JUDGMENT Sanjib Banerjee; CJ. - The respondents have not been called upon. 2. Two primary issues have been raised by the appellants in assailing an order dated August 17, 2022 by which the writ petition filed by the 66 appellants was dismissed. Of the 66 appellants, it is the case of 46 appellants that they have been unduly discriminated against on the ground of age. A further case has been made out in respect of 12 other appellants to the effect that they were unfairly marked by the high-powered committee while reconsidering the original assessment made. As far as the remaining appellants are concerned, no special case has been made out in their favour. In a sense, the dismissal of the appeal qua the balance eight writ petitioners has been accepted. 3. As to the erroneous marking of the 12 candidates, the appellants rely on the records before the Single Bench. A chart had been prepared where the individual grievances of the 12 candidates had been indicated. 4. At the outset, it may do well to appreciate the principle before embarking on the assessment on such aspect. A Court is not an expert to assess the competence of participants at a public examination for a particular appointment; far less to go into the adequacy, or the lack thereof, as to the marks alloted. The Court is excited to look into any erroneous marking if it plainly appears to be absurd in the sense that no reasonable person in the position of the examiner could have assessed it in the manner it has been. It is a high test that a person questioning the assessment has to pass before the Court requires a reassessment to be made. A mere mistake or the failure to dot a few i's or cross a few t's would not prompt the Court to require the assessment to be gone into afresh. 5. In all fairness, it must be recorded that the cases of the first three on the list of 12 were pursued. As regards writ petitioner No.2, the highpowered committee which re-examined the marks allotted indicated that the candidate did not deserve to get eight additional marks because of the quality of the certificate course undergone by such candidate and the requirements in terms of a notification of November 24, 2008. As regards writ petitioner No.2, the highpowered committee which re-examined the marks allotted indicated that the candidate did not deserve to get eight additional marks because of the quality of the certificate course undergone by such candidate and the requirements in terms of a notification of November 24, 2008. To justify that the candidate was entitled to the eight additional marks originally allotted, it is suggested that the candidate had undergone two consecutive years of training as a block resource person and was, as such, entitled to a certificate equivalent to BTC. 6. These are matters which are not justiciable. As long as it is evident that the authority tasked with a duty had applied its mind to the matter and had taken relevant considerations into account, the Court in exercise of its authority under Article 226 of the Constitution will not act as an appellate forum. 7. In respect of the writ petitioner No.19, the high-powered committee observed that such candidate did not possess a graduation certificate as on the date of the advertisement, though at the time of presentation of papers post the selection process, a graduation certificate was produced. Ordinarily, the principle is that when certain qualifications are specified entitling candidates to apply for a particular post, such qualifications ought to have been obtained by the stipulated date, if there is any specification in such regard, or by the time the application is made. The subsequent acquisition of any essential or additional qualification would not be taken into consideration. 8. In the case of the writ petitioner No.19, the high-powered committee observed that though the candidate did not possess any graduation certificate on the date of the advertisement yet he was given marks for graduation. Strictly speaking, since the advertisement did not specify the date within which the additional qualification had to be obtained, the committee should have considered the candidate eligible to receive additional marks for graduation if the candidate had obtained such additional qualification by the time that he applied for the post. However, it is evident from the justification of the candidate indicated in the relevant chart that the candidate did not possess the qualification on the date of the advertisement and obtained the requisite qualification only before the interview was conducted. Implicit in such statement is the admission that the relevant candidate had not obtained the additional qualification at the time of application. Implicit in such statement is the admission that the relevant candidate had not obtained the additional qualification at the time of application. 9. The test that is applied by the Court is to see whether one of several possible views was taken by the relevant authority whose decision is questioned. The view that the qualification should be in place as on the date of the advertisement is a possible, and even plausible, view. At any rate, it is evident that the candidate was not eligible to apply as a graduate but obtained such additional qualification during the selection process and presented the certificate only at the interview. Clearly, the candidate was not entitled to the benefit of his graduation in the relevant selection process. 