JUDGMENT (Prayer: This Petition has been filed under Section 34(2)(a)(b)(ii) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 to set aside the arbitral award dated 22.07.2019 and correction award dated 24.09.2019 passed by the Hon'ble Arbitrator with costs and claim Rs.10,00,000/- with interest thereon. 1. The petitioner assails an arbitral award dated 22.07.2019 and the subsequent order passed in the petition under Section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the Arbitration Act)(collectively referred to as the Award) under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. 2. The petitioner is a member of the first respondent, which is engaged inter alia in providing broking services in relation to derivative contracts in commodities. After opening a trading account on 10.01.2018, the petitioner carried out trade in commodity derivatives through the Multi Commodity Exchange(MCX) from time to time. The petition relates to orders placed for derivative contracts in a commodity called crude oil mini in February, 2019. The petitioner incurred losses upon execution of the relevant trades. Since the petitioner had grievances both on the ground of failure to advice and technical glitches in the system, a complaint was lodged with the Investors Grievance and Redressal Committee (IGRC) of the MCX. By order dated 23.02.2019, the IGRC rejected the complaint on the ground that the petitioner had undertaken trading from his own terminal and that the relevant trades were 'at market' transactions. On the petitioner's grievance that he had not been properly advised by the first respondent, the IGRC recorded the finding that it was not possible to provide advice because the trades were carried out by the trader on his terminal. The decision of the IGRC was assailed before the Arbitral Tribunal. The petitioner prayed for an award of Rs.10,00,000/- as damages for the loss incurred by him due to the default of the first respondent. 3. The first respondent filed a written response and denied the assertion that the said respondent was under an obligation to provide advice. The further grievance that there was a technical glitch was refuted by relying upon systems audits that were conducted by the first respondent. Eventually, the Arbitral Tribunal rejected the petition on the ground that the petitioner had placed market orders and that such orders can only be executed as per the instructions of the petitioner. The said award is under challenge herein. 4. The petitioner appears in person. Eventually, the Arbitral Tribunal rejected the petition on the ground that the petitioner had placed market orders and that such orders can only be executed as per the instructions of the petitioner. The said award is under challenge herein. 4. The petitioner appears in person. His first contention is that he placed 'limit' orders in respect of the transactions in February, 2019 and not market orders. In support of this contention, he draws reference to the screen shot at page 141 of the typed set of papers filed by him. When queried as to whether he pleaded that he placed 'limit' and not 'market' orders before the Arbitral Tribunal, he states that he challenged the order of the IGRC before the Arbitral Tribunal. Since the IGRC had recorded that he had carried out 'at market' transactions, he was not in a position to plead that he had placed limit orders and not market orders. The second contention is that the petitioner should have been properly advised about the option of placing a limit order and that the first respondent failed to fulfill the said obligation. The third contention is that the first respondent did not comply with applicable circulars of SEBI in relation to the opening of trading accounts and, in particular, with regard to obtaining the consent of a trading member in relation to orders placed by such member. The party-in-person also submitted that the log sheet on which the first respondent relies was not placed before the Arbitral Tribunal. According to him, the only documents placed before the Arbitral Tribunal by the first respondent were the documents annexed to the letter dated 15.4.2019, which is at page 157 of the typed set of papers. For all these reasons, he states that the impugned award is liable to be set aside. 5. Learned counsel for the first respondent argued to the contrary. His first contention was that the petitioner did not plead before either the IGRC or the Arbitral Tribunal that he placed limit orders and not market orders. Learned counsel pointed out that the pleading was that there was a technical glitch in the system and that proper advice was not provided, as a consequence, orders were executed in such manner as to cause losses to the petitioner. Learned counsel pointed out that the pleading was that there was a technical glitch in the system and that proper advice was not provided, as a consequence, orders were executed in such manner as to cause losses to the petitioner. By drawing specific reference to paragraphs 15 and 39 of the petition filed by the petitioner herein before the Arbitral Tribunal, learned counsel pointed out that the focus of the petition was on the failure to provide necessary information at the time of opening the trading account and on the alleged technical glitches in the software supplied by the broker. By adverting to the grounds on which the Section 34 petition was filed, learned counsel pointed out that the failure to consider that the petitioner had made a limit order is not one of the grounds of challenge. Instead, learned counsel submitted that the petitioner assailed the award on the ground of fraud and public policy without substantiating the said grounds. By drawing reference to the report submitted pursuant to a system audit, learned counsel pointed out that the said audit established that the system was functioning in accordance with the requirements specified by MCX in such regard. On a demurrer, he referred to the log sheet relating to the relevant orders of the petitioner and submitted that the said log sheets indicate conclusively that market orders were placed by the petitioner. As regards the status of the first respondent, he clarified that the first respondent is a broker and not a portfolio manager or investment advisor. 