JUDGMENT : Additional Sub Court, Kottayam has decreed O.S.No.213/2008 on 08.11.2021 on the following terms: “1. The defendant is directed to execute the sale deed with respect to the plaint schedule property within a period of one month from today in the name of the plaintiff by receiving the balance sale price. 2. In case the defendant fails to execute the sale deed as above, the plaintiff is directed to deposit the balance sale price before the court and get the sale deed executed through court at the expense of the defendant. 3. The plaintiff is also entitled to get the costs of the suit from the defendant.” 2. The above judgment and decree are assailed in the appeal by the defendant mainly on the ground that the evidence on record was not appreciated by the court passed it, in its true spirit and meaning. 3. Sri.Biju Abraham the learned counsel, has contended that the defendant had taken a specific contention in the written statement filed in the suit that Ext.A1 agreement for sale on the basis of which the relief of specific performance was sought by the plaintiff was only an agreement fabricated by the plaintiff falsely in a signed stamp paper obtained from him as security while availing Rs.1,50,000/-for repaying his liability towards a bank. According to him, Ext.A1 as it stands then was entered on 06.09.2007, when the plaintiff insisted that money demanded would be given only if a document styled as an agreement for sale is drafted and handed over. According to him, the context in which Ext.A1 was executed being so, it cannot be said to have entered, intending to be acted upon. According to him execution of Ext.A1 in the nature it stands was not intended and it actually being only a security for the money borrowed from the plaintiff, the relief of specific performance of contract ought not to have been granted by the court below in favour of the plaintiff. 4. The learned counsel relying on the dictum of this Court in Mohammed vs. Velayudhan & Another [ 2001 (1) KLJ 161 ] contended that it is the burden of the plaintiff to establish that Ext.A1 was entered, intending to execute, in it’s spirit and contents. 5. 4. The learned counsel relying on the dictum of this Court in Mohammed vs. Velayudhan & Another [ 2001 (1) KLJ 161 ] contended that it is the burden of the plaintiff to establish that Ext.A1 was entered, intending to execute, in it’s spirit and contents. 5. Yet another contention advanced was that even if Ext.A1 is taken to have entered, intending thereby to execute it in accordance with the terms it carry, then also the plaintiff is not entitled to get the decree sought, for his failure to establish his readiness and willingness throughout the transaction. According to him, by taking a plea that the plaintiff was ready and willing and reiterating it in clear terms while adducing evidence, without establishing something more towards readiness and willingness, a suit for specific performance will not succeed. 6. It has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in Mohammed (supra), “To sign means to affix the signature. But when it comes to the signing of a written instrument, it implies more than the act of affixing a signature. It implies more than the clerical act of writing the name. The intention of the person signing is important. The person should have affixed the signature to the instrument in token of an intention to be bound by its conditions. It has been said that for a signing consists of both the act of writing a person's name and the intention in doing this to execute, authenticate or to sign as a witness. The execution of a deed or other instrument includes the performance of all acts which may be necessary to render it complete as a deed or an instrument importing the intended obligation of every act required to give the instrument validity, or to carry it into effect or to give it the forms required to render it valid. Thus, the signature is an acknowledgment that the person signing has agreed to the terms of the document. This can be achieved only if a person signs after the document is prepared and the terms are known to the person signing. Thus, the signature is an acknowledgment that the person signing has agreed to the terms of the document. This can be achieved only if a person signs after the document is prepared and the terms are known to the person signing. In that view of the matter, mere putting of signature cannot be said to be execution of the document.” It is settled by the above dictum that the burden lies on the plaintiff in a case where the execution of the document has been denied by the defendant to establish that the terms therein have been subscribed by the former by affixing the signature therein with intention to execute it. 7. The specific case of the defendant was that he was forced to sign Ext.A1 knowingly of its contents but without any intention to act upon. The defendant is not an illiterate man and he cannot plead ignorance of the consequences of affixing signature to a drafted document fully knowing its contents. After signing the document he cannot say leisurely that it was signed without intention to act upon it. 8. According to DW1, the plaintiff made him to sign Ext.A1 as a security to ensure repayment of the money borrowed from her and assured that it would not be