JUDGMENT 1. The petitioner has come before this Court with this application under Section 482 Cr.PC seeking to quash the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 44(S) of 2019 pending before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, Shillong. 2. The petitioner is a permanent resident of Lalpura, Rampara, Nava Yard, Chhani Road, Nizampura, District, Vadodara, Gujarat and is the Chairman of the Orion Education Trust. 3. It is the case of the petitioner that the William Carey University a State recognized Private University, sponsored/owned by the ACTS Group of Institutions, was facing severe financial crisis has accordingly entered into an understanding with the Orion Education Trust to hand over the management and administration of the said University to the Trust. A Memorandum of Understanding dated 12.10.2017 was drawn up in this regard. 4. The petitioner as the Chairman of the Orion Education Trust has also issued authorization letter to all concerned to the effect that the respondent herein was duly entrusted with the task to Liaison with governmental authorities and to undertake such activities, so as to facilitate the effective transition of all administrative control from Agriculture Crafts Trades and Studies (ACTS). For his services, the respondent would be paid by the petitioner. 5. The petitioner has then stated that the respondent has alleged that the petitioner has issued a cheque for Rs. 5,00,000,000/- (Rupees five crore) only bearing No. 000013 dated 13.10.2018 drawn on Kotak Mahindra Bank, Vadodara Branch in favour of the respondent for services rendered. The respondent has also deposited the said cheque in his ICICI Bank account, at Laitumkhrah, Shillong, East Khasi Hills on 07.12.2018, but the cheque was dishonored with the endorsement 'Insufficient funds'. 6. The respondent then caused issue of a demand notice under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act (N.I. Act) on 19.12.2018, the said notice being sent by registered post AD which was received by the petitioner on 27.12.2018. 7. The respondent then filed the complaint case before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Shillong registered as C.R. Case No. 44(S) of 2019 for the offence under Sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act as well as under Section 420 IPC. 8. 7. The respondent then filed the complaint case before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Shillong registered as C.R. Case No. 44(S) of 2019 for the offence under Sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act as well as under Section 420 IPC. 8. The petitioner has also averred that in response to the notice issued by the respondent under Section 138 N.I. Act, the petitioner has replied to the same on 21.12.2018 stating specifically that since the respondent was allowed to look after the affairs of the Trust, for the purpose of expending the day-to-day requirements of the Trust. In this connection, the petitioner has issued several blank signed cheques to the respondent. 9. The petitioner was however surprised to receive a message from the Kotak Mahindra Bank on 08.12.2018 informing him of cheque for rupees five crore was deposited in the Bank by the respondent. The Bank was immediately requested to stop payment of the same. 10. The petitioner has reiterated that the said cheque was never issued to the respondent, but that he has misused the blank cheques given to him for another purpose as aforesaid. In the said notice dated 21.12.2018, the respondent was also requested to return the said cheque, but he did not response to the notice. 11. The petitioner then lodged an FIR against the respondent on 05.05.2019 before the Gotri Police Station, Vadodara which was registered as C.R. No 1-70 of 2019 under Section 406/420/465/467/471/506(2) and 511 IPC. 12. The petitioner has then entered appearance before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate at Shillong in the said case filed by the respondent and has raised the issue of maintainability for non-joinder of necessary parties. 13. Heard Mr. H.L. Shangreiso, learned Sr. counsel for the petitioner who has contended that the petitioner as Chairman of the said Orion Education Trust simply discharged his duties as such and not in his personal capacity, non impleadment of the Trust as a party to the complaint has struck at the root of the maintainability of the said complaint. 14. It is submitted that in this case, the Orion Education Trust is a registered Public Trust under the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950. As per the Trust Deed, the petitioner is the Settler of the Trust and there are also three other Trustees, namely; i) Mr. Gaurav Mahendrabhai Gupta, ii) Mr. 14. It is submitted that in this case, the Orion Education Trust is a registered Public Trust under the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950. As per the Trust Deed, the petitioner is the Settler of the Trust and there are also three other Trustees, namely; i) Mr. Gaurav Mahendrabhai Gupta, ii) Mr. Mehul Rasiklal Thakkar and iii) Mr. Sunil Dineshchandra Agarwal. Therefore, any liability incurred in course of functioning of the Trust will be that of the Trust and not of an individual Trustee or of the petitioner in this case, even though he is the Chairman of the said Trust. 15. The provision of Section 141 of the N.I. Act requires that if an offence under Section 138 of the Act was committed by a company, then not only will the person or persons who are in charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of its business will be impleaded as accused, but even the company itself has to be made an accused in the case. In this regard, nothing is said that the petitioner was in charge of the conduct of the business of the Trust in question and neither was the Trust made an accused, therefore, on this ground alone, the complaint of the respondent is not maintainable. 