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2022 DIGILAW 309 (JK)

Virender Salgotra v. Union of India

2022-07-01

RAJNESH OSWAL

body2022
JUDGMENT : OW104 No.27/2016 (O&M) This petition has been filed under Section 104 of the Constitution of the Jammu and Kashmir (now 227 of the Constitution of India) for quashing the order dated 15.03.2016 passed by the learned District Judge, Udhampur (hereinafter to be referred as the appellate court) whereby appeal filed by the petitioners against the order dated 20.01.2016 passed by the Sub Judge, Udhampur dismissing the application for grant of temporary injunction in suit titled, “G. L. Mittal vs Union of India”, has been dismissed, thereby upholding the order dated 20.01.2016. 2. The petitioners have impugned the order dated 15.03.2016 on the grounds that learned appellate court has exercised the jurisdiction in an illegal manner by ignoring vital documentary evidence, that clearly demonstrated that there was relationship of lessor and lessee between the parties. Further even if it is assumed that there was relationship of licensor and licensee between the parties, even then the license was irrevocable in nature. 3. The respondents have filed the objections, wherein besides raising preliminary objections with regard to the maintainability of the petition, have stated that the petitioners were the licensees with regard to few shops situated in different areas of 71 Sub-Area, Northern Command Headquarter at Udhampur and were granted licences for a period of 11 months only. The said licence deeds came to be executed as per the standard operating procedure prescribed by the Government of India which authorises all the officers and the units to execute only the licence deed and prescribe various acts and deeds to be done by the licencees which includes the time within which the shops can be opened, the type of business, licence fee and various other acts including the handing over of the premises after the expiry of the licence period. All these conditions make it clear that the respondents could give the shops to the petitioners only on licence basis and there could not be any other meaning, express or hidden, which could be inferred from the said deeds and the acts of the parties. All these conditions make it clear that the respondents could give the shops to the petitioners only on licence basis and there could not be any other meaning, express or hidden, which could be inferred from the said deeds and the acts of the parties. The license deeds, as per section 52 and 54 of the Easements Act make it clear that the deeds were license deeds, which were executed with full knowledge and consent of the petitioners and they were bound to hand over the vacant possession of the shop after the expiry of the licence period and in the absence of any extension. After the expiry of the licence period, the respondents started process for the execution of fresh license deeds and the petitioners were also eligible for participation in tender process but instead of doing so, the petitioners filed the suit before the trial court. It is also submitted that there is no error of fact or law that necessitates the exercise of power under section 104 of then Constitution of J&K, as the judgements of the trial court as well as appellate court are sound judgements. 4. Ms. Zoya Bhardwaj, learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently argued that there is relationship of lessor and lessee between the parties which is substantiated by the notice dated 17.01.2015. She further contented that both the courts have not considered the vital documentary evidence evidencing the relationship of lessor and lessee between the parties. She laid stress that the learned appellate court has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it and as such, the order impugned is required to be set aside. 5. Mr. Vishal Sharma, learned ASGI has vehemently argued that the petitioners were licensees of the respondents and after expiry of license, they have no right to remain in occupation and the respondents in fact want to perpetuate their illegal occupation by filing the suit on the basis of false and frivolous grounds. He further argued that there are concurrent findings of facts by the two courts and there is no jurisdictional error on the part of the appellate court. 6. Heard and perused the record. 7. He further argued that there are concurrent findings of facts by the two courts and there is no jurisdictional error on the part of the appellate court. 6. Heard and perused the record. 