acted upon. A reading of Ext.A1 would make it abundantly clear that it was drafted in such a manner that none would have a doubt on reading its contents that it is a document of nature different from an agreement for sale. Ext.A1 is a pucca agreement for sale under which Rs.1,50,000/-was paid as advance sale consideration for the sale proposed to be effected at a later point of time, when the balance sale consideration is paid. 9. Terms are found specifically incorporated in Ext.A1 as follows : 10. The defendant has no case that the recitals in Ext.A1 were not read by him rather, knowingly of the consequences as above that signature was affixed in Ext.A1. A reasonable man would not put his signature to a document containing terms prejudicial to him without intention to act upon it or under a strong belief that the opposite side would not proceed to act upon it. A reasonable man would not put his signature to a document containing terms prejudicial to him without intention to act upon it or under a strong belief that the opposite side would not proceed to act upon it. By the very act of affixing the signature in a drafted document, the signee will be bound by the terms thereof and he cannot take a defence later that at the time of affixing his signature he had no intention to act upon it. Defendant having affixed his signature in the written document after having read and understood its contents, cannot be said to have acted so unintentionally. Therefore, the plea raised by defendant against voluntary execution of Ext.A1 will not sustain and is only to be discarded. Apart from that an attestor to Ext.A1 examined as PW2 has also stated that affixture of signature in Ext.A1 by DW1 was witnessed by him and it was done voluntarily. PW3 is none other than a person informed by the defendant about his intention to sell the plaint schedule property sufficiently earlier to execution of Ext.A1. The defendant through cross examined PW3, did not succeed to defeat his credibility. 11. Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for short ‘the Act’) is apposite to be extracted hereunder: “16. Personal bars to relief.— Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person— (a) who would not be entitled to recover compensation for its breach; or (b) who has become incapable of performing, or violates any essential term of, the contract that on his part remains to be performed, or acts in fraud of the contract, or wilfully acts at variance with, or in subversion of, the relation intended to be established by the contract; or (c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. Explanation.—For the purposes of clause (c),— (i) where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not essential for the plaintiff to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in court any money except when so directed by the court; (ii) the plaintiff must aver performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction.” The words 'must prove' in the above extract of Clause (c) of Section 16 have been substituted for the words 'must aver' by the Special Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018 (18 of 2018) dated 01/08/2018, w.e.f. 01.10.2018. The suit on hand being of the year 2012, the position prior to the above amendment will alone be applicable. As the position of law applicable then, the plaintiff must have averred in the plaint that she had already performed her part of the agreement for sale or that she is ready and willing to perform her part as per the terms of the agreement for sale. Therefore, in order to obtain a decree for specific performance of contract, the plaintiff must either aver specifically that she had performed her part as per the agreement for sale or that she is ready and willing to perform her part according to its true construction. 12. The pleadings in the plaint in O.S. No.213/08 has to be viewed in the backdrop to see whether those satisfy the statutory requirements as stated above. It is found pleaded in paragraph No.7 of the plaint :- “The plaintiff for raising the fund for purchasing the plaint schedule property, sold her property of an extent 7 Are and 48 Sq.Meters and 80 Sq.Meters comprised in survey number 310/1 and 310/1/1 respectively of the Manarcad Village for a lower price than the then market value of the property and sustained huge loss of approximately Rs.3,00,000/-and arranged the full amount which is to be needed to satisfy this agreement.” 13. It was averred by the plaintiff in the plaint that her property was sold for a lower price than the market value for the purpose of raising the funds to pay the balance sale consideration and thereby sustained a loss to the tune of Rs.3,00,000/-; Exts.A5 to A7 & A7(a) documents are also produced to substantiate the pleading raised as above. Those are allegedly sale deeds evidencing the transactions of sale of immovable property belonging to the plaintiff. Those are allegedly sale deeds evidencing the transactions of sale of immovable property belonging to the plaintiff. Documentary evidence in that respect is not forthcoming. The further aspect pleaded to show her readiness and willingness was that she had been at the Sub Registry Office awaiting the defendant with the balance sale consideration for getting the sale deed in respect of the property