16. To support his contention, the learned Sr. counsel has cited the case of Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours Private Limited: (2012) 5 SCC 661 para 59 & 64. 17. Another case in this regard was cited by the learned Sr. counsel being the case of Himanshu v. B. Shivamurthy & Anr: (2019) 3 SCC 797 wherein at para 11,12,13 & 14, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if the complaint was lodged only against the appellant without arraigning the company as an accused, the complaint against the appellant who is the Director of the said company is not maintainable. 18. On the question as to whether a Trust can be considered as a legal entity or not to be deemed to be a company within the meaning of Section 141 of the N. I. Act, the learned Sr. counsel has referred to the case of M/s Abraham Memorial Educational Trust which is a Trust and 7 others who are all Trustee of the said Abraham Trust v. C. Suresh Babu, in Crl. OP Nos. counsel has referred to the case of M/s Abraham Memorial Educational Trust which is a Trust and 7 others who are all Trustee of the said Abraham Trust v. C. Suresh Babu, in Crl. OP Nos. 12630 & 12661 of 2012 who is the complainant who was issued with cheques which were dishonoured has filed a complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act arraying the Trust as an accused and the Trustees as those responsible for the affairs of the Trust. On being challenged by the Trust and its Trustees, the Hon'ble Madras High Court has held at para 66 and 67 of the said judgment that a Trust, either private or public/charitable or otherwise, is a juristic person who is liable for punishment for an offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. 19. Another ground taken by the petitioner is that under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, there is a specific provision that the person who is in charge and is responsible for the conduct of the business of the company shall be liable to be proceeded against for committing an offence under Section 138 of the Act. 20. In the complaint petition filed by the respondent, there is no specific averment to the effect that the petitioner is responsible for the conduct of the business of the Trust since there are also three other Trustees who are running and managing the affairs of the Trust. In this regard, the case of K.P.G. Nair v. Jindal Menthol India Ltd: (2001) 10 SCC 218 , para 9 and the case of S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd v. Neeta Bhalla & Anr: (2005) 8 SCC 89 para 17 & 18 was referred to by the learned Sr. counsel for the petitioner to support this contention. 21. Mr. A. Khan, learned counsel for the respondent in reply to the argument advanced by the petitioner has submitted that under Section 141 of the N.I. Act, a company can be made an accused in a case under Section 138 of the said Act and the 'Explanation' to the said section clarifies that 'Company' means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals. However, in the light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Madras High Court in the case of M/s Abraham Memorial Educational Trust (supra), wherein it was held that a Trust is a juristic person, therefore a Trust can be impleaded as an accused. 22. If this proposition is accepted by this Court, Mr. Khan has then submitted that the respondent/complainant may be allowed to implead the Trust as an accused in the complaint, for which an application for amendment of the said complaint will be filed before the learned Magistrate. As to the provision for amendment of the complaint, the case of S.R. Sukumar v. S. Sunaad Raghuram: AIR 2015 SC 2757 was cited and the relevant para being 17, 18 & 19 was referred to, the same being reproduced herein as follows:- '17. Insofar as merits of the contention regarding allowing of amendment application, it is true that there is no specific provision in the Code to amend either a complaint or a petition filed under the provisions of the Code, but the Courts have held that the petitions seeking such amendment to correct curable infirmities can be allowed even in respect of complaints. In U.P. Pollution Control Board v. Modi Distillery And Ors., (1987) 3 SCC 684 , wherein the name of the company was wrongly mentioned in the complaint that is, instead of Modi Industries Ltd. the name of the company was mentioned as Modi Distillery and the name was sought to be amended. In such factual background, this Court has held as follows:- 'The learned Single Judge has focused his attention only on the technical flaw in the complaint and has failed to comprehend that the flaw had occurred due to the recalcitrant attitude of Modi Distillery and furthermore the infirmity is one which could be easily removed by having the matter remitted to the Chief Judicial Magistrate with a direction to call upon the appellant to make the formal amendments to the averments contained in para 2 of the complaint so as to make the controlling company of the industrial unit figure as the concerned accused in the complaint. All that has to be done is the making of a formal application for amendment by the appellant for leave to amend by substituting the name of Modi Industries Limited, the company owning the industrial unit, in place of Modi Distillery. All that has to be done is the making of a formal application for amendment by the appellant for leave to amend by substituting the name of Modi Industries Limited, the company owning the industrial unit, in place of Modi Distillery. Furthermore, the legal infirmity is of such a nature which could be easily cured...' 