JUDGMENT : Vikas Budhwar, J. Contents Exordium ………………………………………………………..….3 Relevant Statutory Enactments/Order ………………………....12 Argument of Petitioner (Suitors)………………………………….17 Arguments of Respondents/Answerers ………………………....22 Replication of the Petitioners/Suitors …………………….…...…24 Questions of Determination ………………...………………..……24 Discussions ………………………………………..……………..…24 Summation ……………………………………………..……..……59 Conclusion …………………………………………..………..…….60 Heard Sri Ashok Khare, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Seemant Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners in Writ Petition No.4817 of 2020, (Sudhir and two others Vs. State of U.P. & 6 others) (Group-I) as well as Sri Navin Kumar Sharma in Writ Petition No.4856 of 2020, (Virendra Kumar Vs. State of U.P. and others) (Group-II) and Sri Indra Raj Singh in Writ Petition No.14831 of 2020, (Sunil Kumar Singh Vs. U.P. Secondary Education Services Selection Board) (Group-III), as well as Sri Ajit Kumar Singh, learned Additional Advocate General assisted by Sri Sudhanshu Srivastava, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State-respondents, Sri Shashi Prakash Singh, Addl. Solicitor General assisted by Sri Purnendu Kumar Singh, learned counsel for Union of India as well as Sri Siddharth Singhal, who appears for Uttar Pradesh Subordinate Services Selection Commission. EXORDIUM 2. Seemingly the pivotal question involved in cluster of petitions which need to be addressed is as to whether the petitioners qualify the definition of Section 2(c) “Ex. Servicemen” as provided under the U.P. Public Services (Reservation For Physically Handicapped, Dependents of Freedom Fighters And Ex-Servicemen) Act, 1993 (In short ‘the Act 1993’) and enjoy desirable qualifications on the last date of submission of the application form stipulated in the Advertisement no.3 Examination/2016 for Village Development Officers (General Selections. 2016) (hereinafter referred to as Advertisement). In order to arithmetically simplify the factual status of the writ petitions qua the petitioners, the above noted writ petitions are being classified into groups. Group Petitioner Date of obtaining C.C.C. Certificates in computer application issued by DOEACC now NIELIT Date of retirement I 1 2017 31.7.2016 2 March, 2016 30.11.2016 3 NIL 29.2.2016 II 1 April, 2016 1.1.2016 III 1 NIL 30.4.2017 3. With the consent of the parties, (Group-I) Writ-A No.4817 of 2020 (Sudhir Singh and two others Vs. State of U.P. and six others) is being treated as a leading petition. With the consent of the parties, (Group-I) Writ-A No.4817 of 2020 (Sudhir Singh and two others Vs. State of U.P. and six others) is being treated as a leading petition. However, for the sake of clarity, the reliefs sought therein, are being reproduced herein under :- “(a) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Certiorari calling for the records of the case and quashing the impugned termination orders dated 05.05.2020 passed by the Direct Development Officer, Badaun in reference to petitioner No.1 and petitioner No.2 and impugned termination order dated 28.04.2020 passed by District Development Officer, Balrampur in reference to petitioner No.3 whereby the services of the petitioners on the post of Village Development Officer have been dispensed with treating their appointments as void. (b) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondents to reinstate the petitioners on the post of Village Development Officer in their respective districts with all consequential benefits. (c) Issue any other suitable writ, order or direction, which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. (d) Award the cost of the writ petition to the writ Petitioners.” 4. In Writ Petition No.4817 of 2020 (Sudhir Singh and two others Vs. State of U.P. and six others), consequent to the order dated 7.9.2021 passed by this Court in the above writ petition, following reliefs were added:- “(e) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus declaring Rule 2(c) of the Uttar Pradesh Public Service (Reservation for Physically Handicapped, Dependents of Freedom Fighters and Ex-Servicemen) Act, 1993 to be ultra vires to Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India.” 5. In (Group-II) Writ Petition No.4856 of 2020, (Virendra Kumar Vs. State of U.P. and three others), reliefs sought are being reproduced hereinunder:- “(i) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 11.02.2020 and 12.03.2020 passed by respondent no.2 and 3 respectively (Annexure-1, 2 and 3 to the writ petition). (ii) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to permit the petitioners to work on the post of Village Development Officer in District Shahjahanpur and pay the salary of petitioners as and when it is admissible to them. (ii) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to permit the petitioners to work on the post of Village Development Officer in District Shahjahanpur and pay the salary of petitioners as and when it is admissible to them. (iii) issue a suitable writ, order or direction which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper under the circumstances of the case. (iv) To award the costs of the petition to the petitioner.” 6. In (Group-III) Writ Petition No.14831 of 2020 (Sunil Kumar Singh Vs. U.P. Secondary Education Services Selection Board, Prayagraj through its Secretary), following reliefs were made:- “I. Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus, commanding the respondents particularly respondent no.1-The Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Selection Board, Prayagraj through its Secretary to consider the candidature of the petitioner for selection and appointment as ex-serviceman on the post of Assistant Teacher in Trained Graduate Grade against the advertisement no.01/2016 within stipulated time as may be fixed by this Hon'ble Court. II. Issue any other writ, order or direction in the nature of writs, as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper to meet ends of justice. III. Award cost to the petitioner.” 7. As common questions are involved in the aforesaid writ petitions which are three in number, thus they are being compositely decided. 8. Factual matrix as worded in the leading writ petition are that an advertisement was published by Uttar Pradesh Subordinate Service Selection Commission (hereinafter referred to as Commission) for the filling up the post of Village Development Officer (General Category) in the year 2016 being Advertisement No.3/Examination/2016 wherein it was intended that as many as 3133 posts were to be filled. The relevant dates which are germane to the controversy in question are recapitulated herein under in the form of tabulation chart:- Sl. No. Event Date i Commencement of the date for registration on line for filing of application 18.1.2016 ii Commencement of the date for deposit of the fees on line 20.1.2016 iii Last date of registration for examination 6.2.2016 iv Last date of deposit of fees online 8.2.2016 v Last date of submission of application 10.2.2016 9. No. Event Date i Commencement of the date for registration on line for filing of application 18.1.2016 ii Commencement of the date for deposit of the fees on line 20.1.2016 iii Last date of registration for examination 6.2.2016 iv Last date of deposit of fees online 8.2.2016 v Last date of submission of application 10.2.2016 9. Clause-7 of the advertisement providing for the description/detail as well as reservation for various categories is being reproduced hereinunder:- inksa dh la[;k inksa dh izd`fr in dze la0 foHkkx dk uke in dk uke osru cSUM@osrueku @xszM is 01 tqykbZ 2016 dh vk;q ¼U;wure vf/kdre o"kksZ esa½ vukjf{kr vuwlwfpr tkfr vuwlwfpr tkfr vU; fiNM+k oxZ dqy in 1& vk;qDr] xzkE; fodkl foHkkx] mRrj izns'k] y[kuÅ xzke fodkl vf/kdkjh :0 5200&20200@xszM is&2000@& 18&40 1836 612 74 611 3133 ZLFkk;h 10. Clause-8 of the advertisement providing for essential eligibility (qualification) is as under : in dzekad in uke vfuok;Z vgZrk@vf/kekuh vgZrk 1& xzke fodkl vf/kdkjh ¼1½&foKku ;k d`f"k ds lkFk ek/;fed f'k{kk ifj"kn] mRrj izns'k dh baVjehfM,V ijh{kk ;k jkT;iky }kjk mlds led{k ekU;rk izkIr dksbZ ijh{kk mRrh.kZ dh gksA^^ ¼2½&dEIwVj lapkyu esa lh0lh0lh0 izek.k i= dh vgZrkA 11. Clause-8 of the advertisement providing for essential eligibility (qualification) is as under : in dzekad in uke vfuok;Z vgZrk@vf/kekuh vgZrk 1& xzke fodkl vf/kdkjh ¼1½&foKku ;k d`f"k ds lkFk ek/;fed f'k{kk ifj"kn] mRrj izns'k dh baVjehfM,V ijh{kk ;k jkT;iky }kjk mlds led{k ekU;rk izkIr dksbZ ijh{kk mRrh.kZ dh gksA^^ ¼2½&dEIwVj lapkyu esa lh0lh0lh0 izek.k i= dh vgZrkA 11. Clause-10 of the advertisement providing for age limit is also reproduced herein under :- ^^vk;q lhek%&vkq x.kuk dh fu'pk;d frfFk 01 tqykbZ 2016 gSA fnukad 01-07-2016 dks vH;FkhZ dh vk;q in ds lEeq[k vafdr vk;q lhek 18 o"kZ ds e/; gksuk pkfg, vFkkZr vH;FkhZ us 01 tqykbZ 2016 ¼01&07&2016½ dks 18 o"kZ dh vk;q vo'; izkIr dj yh gks vkSj 40 o"kZ ls vf/kd vk;q izkIr u dh gks vFkkZr mldk tUe 02 tqykbZ 1976 ls iwoZ rFkk 01 tqykbZ 1988 ds ckn u gqvk gksA ¼1½&vuqlwfpr tkfr] vuqlwfpr tutkfr] vU; fiNM+k oxZ vkSj ,slh vU; Js.kh] ds vH;fFkZ;ksa dh n'k esa mPprj vk;q lhek mrus o"kZ vf/kd gksxkh ftruh ljdkj }kjk fofufnZ"V gksA 'kklukns'k fnukad 28-11-1985 ds vuqlkj oxhZd`r [ksyksa ds dq'ky f[kykfM-;ksa dks 5 o"kZ dh NwV vuqeU; gksxhA HkwriwoZ lSfudksa ds fy, vf/kdre vk;q lhek esa 03 o"kZ dh NwV 01 tqykbZ 2016 dks bl 'krZ ds lkFk vuqeU; gksxh fd mudh lEiw.kZ lsok vof/k dks mudh okLrfod vk;q esa ls ?kVk dj ifj.kkeLo:i 'ks"k vk;q fu/kkZfjr vk;q ls 03 o"kZ ls vf/kd u gksA vkosnu dh vafre frfFk rd lsuk ls eqDr gksuk vfuok;Z gSA ¼2½&lekt ds fodykaxtuksa dks mRrj izns'k ljdkj ds v|ru] uohure fo|eku 'kklukns'k fnukad 03 Qjojh] 2008 ds vuqlkj vf/kdre vk;q lhek esa 15 o"kZ dh NwV vuqeU; gksxhA^^ 12. For the sake of clarity the provisions pertaining to reservation for selection as well as other conditions as stands applicable to the applicants as provided in Clause (9), (13) and 14) are being recapitulated herein under:- ^^¼9½ tks vH;FkhZ dsanz ;k jkT; ljdkj dh lsok esa lsokjr gSa] os vius lsok;kstd ls vukifRr izek.k i= izkIr dj ysa ftls ekaxs tkus ij vk;ksx dks izLrqr djuk gksxk] izkjEHk esa vukifRr izek.k i= vko';d ugha gS] ijarq bl vk/kkj ij foyac ls izkIr vkosnu i=ksa dks dkyckf/kr ekuk tk,xkA ¼13½ Pk;fur efgykvksa] m0iz0 Loar=rk laxzke lsukuh ds vkfJr HkwriwoZ lSfudksa rFkk fodykaxtu dks ¼dsoy fpfUgr inkas ds lkis{k dksVk cuus ij½ vkj{k.k vf/kfu;e 1993 ;Fkk la'kksf/kr esa fo|eku fu;ekuqlkj mu Jsf.k;ksa esa j[kk tk,xk] ftuls os lacfU/kr gSaA ¼14½ vuqlwfpr tkfr] vuqlwfpr tutkfr] vU; fiNM+k oxZ] Lora=rk laxzke lsukuh ds vkfJr efgyk vH;fFkZ;ksa] HkwriwoZ lSfudksa rFkk fodykaxtu dks tks mRrj izns'k ds ewy fuoklh ugha gSa] mUgsa vkj{k.k dk ykHk vuqeU; ugha gSa] ,sls vH;FkhZ vukjf{kr ¼lkekU;½ Js.kh ds ekus tk;saxsA efgyk vH;fFkZ;ksa ds ekeyss esa firk i{k ls fuxZr izek.k&i= dh ekU; gksxkA^^ 13. General conditions so mentioned Clause I are also being quoted herein under:- “I) LAST DATE FOR RECEIPT OF APPLICATION: On-line-Application process must be completed (including filling up of Part-I, Part-II and Part-III of the Form) before last date of form submission according to Advertisement, after which the web-link will be disabled.” 14. Pleadings so set forth in the leading petition being (Sudhir Singh and two others Vs. State of U.P. and six others) (Group-I) reveal that there are three petitioners therein and so far as the petitioner no.1 is concerned he applied in pursuance of the above noted advertisement claiming himself to be an ex-servicemen while being employed with the Indian Army Rank LME No.129651M on 27.7.2001, on the strength of no objection certificate issued by Commander SSO (ADMIN) (AOD) for Commodore, Bureau of Sailors Sion-Trombay Road, Mankhurd, Mumbai-400 088 mentioning therein that the petitioner no.1 was to be released from Indian Navy on 31.7.2016. 15. Similarly, the petitioner no.2, in order to establish that he is an ex-serviceman also produced before the Commission, a no objection certificate issued by AIR Commander dated 19.12.2015 claiming that he is an ex-serviceman having been employed in Air-Force on the post as Sergeant having Service No.775830-N and his date of enrollment in Indian Air force is 18.11.1996. 16. 15. Similarly, the petitioner no.2, in order to establish that he is an ex-serviceman also produced before the Commission, a no objection certificate issued by AIR Commander dated 19.12.2015 claiming that he is an ex-serviceman having been employed in Air-Force on the post as Sergeant having Service No.775830-N and his date of enrollment in Indian Air force is 18.11.1996. 16. Petitioner No.3 has also submitted no objection certificate before the Commission certifying him to be in Indian Navy in the rank of PORTAC No.129257T from the date 2.2.2001 and the date of relieving being 29.2.2016. 17. As per the pleadings, selections were conducted pursuant whereof the petitioners herein were finally selected for the post of Village Development Officer (In short V.D.O.) vide notification dated 18.7.2018 wherein total 70 candidates belonging to ex-servicemen quota inclusive of the petitioners were shown to have cleared the selection. However, on the same date i.e. 18.7.2018, the roll number so assigned to the petitioners were included in the list of the candidates whose results were withheld being Roll No.00106028 of petitioner Roll No.00134474, petitioner no.2 and Roll No.00214143 of petitioner no.3. A note was appended that withholding of the 70 candidates including the petitioners were on account of the fact that they did not possess the minimum educational qualifications and accordingly the matter was referred to the State Government. 18. It has also come on record that by virtue of a notice dated 14.12.2018, 70 candidates whose results have been withheld were required to appear before the Commission on 26.12.2018 at 10.30 a.m. along with papers relating to their educational qualification which obviously included the names of petitioners. 19. Thereafter, on 20.12.2018 the Commission issued another notice requiring 70 candidates including the petitioners to appear on 26.12.2018 before it along with necessary documents pertaining to their qualifications for considering the same in order to find out as to whether the qualification possessed by the petitioners was equivalent to the Course of Computer Concept (hereinafter referred to CCC) certificate so issued by DOEACC now NIELIT in the light of the letter dated 5.7.2018 issued by Additional Chief Secretary U.P. Government Lucknow, addressed to all Additional Chief Secretary/Secretary U.P. Government. 20. 20. The petitioners claim that they produced all relevant documents pertaining to their educational qualifications and thereafter on 7.2.2019 recommendation was made by the Commission in favour of the petitioners for appointment on the post of VDO addressed to the Commissioner Rural Development, U.P. Lucknow, who in turn, issued an order dated 13.2.2019 addressed to District Development Officers, Budaun, Kasganj, Shahjahanpur, Siddharth Nagar, Balrampur and Lakhimpur Kheri mentioning therein that so far as the petitioner no.1 and 2 are concerned, they were allotted district Budaun and petitioner no.3 district Balrampur for being sent for training for a period of 15 days. The petitioners consequently, completed their training and on 19.3.2019 Principal, Regional Village Development Institutes certified that the petitioners had completed their training successfully. 21. Eventually, appointment orders were issued on 29.5.2019 and 27.5.2019 appointing the petitioners on the post of V.D.O. on temporary basis in the pay band 5200-20200 Grade Pay 2000. However, on 19.2.2020 a show cause notice was issued under the signature of respondent no.3 addressed to the petitioner no.1 show causing him as to why the appointment so sought to be made on the post of V.D.O. be held to be nullity as on the last date of submission of the application form so provided in the advertisement in question being 10.2.2016, he was already employed with the Indian Navy and thus he could not be treated to be an ex-serviceman and further on the last date of submission of the application form, he was also not possessing the C.C.C. certificate awarded by DOEACC now NIELIT. 22. Notice, in similar fashion, was also issued by the respondent no.3 to petitioner no.2 on 19.2.2020. Petitioner no.3 also received notice on 12.2.2020 containing the said objections. It has also come on record that the said notices were replied by petitioners on 2.3.2020. 23. On 5.5.2020 and 28.4.2020, the orders impugned have been passed by respondent nos. 3 and 4; respectively, declaring the appointments of the petitioners to be null and void, as they were shown to be not qualifying the status of ex-servicemen on the last date of submission of application form and further not possessing the certificate of CCC either awarded by DOEACC now NIELIT. 24. 3 and 4; respectively, declaring the appointments of the petitioners to be null and void, as they were shown to be not qualifying the status of ex-servicemen on the last date of submission of application form and further not possessing the certificate of CCC either awarded by DOEACC now NIELIT. 24. In relation to Group-II petition, instituted by Virendra Kumar, his appointment was also declared to be null and void by the Commissioner, Village Development, Lucknow on 11.2.2020 and on 12.3.2020 by the District Development Officer, Shahjahanpur on the ground that Sri Virendra Kumar did not qualify the definition of ex-servicemen on the last date of submission of application form and he did not possess the CCC certificate issued by DOEACC now NIELIT on the last date of submission of application form itself. 25. In Group-III petition, so instituted by Sri Sunil Kumar Singh, the Court finds that there is no order declaring the selection of the petitioners therein to be null and void, but this much has been prayed that the commission be directed to consider the candidature of the petitioner for selection and appointment as ex-servicemen in pursuance of the advertisement in question. 26. Petitioners in the leading writ petition had annexed as Annexure-20 being the notification pertaining to selection on the post of Constable, Civil Police and Constable, PAC, Direct Recruitment, 2018 issued by Uttar Pradesh Police Recruitment and Promotion Board Lucknow, wherein a specific clause has been inserted being Clause 5.6 relatable to Ex-Servicemen of the Defence, wherein it has been mentioned that though ex-defence personnel would be eligible, who are either ex-servicemen on the last date of submission of the application form or they are able to establish that they would be ex-servicemen after applying before one year of their actual discharge. Noticing the said fact, this Court passed an order dated 13.10.2020 requiring the respondents to file an affidavit with regard to the eligibility criteria for appointment of ex-servicemen in various State services as recommended by Government Orders/Circulars of Ministry of Defence, Director General (Resettlement) indicating also whether persons in service, who will be discharged within a period of one year are entitled to apply for appointment in various services and also apprise the Court as to why the criteria for appointment as ex-servicemen is not uniform in various department in State of Uttar Pradesh. On 12.2.2021, an affidavit was filed by Addl. On 12.2.2021, an affidavit was filed by Addl. Chief Secretary, Department of Rural Development, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow, wherein reference had been made to a letter dated 9.2.2021 issued by Joint Secretary Uttar Pradesh Shashan addressed to Commissioner, Department of Rural Development, Government of Uttar Pradesh providing this much that the provisions contained in Section 2 (c) of the Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Reservation for Physically Handicapped, Dependent of Freedom Fighters and Ex-Servicemen) Act, 1993 applies in State services, which provide 5% reservation for Ex-Serviceman in Services under the State. The said affidavit was found to be unsatisfactory and accordingly, on 17.2.2021, the respondents were directed to file better affidavit. 