JUDGMENT : 1. The show-cause notices issued by the Additional District Magistrate, Sitapur, Respondent 2 herein, under Section 3 (1) of the Uttar Pradesh Control of Goondas Act, 1970 (for short the 'Act') are under challenge in the present writ petition. 2. Ms. Rupa Mishra, Advocate holding brief of Shri Suryakant Tripathi, the learned counsel for the Petitioners has contended that the notices have been issued on the basis of two criminal cases; it is contended that Section 2(b)(i) defines 'Goonda' to mean a person who either by himself or as member or leader of a gang, habitually commits or attempts to commit, or abets the commission of an offence punishable under Section 153 or 153-B or Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code or Chapter XV, or Chapter XVI, Chapter XVII, or Chapter XXII of the said code; that only on the basis of two criminal cases, it cannot be said that the petitioner is a person, who habitually commits the aforesaid offences. It is contended that the general nature of the material allegations against the Petitioners in respect of Clauses (a) (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act have not been mentioned in the notices and as such the said notices are illegal. 3. Ms. Ruhi Siddiqui, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the State-Respondents on the other hand has raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the writ petition. The counsel contends that the Petitioners have yet to appear before Respondent 2 and show-cause; the writ petition at this stage, is premature and should not be entertained. 4. At this juncture, it is relevant to keep in mind the observations made by the Apex Court, though in a slightly different context in Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board vs. Ramesh Kumar Singh, (1996) 1 SCC 327 . Paragarph 10 of the said report reads as under: - "10. We are concerned in this case, with the entertainment of the Writ Petition against a show cause notice issued by a competent statutory authority. It should be borne in mind that there is no attack against the vires of the statutory provisions governing the matter. No question of infringement of any fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution is alleged or proved. It cannot be said that Ext. It should be borne in mind that there is no attack against the vires of the statutory provisions governing the matter. No question of infringement of any fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution is alleged or proved. It cannot be said that Ext. P-4 notice is ex facie a ‘nullity’ or totally “without jurisdiction” in the traditional sense of that expression — that is to say, that even the commencement or initiation of the proceedings, on the face of it and without anything more, is totally unauthorised. In such a case, for entertaining a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against a show-cause notice, at that stage, it should be shown that the authority has no power or jurisdiction, to enter upon the enquiry in question. In all other cases, it is only appropriate that the party should avail of the alternate remedy and show cause against the same before the authority concerned and take up the objection regarding jurisdiction also, then. In the event of an adverse decision, it will certainly be open to him to assail the same either in appeal or revision, as the case may be, or in appropriate cases, by invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India." (emphasis supplied) 5. In Kabir Chawla vs. State of U.P. and others, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 274, while dealing with a challenge to a notice issued under Section (3)(1) of the Act, the Apex Court has held as under : "The Petitioner has made a grievance in relation to the proceedings that have been initiated against him by the District Magistrate, Nainital, by the show-cause notice dated March 10, 1993 under Section 3 (1) of the U.P. Control of Goondas Act, 1970. The petitioner states that he has submitted his reply to the show-cause notice but no final order has been made so far and that he has to appear before the District Magistrate. The petitioner, however, prays that the said proceedings may be quashed. We do not find any ground for quashing the said proceedings at this stage. The matter is under consideration before the District Magistrate. It is open to the petitioner to satisfy the District Magistrate that no ground has been made out for passing the order against him. The petitioner, however, prays that the said proceedings may be quashed. We do not find any ground for quashing the said proceedings at this stage. The matter is under consideration before the District Magistrate. It is open to the petitioner to satisfy the District Magistrate that no ground has been made out for passing the order against him. In the writ petition the petitioner has not made out a case that in issuing the show-cause notice the District Magistrate was actuated by mala fides. There is, therefore, no reason to assume that the District Magistrate would not give a fair consideration to the matter. We are, therefore, unable to accept the submissions