18. What is discernible from the U.P. Pollution Control Board's case is that easily curable legal infirmity could be cured by means of a formal application for amendment. If the amendment sought to be made relates to a simple infirmity which is curable by means of a formal amendment and by allowing such amendment, no prejudice could be caused to the other side, notwithstanding the fact that there is no enabling provision in the Code for entertaining such amendment, the Court may permit such an amendment to be made. On the contrary, if the amendment sought to be made in the complaint does not relate either to a curable infirmity or the same cannot be corrected by a formal amendment or if there is likelihood of prejudice to the other side, then the Court shall not allow such amendment in the complaint. 19. In the instant case, the amendment application was filed on 24.05.2007 to carry out the amendment by adding paras 11(a) and 11 (b). Though, the proposed amendment was not a formal amendment, but a substantial one, the Magistrate allowed the amendment application mainly on the ground that no cognizance was taken of the complaint before the disposal of amendment application. Firstly, Magistrate was yet to apply the judicial mind to the contents of the complaint and had not taken cognizance of the matter. Secondly, since summons was yet to be ordered to be issued to the accused, no prejudice would be caused to the accused. Thirdly, the amendment did not change the original nature of the complaint being one for defamation. Fourthly, the publication of poem 'Khalnayakaru' being in the nature of subsequent event created a new cause of action in favour of the respondent which could have been prosecuted by the respondent by filing a separate complaint and therefore to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, the trial court allowed the amendment application. Fourthly, the publication of poem 'Khalnayakaru' being in the nature of subsequent event created a new cause of action in favour of the respondent which could have been prosecuted by the respondent by filing a separate complaint and therefore to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, the trial court allowed the amendment application. Considering these factors which weighed in the mind of the courts below, in our view, the High Court rightly declined to interfere with the order passed by the Magistrate allowing the amendment application and the impugned order does not suffer from any serious infirmity warranting interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.' 23. The learned counsel has further relied on two other judgments, that is, the case of Sarabjit Singh v. State of NCT of Delhi & Ors. where in an order dated 18.10.2018, the Hon'ble High Court had allowed notice under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to be issued upon the company/second respondent as an additional accused, apparently on the company not being named in the array of accused in the complaint under Section 138 N.I. Act. Similarly, the case of Mrs. Manjula Kapoor v. State of H.P. & Anr: 2016 SCC OnLine HP 2124 was also cited in which the Hon'ble Himachal Pradesh High Court at para 11 of the said judgment has directed the Magistrate to implead the company as an accused and to issue notice under Section 319 Cr.P.C. 24. In view of the above, the learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the Trust may be impleaded as accused as the omission thereof in the proceedings before the Trial Court is a curable defect and that notice under Section 319 Cr.P.C. be allowed to be issued. 25. From the submission and contention of the parties what could be understood is that the petitioner has assailed the proceedings before the Trial Court on two grounds, firstly, that the Trust which is the body incorporate to which the petitioner as the Chairman and Trustee is answerable and as such, any act purportedly done in furtherance of the objectives of the said Trust is done for and on behalf of the Trust and as such, the alleged cheque issued by the petitioner being done in the name of the Trust, proceedings under Section 138 N.I. Act has to include the Trust as a party. Secondly, that the respondent has filed the complaint before the Trial Court against the petitioner in his capacity as the Chairman of the said Orion Education Trust, but no specific averments has been made stating that he is in charge of, and was responsible to the Trust for the conduct of the business of the Trust and on this ground alone the complaint would fail for non-joinder of proper and necessary parties. 26. As to the status of the Trust in these proceedings, the learned counsel for the petitioner citing the case of M/s Abraham Memorial Educational Trust & Ors v. C. Suresh Babu: Crl. OP Nos. 12630 & 12661 of 2012 wherein, the Hon'ble Madras High Court while elaborating on the words 'association of individuals' as found in explanation (a) to Section 141 of the N. I. Act, has concluded that a Trust having two or more person will fall within the ambit of 'association of individuals' and thus, such a Trust is a company, has contended that the Orion Education Trust can therefore be regarded as a company and in view of Section 141 the Trust invariably has to be arrayed as an accused in the said complaint. 27. This proposition of law was not disputed by the learned counsel for the respondent and this Court on an overall appreciation of the principle stated is also in respectful agreement with the findings of the Hon'ble Madras High Court in this regard. 