agreed to be sold, registered. According to the plaintiff the said aspect could be further substantiated from her affixture of signature as a witness for execution of a deed that had taken place there on that day. According to the plaintiff, a registered lawyer notice was sent by her to the defendant, demanding him to be present at the Sub Registry Office on 29.03.2008 or on 31.03.2009, for executing the sale deed. 14. In the context, it is relevant to have an understanding of the specific terms incorporated in Ext.A1: Therefore, as per terms, the plaintiff has to pay the balance sale consideration to the defendant on or before 31.03.2008 and on such payment being made, the latter shall cause the sale deed in respect of the immovable property agreed to be sold, drafted in favour of the plaintiff or to anyone instructed by her and the possession of the property free from all sorts of encumbrances shall be conveyed to her and shall cause the original deed available for registration alongwith tax receipt and torrence plan and shall bear all expenses for registration. 15. The law on the point is settled by the Apex Court. The Apex Court had drawn a distinction among the terms 'readiness' and 'willingness' and held that the plaintiff claiming for a relief of specific performance of contract must adduce evidence to establish that she was ready throughout, from the date on which Ext.A1 was executed till institution of the suit seeking for a decree of specific performance. True that the words readiness and willingness are incorporated in the plaint and those terms had been spoken to by the plaintiff while tendering oral evidence as PW1, but she failed to adduce evidence to establish that money to pay the balance sale consideration was with her or that sources to avail the money were available to her at the relevant time for payment stipulated in Ext.A1 or at the time of institution of the plaint. 16. 16. The stand taken by the defendant in the suit is worthy to be noted here. According to the him, he met with a stroke and thereby his left side was paralysed in the year 2005. He was undergoing treatment for that and therefore was unable even to think of selling the property. The defendant had availed a loan from Service Co-operative bank on the security of the plaint schedule property and various debts were also outstanding for payment by him. 17. In order to pay off his debt to the bank that Rs.1,50,000/-was borrowed by him from the plaintiff, agreeing to repay the same with interest at 12% per annum. To establish that he was suffering from ailments and was in dire need of money for treatment, a person who acted as intermediary in the transaction among himself and the plaintiff was examined as DW2. He had tendered a version contrary to the stand taken by the defendant while filing written statement in the suit and tendering evidence through DW2. The evidence tendered by DW2 was that the defendant was in requirement of money for carrying the construction work of the boundary wall and completion of work of kitchen. 18. Medical records are produced by the defendant in his attempt to establish his contentions. Ext.B2, a medical document of the year 2005 would show that in the month of June, defendant had a stroke and availed treatment for that during 2005-06. Further treatment was found resumed only on 24.09.2008, much later to the execution of Ext.A1 on 06.09.2007. Not even a single medical document is produced by the defendant to show that he had been undergoing any treatment during 2006 till 24.09.2008. Therefore, Ext.B2 is not supportive of the version of DW1 that money was borrowed by him for meeting some dire requirements and was compelled by the plaintiff to execute Ext.A1 only as a security to secure repayment and not intended to be acted upon as an agreement for sale. Moreover neither in the written statement filed in the suit, nor while tendering evidence through DW1, his wife, the defendant has a case that DW2 was an intermediary to the transaction of borrowal of money from the plaintiff which has been advanced in his presence. 19. Moreover neither in the written statement filed in the suit, nor while tendering evidence through DW1, his wife, the defendant has a case that DW2 was an intermediary to the transaction of borrowal of money from the plaintiff which has been advanced in his presence. 19. The role of DW2 as an intermediary in the transaction of borrowal of money was brought to the notice of the court only during his examination. Therefore, introduction of DW2 into the picture can only be taken as the outcome of an afterthought of the defendant. The defendant proved himself as a man having experience in cultivating lands by availing loan from banks and other financial institutions and therefore cannot be said to be ignorant of the consequences of putting signature on drafted documents, the terms of which are liable to create liability on him without any clause incorporated therein to avoid its execution on repayment of the money and its interest. 