JUDGEMENT : 1. These four petitions, being Criminal Petition No. 763/2019 and Criminal Petition No. 768/2019, under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C, are preferred by the petitioners namely (1) Kezriwal Sugar Agencies Pvt. Ltd., (2) Shri Surya Prakash Agarwal, and Criminal Petition No. 757/2019 and 762/2019 are filed by Smti. Sangeeta kezriwal for setting aside and quashing the impugned order, dated 18.01.2019, passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tinsukia, and further proceedings of the NI Case No. 11/2019 & NI Case No. 12/2019, pending before the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tinsukia. It is to be mentioned here that vide the impugned order, dated 18.01.2019, the learned Court below had taken cognizance of the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881, and issued summons against the petitioners. 2. It is submitted at the Bar that all the petitions may be disposed of together by a common judgment & order as the same arisen out of a common order involving the same sets of parties and a common question of law; and accordingly, it is decided to dispose of all the petitions by this common judgment & order. 3. The factual background leading to filing of the present petitions is adumbrated herein below: “The petitioners, namely, Sri Surya Prakash Agarwal & Smti Sangeeta Kejriwal, are the Directors of the petitioner No. 1 company, i.e. Kejriwal Sugar Agencies Pvt. Ltd. The petitioner company and the opposite party/respondent i.e. M/S Gopiram Chetriram, were involved in a business of dealing of Sugar and were indulging in the same since long. In the year 2018, the petitioner company approached the opposite party/respondent to supply 5200 metric tons of sugar and for that, the opposite party/respondent requested the petitioner company for an advance/security of Rs. 10 crores and the petitioner company, on good faith, issued 2 (two) numbers of Cheques, bearing Nos. 001711 & 001712, of Rs. 5 crores each in favour of the opposite party/respondent. But, despite receiving the sum, the opposite party did not deliver the requisite quantity of sugar to the petitioner company and as such, the petitioner company requested the opposite party/respondent to return the cheques so issued, but the same was not done. 001711 & 001712, of Rs. 5 crores each in favour of the opposite party/respondent. But, despite receiving the sum, the opposite party did not deliver the requisite quantity of sugar to the petitioner company and as such, the petitioner company requested the opposite party/respondent to return the cheques so issued, but the same was not done. Thereafter, the petitioner company received a notice from the opposite party through his lawyer, dated 01.10.2018, stating that the cheques were presented for encashment by the opposite party/respondent, but the same were dishonored and the petitioner company, through its reply has stated that the cheques, in question, were never issued for discharge of any liabilities or any legally enforceable debt and cannot be utilized by the opposite party as the same were issued as an security/advance towards the supply of sugar, which the opposite party/respondent failed to do. Then, the petitioner company, on failure to recover the cheques, filed one Suit, being Title Suit No. 01/2019, before the City Civil Court at Calcutta and obtained an injunction order, dated 03.01.2019, retraining the opposite party/respondent from utilizing the cheques in any manner. Thereafter, the opposite party/respondent, concealing the fact about the said injunction order, filed 2 (two) cases under the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881, being NI Case No. 11/2019 & NI Case No. 12/2019, before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tinsukia, on 17.01.2019, and the learned Court below, vide impugned order dated 18.01.2019, while taking cognizance of the offence, issued process against the petitioners.” 4. Then, being aggrieved by the impugned order, the petitioners approached this Court by filing the instant petitions on the grounds: (i) that the impugned order, dated 18.01.2019, taking cognizance of the offence and issuing summons against the petitioners, is bad in law and abuse of the process of law; (ii) that the learned Court below failed to consider the fact that the petitioners, herein, are not in charge of and responsible towards the company for its day to day affairs and there exists no materials in the instant complaints where for the petitioners may be construed to be vicariously liable for the commissioning of an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881; (iii) that the learned Court below did not consider the fact that the petitioners stay outside the territorial jurisdiction of it and without following the law laid down under Section 202 of the Cr.P.C., issued process only after examination of the opposite party under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C.; (iv) that the learned Court below utterly failed to consider the fact that no ingredients as laid down in Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881, is attracted against the petitioners inasmuch as the petitioners are neither the signatories of the said cheques nor issued the cheques in question; and (v) that the Cheque Nos. 001711 & 001712, dated 30.08.2018, of Rs. 5 crores each, drawn on HDFC Bank, Burra Bazar Branch, Kolkata, were neither issued in connection with any legally enforceable debt/liability owed by the petitioner company to the opposite party nor there was any debt/liability owned by the petitioner company to the opposite party at the time of dishonor of cheques. The cheques, in question, were in the form of security/advance which cannot be termed as legally enforceable debt and using of these cheques cannot attract the ingredients of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881, and, therefore, it is contended to set aside and quash the impugned order, dated 18.01.2019. 