28. It follows suit that, the Trust being in the nature of a company the respondent ought to have impleaded the same as a party or an accused in the complaint which was not done so. However, in answer to this, the learned counsel for the respondent has referred to the case of S. R. Sukumar (supra) to say that in this case, the court considering the issue of amendment of a complaint or petition the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that easily curable legal infirmity could be cured by means of a formal application for amendment. If the amendment sought to be made relates to a simple infirmity which is curable by means of a formal amendment and by allowing such amendment, no prejudice could be cause to the other side, notwithstanding the fact that there is no enabling provision in the Code for entertaining such amendment, the court may permit such an amendment to be made. 29. It is stressed by the respondent that he may be allowed to file a petition for amendment of the complaint before the Trial Court to implead the Trust as a party and if allowed, such amendment would cause no prejudice to the petitioner. 30. The learned counsel for the respondent has also argued before this Court that taking recourse to the provision of Section 319 Cr.P.C, the Trial Court may be directed to issue summons to the Trust in question and to implead the said Trust as a party in the proceedings. The authority in the case of Mrs. Manjula Kapoor (supra) was cited, wherein the Hon'ble High Court on being made aware that the in a complaint case under Section 138 N. I. Act, the complainant therein had proceeded against the petitioner as a representative of the company but the company was not impleaded as a party. On consideration of the arguments of the parties, the Court directed that the Trial Court cause issue of show cause notice suo motu to the company in question under Section 319 Cr.PC and thereafter, to implead the said company as a co-accused in the case. 31. In this case too, it is submitted that the respondent/complainant may be allowed to file an application for impleadment of the Trust and for issue of notice under Section 319 Cr.P.C. 32. Before answering the question as to whether the Trust is required to be impleaded in the proceedings before the Trial Court, the issue as to whether the petitioner has been named as a person who was in charge and responsible for the conduct of the business of the Trust and was impleaded in the complaint as such, has to be answered in the first instance. 33. 33. The fact that the respondent is aware that the petitioner is the Chairman of the said Orion Education Trust is apparent inasmuch as, he was designated as a representative of the said Trust to handle the affairs of the Trust at Shillong, therefore, the respondent cannot plead ignorance as to the role of the petitioner in the Trust. As contended by the learned Sr. counsel for the petitioner there is no specific averment in the complaint indicating that the petitioner/accused is in charge and responsible for the affairs of the Trust. This according to the learned Sr. counsel strikes at the very root of the complaint and on this ground alone the complaint proceedings have to be quashed. 34. In the case of S. M. S Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (supra) at para 10, 17 and 18 a three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:- '10. While analysing Section 141 of the Act, it will be seen that it operates in cases where an offence under Section 138 is committed by a company. The key words which occur in the Section are 'every person'. These are general words and take every person connected with a company within their sweep. Therefore, these words have been rightly qualified by use of the words: 'who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence etc.' What is required is that the persons who are sought to be made criminally liable under Section 141 should be, at the time the offence was committed, in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company. Every person connected with the company shall not fall within the ambit of the provision. It is only those persons who were in charge of and responsible for conduct of business of the company at the time of commission of an offence, who will be liable for criminal action. It follows from this that if a director of a Company who was not in charge of and was not responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time, will not be liable under the provision. It follows from this that if a director of a Company who was not in charge of and was not responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time, will not be liable under the provision. The liability arises from being in charge of and responsible for conduct of business of the company at the relevant time when the offence was committed and not on the basis of merely holding a designation or office in a company. Conversely, a person not holding any office or designation in a Company may be liable if he satisfies the main requirement of being in charge of and responsible for conduct of business of a Company at the relevant time. Liability depends on the role one plays in the affairs of a Company and not on designation or status. If being a Director or Manager or Secretary was enough to cast criminal liability, the Section would have said so. Instead of 'every person' the section would have said 'every director, manager or secretary in a company is liable'...etc. The legislature is aware that it is a case of criminal liability which means serious consequences so far as the person sought to be made liable is concerned. Therefore, only persons who can be said to be connected with the commission of a crime at the relevant time have been subjected to action. 