27. Thereafter, on 1.3.2021/20.3.2021, a counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent nos. 1 to 4 in the leading writ petition giving reference in paragraph-3 of the same, while appending a letter dated 25.2.2021 issued by Addl. Secretary, Recruitment, Uttar Pradesh Police Recruitment and Promotion Board, Lucknow addressed to Joint Secretary, Village Development Anubhag-3, mentioning therein that Clause-5.6 of the advertisement dated 16.11.2018 issued by Uttar Pradesh Police Recruitment and Promotion Board, Lucknow for Selection of Constable, Civil Police and Constable PAC Direct Recruitment 2018 was with reference to the office memorandum issued by Ministry of Personnel and Public Grievance and Pension Department of Personnel and Training dated 3.4.2021 wherein it has been provided that it is expected from the applicant so applying in pursuance of the said notification should possess necessary eligibility and documents to prove the same on the last date of submission of the application form. On the question of eligibility referable to qualification which is to be possessed by the applicants on the last date of submission of application form in the selection for the post of V.D.O, reference was made to the order dated 5.7.2018 issued by Addl. Chief Secretary addressed to all Addl. Chief Secretary/Principal Secretary/Secretary, U.P. Government laying down the condition of equivalence qua CCC certificate in computer application issued by DOEACC now NIELIT providing further that an applicant having higher qualification like, B.A, B.Sc, B-Tech, M.Sc. Chief Secretary addressed to all Addl. Chief Secretary/Principal Secretary/Secretary, U.P. Government laying down the condition of equivalence qua CCC certificate in computer application issued by DOEACC now NIELIT providing further that an applicant having higher qualification like, B.A, B.Sc, B-Tech, M.Sc. and M.B.A. and having studied computer as a subject or having a computer course in semester would be treated to be eligible for selection, coupled with the fact that though, the selection was of the year 2016 and last date for submission of application was 10.2.2016 but the order dated 5.7.2018 is prospective in operation and will not apply in the selections conducted prior to it. 28. To the said pleadings, a rejoinder affidavit has been filed by the petitioners dated 25.3.2021, disputing the aforesaid averments and the allegations so contained in the said counter affidavit. Supplementary Counter Affidavit has also been filed annexing certain notifications and reiterating the stands so taken in the counter affidavit filed by them. RELEVANT STATUTORY ENACTMENTS/ORDERS 29. The relevant extract of the Uttar Pradesh Services (Reservation for physically handicapped, dependents of freedom fighters and Ex-Servicemen) Act, 1993 (the Act 1993) is quoted hereinunder: “The U.P. Public Services (Reservation For Physically Handicapped, Dependents of Freedom Fighters and Ex-Servicemen) Act, 1993 (U.P. Act No. 4 of 1993) Last Updated 30th March, 2021 [up106] (As passed by the U.P. Legislature) [December 29, 1993 Received the assent of the President on 29.12.1993, and Published in the U.P. Gazette, Extraordinary, Part I, (Ka), dated 30.12.1993. An Act to provide for the reservation of posts in favour of physically handicapped, dependents of freedom-fighters and ex-servicemen and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. It is hereby enacted in the Forty-fourth year of the Republic of India as follows : 1. Short title and commencement. -(1) This Act may be called the Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Reservation for Physically Handicapped, Dependents of Freedom Fighters and Ex-Servicemen), Act, 1993. (2) It shall be deemed to have come into force on December 11, 1993. 2. Definitions. -In this Act - (a)… (b)... Short title and commencement. -(1) This Act may be called the Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Reservation for Physically Handicapped, Dependents of Freedom Fighters and Ex-Servicemen), Act, 1993. (2) It shall be deemed to have come into force on December 11, 1993. 2. Definitions. -In this Act - (a)… (b)... (c)"ex-serviceman" means a person who has served in any rank, as combatant or non-combatant, in the Indian Army, Navy or Air Force, and - (i) has retired from such service after earning his pension, or (ii) has been released from such service on medical grounds, in accordance with the requirements of such service, or because of circumstances beyond his control and has been granted medical or disability pension, or (iii) has been released, otherwise than on his own request, as a consequence of reduction in the establishment of such service, or (iv) has been released from such service after a fixed specific period, but has not been released on his own request or has not been dismissed or, discharged on account of misconduct or inefficiency and has been granted gratuity; and includes the following categories of territorial Army personnel who - (i) get pension for continuous embodied service, (ii) have become medically unfit owing to military service, and (iii) are winners of gallantry award ... 30. Relevant extract of The Ex-Servicemen (Re-employment in Central Civil Services and Posts) Rules (1st notification), 1979 is quoted hereinunder: “(c) “ex-serviceman’ means a person, who has served in any rank (whether as a combatant or as non combatant), in the Armed Forces of the Union, including the Armed Forces of the former Indian States, but excluding the Assam Rifles, Defence Security Crops, General Reserve Engineering Force, Lok Sahayak Sena and Territorial Army, for a continuous period of not less than six months after attestation, and (i) has been released, otherwise than at his own request or by way of dismissal or discharge on account of misconduct or inefficiency, or has been transferred to the reserve pending such release, or (ii) has to serve for not more than six months for completing the period of service requisite for becoming entitled to be released or transferred to the reserve as aforesaid; or (iii) has been released at his own request, after completing five years service in the Armed Forces of the Union; 3. Application. These rules shall apply to all the Central Civil Services and Posts. Application. These rules shall apply to all the Central Civil Services and Posts. Group ‘C’ and Group ‘D’ and the posts of the level of Assistant Commandant in all paramilitary forces.” 31. Relevant extract of The Ex-Servicemen (Re-employment in Central Civil Services and Posts) Rules, 1979 (2nd notification dated 27.10.1986), is quoted hereinunder: “2. (c) “ex-serviceman’ means a person, -who has served in any rank (whether as a combatant or as a non-combatant), in the Regular Army, Navy and Air Force of the Indian Union, but does not include a person who has served in the Defence Security Crops, the General Reserve Engineering Force, the Lok Sahayak Sena and the para military forces; and (i) who has retired from such service after earning his/her pension; or (ii) Who has been released from such service on medical grounds attributable to military service or circumstances beyond his control and awarded medical or other disability pension; or (iii) Who has been released, otherwise than on his own request, from such service as a result of reduction in establishment; or (iv) who has been released from such service after completing the period of engagement, otherwise than at his own request or by way of dismissal or discharge on account of misconduct or inefficiency, and has been given a gratuity; and includes personnnel of the Territorial Army of the following categories, namely; (i) pension holders for continuous embodied service; (ii) persons with disability attributable to military service; and (iii) gallantry award winners. Explanation : The persons serving in the Armed Forces of the Union, who on retirement from service, would come under the category of ‘ex-servicemen’, may be permitted to apply for re employment one year before the completion of the specified term of engagement and avail themselves of all concessions available to ex-servicemen but shall not be permitted to leave the uniform until they complete the specified term of engagement in the Armed Forces of the Union.” 32. Relevant extract of The Ex-Servicemen (Re-employment in Central Civil Services and Posts) Rules, 1979 (3rd notification dated 27.3.1987), is quoted hereinunder: “2. Relevant extract of The Ex-Servicemen (Re-employment in Central Civil Services and Posts) Rules, 1979 (3rd notification dated 27.3.1987), is quoted hereinunder: “2. (c) the following proviso shall be added, namely; Provided that for the period commencing on the 15th day of November, 1986 and ending with the 30th day of June, 1987, any person who has been released; (a) at his own request after completing 5 years service in the Armed Forces of the Union; or (b) after serving for a continuous period of six months after attestation, otherwise than at his own request or by way of dismissal or discharge on account of mis-conduct or inefficiency or has been transferred to the reserve pending such release; shall also deemed to be an ex-serviceman for the purposes of this clause.” 33. Relevant extract of The Ex-Servicemen (Re-employment in Central Civil Services and Posts) Rules, 1979 (4th Notification dated 04.10.2012), is quoted hereinunder: “2. Relevant extract of The Ex-Servicemen (Re-employment in Central Civil Services and Posts) Rules, 1979 (4th Notification dated 04.10.2012), is quoted hereinunder: “2. In the Ex-servicemen (Re-employment in Central Civil Services and Posts) Rules, 1979 (I) in rule 2, for clause (c), the following clause shall be substituted, namely:- (c) An “ex-serviceman’ means a person - (i) who has served in any rank whether as a combatant or noncombatant in the Regular Army, Navy and Air Force of the Indian Union, and (a) who either has been retired or relieved or discharged from such service whether at his own request or being relieved by the employer after earning his or her pension; or (b) who has been relieved from such service on medical grounds attributable to military service or circumstances beyond his control and awarded medical or other disability pension; or (c) who has been released from such service as a result of reduction in establishment; Or (ii) who has been released from such service after completing the period of engagement, otherwise than at his own request, or by way of dismissal, or discharge on account of misconduct or inefficiency, and has been given a gratuity; and includes personnel of the Territorial Army, namely, pension holders for continuous embodied service or broken spells of qualifying service; Or (ii) personnel of the Army Postal Service who are part of Regular Army and retired from the Army Postal Service without reversion to their parent service with pension, or are released from the Army Postal service on medical grounds attributable to or aggravated by Military service or circumstance beyond their control and awarded medical or other disability pension; Or (iv) Personnel, who were on deputation in Army Postal Service for more than six months prior to the 14th April 1987; Or (v) Gallantry award winners of the Armed forces including personnel of Territorial Army; Or (vi) Ex-recruits boarded out or relieved on medical ground and granted medical disability pension.” 34. Office Memorandum dated 3.4.1991 No.36034/2/91 Estt (SCT) Ministry of Personnel and Public Grievances and Pension Department of Personnel Training containing the subject “Form of Undertaking to furnish for Armed Personnel applying for Civil Post under Ex-Servicemen category”, “Compendium On Reservation Concession And Relaxation For Ex-Serviceman In Central Government Services” is as under: - “2. Office Memorandum dated 3.4.1991 No.36034/2/91 Estt (SCT) Ministry of Personnel and Public Grievances and Pension Department of Personnel Training containing the subject “Form of Undertaking to furnish for Armed Personnel applying for Civil Post under Ex-Servicemen category”, “Compendium On Reservation Concession And Relaxation For Ex-Serviceman In Central Government Services” is as under: - “2. Definition of Ex-servicemen The Ex-servicemen (Re-employment in Central Services and Posts) Rules, 1979, as amended from time to time, defines an ex-servicemen as a person -(i) who has served in any rank whether as combatant or non-combatant in a Regular Army, Navy and Air Force of the Indian Union, and (a) who either has been retired or relieved or discharged from such service whether at his own request or being relieved by the employer after earning his or her pension; or (b) who has been relienied from such service on medical grounds attributable to military service or circumstances beyond his control and awarded medical or other disability pension; or (c) who has been released from such service as a result of reduction in establishment; (ii) who has been released from such service after completing the specific period of engagement, otherwise than at his own request, or by way of dismissal, or discharge on account of misconduct or inefficiency and has been given a gratuity; and includes personnel of the Territorial Army, namely, pension holders for continuous embodied service or broken spells of qualifying service; Or (iii) personnel of Army Postal Service who are part of Regular Army and retired from the Army Postal Service without reversion to their parent service with pension, or are released from the Army Postal service on medical grounds attributable to or aggravated by military service or circumstances beyond their control and awarded medical or other disability pension; Or (iv) Personnel, who were on deputation in Army Postal Service for more than six months prior to 14thApril, 1987; Or (v) Gallantry award winners of the Armed Forces including personnel of Territorial Army; Or (vi) Ex-recruits boarded out or relieved on medical ground and granted medical disability pension. 3. Application of Ex-servicemen Rules These rules shall apply to all the Central Civil Services and posts of Group C and Group D and the posts upto the level of Assistant Commandant in all para-military forces. 3. Application of Ex-servicemen Rules These rules shall apply to all the Central Civil Services and posts of Group C and Group D and the posts upto the level of Assistant Commandant in all para-military forces. Para military forces mean the Border Security Force, Central Reserve Police Force, Indo-Tibetan Border Police, Central Industrial Security Force, Secretariat Security Force, Assam Rifles and Railway Protection Force.” ARGUMENT OF PETITIONERS (SUITORS) 35. Sri Ashok Khare, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Seemant Singh in the leading Writ Petition (Group I) has made manifold submissions namely: A-Section 2(c) of the 1993 Act is ultra vires of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, inasmuch as it creates artificial classification having no nexus with the object sought to be achieved in the matter of restricting the claim of the petitioners with respect to an illegal condition that petitioners should be discharged/retired on the last date of submission of the application forms. B-Uniform yardstick has not been adhered to by the respondents as in the case of recruitment on the post of Constable (Civil Police) and Constable (PAC) Direct Recruitment 2018, pursuant to the advertisement published on 16.11.2018 issued by Uttar Pradesh Police Recruitment and Promotion Board, Lucknow, the applicants therein were also allowed to apply for the said recruitment despite the fact that they were to be discharged post last date of submission of application forms within a period of one year. C-Once the application form so submitted by the petitioners accompanied with no objection certificate was available with the respondents and the same was taken into account while subjecting the petitioners for selection, then the respondents cannot turn around and allege that the appointment of the petitioners was illegal. D-So far as the issue of eligibility relatable to minimum educational qualification is concerned, the petitioners are fully eligible, though they did not possess CCC certificate awarded by DOAECC renamed as NEILET on the last date of submission of application form, but in view of the order dated 5.7.2018 providing that in case an applicant has higher qualification like B.A, B.Sc, B-Tech, M.Sc. and M.B.A. and studied computer as a subject or having a computer course in a semester would be treated to be eligible while granting equivalence, which has even been taken into note of while directing the petitioners to furnish their educational qualification and thereafter they had been offered appointment. 36. and M.B.A. and studied computer as a subject or having a computer course in a semester would be treated to be eligible while granting equivalence, which has even been taken into note of while directing the petitioners to furnish their educational qualification and thereafter they had been offered appointment. 36. Elaborating the first submission, learned Senior Counsel has sought to argue that very insertion of Section 2(c) of 1993 Act containing a condition that in order to qualify to be an ex-serviceman, an applicant has to retire/discharge/relieve, is itself violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India as the very purpose of grant of reservation to the extent of 5% itself stands redundant as the crucial date which is to be seen in the light of the aforesaid statutory provision granting reservation to ex-serviceman is the date of grant of appointment and any date not anterior to it as the petitioners herein were to retire within a short span of period from the last date of submission of application form, 37. Learned Senior Counsel in order to further buttress his argument has also referred to second notification dated 27.10.1986 so as to contend that the person serving in Armed Forces of Union who are retired/discharged/relieved from service would come under the category of ex-servicemen and are to be permitted to apply for re-employment one year before the completion of the specific term of engagement and avail themselves to all concession available to ex-servicemen. 38. In nutshell, the argument of learned counsel for the petitioners is to the extent that in case Section 2(c) of the 1993 Act is allowed to operate and exist on statute book then the very object of enactment of the second notification dated 27.10.1986 will become redundant. 39. According to the learned Senior Counsel though Section 2(c) of the 1993 Act provides for the definition of ex-servicemen but it has to be read in-conformity and consonance with the provisions contained under the second notification dated 27.10.1986. 40. Learned Senior Counsel has next sought to argue that Seventh Schedule under Article 246 of the Constitution of India, Entry no.4 in list I deals with Naval/Military and Air Force Works. 