of the petitioner in this regard." (emphasis supplied) 6. In Ballabh Chaubey vs. Additional District Magistrate (Finance), Mathura and another 1997 All LJ 1630, a Division Bench of this Court considered the question of maintainability of a writ petition at the stage of notice under Section 3 of the Act and after taking into account the provisions of the Act and a catena of decisions of the Apex Court as well as of this Court, dismissed the writ petition on the ground of availability of alternative remedy. Paragraphs 7A to 11 of the said report are extracted below : "7A. The detention laws like National Security Act, or Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act make serious in road in the liberty of a person. Under these laws a person is detained without any prior notice and that too on the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority which satisfaction cannot be challenged on merits. The person detained gets only a right to make representation against his detention but that too after he has been detained and he has been deprived of his liberty. The decision of the representation naturally takes time. The principle that the machinery provided by the Act should not be permitted to be bypassed by taking recourse to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution prior to execution of the detention order was reiterated even in such cases. The decision of the representation naturally takes time. The principle that the machinery provided by the Act should not be permitted to be bypassed by taking recourse to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution prior to execution of the detention order was reiterated even in such cases. In Additional Secretary to Government of India v. Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia, 1991 (1) JT 549 , the submission on behalf of the detaining authority is noticed in para 25 of the Report which is as under : “It was contended by Sri Sibbal, learned Additional Solicitor General, on behalf of the appellants that since the detention law is constitutionally valid, the order passed under it can be challenged only in accordance with the provisions of, and the procedure laid down, by it. In this respect there is no distinction between the orders passed under the detention laws and those passed under other laws. Hence, the High Court under Article 226 of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution should not exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction in a manner which will enable a party to by-pass the machinery provided by the law.” The Court after considering the submissions of the parties held as follows in para 30: “…………… The power under Articles 226 and 32 are wide, and are untrammelled by any external restrictions and can reach any executive order resulting in, civil or criminal consequences. However, the Courts have over the years evolved certain self-restraints for exercising these powers. They have done so in the interests of the administration of justice and for better and more efficient and informed exercise of the said powers. These self-imposed restraints are not confined to the review of the orders passed under detention law only. They extend to the orders passed and decisions made under all laws. It is in pursuance of this self-evolved judicial policy and in conformity with the self-imposed internal restrictions that the Courts insist that the aggrieved person first allow the due operation and implementation of the concerned law and exhaust the remedies provided by it before approaching the High Court and this Court to evoke their discretionary extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 32 respectively. That jurisdiction by its very nature is to be used sparingly and in circumstances where no other efficacious remedy is available…………” This decision has been subsequently followed in N.K. Bapna v. Union of India, 1992 (4) JT 49 , State of Tamil Nadu v. P.K. Shamsuddin, 1992 (4) JT 179 : ( AIR 1992 SC 1937 ) and Subhash Mujimal Gandhi v. L. Miningliana, 1994 (6) SCC 14 : (1994 AIR SCW 4975). The provisions of detention laws are far more stringent than the Control of Goondas Act as here order is passed after notice and trial and the person against whom order is passed does not lose his liberty. He is merely deprived of his right to live in a particular area from where he is externed but is free to reside any where else in the country. There is no reason why the same principle should not apply in the present case as well. The law being well settled that where a Statute provides a machinery of its own, the aggrieved person should first exhaust the remedies provided under the Statutes before approaching the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and the High Court would not normally entertain a petition straightway, the present petition challenging the notice is liable to be rejected on the ground of alternative remedy. 