20. The defendant has also raised a plea of improbability of execution of Ext.A1 contending that the property proposed to be sold infact was Rs.40,00,000/-and not Rs.21,50,000/-. Defendant’s wife as DW1 had also tendered oral evidence that the property was worth Rs.40,00,000/-. But, materials are not forthcoming to substantiate that the property had a market value of Rs.40,00,000/-or a value exceeding Rs.21,50,000/-at the relevant time when Ext.A1 was executed. The version above is only liable to be discarded in the absence of materials in evidence to substantiate it. 21. Now the question relevant and crucial for consideration is whether the plaintiff is entitled to get the discretionary relief of specific performance. Specific enforcement of contractual obligations was available only in equity. For the plaintiff this was a more advantageous remedy than the common law remedy of damages. Fry L.J in his book on specific performance, 6th Edition at page 21 wrote on specific performance; “If a contract be made and one party to it makes default in performance, there appears to result to the other party a right at his election either to insist on the actual performance of the contract, or to obtain satisfaction for the non-performance of it. It may be suggested from this that it follows …….. that it ought to be assumed that every contract is specifically enforceable until the contrary be shown. It may be suggested from this that it follows …….. that it ought to be assumed that every contract is specifically enforceable until the contrary be shown. But so broad a proposition has never, it is believed been asserted by the judges of the court of Chancery or their successors in the High Court of Justice, through if prophecy were the function of a law writer. It might be suggested that they will more and more approximate to such a rule.” 22. This prophecy has not been wholly fulfilled, because the scope of the remedy remains subject to many limitations. In the Indian context, Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 refers about the personal bars to relief which is already extracted supra. Section 16(b) of the Act contemplates a situation where the plaintiff violates an essential term of the contract that remains to be performed, such a plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of specific performance. 23. The words incorporated in the provision ‘violates the essential term’ refer to a term which is absolutely vital to the bargain of the parties in such a material manner that it would no longer be equitable to grant a decree of specific performance as if their mutual relationship continued to be the same as it was at the time when the bargain was entered into. 24. A conjoint reading of Clauses (1) and (2) of Ext.A1 extracted supra, would give the impression that the plaintiff is liable to pay the balance sale consideration of Rs. 20,00,000/-within 31.03.2008. Therefore, a time limit is prescribed by Ext.A1 that the balance sale consideration shall be paid within 31.03.2008 and it undoubtedly is a condition precedent for the plaintiff to make a demand to the defendant to have the sale deed in respect of the property executed in her favour. It was stipulated in Ext.A1 that only on payment of the balance sale consideration by the plaintiff on 31.03.2008 and on making a further demand alone, the defendant needs to perform his part referred to in Clause (3) of Ext.A1, viz, to prepare the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff or any party referred to by the plaintiff and to make it available for registration at the Sub Registry Office, to put the plaintiff in possession of the property, free from all kinds of encumbrances. Therefore, as per the terms in Ext.A1, the plaintiff is primarily obliged to pay the balance sale consideration to the defendant on or before 31.03.2008 so as to enable the defendant to perform the part he is bound to perform under Ext.A1. 25. The question now possibly raised is whether time is an essence of contract under Ext.A1 or in other words whether time bound payment of balance sale consideration by the plaintiff as envisaged by Clauses (1) and (2) of Ext.A1 and non-payment of it before the time limit of 31.03.2008, would tantamount to violation of an essential term in Ext.A1 so as to make it unenforceable. 26. The question whether time is the essence of the contract has to be decided not with reference to the terms of the contract alone but also with reference to the conduct of the parties and the facts and circumstances of the case. Where a contract relates to sale of an immovable property, the normal presumption available was that time is not the essence of the contract. The Apex Court has held in Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Palaniswamy Nadar and others [ AIR 1967 SC 868 ] and Govind Prasad Chaturvedi v. Hari Dutt Shastri and another [ AIR 1977 SC 1005 ] that fixation of the period in a contract of sale within which the contract has to be performed, does not make a stipulation as to time, the essence of the contract. But, if the parties incorporate a term in the contract entered by them which expressly provide that time shall form the essence of the contract and when there is a further stipulation that on a failure of any party to complete it within a specified date, the stipulation as to time will be fundamental. 