40. Learned Senior Counsel has next sought to argue that Seventh Schedule under Article 246 of the Constitution of India, Entry no.4 in list I deals with Naval/Military and Air Force Works. Thus the concessions or the benefits as available to defence personnel in the employment/services under the Government of India bestowing the benefits for making application within one year before the date of actual discharge in terms of the notification dated 27.10.1986, will occupy the field and, thus, the provisions so contained under Section 2(c) of the 1993 Act would yield as the notifications issued by the Central Government being the central subject will prevail over any State enactment. 41. Learned Senior Counsel while addressing the Court on the second issue has argued that the respondents and their instrumentalities are adopting different yardsticks and not resorting to uniformity in the matter of eligibility criteria for ex-servicemen in selections to services in the State of U.P. As in this regard, learned Senior Counsel has taken illustration of the selections so conducted pursuance to the advertisement dated 16.11.2018 published by Uttar Pradesh Police Recruitment and Promotion Board Lucknow for selection of Constable Civil Police and Constable Police PAC Direct Recruitment, 2018 wherein Clause-5.6 of the same itself granted liberty to the applicants to apply for the said post under the Category of ex-servicemen even when they were not retired/discharged on the last date of submission of application form. Learned Senior Counsel has, thus, argued that it is a clear cut case of violation of Article 14 as well as arbitrariness on the part of the State particularly when both the services namely Police Services and post of V.D.O. are State Services, the appointees being Government servants. In other words, the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is to the effect that the State being a welfare State cannot act arbitrarily while creating an artificial differentiation by adopting two different yardsticks when both the services fall under the State. 42. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also drawn the attention of the Court towards the circular issued on 3.4.1991 by the Government of India which in turn has been accepted and followed in the case of recruitment of police personnel and, thus, the petitioners are also entitled to the same benefits which have been accrued to the police personnel. 43. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also drawn the attention of the Court towards the circular issued on 3.4.1991 by the Government of India which in turn has been accepted and followed in the case of recruitment of police personnel and, thus, the petitioners are also entitled to the same benefits which have been accrued to the police personnel. 43. Emphasizing the third submission, learned Senior Counsel has argued that once no objection certificate has been issued by the competent authority granting their no objection to participate in the selection on the post in question specifying the date of relieving of the petitioners and the same was also taken into consideration by the Commission itself then merely because the petitioners were to superannuate/retire/discharge after the last date of submission of application form will have no relevance, particularly when the respondents themselves accepted the same and did not question the same when the testimonials of petitioners were scrutinized by them. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the petitioners once were subjected to selection and they had not played fraud or concealed any material then it is not open for the State and its instrumentalities to declare that petitioners were not eligible. 44. Lastly, learned Senior Counsel has argued that the petitioners herein are fully qualified and their selections cannot be put to naught. As so far as the petitioner no.1 is concerned he has to his credit the qualification of computer on the basis of B.Tech. Degree in which the petitioner no.1 had studied Information and Communication Technology a subject relatable to Computer and also has to his credit Diploma in Direct Entry Engineering Mechanical (Stream) in which the petitioners had studied Computer Science Theory and Practical as well. 45. Similarly, so far as petitioner no.2 is concerned, he has the qualification of Computer on the basis of B.Tech. degree in which the petitioners had studied Information, Communication and Education Technology and has Computer Fundamentals in other words CCC and has also produced Commanding Officer Mechanical Training Institute, Air Force Station Tambaram, Chennai which is equivalent to Degree in Engineering issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Education and Social Welfare (Department of Education). degree in which the petitioners had studied Information, Communication and Education Technology and has Computer Fundamentals in other words CCC and has also produced Commanding Officer Mechanical Training Institute, Air Force Station Tambaram, Chennai which is equivalent to Degree in Engineering issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Education and Social Welfare (Department of Education). Likewise, petitioner no.3 has to his credit the qualification relating to Computer on the basis of Diploma in Telecom-Communication (General communication) issued by Cochin University of Science and Technology wherein the petitioner no.3 had studied Information Technology in theory as well as practical. 46. Learned Senior Counsel has further argued that though the petitioners no. 1 and 2 had obtained the degree of CCC from NIELIT in the year 2017 and March 2016 and the petitioner no.3 had to his credit diploma in Tele-Communication, 2009 from Cochin University of Science and Technology, Kochi, however, in view of the order dated 28.1.2014 issued by the Secretary State of Uttar Pradesh addressed to Commissioner Village Development U.P. and the order dated 5.7.2018 issued by Additional Chief Secretary State of U.P. addressed to all Additional Chief Secretary/Chief Secretary/Secretary, the petitioners having higher qualifications like B.A., B.Sc., B.Tech. And M.Sc. and having studied computer as a subject or having computer course in one or two semesters were to be treated eligible and even in fact aforesaid both the orders were relied to and referred to by the Commission in its letter dated 20.12.2018. Thus, equivalence ought to have been considered by the respondents as the petitioners possessed higher degrees and merely because they did not have CCC certificate from NIELIT will not matter at all. According to learned counsel for the petitioners, no exercise whatsoever has been done at the level of the respondents for considering equivalence, thus orders under challenge cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 47. Sri Navin Kumar Sharma, who appears in the Group II petition has adopted the arguments of the Senior Counsel who had argued in the leading petition and while adding that though the petitioner in this group obtained CCC certificate issued by NIELIT in the month of April, 2016 but he was possessed with CDCA advance computer TRGSCH at Pune and Computer certificate from HS command Pune in 2014. According to him the orders declaring the selection of the petitioner as null and void is illegal. 48. According to him the orders declaring the selection of the petitioner as null and void is illegal. 48. In similar fashion, arguments have also been made in Group-III petition filed by Sri Sunil Kumar Singh. ARGUMENTS OF RESPONDENTS (ANSWERERS) 49. Sri Ajit Singh, learned Addl. Advocate General, assisted by Sri Sudhanshu Srivastava, learned Addl. Chief Standing Counsel for the State has sought to argue that Section 2(c) of the Act, 1993 is intra vires and not ultra vires, as in order to insist the Court to hold the statutory enactment to be unconstitutional, the burden lies upon the party who seeks to get a declaration that the statute is unconstitutional and the said burden is in fact a heavy burden and it cannot be discharged in a cavalier manner stating that the statute is arbitrary or unreasonable. 50. Elaborating the said submission, learned counsel representing the State has sought to argue that the 1993 Act is referable to Entry no. 41 of List -III of Schedule- 7 of the Constitution of India. 51. According to the learned counsels representing the State, the entire gamut of the argument, so raised by the petitioners has no force, particularly when the field itself is occupied by the statutory enactment made by the State within its legislative power. It has been further argued that it is always open for the State while resorting to making legislative enactment to lay down the conditions for grant of reservation to ex-serviceman. The basic logic behind insertion of Section 2(c) of the 1993 Act is to grant benefit to the ex-serviceman, who stands retired/relieved/discharged on the last date of submission of the application form and not to the applicants, who are already in service and who want to play the second innings while seeking to eliminate the chances of those applicants, who at the relevant point of time, i.e., on the last date of submission of application form, have attained maturity qua eligibility in that regard. 52. Learned State Counsels have further argued that it is always open for the petitioners to apply under the General Quota while divorcing from the crown of being an ex-serviceman. 52. Learned State Counsels have further argued that it is always open for the petitioners to apply under the General Quota while divorcing from the crown of being an ex-serviceman. In particular, the submission is that no prejudice whatsoever has been caused to the petitioners as their chances for consideration have not been eliminated so much so they can always appear and face the selection process while standing on their own legs without taking the aid of being ex-servicemen. 53. Learned counsels for the State have further argued that the NOC so issued by the defence authorities in favour of the petitioners is only referable to no objection to participate in the selection and the same cannot partake a character of a situation which may be far stretched to a condition, whereby it can be termed to be final conferring them the benefit of discharge/relieving/retirement. 54. Learned Counsels for the State have further argued that the petitioners cannot take the benefit of the criteria so adopted for making selections for recruitment on the post of Constable (Civil Police) and Constable (PAC), as the Rules pertaining to selections are entirely different vis-a-vis the selection for the post of V.D.O., as per the terms and conditions as en-grafted in the advertisement. Alternatively, it has been argued that it has been consistent stand of the State that the provisions of Section 2(c) of 1993 Act providing reservation to ex-serviceman to the tune of 5% applies and thus merely because there was certain infraction in the conduction of the selection for the post of Constable (Civil Police) and Constable (PAC), the same will be totally irrelevant in so far as the present controversy is concerned as not only the applicant for recruitment of the post of V.D.O. must be an ex-serviceman on the last date of submission of application form being retired, discharged or superannuated but also he should possess the CCC certificate issued by NIELIT. Thus, according to the State Counsel the orders under challenge are liable to be affirmed. 55. Thus, according to the State Counsel the orders under challenge are liable to be affirmed. 55. Sri Siddharth Singhal, who appears for the Commission while adopting arguments of the State has further argued that the selections have been conducted as per the provisions contained in the Act and the Rules in vogue, the Commission conducted the selection in impartial and transparent manner and according to him as the petitioners did not qualify the definition of ex-serviceman and did not have the certificate for CCC issued by DOEACC now NIELIT on the last date of submission of application form, the order under challenge cannot be said to be illegal. 56. Sri Shashi Prakash Singh, Addl. Solicitor General, assisted by Sri Purnendu Kumar Singh who appears for the Union of India has adopted the arguments of the State. REPLICATION OF THE PETITIONERS (SUITORS) 57. The learned counsel for the petitioners in the leading petition as well as in the connected petitions have reiterated the arguments in replication, which they had made at the first instance while arguing the writ petition. QUESTIONS OF DETERMINATION (a) Whether Section 2(c) of the Act 1993 is ultra vires of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India? (b) Whether the petitioners/suitors are entitled to relief qua differential treatment meted to them vis-a-vis the recruitment made with respect to Constable (Civil Police) and Constable (PAC), pursuant to advertisement dated 16.11.2018? (c) Import and impact of issuance of NOC in favour of the petitioners? (d) Issue relating to CCC qualification? DISCUSSIONS 58. We have heard the submissions of learned counsels for the parties and perused the record. 59. Before embarking an enquiry into the constitutional validity of the Section 2(c) of the 1993 Act, this Court has to bear in mind, the relevant factors which are to be taken into consideration for adjudging the validity of the statutory enactment, while declaring it to be ultra vires. It is a settled principle of law that in case any party assails the validity of a provision on the ground that it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India, then it is for the said party to make necessary pleadings and adduce material to show that the same is in violation of the Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India. The presumption is always drawn that legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of people and in order to rebut the said presumption, the onus is upon the party, who alleges it to be unconstitutional. 60. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chiranjit Lal Chaudhary Vs. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41 in paragraph-10 has held as under: - “..I consider to be well-founded on principle, that the presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment, and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles...” 61. In the case of State of Bihar Vs. Sm. Charusila Dasi, AIR 1959 SC 1002 , in paragraph 14, the Apex Court has held as under: “… It is now well settled that there is a general presumption that the legislature does not intend to exceed its jurisdiction, and it is a sound principle of construction that the Act of a sovereign legislature should, if possible, receive such an interpretation as will make it operative and not in-operative;..” 62. In AIR 1997 SC 1511 , State of Bihar vs. Bihar Distillery Ltd., the Supreme Court in paragraph 18 has held as under: - “18. The Court should try to sustain its validity to the extent possible. It should strike down the enactment only when it is not possible to sustain it. The Court should not approach the enactment with a view to pick holes or to search for defects of drafting, much less inexactitude of language employed. Indeed, any such defects of drafting should be ironed out as part of the attempt to sustain the validity/constitutionality of the enactment. After all, an Act made by the Legislature represents the will of the people and that cannot be lightly interfered with. The unconstitutionality must be plainly and clearly established before an enactment is declared as void.” 63. In Greater Bombay Coop. Bank Ltd. Vs. United Yarn Tex (P) Ltd, 2007(6) SCC 236 , provides as under:- “82. The constitutional validity of an Act can be challenged only on two grounds, viz. (i) lack of legislative competence; and (ii) violation of any of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution or of any other constitutional provision. In State of A. P. & Ors. v. McDowell & Co. & Ors. The constitutional validity of an Act can be challenged only on two grounds, viz. (i) lack of legislative competence; and (ii) violation of any of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution or of any other constitutional provision. In State of A. P. & Ors. v. McDowell & Co. & Ors. [ (1996) 3 SCC 709 ], this Court has opined that except the above two grounds, there is no third ground on the basis of which the law made by the competent legislature can be invalidated and that the ground of invalidation must necessarily fall within the four corners of the afore-mentioned two grounds. 83. Power to enact a law is derived by the State Assembly from List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Entry 32 confers upon a State Legislature the power to constitute cooperative societies. The State of Maharashtra and the State of Andhra Pradesh both had enacted the MCS Act, 1960 and the APCS Act, 1964 in exercise of the power vested in them by Entry 32 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Power to enact would include the power to re-enact or validate any provision of law in the State Legislature, provided the same falls in an Entry of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution with the restriction that such enactment should not nullify a judgment of the competent court of law. In the appeals/SLPs/petitions filed against the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, the legislative competence of the State is involved for consideration. Judicial system has an important role to play in our body politic and has a solemn obligation to fulfil. In such circumstances, it is imperative upon the Courts while examining the scope of legislative action to be conscious to start with the presumption regarding the constitutional validity of the legislation. The burden of proof is upon the shoulders of the incumbent who challenges it. In such circumstances, it is imperative upon the Courts while examining the scope of legislative action to be conscious to start with the presumption regarding the constitutional validity of the legislation. The burden of proof is upon the shoulders of the incumbent who challenges it. It is true that it is the duty of the constitutional courts under our Constitution to declare a law enacted by the Parliament or the State Legislature as unconstitutional when Parliament or the State Legislature had assumed to enact a law which is void, either for want of constitutional power to enact it or because the constitutional forms or conditions have not been observed or where the law infringes the Fundamental Rights enshrined and guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution. 