10. As far as the writ petitioner No.39 is concerned, the high-powered committee observed that she should have been given only two marks for passing the HSSLC in third division but had been unfairly given an additional mark in the original assessment. The argument put forth on behalf of the candidate is that after improvement she secured a second division and, therefore, she may have been entitled to the additional mark allotted. More importantly, this is what the candidate suggests: ' on top of that, she was allotted marks by the examiners of their own wisdom and there is no allegation of manipulation against her.' The suggestion is as facetious as it is indicative of a guilty mind. 11. At this stage, it may require a bit of history to be recounted. The matter pertains to a selection process of the year 2008 for the post of Assistant Teachers in government schools in the State. Upon a challenge to the selection process on the ground of corrupt practices adopted, the matter culminated in the selection processes undertaken at several of the centres being annulled in the sense that the successful candidates were required to be reassessed by a high-powered committee. It is the case of the appellants herein that though these appellants did not belong to the centres which were tainted, so to say, since the candidates at the other centres had been given an opportunity for their marks to be reassessed, the appellants also sought and obtained a similar order pursuant to which the appellants' cases were also re-examined by the high-powered committee. 12. 12. In the light of the hopeless cases of the writ petitioner Nos.2, 19 and 39, the similar specious reasons for seeking a reassessment of the remaining nine of the 12 candidates in such category have not been pursued. At any rate, the grounds put forth in the relevant chart relied upon by the appellants in respect of such nine other candidates are no better than the grounds already noticed in respect of the three others specifically referred to hereinabove. 13. The discussion has now to move to the other 46 candidates who complain that they have been discriminated against on the ground of age. The contention is that the consideration in such regard was flawed and contrary to Subsidiary Rules and the specific rule in such regard in the notification pursuant to which the advertisement for the recruitment process was issued. 14. For such purpose, SR 6 notified in this State in 1984 has been relied upon: 'S.R. 6 Except as otherwise provided by rules governing recruitment to a particular service a person whose age exceeds twenty-seven years (on the 1st January of the year in which the recruitment is made) may not ordinary be admitted into service of the State Service without the sanction of Government. This ordinary limit is extended to:- (a) Thirty years in case of - (i) appointments to teaching posts in college in Meghalaya Education Service. (ii) Appointment to teaching post on non-technical subjects in Engineering and technical institution. (iii) Twenty nine years in the case of appointment of Medical graduates in the State Service. (iv) Thirty five years in respect of candidates in employ in aided schools for appointment of Meghalaya School Service provided they are eligible for the same otherwise and have acquired necessary experience.' 15. The appellants also rely on the notification that preceded the advertisement in respect of the recruitment process. Such notification of November 24, 2008 provided as follows in clause 28 thereof pertaining to the age of the candidates: '28. The appellants also rely on the notification that preceded the advertisement in respect of the recruitment process. Such notification of November 24, 2008 provided as follows in clause 28 thereof pertaining to the age of the candidates: '28. Interested and eligible candidates may bring their certificates and testimonials in support of their educational qualification, age, community, etc., and appear at the interview: Provided that the candidate should be within the following age limits as on the 1st January of the year on which the post is advertised :- (i) In the case of candidates who have been mentioned at sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii) of paragraph 1 of this notification, the candidate should not be less than 18 years of age and should not have crossed 27 years of age (relaxable upto 32 years in the case of SC/ST candidates); (ii) In the case of candidates mentioned at sub-paragraph (iii) of paragraph 1 of the notification, the candidate should have first entered service (contractual or otherwise) within the age limit mentioned at sub-paragraph (i) of this paragraph;' 16. The relevant advertisement was issued on December 10, 2008. Clause 1 of such advertisement, published in pursuance of the notification of November 24, 2008, specified the eligibility and educational qualifications. The relevant clause is set out: '1) Educational Qualification: a) HSSLC or Pre-University Passed candidates who have cleared SET during 2006-07. (OR) b) BA/B.Sc/B.Com