27. In the case on hand, it has been stated by the plaintiff during her examination as PW1 that the property agreed to be sold was measured at the instance of the defendant and the boundaries were shown to her and she was convinced of the extent and boundaries in the month of March 2008 itself. Therefore, though not specifically incorporated under Ext.A1 as a part to be performed by the defendant, he has performed it to the satisfaction of PW1 as deposed by her. Therefore, though not specifically incorporated under Ext.A1 as a part to be performed by the defendant, he has performed it to the satisfaction of PW1 as deposed by her. Therefore the plaintiff is obliged to pay the balance sale consideration in the month of March itself, which as per the stipulations in Ext.A1, cannot go beyond 31.03.2008. 28. The word in Clause (1) of Ext.A1 refers that the parties while entering into Ext.A1 has mutually agreed to have the payment of balance sale consideration on a date, not later than 31.03.2008. It is therefore well established from the terms and the conduct of the parties that time was essence of Ext.A1. 29. Therefore, by failing to pay the balance sale consideration before 31.03.2008, being the maximum time contemplated by Ext.A1 itself, the plaintiff has violated a vital term in the contract stipulated for her performance and made the remedy of specific performance far reaching for her. 30. It has been envisaged under Clause (c) of Section 16 of the Act that a party seeking for a decree of specific performance shall plead and prove either that he has already performed or that he has always been ready and willing to perform the essential part of the contract, liable to be performed under the contract other than those, performance of which has been prevented or waived by the opposite party. 31. As per Clause (ii) of Explanation to Section 16 of the Act the plaintiff must aver that she has already performed or that she is ready and willing to perform the part assigned to her by the terms of Ext.A1 in accordance with its true meaning and construction. 32. The plaintiff has taken the following pleas in paragraph 8 of the plaint : “The plaintiff was always ready and willing to take the sale as stipulated in the agreement of sale within the period fixed and demanded the defendant to do so. But the defendant put off the sale by some reason or other and the executors of the sale did not take place as provided in the agreement and thus the defendant committed default in performing the agreement and so the plaintiff is entitled to get the agreement specifically enforced through the court and this suit is filed accordingly. But the defendant put off the sale by some reason or other and the executors of the sale did not take place as provided in the agreement and thus the defendant committed default in performing the agreement and so the plaintiff is entitled to get the agreement specifically enforced through the court and this suit is filed accordingly. The plaintiff informed her willingness to perform her part to the defendant several times, but the defendant did not turn up to perform his part of the agreement. Finally on 28.03.2008, plaintiff send a lawyers notice inviting the defendant to be present at the Sub-Registrar’s Office, Kottayam with the agreed documents to execute the sale on 29.03.2008 and further on 31.03.2008. The plaintiff with the balance consideration went and waited for the defendant at the Sub Registrar’s Office at Kottayam on both the above days, but the defendant did not turn up. The defendant has no right to do so.” 33. The plaintiff had never raised a claim in the plaint that she had already performed her part as stipulated in Ext.A1 by paying the balance sale consideration before 31.03.2008. It has been pleaded in the plaint that the defendant by one or other reasons postponed the execution of the sale deed and thereby committed default in performing his part of the agreement and therefore the plaintiff is entitled to get the agreement specifically enforced in her favour as per the terms of Ext.A1. 34. Even if it is taken for granted that time was not essence of contract, then also the suit on hand is liable to fail for the reason that the requirements envisaged under Section 16(c) of the Act are not established as met with by the plaintiff. 35. A Division Bench of this Court in Susheela (Died) and others v. T.M. Muhamedkunhi [ 2012 (1) KHC 508 ] had considered the necessity of the party seeking specific performance to aver and prove readiness and willingness in a case where he infact had already performed his part of the contract and held that there is no necessity to plead and prove readiness or willingness but only to plead and prove that he has performed his part of the contract. 36. 