84. As observed by this Court in CST v. Radhakrishnan in considering the validity of a Statute the presumption is always in favour of constitutionality and the burden is upon the person who attacks it to show that there has been transgression of constitutional principles. For sustaining the constitutionality of an Act, a Court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, reports, preamble, history of the times, objection of the legislation and all other facts which are relevant. It must always be presumed that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people and that discrimination, if any, is based on adequate grounds and considerations. It is also well-settled that the courts will be justified in giving a liberal interpretation in order to avoid constitutional invalidity. A provision conferring very wide and expansive powers on authority can be construed in conformity with legislative intent of exercise of power within constitutional limitations. Where a Statute is silent or is inarticulate, the Court would attempt to transmutate the inarticulate and adopt a construction which would lean towards constitutionality albeit without departing from the material of which the law is woven. These principles have given rise to rule of "reading down" the provisions if it becomes necessary to uphold the validity of the law.” 64. In Zaheer Ahmed Latifur Rehman Sheikh Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, JT 2010(4) SCC 256 in paragraph 34 and 35, the Supreme Court has held as under: - “34. These principles have given rise to rule of "reading down" the provisions if it becomes necessary to uphold the validity of the law.” 64. In Zaheer Ahmed Latifur Rehman Sheikh Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, JT 2010(4) SCC 256 in paragraph 34 and 35, the Supreme Court has held as under: - “34. It is a well-established rule of interpretation that the entries in the List being fields of legislation must receive liberal construction inspired by a broad and generous spirit and not a narrow or pedantic approach. Each general word should extend to all ancillary and subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be comprehended within it. [Reference in this regard may be made to the decisions of this Court in Navinchandra Mafatlal v. Commr. of I.T. [ AIR 1955 SC 58 ], State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti lal Shah [ (2008) 13 SCC 5 ]. It is also a cardinal rule of interpretation that there shall always be a presumption of constitutionality in favour of a statute and while construing such statute every legally permissible effort should be made to keep the statute within the competence of the State Legislature [Reference may be made to the cases of: Charanjit Lal Choudhary v. Union of India [ AIR 1951 SC 41 ], T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka [ (2002) 8 SCC 481 ], Karnataka Bank Ltd. State of AP [ (2008) 2 SCC 254 ]] 35. One of the proven methods of examining the legislative competence of a legislature with regard to an enactment is by the application of the doctrine of pith and substance. This doctrine is applied when the legislative competence of the legislature with regard to a particular enactment is challenged with reference to the entries in various lists. If there is a challenge to the legislative competence, the courts will try to ascertain the pith and substance of such enactment on a scrutiny of the Act in question. In this process, it is necessary for the courts to go into and examine the true character of the enactment, its object, its scope and effect to find out whether the enactment in question is genuinely referable to a field of the legislation allotted to the respective legislature under the constitutional scheme. In this process, it is necessary for the courts to go into and examine the true character of the enactment, its object, its scope and effect to find out whether the enactment in question is genuinely referable to a field of the legislation allotted to the respective legislature under the constitutional scheme. This doctrine is an established principle of law in India recognized not only by this Court, but also by various High Courts. Where a challenge is made to the constitutional validity of a particular State Act with reference to a subject mentioned in any entry in List I, the Court has to look to the substance of the State Act and on such analysis and examination, if it is found that in the pith and substance, it falls under an entry in the State List but there is only an incidental encroachment on any of the matters enumerated in the Union List, the State Act would not become invalid merely because there is incidental encroachment on any of the matters in the Union List.” 65. In Namit Sharma Vs. Union of India, 2013(1) SCC 745 , in paragraph 51 and 61, the Supreme Court has held as under: - “51. Another most significant canon of determination of constitutionality is that the courts would be reluctant to declare a law invalid or ultra vires on account of unconstitutionality. The courts would accept an interpretation which would be in favour of the constitutionality, than an approach which would render the law unconstitutional. Declaring the law unconstitutional is one of the last resorts taken by the courts. The courts would preferably put into service the principle of ‘reading down’ or ‘reading into’ the provision to make it effective, workable and ensure the attainment of the object of the Act. These are the principles which clearly emerge from the consistent view taken by this court in its various pronouncements. 61. It is a settled principle of law, as stated earlier, that courts would generally adopt an interpretation which is favourable to and tilts towards the constitutionality of a statute, with the aid of the principles like ‘reading into’ and/or ‘reading down’ the relevant provisions, as opposed to declaring a provision unconstitutional. The courts can also bridge the gaps that have been left by the legislature inadvertently. The courts can also bridge the gaps that have been left by the legislature inadvertently. We are of the considered view that both these principles have to be applied while interpreting Section 12(5). It is the application of these principles that would render the provision constitutional and not opposed to the doctrine of equality. Rather the application of the provision would become more effective.” 66. Another additional aspect needs to be further noticed at this juncture that though the earlier law was to the effect that the Constitutional validity of Act can be challenged only on two grounds namely (I), lack of legislative competence and (ii) violation of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part-III of the Constitution. However, the exception to the said Rule has been noticed in the case of Shayara Bano Vs. Union of India, 2017 (9) SCC 1 , wherein a third exception was carved out with regard to the fact that the Courts of law can even hold the statutory enactment to be ultra vires, where there is “manifest arbitrariness. The Hon’ble Apex Court in its majority opinion 3:2 has held in paragraphs-87, 88, 89, 90 and 101 as under: - “87. The thread of reasonableness runs through the entire fundamental rights Chapter. What is manifestly arbitrary is obviously unreasonable and being contrary to the rule of law, would violate Article 14. Further, there is an apparent contradiction in the three Judges’ Bench decision in McDowell (supra) when it is said that a constitutional challenge can succeed on the ground that a law is “disproportionate, excessive or unreasonable”, yet such challenge would fail on the very ground of the law being “unreasonable, unnecessary or unwarranted”. The arbitrariness doctrine when applied to legislation obviously would not involve the latter challenge but would only involve a law being disproportionate, excessive or otherwise being manifestly unreasonable. All the aforesaid grounds, therefore, do not seek to differentiate between State action in its various forms, all of which are interdicted if they fall foul of the fundamental rights guaranteed to persons and citizens in Part III of the Constitution. 88. We only need to point out that even after McDowell (supra), this Court has in fact negated statutory law on the ground of it being arbitrary and therefore violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 88. We only need to point out that even after McDowell (supra), this Court has in fact negated statutory law on the ground of it being arbitrary and therefore violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 2 SCC 1 , this Court held that after passage of time, a law can become arbitrary, and, therefore, the freezing of rents at a 1940 market value under the Bombay Rent Act would be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India (see paragraphs 8 to 15 and 31). 89. Similarly in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. etc. etc., (2004) 4 SCC 311 at 354, this Court struck down Section 17(2) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, as follows: “64. The condition of pre-deposit in the present case is bad rendering the remedy illusory on the grounds that: (i) it is imposed while approaching the adjudicating authority of the first instance, not in appeal, (ii) there is no determination of the amount due as yet, (iii) the secured assets or their management with transferable interest is already taken over and under control of the secured creditor, (iv) no special reason for double security in respect of an amount yet to be determined and settled, (v) 75% of the amount claimed by no means would be a meagre amount, and (vi) it will leave the borrower in a position where it would not be possible for him to raise any funds to make deposit of 75% of the undetermined demand. Such conditions are not only onerous and oppressive but also unreasonable and arbitrary. Therefore, in our view, sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act is unreasonable, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 90. In two other fairly recent judgments namely State of Tamil Nadu v. K. Shyam Sunder (2011) 8 SCC 737 at paragraphs 50 to 53, and A.P. Dairy Development Corpn. Federation v. B. Narasimha Reddy (2011) 9 SCC 286 at paragraph 29, this Court reiterated the position of law that a legislation can be struck down on the ground that it is arbitrary and therefore violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 101. Federation v. B. Narasimha Reddy (2011) 9 SCC 286 at paragraph 29, this Court reiterated the position of law that a legislation can be struck down on the ground that it is arbitrary and therefore violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 101. It will be noticed that a Constitution Bench of this Court in Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641 , stated that it was settled law that subordinate legislation can be challenged on any of the grounds available for challenge against plenary legislation. This being the case, there is no rational distinction between the two types of legislation when it comes to this ground of challenge under Article 14. The test of manifest arbitrariness, therefore, as laid down in the aforesaid judgments would apply to invalidate legislation as well as subordinate legislation under Article 14. Manifest arbitrariness, therefore, must be something done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle. Also, when something is done which is excessive and disproportionate, such legislation would be manifestly arbitrary. We are, therefore, of the view that arbitrariness in the sense of manifest arbitrariness as pointed out by us above would apply to negate legislation as well under Article 14.” 67. Recently, in one of the decisions in the case of K.S. Puttaswamy (Aadhar) Vs. Union of India, reported in 2019 (1) SCC 1 in paragraphs 103, 104 and 105 has held as under: - “103. In support of the aforesaid proposition that an Act of the Parliament can be invalidated only on the aforesaid two grounds, passages from various judgments were extracted 21. The Court also noted the observations from State of A.P. & Ors. v. MCDOWELL & Co. & Ors., (1996) 3 SCC 709 wherein it was held that apart from the aforesaid two grounds, no third ground is available to validate any piece of legislation. In the process, it was further noted that in Rajbala & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., (2016) 2 SCC 445 (which followed MCDOWELL & Co. case), the Court held that a legislation cannot be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it is ‘arbitrary’ inasmuch as examining as to whether a particular Act is arbitrary or not implies a value judgment and courts do not examine the wisdom of legislative choices, and, therefore, cannot undertake this exercise. 104. case), the Court held that a legislation cannot be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it is ‘arbitrary’ inasmuch as examining as to whether a particular Act is arbitrary or not implies a value judgment and courts do not examine the wisdom of legislative choices, and, therefore, cannot undertake this exercise. 104. The issue whether law can be declared unconstitutional on the ground of arbitrariness has received the attention of this Court in a Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Shayara Bano v. Union of India & Ors., (2017) 9 SCC 1 , R.F. Nariman and U.U. Lalit, JJ. State of M.P. v. Rakesh Kohli, (2012) 6 SCC 312 ; Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India, (2008) 6 SCC 1 discredited the ratio of the aforesaid judgments wherein the Court had held that a law cannot be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it is arbitrary. The Judges pointed out the larger Bench judgment in the case of Dr. K.R. Lakshmanan v. State of T.N. & Anr., (1996) 2 SCC 226 and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India & Anr., (1978) 1 SCC 248 where ‘manifest arbitrariness’ is recognised as the third ground on which the legislative Act can be invalidated. Following discussion in this behalf is worthy of note: “87. The thread of reasonableness runs through the entire fundamental rights chapter. What is manifestly arbitrary is obviously unreasonable and being contrary to the rule of law, would violate Article 14. Further, there is an apparent contradiction in the three-Judge Bench decision in State of A.P. v. McDowell and Co., (1996) 3 SCC 709 when it is said that a constitutional challenge can succeed on the ground that a law is “disproportionate, excessive or unreasonable”, yet such challenge would fail on the very ground of the law being “unreasonable, unnecessary or unwarranted”. The arbitrariness doctrine when applied to legislation obviously would not involve the latter challenge but would only involve a law being disproportionate, excessive or otherwise being manifestly unreasonable. All the aforesaid grounds, therefore, do not seek to differentiate between State action in its various forms, all of which are interdicted if they fall foul of the fundamental rights guaranteed to persons and citizens in Part III of the Constitution. 88. All the aforesaid grounds, therefore, do not seek to differentiate between State action in its various forms, all of which are interdicted if they fall foul of the fundamental rights guaranteed to persons and citizens in Part III of the Constitution. 88. We only need to point out that even after McDowell [State of A.P. v. McDowell and Co., (1996) 3 SCC 709 ], this Court has in fact negated statutory law on the ground of it being arbitrary and therefore violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 2 SCC 1 , this Court held that after passage of time, a law can become arbitrary, and, therefore, the freezing of rents at a 1940 market value under the Bombay Rent Act would be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India (see paras 8 to 15 and 31). xx xx xx 99. However, in State of Bihar v. Bihar Distillery Ltd., (1997) 2 SCC 453 , SCC at para 22, in State of M.P. v. Rakesh Kohli [State of M.P. v. Rakesh Kohli, (2012) 6 SCC 312 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 481], SCC at paras 17 to 19, in Rajbala v. State of Haryana, (2016) 2 SCC 445 , SCC at paras 53 to 65 and in Binoy Viswam v. Union of India, (2017) 7 SCC 59 , SCC at paras 80 to 82, State of A.P. v. McDowell and Co., (1996) 3 SCC 709 was read as being an absolute bar to the use of “arbitrariness” as a tool to strike down legislation under Article 14. As has been noted by us earlier in this judgment, McDowell State of A.P. v. McDowell and Co., (1996) 3 SCC 709 itself is per incuriam, not having noticed several judgments of Benches of equal or higher strength, its reasoning even otherwise being flawed. The judgments, following State of A.P. v. McDowell and Co., (1996) 3 SCC 709 are, therefore, no longer good law.” 105. The historical development of the doctrine of arbitrariness has been noticed by the said Judges in Shayara Bano in detail. It would be suffice to reproduce paragraphs 67 to 69 of the said judgment as the discussion in these paras provide a sufficient guide as to how a doctrine of arbitrariness is to be applied while adjudging the constitutional validity of a legislation. It would be suffice to reproduce paragraphs 67 to 69 of the said judgment as the discussion in these paras provide a sufficient guide as to how a doctrine of arbitrariness is to be applied while adjudging the constitutional validity of a legislation. “67. We now come to the development of the doctrine of arbitrariness and its application to State action as a distinct doctrine on which State action may be struck down as being violative of the rule of law contained in Article 14. In a significant passage, Bhagwati, J., in E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N. stated: (SCC p. 38, para 85) “85. The last two grounds of challenge may be taken up together for consideration. Though we have formulated the third ground of challenge as a distinct and separate ground, it is really in substance and effect merely an aspect of the second ground based on violation of Articles 14 and 16. Article 16 embodies the fundamental guarantee that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. Though enacted as a distinct and independent fundamental right because of its great importance as a principle ensuring equality of opportunity in public employment which is so vital to the building up of the new classless egalitarian society envisaged in the Constitution, Article 16 is only an instance of the application of the concept of equality enshrined in Article 14. In other words, Article 14 is the genus while Article 16 is a species. Article 16 gives effect to the doctrine of equality in all matters relating to public employment. The basic principle which, therefore, informs both Articles 14 and 16 is equality and inhibition against discrimination. Now, what is the content and reach of this great equalising principle? It is a founding faith, to use the words of Bose, J., “a way of life”, and it must not be subjected to a narrow pedantic or lexicographic approach. We cannot countenance any attempt to truncate its all-embracing scope and meaning, for to do so would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be “cribbed, cabined and confined” within traditional and doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. We cannot countenance any attempt to truncate its all-embracing scope and meaning, for to do so would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be “cribbed, cabined and confined” within traditional and doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14, and if it effects any matter relating to public employment, it is also violative of Article 16. Articles 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment. They require that State action must be based on valid relevant principles applicable alike to all similarly situate and it must not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant considerations because that would be denial of equality. Where the operative reason for State action, as distinguished from motive inducing from the antechamber of the mind, is not legitimate and relevant but is extraneous and outside the area of permissible considerations, it would amount to mala fide exercise of power and that is hit by Articles 14 and 16. Mala fide exercise of power and arbitrariness are different lethal radiations emanating from the same vice: in fact the latter comprehends the former. Both are inhibited by Articles 14 and 16.” (emphasis supplied) 68. This was further fleshed out in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, where, after stating that various fundamental rights must be read together and must overlap and fertilise each other, Bhagwati, J., further amplified this doctrine as follows: (SCC pp. 283-84, para 7) “The nature and requirement of the procedure under Article 217. Now, the question immediately arises as to what is the requirement of Article 14: what is the content and reach of the great equalising principle enunciated in this article? There can be no doubt that it is a founding faith of the Constitution. It is indeed the pillar on which rests securely the foundation of our democratic republic. And, therefore, it must not be subjected to a narrow, pedantic or lexicographic approach. There can be no doubt that it is a founding faith of the Constitution. It is indeed the pillar on which rests securely the foundation of our democratic republic. And, therefore, it must not be subjected to a narrow, pedantic or lexicographic approach. No attempt should be made to truncate its all-embracing scope and meaning, for to do so would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be imprisoned within traditional and doctrinaire limits. We must reiterate here what was pointed out by the majority in E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N., namely, that: (SCC p. 38, para 85) ‘85. … From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic, while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14….’ Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Article 14. It must be “right and just and fair” and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise, it would be no procedure at all and the requirement of Article 21 would not be satisfied.” (emphasis supplied) 69. This was further clarified in A.L. Kalra v. Project and Equipment Corpn., following Royappa and holding that arbitrariness is a doctrine distinct from discrimination. It was held: (A.L. Kalra case, SCC p. 328, para 19) “19. … It thus appears well settled that Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in executive/administrative action because any action that is arbitrary must necessarily involve the negation of equality. One need not confine the denial of equality to a comparative evaluation between two persons to arrive at a conclusion of discriminatory treatment. An action per se arbitrary itself denies equal of (sic) protection by law. One need not confine the denial of equality to a comparative evaluation between two persons to arrive at a conclusion of discriminatory treatment. An action per se arbitrary itself denies equal of (sic) protection by law. The Constitution Bench pertinently observed in Ajay Hasia case and put the matter beyond controversy when it said: (SCC p. 741, para 16) ‘16. … Wherever therefore, there is arbitrariness in State action whether it be of the legislature or of the executive or of an “authority” under Article 12, Article 14 immediately springs into action and strikes down such State action.’ This view was further elaborated and affirmed in D.S. Nakara v. Union of India. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India it was observed that Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. It is thus too late in the day to contend that an executive action shown to be arbitrary is not either judicially reviewable or within the reach of Article 14.” The same view was reiterated in Babita Prasad v. State of Bihar, SCC at p. 285, para 31.” This doctrine is, thus, treated as a facet of both Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.” 68. This Court has also considered the validity of a statutory enactment after following the judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court, while holding that the third ground is also available with a party, who alleges that the statutory enactment is unconstitutional, but it has been observed that the party, who alleges that an enactment is unconstitutional, is possessed with a heavy burden to prove the same and he cannot discharge its onus in a cavalier manner by merely stating that the Amendment Act is unreasonable. In the case of Noida Employees Association and others Vs. State of U.P, 2019(5) ADJ 602 , this High Court has held as under: - “23. Coming to the exact challenge raised by the petitioners, the learned Advocate General would submit, the challenge being to the enactment of the State Legislature, the grounds of challenge are limited i.e. two and strict, being either the Act be shown to be beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature or in violation of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part-III of the Constitution of India or of any other constitutional provision. There does not exist any third ground to challenge the Amending Act. There does not exist any third ground to challenge the Amending Act. Relying on that principle firmly emphasised by the Supreme Court in State of A.P. & Ors Vs MCDOWELL & Co. & Ors., (1996) 3 SCC 709 , it has been submitted, the burden to establish unconstitutionality of a Statute is a heavy burden that lies strictly on the challenger/petitioners. It cannot be discharged in a cavalier manner by merely stating that the Amending Act is arbitrary or unreasonable. In absence of any challenge raised to the legislative competence or any constitutional infirmity in the Amending Act, it does not lie with the petitioners to set up a loose plea of the Amending Act being contrary to the original Act. Such a ground does not exist. According to him, 'arbitrariness' does not exist as a ground to challenge plenary legislation.” 69. Now let us examine the grounds taken in the leading writ petition to attack the constitutional validity of the Act 1993: “K. Because, the petitioners were about to be discharged on 30.11.2016, insofar as it relating to petitioner No.1 and petitioner no.2 while petitioner No.3 was to be actually discharged on 28.02.2016 from the defense services, inasmuch as the petitioners had applied within a period of 1 year from the date of their actual discharge after taking no objection certificates from the competent authorities while working in the defense services. L. Because, the Armed Forces or the defense services come directly under the Government of India, in fact, the Government of India specifically provides the definition of “ex-servicemen” under Ex-servicemen (Re-employment in Central Civil Services and Posts) Rules, 1979, in which Clause (c) has been substituted vide notification dated 27.10.1986 issued by the Government of India (Ministry of Personnel and Training) under which explanation has been given as the persons serving in the Armed Forces of the union, who on retirement from service, would come under the category of “Ex-servicemen” may be permitted to apply for reemployment one year before the completion of the specified term of the engagement and avail themselves of all concessions available to ex-servicemen, but shall not be permitted to leave the uniform until they complete the specified terms of engagement in the Armed Forces of the Union. M. Because, there cannot be separate yardstick for making recruitment on the posts advertised by the Uttar Pradesh Subordinate Service Selection Commission, Lucknow in which an ex-serviceman is required to be retired from the service, only then he can apply under ex-servicemen quota while the Government of India requires a defense personnel to apply 1 year before the actual date of discharge, therefore, the provision available under the Government of India is also required to be followed by the State Government in respect of allowing the defense personnel to apply 1 year before the date of actual discharge, there cannot be any hard and fast rule that a defense personnel in the state of U.P. has to retire first and become unemployed and only then he can avail the benefits for ex-servicemen for applying against the posts of State Government. N. Because, the Government of India permits the defense personnel being in service to apply 1 year before the date of actual discharge and it has nexus with the service given by such defense personnel to the nation for which the Government of India requires them to apply 1 year before the date of actual discharge, enabling them to remain employed even after discharging from the defense services. O. Because, the Uttar Pradesh Police Recruitment and Promotion Board, Lucknow is adhering to the provisions of Government of India in respect of allowing the defense personnel to apply 1 year before the date of their actual discharge following the rules of Government of India, hence, the same yardstick is required to be followed by Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission, Lucknow in reference of defense personnel like petitioners who has applied 1 year before the date of actual discharge and another hard and fast rule can be applied in the matters of defense personnel requiring them to be actually discharged on the last date of submission of application form i.e. 10.02.2016. P. Because, 7th Schedule of the Constitution of India which refers to List-1 i.e. Union List, in which Naval, Military and Air Forces, any other Armed Forces of the union are part and parcel of the 7th Schedule, Article 246 of the Constitution of India. P. Because, 7th Schedule of the Constitution of India which refers to List-1 i.e. Union List, in which Naval, Military and Air Forces, any other Armed Forces of the union are part and parcel of the 7th Schedule, Article 246 of the Constitution of India. The concessions or the benefits as available to the defense personnel under the Government of India like making applications for the employment, 1 year before the date of actual discharge has to be adopted in a manner as it is provided by the Government of India. Q. Because, the petitioners are aggrieved by the Rule 2 (c) of the Act of 1993 which takes only the retired/discharged defense personnel under the ex-servicemen quota rather the petitioners are also liable to be given the concessions/benefits of the ex-servicemen for applying 1 year before the date of their actual discharge, otherwise, the intent of defense personnel like petitioners has to wait for their discharge/retirement to get unemployed and them make efforts to get the employment after being actually discharged/retired from the defense service. R. Because, once the defense services are part and parcel of the List-1 i.e. Union List, then the law or the provisions made by the Government of India with respect to defense personnel, are very much applicable upon the State Government also.” 70. The principal argument so canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the Section 2(c) of the Act of 1993 is in violation of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India as it creates artificial classification having no nexus with the object sought to be achieved. 71. Elaborating the said argument learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that grant of reservation of ex-serviceman is a beneficial act of the State just in order to provide them with suitable jobs in civil services so that they may not face difficulty in adjusting themselves in civil society after leaving the defence services. Thus according to the submissions of learned Senior Counsel the insertion of Section 2(c) in the 1993 Act tantamount to destroying the entire object of granting reservation. 72. Thus according to the submissions of learned Senior Counsel the insertion of Section 2(c) in the 1993 Act tantamount to destroying the entire object of granting reservation. 72. Learned Senior Counsel has referred to 2nd notification dated 27.10.1986 so as to contend that the explanation to Rule 2(c) itself provides that the persons serving in the armed forces of union who on retirement from service would come under the category of ex-serviceman may be permitted to apply for re-employment one year before the completion of the specified term of engagement and avail themselves of all concessions available to ex-serviceman but shall not be permitted to leave uniform but they complete specified terms of engagement in the armed forces of the union. 73. In nutshell the arguments of learned counsels for the petitioners is to the extent that crucial date for eligibility is the date on which the appointment is to be made and not the date anterior to it being the last date of submission of application form. 74. Before proceeding further it would be relevant to quote necessary provisions which are germane to the controversy in question:- Article 246 Constitution of India “246. Subject-matter of laws made by Parliament and by the Legislatures of States:- (1) Notwithstanding anything in clauses (2) and (3), Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the “Union List”). (2) Notwithstanding anything in clause (3), Parliament, and, subject to clause (1), the Legislature of any State also, have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the “Concurrent List”). (3) Subject to clauses (1) and (2), the Legislature of any State has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the “State List”). (3) Subject to clauses (1) and (2), the Legislature of any State has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the “State List”). (4) Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of the territory of India not included in a State notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the State List.” For the controversy in question, Entry 70 of list-I is relevant:- “Union Public Service; All-India Services; Union Public Service Commission.” Entry 4 of Union List 1 of Seventh Schedule provides as under: “Naval, military and air force works.” Entry 41 list II---State List “State public services; State Public Service Commission.” 75. Perusal of Article 246 of the Constitution of India itself reveals that under Clause (1), notwithstanding anything contained in Clause (2) and (3), Parliament has been conferred the exclusive power to enact laws with respect to the matters enumerated in List-I of the Union List in Seventh Schedule. Clause (2) empowers the Parliament and State Legislature subject to the power of Parliament under Sub-clause (1) to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List-III in Seventh Schedule as provided in the Constitution as “the Concurrent List” notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-clause (3). Moreover, under Clause (3), the State Legislature has been conferred with exclusive powers to make laws in respect of matters enumerated in List-II in the Seventh Schedule, which is described as State List, but subject to Clauses (1) and (2). 76. Considering the issue of repugnancy, we may note that the Entry 70 of list-I (Union List) pertains to Union Public Services, All India services and the services wherein recruitment is made by the Union Public Service Commission. Whereas Entry 4 of list-II (State Public Services) pertains to the public services wherein recruitment is made by the State Public Service Commission. 77. Here in the present case, we are concerned with the recruitment in the State Public Services conducted through the State Public Service Commission. The reservation in State Public Services for certain categories such as physically challenged, dependent of freedom fighter and ex-servicemen is governed by the Act’ 1993. 77. Here in the present case, we are concerned with the recruitment in the State Public Services conducted through the State Public Service Commission. The reservation in State Public Services for certain categories such as physically challenged, dependent of freedom fighter and ex-servicemen is governed by the Act’ 1993. The legislature of the State of U.P., thus, has exclusive power to make laws for the recruitment/appointment to State services as the subject State Public Services is enumerated in list-II in the 7th Schedule. The reference to Entry-4 of Union list of the 7th Schedule is misconceived, inasmuch as, the enactment under challenge i.e. the Act’ 1993 does not pertain to any of the matters connected to the said entry. The legislative power of the State is not subject matter of challenge. 78. The question of repugnancy has to be considered keeping in mind the status and nature of the statutory enactments and the field occupied by them. There are two types of enactments one with the name and nomenclature of Ex-Servicemen (Re-employment of Central Government Service) Rules, 1979, which underwent amendments, titled as 1st notification, 2nd notification, 3rd notification and 4th notification. The other being the Act by the name and nomenclature of the U.P. Public Services (Reservation For Physically Handicapped, Dependents of Freedom Fighters And Ex-Servicemen) Act, 1993, a State Act providing for reservation of 5% to Ex-Servicemen in State services. The Central Rules’1979 who enacted in exercise of the powers conferred under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. 79. The original notifications and the amendments numbers 1, 2 & 3 of the Central Government themselves at a very glance show that the notified rules are applicable to all Central Civil Services and Post Group 'C' and Group 'D' and the post of the level of Assistant Commandant in all Para Military Forces. Meaning thereby that the application of the rules itself stands confined to the services referable to the Central Government and the same can not be applied to the services of the State in question. 80. The State Enactment being the U.P. Public Services (Reservation For Physically Handicapped, Dependents of Freedom Fighters And Ex-Servicemen) Act, 1993 is a special Act providing for reservations under various categories including all the Ex-Servicemen, in particular Section 2(c) for recruitment in State services. 80. The State Enactment being the U.P. Public Services (Reservation For Physically Handicapped, Dependents of Freedom Fighters And Ex-Servicemen) Act, 1993 is a special Act providing for reservations under various categories including all the Ex-Servicemen, in particular Section 2(c) for recruitment in State services. According to it in order to qualify for being treated as an ex-serviceman, an applicant has to be discharged, retired or relieved on the last date of submission of application form. The Court is of the firm opinion that there is no repugnancy, as both the statutory provisions operate in different fields and deal with recruitment in different public services. They do not either overlap or trench in each other’s territory. 81. Even otherwise this Court finds that the provision contained in the explanation attached to Rule 2(c) of the 2nd notification dated 27.10.1986 according permission to ex-serviceman to apply for employment one year before the completion of the enactments and avail themselves to all concessions available to ex-serviceman had itself been superseded by the 3rd notification dated 27.10.1987 and the latest notification namely 4th notification dated 4.10.2012. Both the said notifications do not contain the said benefits. Thus in all eventualities, the benefit so sought to be drawn by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners by virtue of the explanation appended to Section 2(c) of 1986 notification itself stands evaporated. 82. Nonetheless the Constitution makers were quiet conscious about the fact regarding the contingencies which might arise when there are two different legislations namely of Central and State in existence and that is why in order to demarcate the boundary the three list being Central and State and Concurrent List were put into a motion. 83. The Court finds that there is nothing on record to suggest that the notifications issued by the Central Government as referred to above being titled as first, second, third and forth notifications have been adopted as the things are otherwise that there exist a statutory enactment of State itself occupying the field in question. 84. Additionally, we may also refer to the judgments of the Hon. Apex Court on the issue relating to Article 246 of the Constitution of India. 85. 84. Additionally, we may also refer to the judgments of the Hon. Apex Court on the issue relating to Article 246 of the Constitution of India. 85. In the case of Greater Bombay Co-operative Bank (Supra) the Hon. Apex Court in para 92 has observed as under:- The first three clauses of Article 246 of the Constitution relate to the demarcation of legislative powers between the Parliament and the State Legislatures. Under clause (1), notwithstanding anything contained in clauses (2) and (3), Parliament has been given the exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I or the Union List in the Seventh Schedule. Clause (2) empowers the Parliament and State Legislatures subject to the power of Parliament under sub-clause (1), to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule described in the Constitution as the 'Concurrent List' notwithstanding anything contained in sub-clause (3). Under clause (3) the State Legislatures have been given exclusive powers to make laws in respect of matters enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule described as the 'State List' but subject to clauses (1) and (2). The three lists while enumerating in detail the legislative subjects carefully distribute the areas of legislative authority between Parliament (List I) and the State (List II). The supremacy of Parliament has been provided for by the non-obstante clause in Article 246 (1) and the words 'subject to' in Article 246 (2) and (3). Therefore, under Article 246 (1) if any of the Entries in the three Lists overlap, the Entry in List I will prevail. Additionally, some of the Entries in the State List have been made expressly subject to the power of Parliament to legislate either under List I or under List III. Entries in the Lists of the Seventh Schedule have been liberally interpreted, nevertheless Courts have been wary of upsetting this balance by a process of interpretation so as to deprive any Entry of its content and reduce it to 'useless lumber'. The use of the word 'exclusive' in Clause (3) denotes that within the legislative fields contained in List II, the State Legislatures exercise authority as plenary and ample as Parliament. 86. Further in the case of UCO Bank and others Vs. Dipak Debbarma and others reported in (2017) 2 SCC 585 has observed as under:- “11. The use of the word 'exclusive' in Clause (3) denotes that within the legislative fields contained in List II, the State Legislatures exercise authority as plenary and ample as Parliament. 86. Further in the case of UCO Bank and others Vs. Dipak Debbarma and others reported in (2017) 2 SCC 585 has observed as under:- “11. In interpreting Article 246 regard must be had to the constitutional scheme which visualises a federal structure giving full autonomy to the Union Parliament as well as to the State legislatures in their respective/demarcated fields of legislation. The problem may, however, become a little more complex than what may seemingly appear as the two legislations may very well be within the respective domains of the concerned legislatures and, yet, there may be intrusion into areas that fall beyond the assigned fields of legislation. In such a situation it will be plain duty of the Constitutional Court to see if the conflict can be resolved by acknowledging the mutual existence of the two legislations. If that is not possible, then by virtue of the provisions of Article 246(1), the Parliamentary legislation would prevail and the State legislation will have to give way notwithstanding the fact that the State legislation is within the demarcated field (List II). This is the principle of federal supremacy which Article 246 of the Constitution embodies. The said principle will, however, prevail provided the pre-condition exists, namely, the Parliamentary legislation is the dominant legislation and the State legislation, though within its own field, has the effect of encroaching on a vital sphere of the subject or entry to which the dominant legislation is referable. This is the principle that is discernible from the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in State of West Bengal and Ors. vs. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal and Ors., Paragraphs 25, 26 and 27 which illuminates the issue may be conveniently extracted below. “25. The non obstante clause in Article 246(1) contemplates the predominance or supremacy of the Union Legislature. vs. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal and Ors., Paragraphs 25, 26 and 27 which illuminates the issue may be conveniently extracted below. “25. The non obstante clause in Article 246(1) contemplates the predominance or supremacy of the Union Legislature. This power is not encumbered by anything contained in clauses (2) and (3) for these clauses themselves are expressly limited and made subject to the non obstante clause in Article 246(1).The State Legislature has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule and it also has the power to make laws with respect to any matters enumerated in List III (Concurrent List). The exclusive power of the State Legislature to legislate with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II has to be exercised subject to clause (1) i.e. the exclusive power of Parliament to legislate with respect to matters enumerated in List I. As a consequence, if there is a conflict between an entry in List I and an entry in List II, which is not capable of reconciliation, the power of Parliament to legislate with respect to a matter enumerated in List II must supersede pro tanto the exercise of power of the State Legislature. 26. Both Parliament and the State Legislature have concurrent powers of legislation with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III. The words “notwithstanding anything contained in clauses (2) and (3)” in Article 246(1) and the words “subject to clauses (1) and (2)” in Article 246(3) lay down the principle of federal supremacy viz. that in case of inevitable conflict between the Union and State powers, the Union power as enumerated in List I shall prevail over the State power as enumerated in Lists II and III and in case of an overlapping between Lists II and III, the latter shall prevail. 27. Though, undoubtedly, the Constitution exhibits supremacy of Parliament over the State Legislatures, yet the principle of federal supremacy laid down in Article 246 of the Constitution cannot be resorted to unless there is an irreconcilable direct conflict between the entries in the Union and the State Lists. 27. Though, undoubtedly, the Constitution exhibits supremacy of Parliament over the State Legislatures, yet the principle of federal supremacy laid down in Article 246 of the Constitution cannot be resorted to unless there is an irreconcilable direct conflict between the entries in the Union and the State Lists. Thus, there is no quarrel with the broad proposition that under the Constitution there is a clear demarcation of legislative powers between the Union and the States and they have to confine themselves within the field entrusted to them. It may also be borne in mind that the function of the lists is not to confer powers; they merely demarcate the legislative field……………………” 12. Equally illuminating is the view available in the opinion of this Court rendered in re. Special Reference No. 1 of 2001[4], which is reproduced below. “13. The Constitution of India delineates the contours of the powers enjoyed by the State Legislature and Parliament in respect of various subjects enumerated in the Seventh Schedule. The rules relating to distribution of powers are to be gathered from the various provisions contained in Part XI and the legislative heads mentioned in the three lists of the Schedule. The legislative powers of both the Union and State Legislatures are given in precise terms. Entries in the lists are themselves not powers of legislation, but fields of legislation. However, an entry in one list cannot be so interpreted as to make it cancel or obliterate another entry or make another entry meaningless. In case of apparent conflict, it is the duty of the court to iron out the crease and avoid conflict by reconciling the conflict. If any entry overlaps or is in apparent conflict with another entry, every attempt shall be made to harmonise the same. 14. When the question arose about reconciling Entry 45 of List I, duties of excise, and Entry 18 of List II, taxes on the sale of goods, of the Government of India Act, 1935, Sir Maurice Gwyer, C.J. in Central Provinces and Berar Act No. XIV of 1938, In re, (1939) FCR 18, at pp. 14. When the question arose about reconciling Entry 45 of List I, duties of excise, and Entry 18 of List II, taxes on the sale of goods, of the Government of India Act, 1935, Sir Maurice Gwyer, C.J. in Central Provinces and Berar Act No. XIV of 1938, In re, (1939) FCR 18, at pp. 42-44 observed: “A grant of the power in general terms, standing by itself, would no doubt be construed in the wider sense, but it may be qualified by other express provisions in the same enactment, by the implications of the context, and even by considerations arising out of what appears to be the general scheme of the Act.” It was further observed: “An endeavour must be made to solve it, as the Judicial Committee have said, by having recourse to the context and scheme of the Act, and a reconciliation attempted between two apparently conflicting jurisdictions by reading the two entries together and by interpreting, and, where necessary modifying the language of the one by that of the other. If indeed such a reconciliation should prove impossible, then, and only then, will the non obstante clause operate and the federal power prevail;” 15. Although Parliament cannot legislate on any of the entries in the State List, it may do so incidentally while essentially dealing with the subject coming within the purview of the entry in the Union List. Conversely, the State Legislature also while making legislation may incidentally trench upon the subject covered in the Union List. Such incidental encroachment in either event need not make the legislation ultra vires the Constitution. The doctrine of pith and substance is sometimes invoked to find out the nature and content of the legislation. However, when there is an irreconcilable conflict between the two legislations, the Central legislation shall prevail. However, every attempt would be made to reconcile the conflict.” 13. The federal structure under the constitutional scheme can also work to nullify an incidental encroachment made by the Parliamentary legislation on a subject of a State legislation where the dominant legislation is the State legislation. However, every attempt would be made to reconcile the conflict.” 13. The federal structure under the constitutional scheme can also work to nullify an incidental encroachment made by the Parliamentary legislation on a subject of a State legislation where the dominant legislation is the State legislation. An attempt to keep the aforesaid constitutional balance intact and give a limited operation to the doctrine of federal supremacy can be discerned in the concurring judgment of Ruma Pal, J. in ITC Ltd. vs. Agricultural Produce Market Committee and Ors., wherein after quoting the observations of this Court in the case of S.R. Bomai vs. Union of India (para 276), the learned Judge has gone to observe as follows (para 94 of the report): “276. The fact that under the scheme of our Constitution, greater power is conferred upon the Centre vis-à-vis the States does not mean that States are mere appendages of the Centre. Within the sphere allotted to them, States are supreme. The Centre cannot tamper with their powers. More particularly, the courts should not adopt an approach, an interpretation, which has the effect of or tends to have the effect of whittling down the powers reserved to the States. 94. Although Parliament cannot legislate on any of the entries in the State List, it may do so incidentally while essentially legislating within the entries under the Union List. Conversely, the State Legislatures may encroach on the Union List, when such an encroachment is merely ancillary to an exercise of power intrinsically under the State List. The fact of encroachment does not affect the vires of the law even as regards the area of encroachment. [A.S. Krishna vs. State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 297 ; Chaturbhai M. Patel vs. Union of India, (1960) 2 SCR 362 ; State of Rajasthan vs. G. Chawla, AIR 1959 SC 544 ; Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. vs. State of U.P., (1980) 4 SCC 136 ]. This principle commonly known as the doctrine of pith and substance, does not amount to an extension of the legislative fields. Therefore, such incidental encroachment in either event does not deprive the State Legislature in the first case or Parliament in the second, of their exclusive powers under the entry so encroached upon. In the event the incidental encroachment conflicts with legislation actually enacted by the dominant power, the dominant legislation will prevail.” 14. Therefore, such incidental encroachment in either event does not deprive the State Legislature in the first case or Parliament in the second, of their exclusive powers under the entry so encroached upon. In the event the incidental encroachment conflicts with legislation actually enacted by the dominant power, the dominant legislation will prevail.” 14. The aforesaid view in the concurring judgment of Ruma Pal, J. in ITC Ltd. vs. Agricultural Produce Market Committee and Ors. (supra), seems to have been echoed in a recent pronouncement of this Court in Vishal N. Kalsaria vs. Bank of India & Ors., wherein this Court had held that the provisions of the Act of 2002 will not have an overriding effect on the provisions of the State Rent Control Acts. 87. Further in the case of Chief Secretary to the Government Chennai, Tamil Nadu and others Vs. Animal Welfare Board and others reported in (2017) 2 SCC 144 as under:- “22. Coming back to the facet of repugnancy, we may profitably refer to what has been stated by the Constitution Bench in Deep Chand (supra). In the said case, the majority has opined thus:- "Article 254(1) lays down a general rule. Clause (2) is an exception to that Article and the proviso qualifies the exception. If there is repugnancy between the law made by the State and that made by Parliament with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, the law made by Parliament shall prevail to the extent of the repugnancy and the law made by the State shall, to the extent of such repugnancy, be void. Under cl. (2), if the Legislature of a State makes a provision repugnant to the provisions. Of the law made by Parliament, it would prevail if the legislation of the State received the assent of the President. Even in such a case, Parliament may subsequently either amend, vary or repeal the law made by the Legislature of a State." 23. In M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India, (1979) 3 SCC 431 , the Constitution Bench after referring to Deep Chand (supra), Zaveribhai Amaidas v. State of Bombay, (1955) 1 SCR 799 , opined thus:- "On a careful consideration, therefore, of the authorities referred to above, the following propositions emerge:- 1. In M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India, (1979) 3 SCC 431 , the Constitution Bench after referring to Deep Chand (supra), Zaveribhai Amaidas v. State of Bombay, (1955) 1 SCR 799 , opined thus:- "On a careful consideration, therefore, of the authorities referred to above, the following propositions emerge:- 1. That in order to decide the question of repugnancy it must be shown that the two enactments contain inconsistent and irreconcilable provisions, so that they cannot stand together or operate in the same field. 2. That there can be no repeal by implication unless the inconsistency appears on the face of the two statutes. 3. That where the two statutes occupy a particular field, there is room or possibility of both the statutes operating in the same field without coming into collision with each other, no repugnancy results. 4. That where there is no inconsistency but a statute occupying the same field seeks to create distinct and separate offences, no question of repugnancy arises and both the statutes continue to operate in the same field." 24. Be it stated, in the said case, a passage from the State of Orissa v. M.A. Tulloch & Co., (1964) 4 SCR 461 , was reproduced. The said passage, being instructive, is extracted hereunder:- "Repugnancy arises when two enactments both within the competence of the two Legislatures collide and when the Constitution expressly or by necessary implication provides that the enactment of one Legislature has superiority over the other then to the extent of the repugnancy the one supersedes the other. But two enactments may be repugnant to each other even though obedience to each of them is possible without disobeying the other. The test of two legislations containing contradictory provisions is not, however, the only criterion of repugnancy, for if a competent legislature with a superior efficacy expressly or impliedly evinces by its legislation an intention to cover the whole field, the enactments of the other legislature whether passed before or after would be overborne on the ground of repugnance. Where such is the position, the inconsistency is demonstrated not by a detailed comparison of provisions of the two statutes but by the mere existence of the two pieces of legislation." (28) In State of A.P. and others v. McDowell & Co. Where such is the position, the inconsistency is demonstrated not by a detailed comparison of provisions of the two statutes but by the mere existence of the two pieces of legislation." (28) In State of A.P. and others v. McDowell & Co. and others, (1996) 3 SCC 709 it has been held that the several entries in the three Lists in the Seventh Schedule are mere legislative heads and it is quite likely that very often they overlap. Wherever such a situation arises, the issue must be solved by applying the rule of pith and substance. Whenever a piece of legislation is said to be beyond the legislative competence of a State Legislature, what one must do is to find out, by applying the rule of pith and substance, whether that legislation falls within any of the entries in List II. If it does, no further question arises; the attack upon the ground of legislative competence shall fail.” 88. Thus, a striking balance is to be resorted while finding out as to whether there is any repugnancy and while taking into account the over all aspects, this Court finds that there is no repugnancy in the present case. The legislative power of the State is not in question. As the two legislations (One Act and another Subordinate Rules) operate in different fields, the question of the impugned enactment being in violation of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India does not arise. 