted. 57. The precedent law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), as it stands today, is the law of the land, and what is sought before this Court in the present petitions regarding providing a copy of ECIR in question, if granted to the present petitioners, the same would be in direct violation of the mandate of the Hon'ble Apex Court, as laid down in the said case. More so, in the given factual matrix wherein predicate offences have been found to be made out against the accused persons, and the process of investigation as under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. is pending with respect to present petitioners, the petitioners have failed to indicate any violation; of any procedure as provided for under the PML Act, or of the principles as laid down in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) so as to warrant the interference of this Court in the impugned ECIR. 58. 58. As an upshot of the above discussion, and keeping in mind the above cited catena of judicial precedents, more particularly, Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), and the submissions made, this Court does not find that any case is made out so as to grant the relief to the present petitioners, as prayed for in the instant petitions, at the present stage; more so when the issue in question is no longer res integra, in view of the judgment rendered in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra). 59. Consequently, the present petitions do not merit acceptance, and the same are accordingly dismissed. 60. However, in the interest of justice, it is directed that the interim orders dated 19.12.2018 (in petition No.462/2018) and 21.02.2018 (in petition No.18/2018) passed by this Hon’ble Court, which have been operative all throughout the adjudication, shall remain in currency for the next two weeks i.e. 05.01.2023, and thereafter, the same shall automatically stand vacated. 61. After the judgment was pronounced, Mr. K.T.S. Tulsi, learned Senior Counsel, appearing through Video Conferencing made a request that the aforementioned interim orders, which have been extended for two weeks from today i.e. upto 05.01.2023, may be extended for four weeks i.e. upto 19.01.2023. 61.1 In the given circumstances, such request made by learned Senior Counsel is acceded to, and thus, the aforementioned interim orders dated 19.12.2018 (in petition No.462/2018) and 21.02.2018 (in petition No.18/2018) passed by this Hon’ble Court, which have been operative all throughout the adjudication, shall remain in currency for a period of four weeks from today i.e. upto 19.01.2023, and the same shall automatically stand vacated on that date itself.