36. Under Section 16(c) it is a condition precedent for the enforcement of specific performance that the party seeking for it must plead and establish that he has performed his part required to be performed under the agreement executed or that he was and is ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement for sale. According to PW1 the defendant had convinced her about the measurement of the property and its boundaries in the year 2008 itself. Therefore, as per the stipulation in Ext.A1, it is for the plaintiff to pay the balance sale consideration. Therefore, while seeking recourse to get a decree for specific performance, the plaintiff if has already paid the sale consideration in full, has only to plead and prove accordingly before a court of law or if payment is not made and still due, he has to plead and prove that he was and even at the time of filing of the suit is ready with the money and willing to pay it. 37. The Division Bench has also drawn a distinction of the terms, ‘readiness’ and ‘willingness’, which is extracted hereunder : “A distinction may be drawn between readiness to perform the contract and willingness to perform the contract. Readiness means the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract and it includes his financial ability to raise the money to pay the purchase price. Even if the plaintiff has the financial capacity to pay the purchase price and he thereby shows readiness to perform the contract, that need not necessarily mean that he is wiling to perform his part of the contract. Unless he is also wiling to perform his part of the contract, mere readiness to do so cannot be of no avail to him. He may, nevertheless be disqualified from seeking specific performance of the contract if he is really unwilling to buy the property although he may be ready to do so.” It was further held : “Courts have been very strict regarding this requirement of S.16(c) of the Specific Relief Act which provision has been couched in negative terms. S.16(c) is not an empty formality and readiness and willingness are to be proved right from the date of the contract till the date of the decree. In other words, the strict requirement of law is the continuous readiness and willingness. S.16(c) is not an empty formality and readiness and willingness are to be proved right from the date of the contract till the date of the decree. In other words, the strict requirement of law is the continuous readiness and willingness. In the absence of a plea in the plaint regarding readiness and willingness, no decree for specific performance can be granted to plaintiff.” Sub-section (ii) of Explanation to Section 16 of the Act says that the plaintiff must aver performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction. Clause (c) provides that plaintiff who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him will not be entitled to get a decree for specific performance in his favour. 38. Therefore, the plaintiff has to establish that she was ready from the date of execution of the agreement for sale and continues to be so even at the time of institution of the suit to perform the part to be performed by her under Ext.A1. She must plead in the plaint that the fund to pay the balance sale consideration was ready and kept by her and still has it or that he has the necessary source of money wherefrom the balance sale consideration could easily be drawn or availed and paid. She must also aver in the plaint and adduce evidence to establish that she is prepared and willing to pay the balance sale consideration at any point of time as directed by the court for getting the sale deed executed in her favour. Non-compliance of Section 16(c) of the Act undoubtedly will operate as a statutory interdict against the court granting a decree for specific performance of a contract. 39. In C.S. Venkatesh v. A.S.C Murthy [ (2020) 3 SCC 280 ], the Apex Court has considered the essentialities to be considered to establish readiness and willingness of the plaintiff approaching a court for a decree for specific performance and held : “16. The words ‘ready and willing’ imply that the plaintiff was prepared to carry out those parts of the contract to their logical end so far as they depend upon his performance. The words ‘ready and willing’ imply that the plaintiff was prepared to carry out those parts of the contract to their logical end so far as they depend upon his performance. The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of performance. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of contract, the court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior, and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount which he has to pay the defendant must be of necessity to be proved to be available. Right from the date of the execution of the contract till the date of decree, he must prove that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was always ready to perform his contract. 21. In the instant case, the plaintiff has alleged that he was ready to pay Rs.35,000/-to the defendants and called upon them to execute the re-conveyance deed. However, in para 11 of the plaint it is pleaded that the plaintiff was running contract business wherein he suffered heavy loss and as such he gave up the business. It is also pleaded that at present the plaintiff has no business or profession and has no source of income. He has no property, either movable or immovable. Mere plea that he is ready to pay the consideration, without any material to substantiate this plea, cannot be accepted. It is not necessary for the plaintiff to produce ready money, but it is mandatory on his part to prove that he has the means to generate the consideration amount. Except the statement of PW-1, there is absolutely no evidence to show that the plaintiff has the means to make arrangements for payment of consideration under the re-conveyance agreement. 22. It is relevant to state here that before filing the suit, the plaintiff had filed an application before the competent authority under the Karnataka Debt Relief Act seeking extinguishment of the debt and delivery of the property back to him. No doubt, the application was dismissed by the authority. 