17. K.P.G. Nair v. Jindal Menthol India Ltd. (2001) 10 SCC 218 , was a case under the Negotiable Instruments Act. It was found that the allegations in the complaint did not in express words or with reference to the allegations contained therein make out a case that at the time of commission of the offence, the appellant was in charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. It was held that requirement of Section 141 was not met and the complaint against the accused was quashed. Similar was the position in Katta Sujatha v. Fertilizers & Chemicals Travancore Ltd. (2002) 7 SCC 655 . This was a case of a partnership. It was held that requirement of Section 141 was not met and the complaint against the accused was quashed. Similar was the position in Katta Sujatha v. Fertilizers & Chemicals Travancore Ltd. (2002) 7 SCC 655 . This was a case of a partnership. It was found that no allegations were contained in the complaint regarding the fact that the accused was a partner in charge of and was responsible to the firm for the conduct of business of the firm nor was there any allegation that the offence was made with the consent and connivance or that it was attributable to any neglect on the part of the accused. It was held that no case was made out against the accused who was a partner and the complaint was quashed. The latest in the line is the judgment of this Court in Monaben Ketanbhai Shah v. State of Gujarat (2004) 7 SCC 15. It was observed as under: '4. It is not necessary to reproduce the language of Section 141 verbatim in the complaint since the complaint is required to be read as a whole. If the substance of the allegations made in the complaint fulfil the requirements of Section 141, the complaint has to proceed and is required to be tried with. It is also true that in construing a complaint a hyper-technical approach should not be adopted so as to quash the same. The laudable object of preventing bouncing of cheques and sustaining the credibility of commercial transactions resulting in enactment of Sections 138 and 141 has to be borne in mind. These provisions create a statutory presumption of dishonesty, exposing a person to criminal liability if payment is not made within the statutory period even after issue of notice. It is also true that the power of quashing is required to be exercised very sparingly and where, read as a whole, factual foundation for the offence has been laid in the complaint, it should not be quashed. All the same, it is also to be remembered that it is the duty of the court to discharge the accused if taking everything stated in the complaint as correct and construing the allegations made therein liberally in favour of the complainant, the ingredients of the offence are altogether lacking. All the same, it is also to be remembered that it is the duty of the court to discharge the accused if taking everything stated in the complaint as correct and construing the allegations made therein liberally in favour of the complainant, the ingredients of the offence are altogether lacking. The present case falls in this category as would be evident from the facts noticed hereinafter.' It was further observed: '6 The criminal liability has been fastened on those who, at the time of the commission of the offence, were in charge of and were responsible to the firm for the conduct of the business of the firm. These may be sleeping partners who are not required to take any part in the business of the firm; they may be ladies and others who may not know anything about the business of the firm. The primary responsibility is on the complainant to make necessary averments in the complaint so as to make the accused vicariously liable. For fastening the criminal liability, there is no presumption that every partner knows about the transaction. The obligation of the appellants to prove that at the time the offence was committed they were not in charge of and were not responsible to the firm for the conduct of the business of the firm, would arise only when first the complainant makes necessary averments in the complaint and establishes that fact. The present case is of total absence of requisite averments in the complaint.' 18. To sum up, there is almost unanimous judicial opinion that necessary averments ought to be contained in a complaint before a persons can be subjected to criminal process. A liability under Section 141 of the Act is sought to be fastened vicariously on a person connected with a Company, the principal accused being the company itself. It is a departure from the rule in criminal law against vicarious liability. A clear case should be spelled out in the complaint against the person sought to be made liable. Section 141 of the Act contains the requirements for making a person liable under the said provision. That respondent falls within parameters of Section 141 has to be spelled out. A complaint has to be examined by the Magistrate in the first instance on the basis of averments contained therein. Section 141 of the Act contains the requirements for making a person liable under the said provision. That respondent falls within parameters of Section 141 has to be spelled out. A complaint has to be examined by the Magistrate in the first instance on the basis of averments contained therein. If the Magistrate is satisfied that there are averments which bring the case within Section 141, he would issue the process. We have seen that merely being described as a director in a company is not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Section 141. Even a non-director can be liable under Section 141 of the Act. The averments in the complaint would also serve the purpose that the person sought to be made liable would know what is the case which is alleged against him. This will enable him to meet the case at the trial.' 35. This Court need not go further than this to be convinced that there must be a specific averment in the complaint to the extent indicating that the petitioner herein was in charge and responsible for the affairs of the Trust. Since this material fact has not been indicated in the complaint, though an attempt has been made by the respondent/complainant to show that the petitioner is the Chairman of the Trust at the relevant period, nothing is said about him being in charge and responsible for the conduct of the Trust. The requirements of Section 141 N.I. Act has therefore not been met by the respondent and on this ground alone, the proceedings before the Trial Court are liable to be quashed. 