7. The facts necessary for the disposal of the present petition are that a suit for declaration was filed by the petitioners to the effect that the petitioners are the lessees/tenants of the respondents and not the licensees with regard to their respective shops situated at Dhruva Shopping Complex (Dhruva Amenities) Chinar, Dhar Road, Tawi Vihar, Jadunath Enclave, Albert Ekka Enclave, Bikram Enclave Complex, Krimchi Complex, Medical Complex Udhampur with consequential relief of permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the respondents as well as their officers/agents from interfering with the smooth running of the business of the petitioners in their respective shops and also restraining them from evicting the petitioners from their respective shops without following due course of law. 8. The said suit was filed on the ground that the petitioners were permitted to occupy the shops as tenants and the licence deeds were merely a camouflage, as from the very beginning the intention of the parties was to create a relationship of lessor and lessee. The petitioners claim to have received the communication dated 17.01.2015 whereby the petitioners were intimated that an additional clause to calculate administrative and maintenance charges will be introduced in the fresh lease with effect from 01.03.2015 and the petitioners were required to intimate their willingness to the inclusion of the additional clause which will be a factor proportional to the profit being earned by the shop and will be introduced to ascertain the net administrative and maintenance charges and it was further stated that in case of no reply, the willingness of the petitioners will be assumed. Later on, the petitioners came across the notice dated 27.02.2015 whereby they were asked to vacate the shops within one month and in “Amar Ujala” newspaper of edition dated 06.03.2015 notice was got published by the respondents thereby inviting applications for allotment of shops. 9. The respondents filed their written statement wherein it was stated that Udhampur, being a disturbed area, there is every security threat to the security forces and any activity inside the premises is fully controlled and restricted by the army security and personnel. 9. The respondents filed their written statement wherein it was stated that Udhampur, being a disturbed area, there is every security threat to the security forces and any activity inside the premises is fully controlled and restricted by the army security and personnel. Special security passes are issued on the request of the licensees to the licensees/petitioners as well as their employees to enter into the licensed premises and nobody is allowed to reside inside the above said premises beyond the stipulated time i.e. from 9 AM to 9 PM on all days except on every Tuesday of each month for maintenance due to normal wear and tear. It was also stated that the petitioners have not challenged the licence deeds entered into between the parties and that the licence deed is purely temporary for a period of 11 months only and the petitioners are allowed to do a particular business activity for 11 months only by way of licence deed and after the expiry of term of 11 months, the respondents have right to seek vacation of the premises and re-allot and utilise the same as per organisational requirement keeping in view the necessity of the troops and their families. It was further stated that after the expiry of the licence period, the respondents were well within their right to issue notice to the petitioners for vacation of the respective shops/premises within the period of 30 days and as such after the period of expiry of licence, the occupation of the petitioners over the said premises/shops is that of trespasser. 10. Along with the said suit, the petitioners also filed an application for grant of interim relief and the learned trial court vide order dated 20.01.2016 dismissed the said application for grant of interim relief and even the appeal filed by the petitioners before the appellate court was also dismissed vide order dated 15th of March 2016. 11. The learned trial court while dismissing the application for grant of interim relief filed by the petitioners has considered the contention of the petitioners that in the notice dated 17.01.2015, the word lease has been mentioned instead of licence. The learned trial court while rejecting the contention of the petitioners has considered the licence deeds executed between the parties and has returned a finding that the intention of the parties was to create a license and not lease. The learned trial court while rejecting the contention of the petitioners has considered the licence deeds executed between the parties and has returned a finding that the intention of the parties was to create a license and not lease. In para 22 of the licence deed, it has been mentioned that the licensee has been allowed to work on the premises from 9 AM to 9 PM for 12 hours and for the remaining period, the possession of the shops remain with the respondents. This is also not in dispute that the period of licence as mentioned in the licence deeds is 11 months and the said period has expired since long. Due to pendency of this petition, the petitioners have remained in occupation for 6 long years. The service of the notice of eviction has not been disputed by the petitioners and the petitioners cannot be allowed to remain in occupation of the premises after the expiry of the licence period only on the basis of the suit filed by the petitioners. The learned trial court has considered in detail all the legal as well as factual aspects of the case and after relying upon the various pronouncements of Apex court, has dismissed the application for grant of interim relief. 