JUDGMENT : Saroj Yadav, J. 1. This Criminal Appeal has been filed by the appellant-State of U.P. against the judgment and order dated 2.12.2005 passed by Additional Sessions Judge Court No. 1, District Kheri in Sessions Trial No. 797 of 2003 under Sections 498-A, 304-B, 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short I.P.C.) and Section ¾ of Dowry Prohibition Act (in short D.P. Act), whereby the accused/respondents were acquitted. 2. The facts necessary for disposal of this appeal as culled out are as under: i. A First Information Report (in short F.I.R.) was registered at Case Crime No. 443 of 2002 under Sections 498-A, 304-B, 201 of I.P.C. and Section ¾ of Dowry Prohibition Act on the basis of written report submitted by the complainant Mustakim. it was described in the written report that the complainant married his daughter Parvin aged about 24 years in June 1996 to Lallan son of Asgar. After the marriage Lallan and other family members i.e. Asgar (mother-in-law) Sahnoor (Jeth), Khanney (jeth), Laddan (dewar), wife of Sahnoor (jethani) and wife of Khanney (jethani) started complaining about the less dowry given in the marriage and used to demand Passion Motorcycle. The complainant gave dowry in the marriage according to his status and capacity, but due to scarcity of money he could not give motorcycle. For this reason, Lallan and other family members used to beat his daughter. Just eight days ahead of the incident Lallan came to take his daughter and when he left the house of the complainant he asked him to arrange the motorcycle within eight days otherwise that will not be good. On 24.12.2002 at about 2:00 P.M. Vasir informed to the complainant that his daughter Parvin had died in the night. On this information he reached the matrimonial home of his daughter and found the dead body lying in the home and all accused persons fled away. Only the mother-in-law of the deceased was present there. The villagers and Gram Pradhan who were present there tried to allure him by offering Rs. 20 thousand and not to report to the police, when complainant refused the offer, they did not even gave the dead body to him. Only the mother-in-law of the deceased was present there. The villagers and Gram Pradhan who were present there tried to allure him by offering Rs. 20 thousand and not to report to the police, when complainant refused the offer, they did not even gave the dead body to him. Thereafter the complainant went to the police station Oel district Kheri, but his report was not lodged and he was asked to present a written report that his daughter was killed by the accused persons in the night of 23/24.12.2002. After investigation the charge-sheet was submitted against all the accused persons in the Court. The concerned Magistrate after taking cognizance committed the case to Sessions Court for trial. Sessions Judge framed the charges against all the accused persons on 7.7.2004. All the accused persons denied the crime and claimed to be tried. In order to prove its case the prosecution examined the following witnesses : (i) PW-1 Mustakim, complainant. (ii) PW-2 Mubarak Ali, brother of the deceased (iii) PW-3 Mr. Vijay Vardhan Tomar, Naib Tehsildar who prepared the inquest report and send the dead body for post-mortem alongwith necessary police papers (iv) PW-4 Dr. A.K. Malik, who conducted the post-mortem on the cadaver of the deceased. Apart from the above oral evidence, documentary evidence Exhibit-Ka 1 to Exhibit Ka-9 were also proved. These exihibits are as under : (i) Exhibit Ka-1, written report. (ii) Exhibit Ka-2 inquest report. (iii) Exhibit Ka-3 Police Form 13. (iv) Exhibit Ka-4 Police Form 33. (v) Exhibit Ka-5 Photo Nash. (vi) Exhibit Ka-6 report of R.I. (vii) Exhibit Ka-7 report to C.M.O. for conducting post-mortem. (viii) Exhibit-Ka-8 specimen seal. (ix) Exhibit Ka-9 post-mortem report. After close of evidence by prosecution the statement of accused persons were recorded under Section 313 of Code of Criminal Procedure (in short Cr.P.C.), wherein they denied the crime and stated that marriage of the deceased with Lallan was solemnized in the year 1995 and the deceased was ill, so she committed suicide by hanging. Accused Lallan examined herself as DW-1 after seeking permission of the trial Court and proved two documents, Exhibit Kha-1 marriage card of the deceased with accused Lallan and Exhibit Kha-2 prescription of a doctor who treated the deceased. Accused Lallan examined herself as DW-1 after seeking permission of the trial Court and proved two documents, Exhibit Kha-1 marriage card of the deceased with accused Lallan and Exhibit Kha-2 prescription of a doctor who treated the deceased. The trial Court after hearing the arguments of both the sides on the basis of evidence available on record reached on the conclusions that the marriage of the deceased with accused/appellant Lallan was solemnized in the year 1995 and incident did not take place within seven years of marriage. The trial Court also concluded that deceased was mentally ill as has been proved by Lallan examined as DW-1 and evident from Exhibit Kha-2 the prescription of treatment by Dr. Dinesh Dua of the deceased. PW-1. Mustakim, the father of the deceased has also stated in his cross-examination that Pravin was ill and he incurred all expenditure of treatment till the deceased was alive and treatment was going on in Laherpur. Exhibit Kha-2 shows that the deceased was suffering from 'fits of unconsciousness', so she committed suicide. As far as demand of Passion Motorcycle is concerned learned trial Court has observed that at the relevant time Passion Motor Cycle was not launched in the market, hence the allegation of demand of Passion Motorcycle is also false, hence the learned trial Court acquitted all the appellants/accused persons of the charges levelled against them. Being aggrieved by this acquittal this appeal has been filed by the State Government. 3. Heard Mr. C.S. Pandey, learned Additional Government Advocate (A.G.A.) for the State-appellant. 4. Learned A.G.A. submitted that the impugned judgment is against facts and evidence available on record. Learned trial Court has not appreciated the evidence in right perspective and has committed the grave error by acquitting the appellant/accused persons. The factum of demand of dowry has been proved by the witnesses of facts, the complainant and the brother of the deceased, but the trial Court has wrongly disbelieved them and also wrongly disbelieved the evidence that marriage of the deceased was solemnized with the accused/appellant Lallan in the year 1997, hence the impugned judgment should be set-aside. 5. Considered the submissions made by learned A.G.A. and perused the original record. 6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Achhar Singh vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2021) 5 SCC 543 , has laid down as under (Para 16): ''16. 5. Considered the submissions made by learned A.G.A. and perused the original record. 