89. The Court while analysing the argument of the rival parties with regard to differential treatment so meted to the petitioners with regard to the fact that in the recruitment exercise undertaken in relation to the post of Constable Civil Police and Constable PAC Direct Recruitment in 2018 pursuant to the advertisement dated 16.11.2018 with respect to Clause 5.6 allowing the applicants to appear and rendering them eligible to apply even though they were not discharged, relieved/retired on the date of submission of application form with a condition that they can apply in case there are able to furnish the service that they would have retired within a period of one year, is of no help to the petitioners particularly in view of the fact that this Court is concerned with the selection process for the post of V.D.O. pursuant to the Advertisement no.3 of 2016. Clause 11 of the advertisement in question categorically provides that the reservation is to be granted as per the conditions set out in 1993 Act then merely because a different stand has been taken in any other recruitment with respect to another post will not confer any benefit as there is nothing on record which would suggest that the 1993 Act is not applicable in State services. 90. Along with the compilation dated 17.2.2020 provided by the respondents a copy of the Uttar Pradesh Pradeshik Armed Constabulary Subordinate Officers Service Rules, 2015 dated 14.8.2015 as well as Uttar Pradesh Police Constable and Head Constable Service Rules 2015 dated 2.12.2015 and Uttar Pradesh Police Constable and Head Constable Service (Ist Amendment) Rules 2017 dated 17.8.2017 has been filed. The Uttar Pradesh Constable and Head Constable Service Rules dated 2.12.2015 so framed in exercise of the powers under clause (c) sub-clause(2) of Section 46 read with Sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the Police Act, 1861 itself provides in Clause 6 as under:- “6. Reservation for the candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other categories shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Reservation for Physically Handicapped, Dependents of Freedom Fighters and Ex-Servicemen) Act, 1993 as amended from time to time and the orders of the Government in force at the time of the recruitment. The reservation of the National/State level sportsmen shall be in accordance with the Government Orders in force at the time of recruitment provided that physically handicapped persons will not be eligible for police services.” 91. It has been further informed that the 1993 Act stands applicable with respect to the selection of Police Constable. However, in the counter affidavit, so filed by the State on 20.3.2021, it has been stated that though the circular dated 3.4.1991 of the Government of India was for Ex-Serviceman applying on Central Civil Services, the cut off date of considering eligibility was the last date for submitting the application form and it was expected from the applicant to prove his/her eligibility before the competent authority on the basis of documentary proofs. However, whatever might be the reason for either including or excluding the applicants in the aforesaid selection, which is of different stream, but the yardstick so adopted therein cannot be applied in the selection in question, which is of Village Development Officer, particularly, when statutory enactment is already in existence and occupying the field being one of the wheel for conducting selections. The Hon’ble Apex Court has continuously cautioned the High Courts to adopt restraint in resorting to such a condition whereby there is violence to statutory rules which are the part and parcel of the selection proceedings. 92. Our view stands further amplified from the fact that the different dictionaries, which are often used for reference in legal fraternity itself defines the various words, which are germane to the present controversy in question. 93. In P Ramanatha Aiyar The Law Lexicon, at page 560, the word ‘discharge’ has been defined as under:- “Discharge. Release absolves, or acquit, as, of an obligation, claim, accusation, or service due ; to exonerate ; to relieve ; to clear. 1. the act of freeing from obligation, liability or restraint ; 2. the act of clearing off a pecuniary liability ; 3. fulfilment ; execution ; 4. to relieve of obligation ; to exonerate ; 5. to cancel, annul (an order); 6. to relieve from an appointment ; 7. to fire off ; to shoot ; 8. the act of discharging removal of a load; 9. a flowing or issuing out.” 94. In P Ramanatha Aiyar The Law Lexicon word ‘relieve’ has been defined as under: “Relieve. To free or clear (a person) from an obligation…. A system of faith and worship” 95. In P Ramanatha Aiyar The Law Lexicon word ‘retire’ has been defined as under: “Retire. Withdraw ; go back (as) order for troops to retire. 1. To withdraw from office, generally on superannuation ; to withdraw from business ...; 2. to withdraw to or into a place for seclusion ; 3. retire from service.” 96. In Black’s Law Dictionary Seventh Edition word ‘dismissal’ has been defined as under: - “Discharge. n. 1. The payment of a debt or satisfaction of some other obligation. 2. The release of a debtor from monetary obligations upon adjudication of bakruptcy; RELEASE (1). 3. The dismissal of a case. 4. The canceling or vacating of a court order. 5. The release of a prisoner from confinement. n. 1. The payment of a debt or satisfaction of some other obligation. 2. The release of a debtor from monetary obligations upon adjudication of bakruptcy; RELEASE (1). 3. The dismissal of a case. 4. The canceling or vacating of a court order. 5. The release of a prisoner from confinement. 6. The relieving of a witness, juror, or jury from further responsibilities in a case. 7. The firing of an employee. constructive discharge. A termination of employment brought about by making the employee’s working conditions so intolerable that the employee feels compelled to leave. “Most constructive discharges fall into one of two basic fact patterns. First, the employer can cause a constructive discharge by breaching the employee’s contract of employment in some manner short of termination. Second, the employer can make working conditions so intolerable that the employee feels compelled to quit.” Mark A Rothstein et al., Employment Law 9.7, at 539(1994). retaliatory discharge. A discharge that is made in retaliation for the employee’s conduct (such as reporting unlawful activity by the employer to the government) and that clearly violates public policy. Most states have statutes allowing an employee who is dismissed by retaliatory discharge to recover damages. Unconditional discharge. 1. A release from an obligation without any conditions attached. 2. A release from confinement without any parole requirements to fulfill. Wrongful discharge. A discharge for reasons that are illegal or that violate public policy. 8. The dismissal of a member of the armed services from military service (the sergeant was honorably discharge). – discharge” 97. The definitions so referred to above clearly indicate that no other meaning can be assigned to the words ‘discharge’, ‘relieve’ or ‘retire’ and thus, the interpretation so sought to be canvassed by learned counsels for the petitioners cannot be accepted. 98. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sansar Chand Attri vs. State of Punjab and others reported in Civil Appeal no. 2403 of 2002 decided on 2.4.2002 had an occasion to consider the para materia of provisions as contained under Section 2(c) of the 1993 Act, which even infact was relatable to State of Punjab being “Punjab Recruitment of Ex-servicemen Rules 1982’, which was amended on 22.9.1992. 2403 of 2002 decided on 2.4.2002 had an occasion to consider the para materia of provisions as contained under Section 2(c) of the 1993 Act, which even infact was relatable to State of Punjab being “Punjab Recruitment of Ex-servicemen Rules 1982’, which was amended on 22.9.1992. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the said case has held as under: - “The question whether the appellant is an ex-servicemen or not is to be determined on the basis of the provisions of the Punjab Recruitment of Ex-servicemen Rules 1982 as amended by the Notification dated 22.9.1992. The said Rules were framed by the Government of Punjab in exercise of the power conferred by the proviso to Article 309 read with Articles 234 and 318 of the Constitution. In Rule 2(e) thereof, 'ex-servicemen' is defined as follows: "Rule 2(e) 'Ex-Servicemen' means a person who joined any rank, whether as a combatant or as a non-combatant on or after the first day of November, 1962, in the Armed Forces of the Union, excluding the Assam Rifles, Lock Sahetak Sena, Jammu and Kashmir Militia, Territorial Army, Defence Security Corps and the General Reserve Engineering Force, and has been released otherwise than on ground of misconduct or inefficiency." Rule 3 which makes provision regarding extent of application provides that the rule shall apply to all the State Civil Services and posts connected with the affairs of State of Punjab excepting the Punjab Vidhan Sabha and the Secretariat Services and the Punjab Higher Judicial Service. In Rule 4 provision is made for reservation of 15% of the vacancies to be filled in by direct appointment in all the State Civil Services and posts connected with the affairs of the State of Punjab to be filled in by recruitment of ex-servicemen. In the proviso to the said Rule a limit of 50% is prescribed for the total number of reserved vacancies. In Rules 5 to 7 certain relaxations are made regarding the number of attempts which an ex-serviceman may make in the competitive examination, age limit for appointment and educational qualification and experience. From the provisions of the Rule it is clear that its purpose is to benefit the ex-servicemen in getting appointment to Civil posts under the State. By the notification dated 22.9.1992 issued by the State Government certain provisions of the 1982 Rules were amended. From the provisions of the Rule it is clear that its purpose is to benefit the ex-servicemen in getting appointment to Civil posts under the State. By the notification dated 22.9.1992 issued by the State Government certain provisions of the 1982 Rules were amended. The definition of ex-servicemen in Rule 2(c)(ii) was substituted by the provision quoted hereunder: "Ex-servicemen" means a person who has served in any rank, whether as a combatant or a non-combatant in the Naval, Military and Air Force of the Union of India (hereinafter referred to as the Armed Forces of the Union of India), and who has :- (i) retired from such service after earning his pension; or (ii) been released from such service on medical grounds attributable to military service or circumstances beyond his control and awarded medical or other disability pension; or (iii) been released, otherwise than on his own request from such service as a result of reduction in establishment, or (iv) been released from such service after completing the specific period of engagement otherwise than at his own request or by way of dismissal or discharge on account of misconduct or inefficiency and has been given a gratuity. but does not include a person who has served in the defence security corps, the General Reserve Engineering Force the lok Sahayak sena and the para military forces, but includes personnel of the Lok Sahayak sena of the following categories, namely ; (i) pension holders for continuous embodied services; (ii) persons with disability attributable to military service and (iii) gallantry award winners. Explanation : The persons serving in the armed Forces of the Union, who on retirement from service would come under the category of 'ex-serviceman' may be permitted to apply for reemployment and avail themselves of all concessions available to ex-servicemen but shall not be permitted to leave the uniform until they complete the specific terms of engagement in the Armed Forces of the Union." (emphasis supplied) The answer to the question formulated earlier depends on a fair interpretation of the Rules particularly the Rule laying down the definition of the term 'ex-servicemen'. The Public Service Commission was not inclined to consider the appellant's candidature in the posts reserved for ex-servicemen because the appellant had been discharged from service at his own request and had not retired from the service. The Public Service Commission was not inclined to consider the appellant's candidature in the posts reserved for ex-servicemen because the appellant had been discharged from service at his own request and had not retired from the service. The High Court accepted the interpretation made by the Commission mainly on the ground that in the provisions of the Army Rules a distinction is maintained between 'discharge', 'retire' and 'release' of army personnel from the service. The High Court took the view that under the 1982 services rules as amended in 1992 a person who has been released from the service on his own request as provided in Rule 2(c)(iii) is specifically excluded from the purview of the term 'ex-servicemen'. Relying on the said provision the High Court took the view that the appellant has neither retired from the service nor has been released from service as contemplated under the aforementioned provision but has been 'discharged ' from service on his own request. Because of the exclusory definition of the term 'ex-servicemen' the High Court was not persuaded to accept the claim of the appellant that he should be considered as an ex-serviceman. It is relevant to note here that in the Certificate issued by the Ministry of Defence the appellant has been described as an ex-serviceman. The provision for reservation in the service rules is meant for the benefit of ex-servicemen. The purpose is to provide them with suitable jobs in civil services so that they may not face difficulty in adjusting themselves in civil society after leaving the defence service. In the context of the scheme of the provision the provisions in the rule should be interpreted in a purposive and reasonable manner so that the intent and purpose of the provision is served. From the provisions in the rules it appears that a distinction has been made by persons who are released from the army on ground of medical disqualification or on ground of inefficiency or misconduct. Such distinction is reasonable keeping in view the purpose of reservation of posts made under the rules. All the ex-defence service personnel are to be treated as a class separate from other candidates for the purpose of offer of jobs and no differentiation or discrimination can be made amongst them unless such differences are real and substantial. Such distinction is reasonable keeping in view the purpose of reservation of posts made under the rules. All the ex-defence service personnel are to be treated as a class separate from other candidates for the purpose of offer of jobs and no differentiation or discrimination can be made amongst them unless such differences are real and substantial. Testing the provisions in this context we are of the view that a person in the army who has earned pension after putting in the requisite period of service before leaving the army whether at his own request or on being released by the employer on any ground should be treated as an ex-serviceman who has retired from the army. Such treatment is to be meted out to all such persons irrespective of whether the nomenclature used is 'relieved' or 'discharged' or 'retired'. If the contention raised on behalf of the Service Commission and the State Government that since the appellant has been discharged from the Army at his own request, he cannot be treated as an ex-serviceman, is accepted then it will create a class within a class without rational basis and, therefore, becomes arbitrary and discriminatory. It will also defeat the purpose for which the provision for reservation has been made. The High Court, in our view, is not justified in placing reliance on sub-clause (iv) of the definition clause and excluding the writ petitioners from the eligible category on that basis. Sub-clause (iv) has no application in the instant case for the reason that it applies to such of those persons who are relieved from service after specific period of engagement and become entitled to get gratuity. If a person, who served in the armed forces, is released after being granted the benefit of pension, the case is taken out of purview of sub-clause (iv). The exclusionary words "otherwise than at his own request" occurring in sub-clause (iv) cannot, therefore, be relied upon to deny the benefit to the appellants. Then the question arises whether such person would fall under sub-clause (i)? True, according to the terminology used in the Service Rules governing the armed forces there is a distinction between retirement and release/discharge, as pointed out by the High Court. But, in the context of definition of ex-serviceman in Rule 2(c)(ii), broader meaning has to be given to the word 'retired' occurring in sub-clause (i). True, according to the terminology used in the Service Rules governing the armed forces there is a distinction between retirement and release/discharge, as pointed out by the High Court. But, in the context of definition of ex-serviceman in Rule 2(c)(ii), broader meaning has to be given to the word 'retired' occurring in sub-clause (i). In principle and in the light of the considerations set out above, there is no rational basis for excluding those discharged or released from service after earning pension. It is only after considerable period of satisfactory service a member of armed forces becomes entitled to pension. The mere fact that after such long period of service he voluntarily quit the service with the consent of the employer should not place him in a dis-advantageous position for claiming the benefit of reservation for ex-serviceman. Therefore, the expression 'retirement' should be given wider meaning in order to effectuate the objective behind the Rule.” 99. Though in the case of Sansar Chand Attri (supra), the question was with regard to interpretation of Section 2(c)(ii) sub-clause (iv), but the Apex Court noticed that a distinction has been made between discharge, retire or relieve, but there also one of the conditions was that once an applicant applies under Ex-Serviceman Quota, then he has to be either discharged, retired or relieved. Learned counsel for the respondents have also relied upon the judgment in the case of Chairman Life Insurance Corporation of India, Bombay vs. Suraj Vir Singh, reported in 1998 ALJ page 181, wherein the similar controversy with regard to discharge of an ex-serviceman post last date of submission of application form was in question. This Court observed as under:- “2. The facts in brief are that on 7th Dec. 1992 an advertisement was published by the North Central Zone of the Life Insurance Corporation, Kanpur inviting applications for the post of Assistant in various Divisions of Life Insurance Corporation in Uttar Pradesh. In the advertisement published in ‘Dainik Jagaran’ dated 7-12-1992, the last date for submission of the application form was mentioned as 28-12-1992 which was later on extended to 11-1-1993. Clause 12 of the advertisement provided that along with the application attested copies relating to age, educational qualification etc. should be attached. As regards Ex-serviceman in Army, the Service discharge certificate was to be attached. 