12. The perusal of order dated 20.01.2016 reveals that the learned appellate court also has come to the conclusion that the petitioners have miserably failed to make out the prima facie case in their favour to demonstrate that the deeds entered into between the petitioners and respondents were lease deeds and not licence deeds and while returning the said finding the learned appellate court has observed that the terms and conditions of the document would show that the petitioners have been given the shops for the sale of specified items and they have no personal right in the said shops and cannot make any alterations etc in the shops licensed out to them. The shops shall be utilised for the sole purpose of the sale of agreed items and it is a licence deed which is purely temporary for a period of 11 months and gives the petitioners right to come and use the shop whereas its possession and control remain with the respondents. The shops shall be utilised for the sole purpose of the sale of agreed items and it is a licence deed which is purely temporary for a period of 11 months and gives the petitioners right to come and use the shop whereas its possession and control remain with the respondents. Further the appellate court has taken into consideration the other terms and conditions of the licence deed to come to the conclusion that there is relationship of licensor and licensee between the parties. 13. The findings returned by both the trial court as well as the appellate court cannot be termed as perverse or contrary to record. This Court does not find any substance in the submission made by Ms. Bhardwaj that the communication dated 17.01.2015 would show that there was a relationship of lessor and lessee between the parties. The mere use of word “lease” in communication dated 17.01.2015 would not make the petitioners as lessees qua the shops in question. The relationship between the parties is governed by the document that has been executed between the parties and the “tone and tenor” of the said documents would reveal that the intention of the parties was to create a relationship of licensor and licensee and not that of lessor and lessee. Even the licence deed dated 01/04/2014 placed on record along with the present petition would reveal that the duration of the licence is for a period of 11 months only and that gives the right to the licensee to come on the premises for its use for a particular business only. Further the licensee has been permitted to keep the shop open continuously from 900 hours to 2100 hours on all days except every Tuesday. Merely a payment of security of Rs.3000/- against non-payment of MES charges including electricity, water etc. and further payment of Rs.3060/- per month as administrative and maintenance fee would not alter the relationship between the parties. 14. In Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329 , the Apex Court has held that in exercise of its power of superintendence, High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. More so, High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it. High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals and courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. 15. Both the learned trial court as well as the appellate court have rightly come to the conclusion that the petitioners have failed to make out a prima facie case in their favour and the said findings duly substantiated by the reasons, cannot be termed as perverse. Therefore, taking into consideration the law laid down by the Apex Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that there is no jurisdictional error on the part of both the Courts that warrants interference by this Court invoking article 227 of the Constitution of India. Merely, other view may also be possible on the basis of same facts and circumstances of the case, can hardly be a ground to interfere with the discretionary orders passed by the trial court as well as appellate court. 16. Viewed thus, there is no illegality in the order impugned and as such the present petition is dismissed as being devoid of merits. WP (C) No.1853/2019 (O&M) 1. The petitioners claim to have constructed their shops over the vacant pieces of land allotted to them by the respondents in the BD Bari Military Station. It is stated that the petitioners have been running their shops constructed upon the land so allotted to them for the last 10 to 20 years and have been regularly paying the rent to the respondents as per the settled terms and conditions of the agreement. The agreements have been renewed from time to time on yearly basis by the respondents with periodic increase in rent. The agreements have been renewed from time to time on yearly basis by the respondents with periodic increase in rent. It is further stated that identical issue cropped up before this Court as regards interpretation and connotation of the document styled as “Memorandum of Agreement” by way of petition under section 104 bearing No. 95/2015 filed by the similar occupants of 213 Transit Camp, who were sought to be evicted from their shops. This Court vide order dated 03.07.2015 had protected the possession of the petitioners in that case but subsequently the petition was withdrawn. It is also stated that the similar issue arises in this case as regards the interpretation of the terms used in the agreement. The petitioners have now come across the communication dated 30.04.2019 issued by the respondents wherein, under the camouflage to allot these very shops to the ex-servicemen etc, the petitioners are sought to be evicted from their respective shops. The communication appears to be issued on the basis of some communication by the Ministry of Defence dated 17.01.2018. 