5. Heard Mr. Pran Bora, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners. Also heard Mr. Z. Kamar, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. D. Talukdar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. 6. Mr. 5. Heard Mr. Pran Bora, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners. Also heard Mr. Z. Kamar, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. D. Talukdar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. 6. Mr. P. Bora, the learned counsel for the petitioners submits that in connection with the business transaction between the petitioners and the respondents the petitioners have issued two cheques being Cheque No. 001711 dated 30.08.2018 for a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/-and Cheque No. 001712 dated 30.08.2018 for a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/-and the same were dishonoured on the ground of insufficient fund. Thereafter the petitioners have instituted a title suit being T.S. No. 01/2019 on 02.01.2019 before the learned 6th City Civil Court at Calcutta, wherein the learned 6th City Civil Court, Calcutta has passed injunction order dated 03.01.2019, restraining the respondents from utilizing the Cheque No. 001711 and 001712 in any manner whatsoever till 02.02.2019, and the said order was communicated to the petitioners and delivered to them on 10.01.2019. But, the respondent, with a view to wreck vengeance and harass, lodged a complaint case before the learned CJM, Tinsukia on 17.01.2019 under Section 138 N.I. Act and the learned court below has taken cognizance of the same on 18.01.2019 when the injunction order was in force. It is further submitted that the complaint case under the N.I. Act are counter blast of the aforesaid title suit and filed with malafide intention and in view of the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, reported in 1992 Supple. 1 SCC 339 in point No. 7, the respondent cannot institute complaint case as prohibited by the injunction order. Mr. Bora further submits that after a week of the filing of the case the respondents appeared before the Calcutta High Court and prayed for early disposal of the suit. Secondly, Mr. Bora submits that thought Smt. Sangeeta Kejriwal is the Director of the Company, yet, she is not at all liable as she is not concerned with day to day affairs of the Company and no averment is made against her in the complaint, how she is liable. Mr. Bora submits that without any averment in the complaint merely because she is the Director of the firm/company, she cannot be made liable vicariously. To support his contention Mr. Mr. Bora submits that without any averment in the complaint merely because she is the Director of the firm/company, she cannot be made liable vicariously. To support his contention Mr. Bora has referred three case laws, Samsung India Electronics Pvt. Ltd. Vs. The State of Assam and Ors., reported in 2009 (4) GLT 685 and another case law of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Monaben Ketanbhai Shah Vs. State of Gujarat, reported in (2004) 7 SCC 15 and another case law of Hon’ble Supreme Court in N.K. Wahi Vs. Shekhar Singh, reported in (2007) 9 SCC 481 . Mr. Bora has also referred another case law of National Small Industrial Cooperative Bank Vs. Ana Singh Pental, reported in (2010) 3 SCC 220 in support of his submission. As parallel proceedings cannot go together, Mr. Bora has contended to allow the petition by setting aside the criminal proceedings under 138 N.I. Act pending before the Court of learned CJM, Tinsukia. 7. Whereas Mr. Z. Kamar, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr. D. Talukdar, submits that the two cheques, being No. 001711 and No. 001712, were issued by the petitioners in discharge of their legally enforceable debt and the said two cheques were issued on 30.08.2018 and the same was presented with the banker of the respondents on 13.09.2018. But, the same returned dishonoured on the ground of insufficient fund. Thereafter, demand notice was issued to the petitioners on 19.09.2018, and the petitioners have received the same and thereafter requested the respondents to present the cheque after one month again. Accordingly, the respondent presented the cheque on 21.11.2018, But, again the same returned dishonoured with a remark ‘insufficient fund’ and the respondents received the same on 29.11.2018. Further Mr. Kamar submits that demand notice was issued to the petitioners on 20.12.2018 and the same was received by the petitioners on 27.12.2018. Thereafter, the respondent instituted the complaint on 17.01.2019 and cognizance was taken by the court on 18.01.2019 and thereafter process was issued to the petitioners. Mr. Kamar further submits that the title suit was filed by the petitioners on 02.01.2019 and injunction was granted on 03.01.2019 and the petitioners stated that the respondents have received the order on 10.01.2019, but the same is incorrect statement and that the respondents have never received the order of the court on 10.01.2019. Mr. Mr. Kamar further submits that the title suit was filed by the petitioners on 02.01.2019 and injunction was granted on 03.01.2019 and the petitioners stated that the respondents have received the order on 10.01.2019, but the same is incorrect statement and that the respondents have never received the order of the court on 10.01.2019. Mr. Kamar further submits that granting of injunctions have been clearly barred and not permitted under law and the same has been specifically stated in Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act which prohibits the Civil Courts of the country from passing any injunction order under 10 circumstances, i.e. (a) to (j) of the Specific Relief Act and the present case falls under the ambit of Clause (a), (b) and (d) of Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act. Mr. Kamar has referred one case law Aristro Printer Private Limited Vs. Purbanchal Erade Centre, M.A.