13. Clause 12 of the advertisement provided that along with the application attested copies relating to age, educational qualification etc. should be attached. As regards Ex-serviceman in Army, the Service discharge certificate was to be attached. 13. In Alpana's case (1994 AIR SCW 2861) (supra) where the candidate had submitted the application form slating that she had appeared in law degree examination and the result was awaited, she was allowed to appear in the written examination which she successfully passed. She was, however, not called for interview on the ground that she did not satisfy the eligibility condition of educational qualification on the last date fixed for receipt of the applications. The Supreme Court held that the respondents were not estopped from refusing the candidate to give appointment on the ground that they had accepted her application knowingly that respondents alleged that they had submitted no-objection certificate from the authority where they were employed slating that those candidates shall be discharged on a specified date in future which was admittedly the date after submission of the application. They having not been discharged/released till the last date fixed for submission of applications, cannot be treated as eligible for selection appointment as ex-servicemen to the post of Assistant as advertised by the appellant in the advertisement notice dated 7-12-1992. 14. Another submission raised on behalf of learned counsel for the respondent is that the respondents were Airmen in the Indian Air Force. They were entitled to make application for appointment one year prior to their discharge/release from service. Rule 2 of Ex-servicemen (Re-Employment in Central Civil Services) Rules, 1979 defines ex-servicemen. Explanation added to this clause reads as follows:- “Persons serving in the Armed Forces of the Union, who on retirement from service, would, come under category of Ex-servicemen, may be permitted to apply for re-employment one year before the completion of specified term of engagement and avail themselves of all concessions available to Ex-servicemen but shall not be permitted to leave the uniform until they complete the specified terms of engagement in the Armed Forces of the Union.” This Rule is applicable in relation to the employment of Civil Service under the Central Government. The appointment to any post in the Life Insurance Corporation is governed by Life Insurance Corporation of India Act, 1956. The appointment to any post in the Life Insurance Corporation is governed by Life Insurance Corporation of India Act, 1956. Section 49 of the Act empowers the Life Insurance Corporation to make Regulations, In exercise of those powers the Corporation framed Regulations known as LIC of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Regulation 4 authorises the Chairman to issue instructions or directions as may be necessary to give effect to and carry out the provisions of the Regulation in order to secure effective control over the staff employed in the Corporation. The Chairman issued “L.I.C of India Recruitment Class III and Class IV Staff Instructions 1979” providing for the detailed procedure of recruitment of Class III and Class IV employees of eligibility. Clause 25 provides for relaxation, concession and reservation in favour of ex-servicemen. On October, 21, 1991 the Chairman issued circular removing certain doubts in the practical working to relaxation given to ex-servicemen and this circular specifically provided that the eligibility of the ex-servicemen can be considered only when they are discharged from service. The relevant part of the instructions may be quoted here. “We often receive queries if such personnel awaiting release from the Armed Force should be considered for appointment against ex-servicemen quota in the Corporation as, in effect, this could mean keeping vacancies unfilled to the extent of one year or so till their release/retirement from Army. Such a situation would obviously lead to considerable difficulties in our offices. We, as such, referred the matter to the Government. The Corporation has since been permitted not to consider the candidature of such personnel in the Armed Forces who are still in the service and thus might not be in a position to join along with others according to our Scheduled recruitment exercise. In other words, as Ex-serviceman to be considered for appointment against reserved quota of Ex-servicemen should be actually released or discharged from the active service of the Armed Forces” (emphasis supplied). She was not eligible on the date of submission of the application. If such a practice is permitted, the large number of candidates may apply for admission and if for any reason they are permitted to appear in the examination but later on it is found that they are not entitled to be considered for appointment, such ineligible candidates will succeed in getting appointment to the post applied for. 18. If such a practice is permitted, the large number of candidates may apply for admission and if for any reason they are permitted to appear in the examination but later on it is found that they are not entitled to be considered for appointment, such ineligible candidates will succeed in getting appointment to the post applied for. 18. In the, instant case the allegation of the plaintiff respondent was that they had filed no-objection certificate along with the application in Pursuance of the advertisement. Admittedly, they had not submitted the discharge certificate which was required to be submitted by them. The petitioners were permitted to appear in the written examination and later on they were asked to get medically examined on 4 December, 1993 but before the said date they were informed by letter dated 3rd December, 1993 that the Manager received the clarification from the Zonal Office, Kanpur regarding their eligibility on the date of submission of application by them. It was clarified that as the petitioners-respondents had not been discharged on or before 30-11-1992, they could not be treated as Ex-servicemen entitle to submit applications for selection to the post of Assistant. In these circumstances, there is nothing to show that the respondents on any promise, made by the appellants, suffered any prejudice. They have no right to claim any appointment merely because they were successful in the written test and interview. A candidate who is selected in the interview or written test, if otherwise is not entitled to be appointed, cannot claim a right to be appointed to the post on which he has been selected vide Parvin Zindal v. State of Haryana,1993 Supp (4) SCC 70 : (1993 AIR SCW 1213).” 100. Now coming to the issue of NOC, (No objection certificate) much reliance has been placed upon by the learned counsels for the petitioners that once the NOC has been obtained by them from the competent authority, then they are entitled to be treated to be eligible and the State and its functionaries cannot turn around and insist and assert that the petitioners were not discharged on the date of the last date of submission of application form. The aforesaid arguments has no legs to stand, as the perusal of the no objection certificate which is on record itself shows that the NOC contained a specific condition, which reads as under: “NO OBJECTION CERTIFICATE FOR CIVIL EMPLOYMENT 1. This is to certify that Name : SUDHIR SINGH Rank : LME No: 129651N was enrolled in Indian Navy on 27.07.2001. He is due to be released from the Indian Navy on 31.07.2016. He is eligible to take up civil employment after this date. 2. This Office has no objection to the registration of the sailors name with the Employment Exchange.” 101. The said condition so mentioned therein itself shows that it was not a final relieving, but an NOC to get the petitioners registered with the employment exchange. It also says that the petitioner would be eligible to take up civil employment after the date of relieving. The recital in the NOC itself shows that the date of relieving, was after the last date of submission of the application form. Moreover, unless and until the incumbent is actually relieved, superannuated or retired, he would not be able to take up civil employment. The issue has to be seen from another angle also that there might be a condition, whereby an applicant, who has been issued NOC in the similar fashion has committed a misconduct or court-martial proceedings have been initiated holding him guilty, then in that circumstances, he would not get relieving or discharge from service, the NOC itself cannot be said to be a final order of relieving, discharging or retiring him. The object of the NOC is to be seen and this Court in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot read something, which is not finding its presence in the NOC itself. 102. Now comes another question, which needs to be addressed, whether any exercise has been undertaken by the respondents for considering the eligibility qua the qualification possessed by the petitioners. Undisputedly, the educational qualification provided in advertisement in question is that an applicant should have on the last date of submission of application form Intermediate or Equivalent Qualification in Science or Agriculture and further possessing CCC certificate. Undisputedly, the educational qualification provided in advertisement in question is that an applicant should have on the last date of submission of application form Intermediate or Equivalent Qualification in Science or Agriculture and further possessing CCC certificate. In the counter affidavit filed by the State respondents, as well as in the orders so impugned by the petitioners, stand has been taken that the petitioners did not have CCC certificate issued by DOEACC (now NIELIT) on the last date of submission of application form. However, this Court finds from the record that on 28.1.2014, an order had been issued by the Secretary, State of U.P. through the Commissioner, Village Development, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow granting equivalence to certain degrees/diploma to CCC certificate issued by DOEACC (now NIELIT). Further this Court also finds that on 5.7.2018, order has been issued, whereinunder, the applicants having higher qualifications like B.A, B.Sc, B-Tech, M.Sc. and M.B.A. having studied computer as a subject or having a computer in the semester study course would be treated to be eligible for selection. On 20.12.2018, itself, the Commission issued a notice whereby in pursuance of the order dated 5.7.2018, petitioners herein were directed to produce their educational testimonials by 26.12.2018 in order to demonstrate that they have equivalent qualifications vis-a-vis CCC certificate issued by DOEACC (now NIELIT). The petitioners, as already noticed earlier, had submitted their certificates. But they are complaining in the present cluster of petitions that though they possess equivalent degree but they have not been granted the benefit of equivalence in the light of the clarificatory order dated 5.7.2018. 103. In paragraph-26 and 28 of the counter affidavit dated 20.3.2021, the following has been averred: “26. That the contents of paragraph no.9 of the writ petition are false, incorrect and hence denied. In its reply, it is submitted here that Goivernment Order dated 05.07.2018 will be effective from the date of its issuance and not with retrospective effect. The advertisement no. 3-examination/2016 provides for cut of date for considering eligibility of applicants as last date of submission of applicant form i.e. 10.2.2016. It is further submitted here that previous circular dated 28.01.2014 issued by State government prescribes for CCC from UPDESCO equivalent qualification of CCC Course from DOEACC/NIELIT and qualifications considered higher than it for recruitment to the post of Gramya Vikas Adhikari. It is further submitted here that previous circular dated 28.01.2014 issued by State government prescribes for CCC from UPDESCO equivalent qualification of CCC Course from DOEACC/NIELIT and qualifications considered higher than it for recruitment to the post of Gramya Vikas Adhikari. It is admitted position none of the petitioners has CCC from DOEACC/NIELIT on the last date of submission of application form i.e. 10.02.2016. 28. That the contents of paragraph no. 11, 12 and 13 of the writ petition are false, it is submitted here that Government Order dated 05,.07.2018 will be effective from the date of it issuance. The petitioners did not have CCC certificate from DOEACC/NIELIT on the last date of submission of application forms i.e. 10.02.2016.” 104. This Court finds that the said stand so taken in the counter affidavit is contradictory to the document dated 20.12.2018, whereinunder, the petitioners were required to submit their educational testimonials and documents by 26.12.2018 in the light of the clarificatory order dated 5.7.2018. 105. The document dated 13.10.2020 finds place at page-52 of the counter affidavit, which bears the date 20.6.2020 showing the date to be 12.6.2020 of 89th General Meeting of the Commission, whereby the issue of equivalence of the petitioners vis-a-vis acquiring higher qualification was taken into consideration, and it was further resolved that the question of relaxation/equivalence was not found in favour of the petitioners herein. 106. As a matter of fact, it is not a case wherein the clarificatory order dated 5.7.2018 does not provide for equivalence and further the question of equivalence of CCC certificate issued by DOEACC now NIELIT has been a subject matter before the Hon'ble Apex Court from the proceedings emanating from this Court which culminated into a final judicial verdict in Civil Appeal No.9026 of 2019, Mukul Kumar Tyagi Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others decided on 16.12.2019 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph 44 observed as under:- “44. One of the submissions, which has been advanced by Shri Dushyant Dave, learned senior counsel for the respondent is that the requirement of CCC certificate by DOEACC Society, which was provided for by O.M. dated 29.01.2011 was done away by O.M. Dated 05.07.2013 issued by the Managing Director of the Corporation, which subsequently was ex-post facto approved on 23.11.2015, hence there was no requirement of CCC certificate from DOEACC/NIELIT. It is true that in the O.M. dated 29.01.2011 issued by the Corporation, specific requirement was of CCC certificate issued by the DOEACC Society as noted above. The recruitment on the above basis was held by the Commission in the year 2011 for filling 2974 posts of Technician Grade-II. The Managing Director on 05.07.2013 issued an O.M. where in place of the CCC certificate by DOEACC as provided in O.M. dated 29.01.2011, it was provided that candidate must possess CCC certificate or equivalent computer qualification, which advertisement dated 06.09.2014 was issued containing the computer qualification as mentioned in the O.M. dated 05.07.2013. When the Managing Director referred to Course on Computer Concept (CCC) in the O.M. dated 05.07.2013, where he mentions that CCC certificate, it cannot be held that CCC certificate by DOEACC or NIELIT was not contemplated. When no other body or authority is issuing CCC certificate, it has to be held that CCC certificate mentioned in the O.M. of Managing Director and the advertisement was the CCC certificate issued by DOEACC/NIELIT. The Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation had added the computer qualification as the essential requirement to serve a particular purpose and to select the candidates having such qualification so that they could perform their duties of the job well. It cannot be accepted that Managing Director by deleting the CCC certificate from DOEACC wanted to do away with CCC certificate by DOEACC or wanted to introduce an uncertainty or a window for all kind of certificates to be recognised. It is, however, to be noted that when the qualification of equivalent computer certificate was provided and added, any certificate, which can be held to be equivalent to CCC certificate, shall also confer eligibility to a candidate. Thus, the true determination, which was to be done with regard to an equivalent computer certificate relied by candidate was to find out whether it was equivalent to CCC certificate or not. But the change in the qualification by Managing Director by O.M. dated 05.07.2013 cannot be read to mean that in the CCC certificate or equivalent computer qualification, the equivalence was to be found out and in which it shall not include only the CCC certificate issued by DOEACC or NIELIT. Any other view shall not be in the interest of either Corporation or Commission.” 107. Any other view shall not be in the interest of either Corporation or Commission.” 107. Though this Court could have further gone to issue of qualification of the petitioners with regard to the fact that as to whether any exercise was undertaken by DOEACC (now NIELIT) and further the petitioners were qualified or not despite the fact that according to the petitioners they have placed all relevant documents showing the eligibility before the Commission but the Court in the present proceedings has abstained itself from either going into the said question or recording any finding, particularly, in view of the fact that the petitioners do not qualify the definition of ex-serviceman as contained in Section 2(c) of the 1993 Act and we have upheld the Constitutional validity of definition clause in Section 2(c) of the 1993 Act. SUMMATION 108. In summation of the discussion made herein above, we hold: A. Section 2(c) of the U.P. Public Services (Reservation For Physically Handicapped, Dependents of Freedom Fighters And Ex-Servicemen) Act, 1993 is intra vires and not in violation of the Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. B. The petitioners do not qualify the eligibility criteria of being Ex-Serviceman under Section 2(c) of the 1993 Act C. The Ex-Servicemen (Re-employment in Central Civil Services and Posts) Rules, 1979 as amended from time to time as 1st Notification, 2nd Notification, 3rd Notification and 4th Notification, are not applicable in the selection so conducted on the post of Village Development Officer pursuant to Advertisement No. 3 of 2016. D. Merely because different yardsticks have been adopted by the recruiting authority, namely, Uttar Pradesh Police Recruitment and Promotion Board, Lucknow, in the selection of Head Constable Police and Constable PAC Direct Recruitment, 2018 pursuant to the advertisement dated 16.11.2018 the same will not create equity in favour of the petitioners for recruitment on the post of Village Development Officer in relation to the Advertisement No. 3 of 2016. E. Issuance of the no objection certificate by the defence authorities in favour of the petitioners was a conditional one just in order to get the petitioners to be registered as sailors and the same cannot be said to be final NOC or order of discharge for treating them to be ex-serviceman. CONCLUSION 109. E. Issuance of the no objection certificate by the defence authorities in favour of the petitioners was a conditional one just in order to get the petitioners to be registered as sailors and the same cannot be said to be final NOC or order of discharge for treating them to be ex-serviceman. CONCLUSION 109. In view of the above discussion, the present cluster of writ petitions are found devoid of merit and, thus, are liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, they are dismissed. 110. Cost made easy.