8. In Raja Sukhnandan v. State, AIR 1972 All 498 : (1972 All LJ 537), the writ petition was filed at the stage of notice. The Division Bench examined the contention based upon the constitutional validity of U.P. Control of Goondas Act but refused to consider the submission regarding illegality of the notice on the ground that the same could be agitated before the District Magistrate and if the decision went against the petitioner, in appeal before the Commissioner. In Kabir Chawla v. State of U.P., 1994 SCC (Cri) 577 the validity of the notice u/S. 3 of the Act was assailed but the Supreme Court declined to go into this question on the ground that the petitioner could satisfy the District Magistrate who was seized of the matter. In Kabir Chawla v. State of U.P., 1994 SCC (Cri) 577 the validity of the notice u/S. 3 of the Act was assailed but the Supreme Court declined to go into this question on the ground that the petitioner could satisfy the District Magistrate who was seized of the matter. It may be mentioned here that in all the cases where validity of notice issued under similar Statute relating to externment of Goondas was assailed before the Supreme Court, the matter had been taken in appeal against final orders of externment (see Gurucharan Singh v. State of Bombay, AIR 1952 SC 221 , Hari Khenu Gawli v. Dy. Commissioner of Police, AIR 1956 SC 559 : (1956 Cri LJ 1104); Bhagubhaj v. District Magistrate, AIR 1956 SC 585 : (1956 Cri LJ 1126) and State of Gujarat v. Mehboob Khan, AIR 1968 SC 1468 : 1969 Cri LJ 26. 9. There is another reason for not entertaining the writ petition at the stage of notice. As the preamble of the Act shows it has been enacted to make special provisions for the Control and Suppression of Goondas with a view to the maintenance of Public Order. The provisions of the Act are intended to prevent further mischief by a Goonda and not to secure his conviction in a pending case. If a person is permitted to challenge the notice at the initial stage and seek stay of the proceedings the very purpose for which notice is issued and the law under which it is issued will be frustrated as the externment order remains in operation only for a limited period. 10. Learned counsel has next submitted that in Ramji Pandey v. State of U.P., 1981 All LJ 897 : 1981 All LJ 897 writ petition had been filed challenging the notice under Section 3 of the Act and the writ petition was allowed by a Full Bench of this Court and therefore the present petition also deserves to be entertained. The judgment of the Full Bench shows that the question whether writ petition should be entertained against a notice was not at all considered. The only question which was canvassed and was considered by the Bench was whether the notice was in accordance with the requirement of Section 3 of the Act. The judgment of the Full Bench shows that the question whether writ petition should be entertained against a notice was not at all considered. The only question which was canvassed and was considered by the Bench was whether the notice was in accordance with the requirement of Section 3 of the Act. No such argument that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be entertained at the stage of notice seems to have been canvassed and therefore no decision has been given on this point. It is what settled that a decision is an authority for when it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made in it. (See M/s Orient Paper and Industries Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1991 SC 672 para 19). Doctrine of precedent is limited to the decision itself and as to what is necessarily involved in it. Judicial authority belongs not to the exact words used in this or that judgment, nor even to all reasons given, but only to the principle accepted and applied as necessary grounds of decision see Krishna Kumar v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 207 : (1990 Lab IC 1490 paras 18 and 19). The Full Bench having not, considered the question of maintainability of the writ petition at the stage of notice the decision rendered by it cannot be held to be an authority or binding (sic) precedent for holding the writ petition to be maintainable. 11. In view of the reasons discussed above the, writ petitions are dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy." (emphasis supplied) 7. The validity of Section 3 of the Act has been considered by this Court in Raja v. State, 1972 All LJ 537 and in Harsh Narain v. District Magistrate, 1972 All LJ 762. In both of these cases, the two Division Benches have upheld the validity of the Act. 8. It is not the case of the Petitioners that Respondent 2 has no power or jurisdiction to issue the show-cause notice. The matter is under consideration before Respondent 2. It is open to the Petitioners to show to Respondent 2 that on merits no case is made out against them. 8. It is not the case of the Petitioners that Respondent 2 has no power or jurisdiction to issue the show-cause notice. The matter is under consideration before Respondent 2. It is open to the Petitioners to show to Respondent 2 that on merits no case is made out against them. If an order is passed against the Petitioners it would be subject to an appeal to the Commissioner. We, therefore, do not think it appropriate to consider the matter on merits in this proceeding. 9. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy.