ORDER : 1. This petition under Section 482 of the CrPC is directed against the impugned order dated 2.5.2022 passed by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Rajnandgaon in Criminal M.J.C. NO.6/2022, by which the learned First Additional Sessions Judge has allowed the application filed by respondent No.2 under Section 439(2) of the CrPC and set aside the order dated 4.4.2022 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ambagarh Chowki admitting the petitioners herein to the privilege of bail under Section 437 of the CrPC. 2. On a complaint of respondent No.2 herein, wife of petitioner No.1 and daughter-in-law of petitioner No.2, offence under Section 498A/34 of the IPC and Section 4 of the Muslim Woman (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019 (hereinafter 'Act of 2019') was registered against the petitioners herein, against which, the petitioners herein filed an application under Section 437 read with Section 44 of the CrPC. Learned trial Magistrate while hearing the application though attempt was made to serve notice to the respondent / wife, but it could not be served and ultimately, without serving notice to the respondent / wife, bail was granted and the petitioners herein were admitted to the privilege of bail under Section 437 of the CrPC. Feeling aggrieved against the aforesaid order, respondent No.2 herein filed an application under Section 439(2) of the CrPC for cancellation of bail, which has been allowed by the learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Rajnandgaon by the impugned order and the matter has been remitted to the trial Magistrate for passing the order afresh after affording an opportunity of hearing to respondent No.2 herein, against which, this petition under Section 482 of the CrPC has been filed by the petitioners herein. 3. Mr.Punit Ruparel, learned counsel for the petitioners, would submit that the learned First Additional Sessions Judge is absolutely unjustified in cancelling the bail by recording a finding which is perverse to record, which is liable to be set aside. 4. On the other hand, Mr.Sanjay Pathak, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for respondent No.1/State and Ms Fouzia Mirza, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent No.2, would support the impugned order. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 6. 4. On the other hand, Mr.Sanjay Pathak, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for respondent No.1/State and Ms Fouzia Mirza, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent No.2, would support the impugned order. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 6. In order to decide rival claim of the parties, it would be appropriate to notice Section 7 of the Act of 2019, which states as under: “7. Offences to be cognizable, compoundable, etc. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,- (a) an offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable, if information relating to the commission of the offence is given to an officer in charge of a police station by the married Muslim woman upon whom talaq is pronounced or any person related to her by blood or marriage; (b) an offence punishable under this Act shall be compoundable, at the instance of the married Muslim woman upon whom talaq is pronounced with the permission of the Magistrate, on such terms and conditions as he may determine; (c) no person accused of an offence punishable under this Act shall be released on bail unless the Magistrate, on an application filed by the accused and after hearing the married Muslim woman upon whom talaq is pronounced, is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for granting bail to such person.” 7. A careful perusal of the aforesaid provision would show that the Magistrate is required to issue notice and hear the married Muslim woman upon whom talaq is pronounced and thereafter if the Magistrate is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for granting bail to such person order granting bail would be passed. 8. The Supreme Court in the matter of Rahna Jalal v. State of Kerala and another, (2021) AIR (SC) 225 has held that while entertaining an application for grant of anticipatory bail for an offence under the Act of 2019, the competent court must hear the married Muslim woman who has made the complaint, as prescribed under Section 7(c) of the Act. It was observed as under : “11 The statutory text indicates that Section 7(c) does not impose an absolute bar to the grant of bail. It was observed as under : “11 The statutory text indicates that Section 7(c) does not impose an absolute bar to the grant of bail. On the contrary, the Magistrate may grant bail, if satisfied that “there are reasonable grounds for granting bail to such person” and upon complying with the requirement of hearing the married Muslim woman upon whom talaq is pronounced. Hence, though Section 7 begins with a non obstante clause which operates in relation to the CrPC, a plain construction of Section 7(c) would indicate that it does not impose a fetter on the power of the Magistrate to grant bail, save and except, for the stipulation that before doing so, the married Muslim woman, upon whom talaq is pronounced, must be heard and there should be a satisfaction of the Magistrate of the existence of reasonable grounds for granting bail to the person. This implies that even while entertaining an application for grant of anticipatory bail for an offence under the Act, the competent court must hear the married Muslim woman who has made the complaint, as prescribed under Section 7(c) of the Act. Only after giving the married Muslim woman a hearing, can the competent court grant bail to the accused.” 9. Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of the provisions contained in Section 7(c) of the Act of 2019 and principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court in Rahna Jalal (supra), it is quite vivid that learned Magistrate did not hear respondent No.2/wife as prescribed under Section 7(c) of the Act of 2019 though offence under the Act of 2019 has also been registered and that is the reason which has compelled the learned Additional Sessions Judge to set aside the order of the learned trial Magistrate and remit the matter to the trial Magistrate for passing the order afresh after affording an opportunity of hearing to respondent No.2. 10. 10. In that view of the matter, learned First Additional Sessions Judge is justified in remitting the matter to the trial Magistrate for passing the order afresh after affording an opportunity of hearing to respondent No.2 / wife and since matter is being remitted to the trial Magistrate for passing the order afresh after affording an opportunity of hearing to respondent No.2 (wife of petitioner No.1), it is further directed to the trial Magistrate would do well to decide the application under Section 437 of the CrPC on or before 16th August, 2022. The petitioners and respondent No.2 are directed to appear before the trial Magistrate personally or through their counsel before the trial Magistrate on 1st August, 2022. Since interim order has been granted by this Court on 13.6.2022 staying the order dated 2.5.2022, it shall remain in operation till the application under Section 437 of the CrPC is finally decided by the trial Magistrate. 11. With the aforesaid observation/direction, the CrMP finally stands disposed of.