6. Upon taking stock of the rival contentions, before delving into the merits of the challenge, a brief preamble is in order. Derivative contracts are contracts whose value is dependent on underlying assets. Such underlying assets could be shares, commodities, currencies, interest rates, etc. By their very nature, derivative contracts carry a high degree of risk and it is for this reason that the man referred to as the 'Oracle of Omaha', Warren Buffett, describes them as weapons of mass destruction. In the universe of derivative contracts, commodity derivatives are particularly risky. In the case at hand, the relevant contracts pertain to crude oil minis, which are evidently dependent on the movement of crude oil prices. In relation to such contracts, volatility is the norm and stability is the exception. Derivative contracts typically take the form of futures contracts or options. In the universe of derivative contracts, commodity derivatives are particularly risky. In the case at hand, the relevant contracts pertain to crude oil minis, which are evidently dependent on the movement of crude oil prices. In relation to such contracts, volatility is the norm and stability is the exception. Derivative contracts typically take the form of futures contracts or options. In options contracts, the party is better protected because there is the option but not the obligation to trade at the relevant price but a premium is paid for such purpose. By contrast, in a futures contract, there is no safety net. In the context of commodity derivatives, the parties who are directly engaged in the production and trade of commodities often participate in the derivatives market by way of customized transactions under the the Master Agreement of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA). Such contracts are entered into for hedging purposes. Commodity derivatives are also entered into on commodity exchanges such as the MCX. Because of their inherently risky nature, they are better suited to institutional or other sophisticated investors. It is the latter type of transaction by way of futures contracts in crude oil mini that forms the subject of this petition. 7. Before this Court, the party-in-person contended with great vigour that he had placed a limit order and not a market order. A limit order is one which is placed on the basis that the order would not be executed if the price crosses the limit specified, whereas a market order would be executed at the market price prevailing at the time of execution of the order. Upon examining the petition filed before the Arbitral Tribunal, it appears from paragraphs 3 and 9 thereof that the petitioner complained of technical issues in the software supplied by the broker. Paragraph 19 of the petition indicates that the petitioner complained that he was not provided all material information at the time of account opening. The petitioner also summarized his contentions on the last page of the petition. Serial No.8 of the summary is to the effect that the broker could have provided more time and assisted the petitioner in exiting the trade and that such assistance would have enabled the petitioner to exit at the right prices. The petitioner also summarized his contentions on the last page of the petition. Serial No.8 of the summary is to the effect that the broker could have provided more time and assisted the petitioner in exiting the trade and that such assistance would have enabled the petitioner to exit at the right prices. Thus, on closely examining the petition, as correctly contended by learned counsel for the first respondent, the petitioner did not plead that he placed the trades on limit and not market basis. Therefore, a grievance on that ground cannot be countenanced at this juncture. 8. With regard to the alleged technical glitches, the first respondent placed before the Arbitral Tribunal a systems audit certificate of M/s.Shah Kapadia and Associates. The said certificate pertains to a systems audit carried out for the period 01.04.2017 to 31.03.2018. The report annexed thereto indicates that the system was compliant on all the parameters. The party-in person contended that this systems audit certificate is not relevant because it pertains to an earlier period. Systems audits are not undertaken in relation to specific transactions but are undertaken periodically to assess the integrity of the relevant system. Therefore, this audit certificate indicates that the system was functioning properly during the audit period. In this case, the initial burden of establishing that there was a technical glitch was on the petitioner and the petitioner failed to discharge this onus before the IGRC or the Arbitral Tribunal. Moreover, as correctly contended by learned counsel for the first respondent, any faults in the system would affect all the traders and not only the petitioner. Hence, the challenge on this count also lacks merit. 9. The party-in-person also contended that he should have been appropriately advised in relation to the placement of limit orders instead of market orders. The admitted position is that the petitioner opened the trading account in January, 2018 and had been trading for more than one year when the transactions in question were undertaken. In addition, as pointed out by learned counsel for the first respondent, the first respondent is not an investment advisor. Especially in the context of trade in commodity derivatives, which is inherently risky and not advisable except for sophisticated investors, the contention regarding the failure to provide advice is untenable. In addition, as pointed out by learned counsel for the first respondent, the first respondent is not an investment advisor. Especially in the context of trade in commodity derivatives, which is inherently risky and not advisable except for sophisticated investors, the contention regarding the failure to provide advice is untenable. The petitioner claimed a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- as damages from the Arbitral Tribunal but did not provide any evidence of loss. For that reason also, the petition was doomed to fail. 10. Section 34 of the Arbitration Act provides for interference by the court in the limited circumstances set out therein. As regards the merits of the dispute, the only recognized grounds for interference are if the award violates public policy or if it is patently illegal. For reasons set out above, the petitioner completely failed to establish that the Award is either against public policy or patently illegal. 11. Consequently, the challenge is rejected by dismissing Arb.O.P.No.227 of 2021. However, there shall be no order as to costs.