6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Achhar Singh vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2021) 5 SCC 543 , has laid down as under (Para 16): ''16. It is thus a well crystalized principle that if two views are possible, the High Court ought not to interfere with the trial Court's judgment. However, such a precautionary principle cannot be overstretched to portray that the ''contours of appeal'' against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC are limited to seeing whether or not the trial Court's view was impossible. It is equally well-settled that there is no bar on the High Court's power to re-appreciate evidence in an appeal against acquittal. This Court has held in a catena of decisions (including Chandrappa vs. State of Karnataka, State of Andhra Pradesh vs. M. Madhusudhan Rao and Raveen Kumar vs. State of Himachal Pradesh) that the Cr.P.C. does not differentiate in the power, scope, jurisdiction or limitation between appeals against judgments of conviction or acquittal and that the appellate Court is free to consider on both fact and law, despite the self-restraint that has been ingrained into practice while dealing with orders of acquittal where there is a double presumption of innocence of the accused.'' 7. Before moving forward, it appears appropriate to go through Section 304-B I.P.C. and Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Section 304-B IPC reads as under: ''304B. Dowry death: (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called 'dowry death' and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation.-For the purpose of this sub-section, 'dowry' shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). Explanation.-For the purpose of this sub-section, 'dowry' shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.'' Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872 reads as under: ''113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.-When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, 'dowry death' shall have the same meaning as in Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).'' Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Maya Devi and Another vs. State of Haryana, (2015) 17 SCC 405 , has laid down as under: In order to convict an accused for the offence punishable under Section 304B IPC, the following essentials must be satisfied: (i) the death of a woman must have been caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances; (ii) such death must have occurred within seven years of her marriage; (iii) soon before her death, the woman must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relatives of her husband; (iv) such cruelty or harassment must be for, or in connection with, demand for dowry. When the above ingredients are established by reliable and acceptable evidence, such death shall be called dowry death and such husband or his relatives shall be deemed to have caused her death. If the above mentioned ingredients are attracted in view of the special provision, the Court shall presume and it shall record such fact as proved unless and until it is disproved by the accused. However, it is open to the accused to adduce such evidence for disproving such conclusive presumption as the burden is unmistakably on him to do so and he can discharge such burden by getting an answer through cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses or by adducing evidence on the defence side.'' 8. However, it is open to the accused to adduce such evidence for disproving such conclusive presumption as the burden is unmistakably on him to do so and he can discharge such burden by getting an answer through cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses or by adducing evidence on the defence side.'' 8. Thus to hold guilty the person accused of offence under Section 304-B it must be proved that the death of woman was caused by any burns or bodily injury or she died an unnatural death within seven years of her marriage. It should also be proved that soon before her death the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with any demand of dowry. In the present matter the deceased died an unnatural death in her matrimonial home. Though it has been alleged in the FIR as well as in the statement of the complainant that the marriage of the deceased with the accused/appellant Lallan was solemnized in June 1996, but that fact could not be proved by the prosecution because PW-1 and PW-2 in this regard have given contradictory statements. PW-1 has stated that marriage was solemnized in June 1996, while the PW-2 brother of the deceased has stated that marriage of the deceased was solemnized in June 1997. The accused/appellant Lallan as DW-1 has stated that his marriage with the deceased was solemnized in June 1995. To prove this fact he (Lallan) produced marriage card Exhibit Kha-1 and the trial Court has rightly relied on that evidence and came to the conclusion that marriage of the deceased with accused/appellant Lallan was solemnized in June 1995. The incident took place on 24.12.2002, thus the incident did not occur within seven years of the marriage of the deceased, but after seven years. Further the accused/appellant Lallan has proved that the deceased was mentally ill by producing the Exhibit Kha-2 the prescription of the doctor Dinesh Dua, wherein it has been recorded by the doctor that the deceased was suffering from 'fits of unconsciousness'. The factum of illness of the deceased has also been corroborated by PW-1 the father of the deceased, as in his cross-examination he has stated that her daughter was being treated in Laherpur and he incurred all the expenses of treatment. The factum of illness of the deceased has also been corroborated by PW-1 the father of the deceased, as in his cross-examination he has stated that her daughter was being treated in Laherpur and he incurred all the expenses of treatment. Further the learned trial Court has rightly reached to the conclusion that at the time of alleged demand Honda Passion Motorcycle was not launched in the market as the letter of the concerned Agency has been filed by the appellant on the record in the Court, wherein it has been mentioned that Honda Passion Motorcycle was launched in the market in the year 2001: Hence the learned trial Court has rightly came to the conclusion that the ingredients required under Section 304 B have not been established as to raise the presumption under Section 113-B of Indian Evidence Act against the appellants/accused. In such a situation the learned trial Court rightly acquitted the appellant/accused persons. There appears no error in the findings of the learned trial Court further more the view taken by the learned trial Court is a possible view. Thus there appears no convincing reason to interfere with the acquittal recorded by the learned trial Court. Hence this appeal deserves dismissal and is dismissed accordingly.