(F) No. 108 of 1991 decided on 24.09.1991. Mr. Kamar has also referred one case law of Hon’ble Supreme Court in M. Krishnan Vs. Vijay Singh (2002) SCC (Cri) 19 and submits that if mere pendency of a suit is made as a ground for quashing criminal proceeding unscrupulous litigant apprehending action against them would be encouraged to frustrate the court of justice and by law filing civil suit in respect of documents intended to be used against them after the initiation of the criminal proceeding or in anticipation of such criminal proceeding. Mr. Kamar has further submitted that High Court dealing with a petition under Section 482 Cr.PC cannot look into disputed facts as the same is the business of the Trial Court. Referring another case law-Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) Vs. Arvind Khanna, 2019 0 Supreme (SC) 1152, Mr. Kamar submits that High Court is not entitled to go to the minor details of the allegation of the appellant and defence of the respondent that too after cognizance was taken and cannot record finding of several disputed facts. Mr. Kamar also referred one case law Dr. Lakshman Vs. State of Karnataka 2019 0 Supreme SC 1153 to support aforesaid submission. Mr. Kamar further submits that the petitioner Smt. Sangeeta Kejriwal was responsible for conducting day to day business of the accused Company and that the plea of the petitioners that she is not responsible for day to day business of the Company is nothing but a blatant lie. State of Karnataka 2019 0 Supreme SC 1153 to support aforesaid submission. Mr. Kamar further submits that the petitioner Smt. Sangeeta Kejriwal was responsible for conducting day to day business of the accused Company and that the plea of the petitioners that she is not responsible for day to day business of the Company is nothing but a blatant lie. It is further submitted that Smt. Sangeeta Kejriwal took active part in the business transaction and settlement of the account between the parties till issuance of the cheques in question and as such she and the Director are jointly and severely liable for the act of the Company i.e. the accused No. 1. And in support of his submission Mr. Kamar has referred to one case law on Hon’ble Supreme Court of Summy Bhasin Vs. State of NCT reported in 2021 SCC online Delhi 1189. Mr. Kamar under the premises of aforesaid circumstances contended to dismiss the petition as the petitioners miserably failed to make out a case for invoking the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 8. Having heard the submission of learned Advocates of both sides, I have carefully gone through the petition and the documents placed on record and also the case laws referred by learned Advocates of both the parties. 9. It appears that in the case of National Small Industries Corporation Limited Vs. Harmid Singh Pental (supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that - “it is very clear from Section 141 of the Act that what is required is that the person who is sought to be made vicariously liable for a criminal act/offence under Section 141 should be, at the time of the offence was committed, in charge of, and responsible to the Company for the conduct of the business of the Company. Every person connected with the Company shall not fall within the ambit of the provision. Only those persons who were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company at the time of commission of an offence will be liable for criminal action. If a Director of a Company who was not in charge of and was not responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company at the relevant time, will not be liable for a criminal offence under the provisions. If a Director of a Company who was not in charge of and was not responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company at the relevant time, will not be liable for a criminal offence under the provisions. The liability arises further being the in-charge of and responsible for conduct of the business of the Company at the relevant time when the offence was committed and not on the basis of merely holding a designation or office in a Company.” 10. Again in the case of N.K. Wahi Vs. Shekhar Singh (supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “19. In view of the above discussion, our answers to the questions posed in the reference are as under: (a) It is necessary to specifically aver in a complaint under Section 141 that at the time the offence was committed, the person accused was in charge of, and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. This averment is an essential requirement of Section 141 and has to be made in a complaint. Without this averment being made in a complaint, the requirements of Section 141 cannot be said to be satisfied. (b) The answer to the question posed in sub-para (b) has to be in the negative. Merely being a director of a company is not sufficient to make the person liable under Section 141 of the Act. A director in a company cannot be deemed to be in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. The requirement of Section 141 is that the person sought to be made liable should be in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time. This