passed candidate of any recognized University established by an Act of Parliament or State Legislature having secured a minimum of 45% marks. (OR) c) Person who have successfully completed the course of training for LP School teachers conducted by DIET. Normal Training (NTC) Basic Training Centre (BTC) Cherra Teacher Training Centre (CTTC) and obtained the Junior Teacher Training Certificate/Diploma in Elementary Teacher Education (DETE) or Diploma in Education (D.Ed)/CPE Course conducted by IGNOU. (OR) d) Persons who possess the minimum qualification (HSSLC/PUC) prescribed for appointment as LP School Teacher who have been teaching in the Government LP Schools for a continuous period of not less than 5 (five) years as on 24-11-2008 are also eligible to apply provided they entered service within the prescribed age limit of 27 years.' 17. It is evident on a plain reading of the aforesaid clause that the normal rule as to the age and qualification would apply in respect of those governed by sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the educational qualifications. It is evident on a plain reading of the aforesaid clause that the normal rule as to the age and qualification would apply in respect of those governed by sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the educational qualifications. In other words, those governed by sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of clause 1 of the advertisement would be governed by the age requirement as indicated in clause 28 of the notification of November 24, 2008. There is no doubt that clause 28 of the notification would be governed by SR 6, subject, however, to the caveat at the beginning of SR 6. There is no dispute that clause 28 of the notification conforms to SR 6. Indeed, clause 2 of the advertisement, which applies to the general candidates covered by sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of clause 1 thereof, reaffirms such position. 18. As per the advertisement of December 10, 2008, an additional benefit was conferred to a class of persons who possessed the qualification of being five years in continuous service in teaching in Government LP schools provided that as on November 25, 2003, which was five years prior to the date of the governing notification, they possessed the ordinary age qualification. For clarity, the ordinary age qualification would be 18 to 27 years, relaxabe to the higher limit of 32 years in respect of scheduled caste and scheduled tribe candidates. 19. Since the consideration here pertains to the upper age-limit, it is such aspect which may be looked into. Clause 1(d) of the advertisement permitted candidates who were in five years' continuous service in Government LP schools to apply for the post provided they had not crossed the age-limit of 32 (the maximum possible) as on November 25, 2003. Clause 1(d) was an exception to clause 28 of the notification of November 24, 2008 and clause 1(d) would also pass muster in terms of SR 6 since such rule gives authority to additional or other specifications being stipulated as to age as long as it is not in derogation of SR 6. 20. By no stretch of imagination may clause 1(d) of the relevant advertisement be seen to be in derogation of SR 6. If the upper age-limit of an eligible candidate had been abridged to below 32 years and, as such, contrary to what was provided in SR 6, that would have been an aberration. 20. By no stretch of imagination may clause 1(d) of the relevant advertisement be seen to be in derogation of SR 6. If the upper age-limit of an eligible candidate had been abridged to below 32 years and, as such, contrary to what was provided in SR 6, that would have been an aberration. If the upper age- limit has, in effect, been extended by way of clause 1(d) as a concession granted in respect of a class of candidates who were already in service, neither SR 6 nor clause 28 of the notification of November 24, 2008 would come to the aid of the candidates who were overaged as on November 25, 2003 for them to be considered for the appointment. 21. In simple terms, when a class of persons is conferred a benefit which it would not have otherwise been entitled to and the benefit is hedged with certain conditions, it is the entirety that has to be accepted or not at all. The benefit cannot be divorced from the conditions attached thereto. There is no merit in the contention put forth on behalf of the relevant 46 appellants. 22. By the judgment and order impugned, the Single Bench found no reason to interfere with the reassessment exercise undertaken by the high-powered committee. As indicated above, the case of eight of the original petitioners has not been espoused in this appeal. In respect of 12 candidates, the contention was that they had been marked erroneously. Such aspect of the matter has been dealt with hereinabove. In respect of the balance 46 candidates, the contention that by virtue of SR 6 or clause 28 of the notification of November 24, 2008, the date of reckoning the upper age-limit should have been January 1, 2003 instead of November 25, 2003 does not hold any water. 23. There is no substance in the appeal and WA No.39 of 2022 is hereby dismissed. 24. There will, however, be no order as to costs.