2. The contents of the communication dated 17.01.2018 nowhere reveal that sitting tenants are to be evicted and thereafter the shops are to be allotted to the disabled soldiers/ex-servicemen etc. The letter dated 30.04.2019 has cast potential threat in the minds of the petitioners that they shall be forcibly evicted from their shops and shall not be allowed entry from either side to B D Bari Military Station. It is also stated that the respondents cannot evict the petitioners on the strength of impugned communication dated 30.04.2019 because they have to follow the law of the land and can seek the ejectment of the petitioners from the shops/land on the grounds available to them under Jammu and Kashmir Houses and Shops Rent Control Act. 3. The petitioners, as such, have prayed for quashing of the communication dated 30.04.2019 by virtue of which eviction notice has been issued to the petitioners and they have also prayed that the respondents be directed to permit the petitioners to continue with the business over the shops in question regularly, continuously and uninterruptedly. The petitioners have also prayed for restraining the respondents from acting upon the eviction notices and to provide protection to the petitioners under Jammu and Kashmir Houses and Shops Rent Control Act. 4. The petitioners have also prayed for restraining the respondents from acting upon the eviction notices and to provide protection to the petitioners under Jammu and Kashmir Houses and Shops Rent Control Act. 4. The petitioners have also filed supplementary affidavit in which it has been stated that the possession of the petitioners is covered by the definition of “lease” as laid down under section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act. The correct perusal of the document styled as “Lease and License Agreement” would reveal that not only possession has been exclusively handed over but also periodic rent is fixed which is being accepted. The respondents have also referred to security deposit which in this case is claimed to be a premium as defined under section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is also stated that the nomenclature of the document that is styled as license, is only to defeat the rights vested in the petitioners under law particularly under Jammu and Kashmir Houses and Shops Rent Control Act. 5. The respondents have filed the response in which it has been stated that in BD Bari Military Station, there is a small cluster of temporary shops with tin roof for providing services/items of daily necessities to the residents of this Military Station. This cluster consists of 18 shops which are regimental shops and authorized in a military station where the market is more than 1.5 km away. These shops have been constructed on A1 defence land through regimental resources of the station. The day to day running of these shops is being done on contractual basis for 11 months. After expiry of 11 months, the contract had been generally renewed in favour of the same shopkeepers, if nothing adverse was found against them. It is also stated that the shopkeepers are required to make the payment of rent, water and electricity, rebate and security deposit. Each shopkeeper has to pay the rent which is as per the area of the shop and rates as prescribed by the Quarter Master General Branch Army Headquarters New Delhi. Rebate is the amount fixed by the Board of Officers in charge as per the profit earned by each shopkeeper and paid into the station welfare fund. Security deposit is the token amount taken from the shopkeepers to cover up the default in payment of monthly rebate, rent, water and electricity charges. Rebate is the amount fixed by the Board of Officers in charge as per the profit earned by each shopkeeper and paid into the station welfare fund. Security deposit is the token amount taken from the shopkeepers to cover up the default in payment of monthly rebate, rent, water and electricity charges. It is also stated that the Army Headquarters vide its letter dated 28.09.2017 issued directions to all the Military Stations regarding the allocation and management of regimental shops. These guidelines provided for allotment of 30% of the shops for defence personnel i.e widows/Ex-Servicemen etc and 70% of the shops for government agencies and civilians. On receiving the abovementioned directions, during the periodical meeting with the shopkeepers, the same were conveyed to them and they were asked to make alternative arrangements as that may be the last renewal of the yearly contract. While the shopkeepers paid no heed to the warnings/directions, Government of India, Ministry of Defence letter dated 1701.2018 was received and as per para-3 of the abovementioned