has to be averred as a fact as a fact as there is no deemed liability of a director in such cases. (c) The answer to Question (c) has to be in the affirmative. The question notes that the Managing Director or Joint Managing Director would be admittedly in charge of the company and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. When that is so, holders of such positions in a company become liable under Section 141 of the act. The question notes that the Managing Director or Joint Managing Director would be admittedly in charge of the company and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. When that is so, holders of such positions in a company become liable under Section 141 of the act. By virtue of the office they hold as Managing Director or Joint Managing Director, these persons are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. Therefore, they get covered under Section 141. So far as the signatory of a cheque which is dishonoured is concerned, he is clearly responsible for the incriminating act and will be covered under sub-section (2) of Section 141.” 11. And in the case of Monaben Ketanbhai Shah Vs. State of Gujarat (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court held that – “6. From the above, it is evident that in the complaint there are no averments against the appellants except stating in the title that they are partners of the firm. Learned counsel for the respondent complainants contended that a copy of the partnership deed was also filed which would show that the appellants were active in the business. No such document was filed with the complaint or made part thereof. The filing of the partnership deed later is of no consequence for determining the point in issued. Section 141 does not make all partners liable for the offence. The criminal liability has been fastened on those who, at the time of the commission of the offence, were in charge of and were responsible to the firm for the conduct of the business of the firm. These may be sleeping partners who are not required to take any part in the business of the firm; they may be ladies and others who may not know anything about the business of the firm. The primary responsibility is on the complainant to make necessary averments in the complaint so as to make the accused vicariously liable. For fastening the criminal liability, there is no presumption that every partner knows about the transaction. The obligation of the appellants to prove that at the time the offence was committed they were not in charge of and were not responsible to the firm for the conduct of the business of the firm, would arise only when first the complainant makes necessary averments in the complaint and establishes that fact. The obligation of the appellants to prove that at the time the offence was committed they were not in charge of and were not responsible to the firm for the conduct of the business of the firm, would arise only when first the complainant makes necessary averments in the complaint and establishes that fact. The present case is of total absence of requisite averments in the complaint.” 12. Keeping the aforesaid principles in mind while the Criminal Petition No. 762/2019 and 757/2019 filed by Smt. Sangeeta Kejriwal is examined, it has been found that in paragraph No. 14,15,21 and 22 of the complaint petition, which is being enclosed therewith, some specific averment has been made in the complaint against her that besides being the partner of M/s Gopiram Chetram, Director of Kejriwal Sugar Agencies Private Limited she is an active Director and she took active part in whole business transaction, settlement of account between the parties till the date of the issuance of the cheques. It is to be mentioned here that in paragraph No. 21 of the complaint petition it has been categorically stated that the petitioner along with accused No. 2 in collusion and in connivance with each other, hatched up a criminal conspiracy against the respondent for making wrongful personal gain and acting upon such conspiracy they used to take advance payment from the complaint in lieu of supply of sugar and by restoring to cheating and foul play, created the huge liability payable to the complainant during the last 4 years and misappropriated the amount of the complainant for their wrongful and personal gain and after repeated request and demand they have arrived at a settlement and agreed to return Rs. 10 crore to the complainant and issued two cheques amounting to Rs. 5 crore each in favour of the complainant against discharge of their liabilities. But, they played foul play with the complainant and both the cheques were dishonoured and they issued the cheques knowing fully well that said cheque will be dishonoured and being the Director of the accused No. 1 Company they have committed the offence of criminal breach of trust and cheating and are liable to be punished accordingly. 13. But, they played foul play with the complainant and both the cheques were dishonoured and they issued the cheques knowing fully well that said cheque will be dishonoured and being the Director of the accused No. 1 Company they have committed the offence of criminal breach of trust and cheating and are liable to be punished accordingly. 13. Thus, it is apparent that a clear averment is made in the complaint that at the time of commission of the offence they were in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of business to the company and as such they are vicariously liable for a criminal offence under Section 141 of the N.I. Act. 14. In view of above, the case laws referred by Mr. Pran Bora, learned counsel for the petitioners would not come into his aid, rather it indirectly helps the respondents. 