22. It is relevant to state here that before filing the suit, the plaintiff had filed an application before the competent authority under the Karnataka Debt Relief Act seeking extinguishment of the debt and delivery of the property back to him. No doubt, the application was dismissed by the authority. But the fact remains that the intention of the plaintiff was not to pay the amount as per the re-conveyance agreement.” 40. Therefore, what is envisaged under Section 16 (c) was that, the party seeking for a decree for specific performance if performed his part must plead that he had already performed the part assigned for performance by the agreement for sale and to establish those by adducing cogent and convincing evidence. If he has not performed his part till the relevant time of institution of the Suit, he must prove that he was ready and willing from the very inception of the agreement and that he is, even at the time of institution of Suit and during pendency of it, having the necessary funds to pay the balance sale consideration or that he has the source to obtain and pay it. He must also adduce cogent and convincing evidence to substantiate those aspects. In the case on hand, the pleadings of the plaintiff in the plaint are already extracted supra. The pleadings are not incorporated in its true construction as envisaged under Section 16(b) of the Act. The pleading incorporated was that she is ready and willing to perform her part. But the manner in which she was ready and willing is neither pleaded in the plaint nor established by evidence. 41. According to the plaintiff she had sold her property for a lesser price to perform her part in time and thereby suffered loss. She has produced sale deeds to establish that aspect. But, the alleged sale deeds being prepared in stamp papers worth Rs.20/- and found unregistered are inadmissible in evidence. 42. But, the trial court blindly placed reliance on those. The trial court while relying it is found to have overlooked the mandate of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which is extracted hereunder : “54. “Sale” defined.— ‘‘Sale” is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. 42. But, the trial court blindly placed reliance on those. The trial court while relying it is found to have overlooked the mandate of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which is extracted hereunder : “54. “Sale” defined.— ‘‘Sale” is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. Sale how made.— Such transfer, in the case of tangible immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, or in the case of a reversion or other intangible thing, can be made only by a registered instrument. In the case of tangible immovable property of a value less than one hundred rupees, such transfer may be made either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property. Delivery of tangible immovable property takes place when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs, in possession of the property. Contract for sale.- A contract for the sale of immovable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties. It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property.” 43. Therefore, the court below ought not to have relied on Exts.A5 to A7 & A7(a) to take a view affirmatively on readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform her part of the contract. Therefore, evidence of the plaintiff is insufficient to establish that she had been and still is, having the necessary funds to pay the balance sale consideration as stipulated under Ext.A1 or source wherefrom she could avail it. Though she has pleaded that there was default from the defendant and therefore payment of balance sale consideration was delayed, she failed even to establish any default of the defendant in performing his part, as per Ext.A1. Admittedly of PW1, measurement of the property was already done by the defendant and therefore, the part next to be performed is by the plaintiff, to pay the balance sale consideration to the defendant on or before 31.03.2008. It was neither pleaded by the plaintiff that she had the fund to pay it on or before 31.03.2008 and continues to have it even at the time of institution of the Suit, nor proved those by cogent and reliable evidence. 44. It was neither pleaded by the plaintiff that she had the fund to pay it on or before 31.03.2008 and continues to have it even at the time of institution of the Suit, nor proved those by cogent and reliable evidence. 44. Aforesaid discussion of the relevant aspects convinces this Court that the plaintiff had thoroughly failed to establish the essential requirements which entitles her to obtain a decree of specific performance. The trial court misconceived the true spirit of Section 16(c) of the Act and failed to appreciate the evidence in its true perspective. 45. The decree for specific performance stands granted in favour of the plaintiff by the impugned judgment and decree suffers for all drawbacks as discussed above. Therefore, those are liable to be reversed. Appeal succeeds for the reasons and is allowed. The judgment and decree assailed are set aside. No order as to costs.