36. As to whether the company or the Trust in this case has to be arrayed as an accused in the proceedings has also been answered in the positive, since it is a clear mandate of Section 138 of the Act. Failure to arraign the Trust as an accused in the complaint, would render the proceedings therein ineffectual. The case of Aneeta Hada (supra), at para 58, 59 & 65 referred to by the petitioner is relevant in this regard. The same is reproduced below as: - '58. Applying the doctrine of strict construction, we are of the considered opinion that commission of offence by the company is an express condition precedent to attract the vicarious liability of others. The same is reproduced below as: - '58. Applying the doctrine of strict construction, we are of the considered opinion that commission of offence by the company is an express condition precedent to attract the vicarious liability of others. Thus, the words 'as well as the company' appearing in the section make it absolutely unmistakably clear that when the company can be prosecuted, then only the persons mentioned in the other categories could be vicariously liable for the offence subject to the averments in the petition and proof thereof. One cannot be oblivious of the fact that the company is a juristic person and it has its own respectability. If a finding is recorded against it, it would create a concavity in its reputation. There can be situations when the corporate reputation is affected when a Director is indicted. 59. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we arrive at the irresistible conclusion that for maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning of a company as an accused is imperative. The other categories of offenders can only be brought in the drag-net on the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the provision itself. We say so on the basis of the ratio laid down in C.V. Parekh (1970) 3 SCC 491 , which is a three-Judge Bench decision. Thus, the view expressed in Sheoratan Agarwal (1984) 4 SCC 352 , does not correctly lay down the law and, accordingly, is hereby overruled. The decision in Anil Hada (2000) 1 SCC 1 is overruled with the qualifier as stated in para 51. The decision in Modi Distillery (1987) 3 SCC 684 , has to be treated to be restricted to its own facts as has been explained by us hereinabove. 65. Before we part with the case, we must record our uninhibited and unreserved appreciation for the able assistance rendered by the learned counsel for the parties and the learned amicus curiae.' 37. As to the contention of the respondent relying on the case of S.R. Sukumar (supra), that impleadment can be allowed by way of an amendment to the petition/complaint, the learned Sr. As to the contention of the respondent relying on the case of S.R. Sukumar (supra), that impleadment can be allowed by way of an amendment to the petition/complaint, the learned Sr. counsel for the petitioner has pointed out that as per para 4 of the said judgment, it would appear that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has arrived at the conclusion so mentioned, since it was noticed that there is already an application seeking for amendment of the complaint already on record. However, the fact remains that such an application has not been preferred by the respondent/complainant since he has chosen to cement this point by referring to the case of Mrs. Manjula Kapoor (supra) wherein, direction for suo motu impleadment of the company as accused was made. 38. In such a situation, the above contention of the respondent cannot be sustained, since an explanation in this regard could be seen from a case dealt by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on similar facts and circumstances, in the case of Pawan Kumar Goyal v. State of UP & Anr: Criminal Appeal No. 1999 of 2022, wherein vide Order dated 17.11.2022 at para 23 of the same the Court has held as follows: - '23. In view of the above, arguments advanced by learned counsel for the appellant that an additional accused can be impleaded subsequent to the filing of the complaint merits no consideration, once the limitation prescribed for taking cognizance of the offence under Section 142 of NI Act has expired. More particularly, in view of the fact that neither any effort was made by the petitioner at any stage of the proceedings to arraign the company as an accused nor any such circumstances or reason has been pointed out to enable the Court to exercise the power conferred by proviso to Section 142, to condone the delay for not making the complaint within the prescribed period of limitation.' 39. The proposition as noticed above can be applied to the case of the parties herein and in doing so, this Court would say that since the respondent being aware of the fact that a Trust is involved, the alleged cheque issued by the petitioner being on behalf of the said Trust, failure to implead the Trust as an accused at the relevant time and failure to file any application seeking amendment of the complaint to this effect at the relevant time, has therefore resulted in the proceedings to fall foul of the provisions of Section 141 of the N.I. Act which cannot be cured at this stage. 40. In the light of the above observations and findings, this Court finds that this petition deserves to be considered and allowed and the same is hereby done so. 41. In view thereof, the petition is allowed. The proceedings in C.R Case No. 44(S) of 2019 as well as the summon order dated 11.02.2019 is hereby set aside and quashed. 42. Petition disposed of. Parties to bear their own costs.

Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal v. Sankar Padam Thapa