15. Further it appears that the two cheques were issued on 30.08.2018, and the said two cheques were deposited with the State Bank of India on 13.09.2018. But, the same returned dishonoured due to insufficient fund, and when the matter is reported to the petitioners then they requested the respondents not to present the cheque for one month. When one month was elapsed and the cheques were presented again on 21.11.2018, the same returned dishonoured on 29.11.2018 by cheque returning memo. Thereafter, on 28.12.2018 the respondents have issued notice to the petitioners and the same were receipt by the petitioners on 27.12.2018 and that complaint was filed on 17.01.2019 and cognizance was taken by the learned court below on 18.01.2019. 16. It also appears that Title Suit was filed on 02.01.2019, and the injunction order was passed on 03.01.2019. And much prior to that i.e. on 21.11.2018 the two cheques were presented with its Banker by the respondent. Rests are follow up action in accordance with the provision of N.I. Act and has to be taken up within the time frame, as provided under the Act, otherwise the entire exercise would be a futile one. Though the petitioners claimed that the respondent has received the injunction order on 10.01.2019, yet, the same has been vehemently denied by the respondent. Though the petitioners claimed that the respondent has received the injunction order on 10.01.2019, yet, the same has been vehemently denied by the respondent. And having been disputed by the respondent, this court, in view of the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Central Bureau of Investigation (supra), cannot record a finding on disputed facts and cannot go into minor details of the allegations that too after taken cognizance by the learned court below. Same is the principle of law laid down in the case of Dr. Lakshman (supra) referred by learned counsel for the respondent. 17. Be it mentioned here that Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 lays down in what cases injunction cannot be granted. Under Clause (a) an injunction cannot be granted to restrain any person from prosecuting a judicial proceeding pending at the institution of the suit in which the injunction is sought, unless such restraint is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of proceedings. According to Clause (b), an injunction cannot be granted to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a Court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought. According to Clause (d) injunction cannot be granted to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a criminal matter. In view of the Clause (a), (b) and (d) mentioned in the said Section, a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Aristro Printer Private Limited (supra) has categorically held that injunction cannot be granted to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a criminal matter. In holding so this court relied upon a case law of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Cotton 1983 SC 1272, where it has been held that:- “The Legislature manifestly expressed its mind by enacting Section 41(b) in such clear and unambiguous language that an injunction cannot be granted to restrain any person, the language takes care of injunction acting in personum, from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a Court not subordinate to that from which injunction is sought. Section 41(b) denies to the Court the jurisdiction to grant an injunction restraining any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a Court which is not subordinate to the Court from which the injunction is sought". 18. Section 41(b) denies to the Court the jurisdiction to grant an injunction restraining any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a Court which is not subordinate to the Court from which the injunction is sought". 18. Again Hon’ble Supreme Court in M. Krishnan (supra) held that “if mere pendency of a suit is made as a ground for quashing criminal proceeding unscrupulous litigant apprehending action against them would be encouraged to frustrate the court of justice and by law filing civil suit in respect of documents intended to be used against them after the initiation of the criminal proceeding or in anticipation of such criminal proceeding.” 19. In view of above, it cannot be said that the Civil Suit instituted by the petitioners has stands in the way of filing the complaint by the respondent before the court of leaned CJM, Tinsukia, the process of which was started much prior to passing the impugned order on 03.01.2019, whereas the cheques were presented in the bank by the respondents on 21.11.2018. In view of above, the ratio laid down in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) as referred by Mr. Pran Borah, learned counsel for the petitioner, to the considered opinion of this court, would not come into his aid. When factual foundation for the offence have been laid down in the complaint, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to reliability and genuineness or otherwise of the facts made in the FIR/Complaint, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2021 SCC OnLine SC 315). It is also held in the said case that quashing a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than ordinary rule. 20. Thus, I find substance in the submissions of Mr. Kumar, the learned senior counsel for the respondents and the ratio laid down in the cases, referred by him also fortified his submissions. 21. In the result, I find no merit in these petitions and accordingly, the same stands dismissed. The parties have to bear their own costs. Stay, if any, granted earlier, stands vacated.