letter, the provision of allocation of shops to Government agencies and civilians was done away with. It provides for 100% reservation for the war widows/widows of defence personnel killed while on duty/disabled soldiers/Ex-servicemen and spouses of windows of Ex-servicemen. On receipt of the said letter, the respondent No.2 was bound to adhere to the said instructions and hence the annual contract of the shopkeepers which was expiring on 30.04.2019 was not renewed and eviction notices were served upon all the shopkeepers and they were asked to vacate the shop by 31.05.2019 by giving them one month grace period, so that fresh allocation of shops could be made as per the directives. It is also stated that the alleged dispute raised by the petitioners falls within the domain of private law and the petitioners cannot invoke the public law remedy. It is also the stand of the respondents that the shops which are temporary in nature with tin roofs, were constructed with the resources of army and given to the petitioners to provide items and services to the army personnel and their families residing within the military station. Any further improvement done by the shopkeepers was purely voluntary to make themselves more comfortable and to increase the sales. Any further improvement done by the shopkeepers was purely voluntary to make themselves more comfortable and to increase the sales. It is also stated that the license granted to the petitioners cannot be for eternity and the petitioners cannot have any vested right to remain in occupation of the shop forever. The respondents have furnished the details of the violations of the agreement by the petitioner Nos. 2, 3, 4, 8, 9 and 14. It is also stated that the quoted case and interim order passed by this court has no relevance in the present case as the shopkeepers of BD Bari Military Station have been issued eviction notices on the basis of the policy decision of the Government of India. The laws governing landlord and tenant are not applicable here as the land belongs to Ministry of Defence, Government of India. The military officers are duty-bound to adhere to the directions of the Ministry of Defence, Government of India. The contention of the petitioners that they are being evicted on the basis of communication dated 17.01.2018 is misplaced as the licences of the petitioners have expired and in terms of the policy of the Government of India to allot 100% shops to war widows/widows of Personnel killed while on duty/disabled soldiers/Ex-servicemen and spouses/widows of ex-servicemen etc., the licenses of the petitioners have not been renewed and accordingly eviction notices have been issued to the petitioners to vacate the shops in their occupation. 6. Mr. Anil Sethi, learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently argued that the lease and license agreement executed between the parties is in fact a lease deed and not the licence deed, therefore the petitioners are entitled to seek protection under the provisions of Transfer of Property Act. He further argued that the shops in question are not regimental shops but they constitute Shopping Complex, therefore the respondents cannot evict the petitioners by resorting to the Ministry of Defence, Government of India letter dated 17.01.2018. Mr. Sethi placed reliance upon the judgement of this Court in case titled Manohar Lal versus Yog Dhian, reported in 1989 KashLJ 474 and the interim order dated 22.06.2020 passed by the Gauhati High Court in case titled “Union of India versus Azharul Alam and others”. 7. Per contra, Mr. Mr. Sethi placed reliance upon the judgement of this Court in case titled Manohar Lal versus Yog Dhian, reported in 1989 KashLJ 474 and the interim order dated 22.06.2020 passed by the Gauhati High Court in case titled “Union of India versus Azharul Alam and others”. 7. Per contra, Mr. Vishal Sharma, learned ASGI submitted that there is no relationship of lessor and lessee between the parties and rather by virtue of various licence deeds, the petitioners were permitted to run these shops on licence basis, so as to meet the requirements of the residents of the military station. He further submitted that as per Ministry of Defence, Government of India letter dated 17.01.2018, there is 100% reservation for war widows/widows of defence personnel killed while on duty/disabled soldier/ex-servicemen and spouses/widows of ex-servicemen etc. for allotment of shops on license basis. He further argued that the shops allotted to the petitioners on license basis are the regimental shops and they do not constitute shopping complex as argued by the counsel for the petitioners. 8. Heard and perused the record. 