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2022 DIGILAW 305 (TS)

Rasula Mukunda Rao v. State of Telangana through Public Prosecutor

2022-04-22

K.SURENDER

body2022
JUDGMENT : 1. The appellant/Accused No. l is questioning the judgment of the trial Court in SC No.229 of 2014 dated 27.01.2020, finding him guilty for the offence under Section 307 of IPC and sentenced to under go Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of ten years, filing the present appeal. 2. The case of the prosecution is that, P.W.1 filed a complaint before the Sub-Inspector of Police, Bejjanki on 26.11.2012 stating that there were disputes regarding landed property with the appellant and the acquitted accused Nos.2 and 3. On the said date, there was an altercation between the deceased, who is the husband of P.W.1 and the appellant. In the evening around 6.00 P.M, the appellant and the acquitted accused Nos.2 and 3 entered into the house of P.W.1 and the appellant beat the deceased with the pestle and acquitted A2 and A3 beat P.W.1 with sticks. Having received injuries, the deceased was shifted to the hospital. 3. The case was investigated and charge sheet was filed for the offences under Section 307 r/w 34 IPC against the appellant and two others. 4. Charges under Section 307 r/w 34 IPC and Section 324 r/w Section 324 were framed against the accused on 13.11.2017. 5. During the course of P.W.1 statement on 07.06.2019, the Court on coming to know that the husband of P.W.1 died, differed trial and framed charges under Section 302 and Section 302 r/w 34 of IPC against three accused on 27.01.2020. 6. After completion of trial, the learned Sessions Judge found A1 to A3 not guilty for the offence under Section 302 and Section 302 r/w 34 IPC. However, the appellant was convicted for the offence under Section 307 IPC and the other accused were acquitted of all the charges. 7. Sri Akkam Eshwar, learned counsel for the appellant argued that the conviction is based on inadmissible evidence, firstly, the documents relied upon by the Sessions Judge Exs.P2 to P13 were produced by P.W.1. The prosecution examined P.W.12 who according to the prosecution, is the Doctor, who treated the deceased. However, P.W.12 disowned any kind of treatment to the deceased and also denied seeing photographs and other medical record Ex.P4 shown to the witness. P.W.12 further denied the signature shown on Ex.P26, which is the medical certificate of the deceased. 8. The prosecution examined P.W.12 who according to the prosecution, is the Doctor, who treated the deceased. However, P.W.12 disowned any kind of treatment to the deceased and also denied seeing photographs and other medical record Ex.P4 shown to the witness. P.W.12 further denied the signature shown on Ex.P26, which is the medical certificate of the deceased. 8. On the other hand, Sri Sudarshan, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor submits that since the deceased was treated for a period from 26.11.2012 till his death on 04.04.2013, the documents produced by P.W.1 can be looked into to draw an inference of guilt against the appellant. He further submits that though no appeal is filed against acquitted accused Nos.2 and 3, the evidence placed on record both oral and documentary, are sufficient to sustain the conviction under Section 307 IPC and the same cannot be interfered with. 9. The injuries received by the deceased were not narrated by an expert like Doctor and unfortunately, the witness produced by the prosecution P.W.12 turned hostile to the prosecution case and denied having examined and treated the deceased. Further when P.W.12 was confronted with Ex.P4 alleged to be case sheet from 10.12.2012 to 26.01.2013, P.W.12 stated that it is not case sheet but nursing sheet. Ex.P3 is the X-ray requisition, Ex.P4 is the nursing sheet/case sheet, Ex.P5 is the Discharge chard of Ankith Multi Speciality Hospitals, Hyderabad, which documents were not proved through the persons executing those documents. Similarly, the other medical records, Exs.P9 to P13 were also filed by P.w.1 and no witnesses are examined, who signed or executed the said documents. 10. In the absence of any treating Doctor being examined or the persons, who executed Exs.P3 to P5 and P9 to P13, it is not safe to rely upon the said documents to conclude that they pertain to deceased and that the contents therein are correct, as merely marking documents is not proof of the contents of the documents. 11. The Dying Declaration was marked as Ex.P20 in which the deceased narrated the incident and held the appellant and the acquitted accused Nos.2 and 3 are responsible for the injuries and condition of the deceased. The said document Ex.P20 cannot be considered as a Dying Declaration and hit by Section 161 Cr.P.C. The procedure adopted by the trial court in marking the said statement is not in accordance with law. The said document Ex.P20 cannot be considered as a Dying Declaration and hit by Section 161 Cr.P.C. The procedure adopted by the trial court in marking the said statement is not in accordance with law. Section 32 (1) of the Evidence Act, 1872 reads as follows: “32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc ., is relevant…. (1) when it relates to cause of death. —When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question. Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question.” Admittedly, the death occurred after 5 ½ months after the statement Ex.P20 was made by the deceased. The death should be proximate to the statement to rely upon the statement made by the deceased as a Dying Declaration. When the cause of death cannot be attributed to the incident after which the statement was recorded, the statement of the deceased cannot be considered by the Court as a Dying Declaration and is inadmissible in evidence. 12. The allegation is that the appellant attacked the deceased with pestle and the acquitted accused Nos.2 and 3 attacked P.W.1 with sticks, MO1 and MO2. Pestle allegedly used by the appellant was not recovered. The learned trial Judge, having found that there is no evidence establishing the nexus between the head injury sustained by the deceased and his death and also finding that the Doctor PW.12’s evidence is of no use to the prosecution, erred in relying upon the document Ex.P4 and the oral evidence of P.Ws.1, 4 and 5 to conclude that the appellant with an intention of killing the deceased caused injuries. Since there is no medical evidence to support the injuries received by the deceased, it cannot be inferred that the appellant caused injuries with intent punishable under Section 307 IPC. Since there is no medical evidence to support the injuries received by the deceased, it cannot be inferred that the appellant caused injuries with intent punishable under Section 307 IPC. On the basis of oral evidence of P.Ws.1, 4 and 5 it can only be said that the appellant and others entered into the house of P.w.1 and assaulted the deceased. 13. It is unfortunate that the prosecution has not taken any steps to mark the medical record by the concerned and the Courts cannot rely upon the contents of the medical record produced by P.W.1, without proper proof, to be that of the deceased. In the said circumstances, relying upon the oral evidence, it can be concluded that there was an assault. However, in the absence of the kind of injuries received, the act of the appellant can be only be punished under section 323 IPC and not under Section 307 IPC. The appellant was in jail since the date of judgment i.e., from 22.03.2021 till granting of bail in I.A.No.1 of 2021 on 22.11.2021. The accused was in jail for almost eight months. 14. In the result, the conviction recorded under Section 307 IPC is set aside and the appellant is convicted under Section 323 of IPC and sentenced to imprisonment already undergone by the accused. The bail bonds of the appellant shall stands cancelled. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stands closed.