9. The 1st contention raised by the petitioners is that though the documents are styled as lease and license agreement but in fact they are the lease deeds and as such the petitioners are entitled to the protection under Transfer of Property Act. The perusal of the various licence deeds placed on record by the petitioners reveal that the shops are in the form of temporary structure in Sividha Kendra at BD Bari military station constructed by the respondents out of their own resources and the petitioners have acknowledged the same as the sole property of the respondents. The petitioners have signed the said agreements thereby acknowledging the contents as well as the terms and conditions of the said agreements. The perusal of the agreements reveal that the petitioners/licensees have been permitted to use the said shop for the purpose duly mentioned in the said agreements. The petitioners have been permitted to use the said premises for the purposes of specific retail business. The period of permission has been fixed for 11 months. The licensor has reserved the right to renew the license. The petitioners have been permitted to use the said premises for the purposes of specific retail business. The period of permission has been fixed for 11 months. The licensor has reserved the right to renew the license. Further as per clause M of the said agreement(Annexure-II, Page-40 of the writ petition), the parties have expressed their intention that this is purely a lease and license agreement and nothing contained therein shall constitute any tenancy or sub- tenancy between the licensor and the licensee. Further class 10 of the said agreement(page-41 of the writ petition) provides that this agreement does not and is not intended in any manner to be construed so as to create, confer or grant any lease or tenancy or sub- tenancy or any right, title or interest of any nature whatsoever into or upon the said premises in favour of the licensee. Even for entering the Military Station, the permission from the respondents is required and the employees of the licensees are permitted with in Station Suvidha Kendra only after the security verification from local police station. In Vayallakath Muhammedkutty v. Illikkal Moosakutty, (1996) 9 SCC 382 , the Apex Court has held as under:— “We have considered the document Ext. A-1 containing the terms and conditions under which the defendant was allowed to run the said business and, in our view, the said document is consistent with the case of licence. In D’Souza case, this Court has indicated that for a consideration as to whether a document creates a licence or lease, the substance of the document must be preferred to the form. It is not correct to say that exclusive possession of a party is irrelevant, but at the same time it is also not conclusive. The other tests, namely, intention of the parties and whether the document creates any interest in the property or not, are important considerations. Mr Sukumaran has very strongly relied on the embargo put against sub-letting by the defendant in the said document Ext. A-1 and referring to D’Souza case has submitted that such embargo of sub-lease can arise only in a case of tenancy and for the purpose of proper construction of the document, the said embargo cannot be lost sight of. Mr Sukumaran has very strongly relied on the embargo put against sub-letting by the defendant in the said document Ext. A-1 and referring to D’Souza case has submitted that such embargo of sub-lease can arise only in a case of tenancy and for the purpose of proper construction of the document, the said embargo cannot be lost sight of. Although, normally in a case of licence, question of sub-letting does not arise, but simply for giving such clause in an agreement, an agreement cannot be held to be an agreement for lease. The pith and substance of the document are required to be considered for the purpose of finding out the true import of a document, namely, whether a document creates a lease or a licence......” 10. Thus in order to determine as to whether the document is lease or licence, the true import of document is required to be considered and mere use of word license or lease in the agreement would not matter. It is the intention of the parties that is required to be considered, in order to determine as to whether the document is lease or license. For creation of lease deed there must be transfer of interest in the property whereas in case of license, the licensee is only permitted to a particular act in or upon the property, which in absence of such authorisation would be unlawful. So far as the instant case is concerned, this court is of the considered opinion that there is no transfer of interest in the shop in favour of the petitioners and the petitioners have been simply permitted to use the shops in a particular manner and under the control of the respondents, therefore the agreements placed on record cannot be considered as lease deeds. Otherwise also, if the documents are considered as lease deeds even then the petitioners have no right to remain in occupation after the expiry of the period of 11 months. In the eviction notices dated 30/04/2019, the respondents have granted one month advance notice to the petitioners to vacate the premises and as on date, the petitioners continue to operate their respective businesses in the shops in question, as such they cannot be permitted to continue with their respective businesses after the expiry of the period of 11 months and even when the notice of eviction has been issued to the petitioners. 11. 11. The other issue raised by Mr. Sethi is that Ministry of Defence, Government of India letter dated 17.01.2018 is not applicable in the case of petitioners as the shops in question are not regimental shops but constitute shopping complex. There is no dispute that the letter dated 17.01.2018 is applicable only in case of regimental shops. This is also admitted fact that the petitioners have not challenged the legality of the letter mentioned above and even in the writ petition filed by the petitioners, there is no averment that the letter mentioned above is not applicable to the shops allotted to the petitioners not being regimental shops but forming part of shopping complex. Only a passing reference has been made in the writ petition that the letter dated 17.01.2018 nowhere reveals that the sitting tenants are to be evicted and thereafter the shops are to be allotted to disabled soldiers/Ex-servicemen. Thus no factual foundations have been laid by the petitioners in the present writ petition that the shops allotted to them were not the regimental shops but formed part of shopping complex and in absence of such factual foundations laid in the writ petition, the same cannot be considered in view of the law laid down by Apex Court in case titled “Union of India vs. Dinesh Parsad” reported in (2012)12 SCC 63 , where in, it has been held as under:— “20. In our view, the learned Single Judge was clearly in error in allowing such argument. Firstly, the argument was raised without any foundation in the writ petition. No plea of actual or likelihood of bias was raised in the writ petition. There was also no plea taken in the writ petition that he was denied fair trial in the course of Summary Court Martial. Secondly, and more importantly, the learned Single Judge overlooked and ignored the statutory provisions referred to hereinabove. The Division Bench also failed in considering the matter in right perspective and in light of the provisions in the Army Act and the Army Rules.” 12. Even otherwise, the plea that the shops are not regimental shops is mis-conceived and the same appears to be afterthought in view of interim order passed by the Gauhati High Court. The Division Bench also failed in considering the matter in right perspective and in light of the provisions in the Army Act and the Army Rules.” 12. Even otherwise, the plea that the shops are not regimental shops is mis-conceived and the same appears to be afterthought in view of interim order passed by the Gauhati High Court. “Shopping Complex” as defined by “the Defence Shopping Complexes (Maintenance and Administration) Rules 2006”, is a composite area comprising shops established on A-1 or analogous defence land under the management of Army/Navy/Air Force, but would not include regimental shops which are created exclusively for military personnel and their families. In the objections filed by the respondents, the respondents have categorically stated that in BD Bari military station there is a small cluster of temporary shops with tin roof for providing services/items of daily necessities to the residents of this military station and this cluster consists of 18 shops which are regimental shops and authorised in a military station where the market is more than 1.5 km away. The petitioners have not denied the said stand of the respondents by any subsequent pleading. In view of the absence of any subsequent pleading thereby denying that the shops in question are not regimental shops and also taking into consideration the categoric stand of the respondents that the shops those were given on license basis to the petitioners are regimental shops, the plea of the petitioners is rejected. 13. The Registry has placed an application bearing CM No. 3804/2022 before this Court on 27.06.2022 filed by the applicants/petitioners 7, 10, 11, 12 and 13 on 17.06.2022 for withdrawal of the instant writ petition. 14. This Court had already dictated the judgment when the said application was placed before this Court that was filed by the petitioners/applicants during the vacations. This Court had heard the present writ petition on 28.04.2022, 12.05.2022 and 24.05.2022. Since this Court has already dictated the judgment, as such, this Court is not inclined to consider the application of the applicants for withdrawal of the writ petition, as such, the same is dismissed. 15. Viewed thus, there is no merit in the present petition, as such, the same is dismissed. 16. Since this Court has already dictated the judgment, as such, this Court is not inclined to consider the application of the applicants for withdrawal of the writ petition, as such, the same is dismissed. 15. Viewed thus, there is no merit in the present petition, as such, the same is dismissed. 16. At this stage, in OW104 No. 27/2016 Ms Zoya Bhardwaj, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners are running their businesses for a considerable period of time, as such, three months time be granted to the petitioners to remove their articles and vacate the premises. 17. In view of this, two months time is granted to the petitioners to remove their articles from their respective shops and vacate the premises, provided that they file an undertaking with the Registrar Judicial of this Court that they will remove their articles and vacate the premises within a period of two months from today.