JUDGMENT S.G. Chattopadhyay, J. - This criminal revision petition is directed against the judgment and order dated 17.06.2016 passed by the Sessions Judge, Unakoti Judicial District, Kailashahar in Criminal Appeal No. 07(3) of 2015 affirming the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 20.07.2015 of the petitioner awarded by the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Kailashahar, Unakoti Judicial District in case No. GR 341 of 2010 whereunder the petitioner was convicted and sentenced to RI for 1 (one) year and a fine of Rs. 10,000/- with default stipulation for commission of offence punishable under section 409 IPC and she was further sentenced to RI for 1 (one) year and fine of Rs. 10,000/- with default stipulation for commission of offence punishable under section 468 IPC and it was ordered that both the sentences would run concurrently. 2. The genesis of the case is rooted in the FIR dated 04.09.2010 [Exbt. 10] lodged with the officer in charge of Kailashahar police station by the Block Development Officer of Gournagar R.D. Block against the petitioner alleging, inter alia, that 6 (six) cheques of different sum of money totalling to Rs. 15,599/- were issued to the petitioner who was an Upper Division Clerk in the Panchayat Samity office of Gournagar R.D. Block for withdrawal of the said sum from Kailashahar branch of Tripura Gramin Bank and disbursement among the beneficiaries. But the convict petitioner by fraudulent interpolation raised the figures in the said cheques and had withdrawn a sum of Rs. 1,17,299/-. She had thus withdrawn an excess amount of Rs. 1,01,700/- and misappropriated the excess amount drawn by her. 3. Kailashahar PS case No. 173 of 2010 under sections 409, 420 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code was registered against the petitioner and the case was taken up for investigation. 4. During investigation of the case, the investigating agency gathered incriminating materials including the statements of the witnesses, connected documents and expert opinion and came to the conclusion that the charges against the petitioner were prima facie established during investigation. The investigating officer, therefore, submitted charge sheet against her for commission of offence punishable under sections 409,420 and 468 IPC. 5. The jurisdictional Chief Judicial Magistrate by his order dated 10.05.2011 had taken cognizance of offence punishable under sections 409,420 and 468 IPC. The investigating officer, therefore, submitted charge sheet against her for commission of offence punishable under sections 409,420 and 468 IPC. 5. The jurisdictional Chief Judicial Magistrate by his order dated 10.05.2011 had taken cognizance of offence punishable under sections 409,420 and 468 IPC. The trial of the case commenced before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate with the framing of the following charges: 'That, you during the period from 04-11-09 till 31-03-10 while posted as Upper Division Clerk-cum-Cashier of Gournagar RD Block, Kailashahar and in that capacity of a public servant being entrusted to encash 6 (six) Nos. of cheques have withdrawn Rs. 13,050/- against the cheque bearing No. 630821, dated 04-11-09 for Rs. 3050/-; Rs. 13,044/- against the cheque bearing No. 799113, dated 18-11-09 for Rs. 1344/-; Rs. 21,545/- against the cheque bearing No. 799169, dated 25-01-10 for Rs. 7360/-; Rs. 20,650/- against the cheque bearing No. 802486, dated 22-03-11 for Rs. 650/- and Rs. 31,650/- against the cheque bearing No. 802510, dated 31-03-10 for Rs. 1650/-, and thereby in total you have withdrawn an amount of Rs. 1,17,299/- instead of Rs. 15,599/- and thereby in total you have withdrawn an amount of Rs. 1,17,299/- instead of Rs. 15,599/- and you committed criminal breach of trust with respect to excess amount of Rs. 1,01,700/- and that you thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code and within the cognizance of this Court. Secondly, that you during the same period and in the same capacity forged the cheques No. 630821, dated 04-11-09 for Rs. 3050/- by making it Rs. 13,050/-; No. 799113, dated 18-11-09 for Rs. 1344/- by making it Rs. 13,044/-; No. 799147, dated 21-12-09 for Rs. 1545/- by making it Rs. 21,545/-; No. 799169, dated 25-01-10 for Rs. 7360/- by making it Rs. 17,360/-; No. 802486, dated 22-03-11 for Rs. 650/- by making it Rs. 20,650/- and No. 802510, dated 31-03-10 for Rs. 1650/- by making it Rs. 31,650/- intending that it shall be used for the purpose of cheating and that you thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 468 of the Indian Penal Code and within the cognizance of this Court. And I do hereby direct that you be tried on the said charges.' Petitioner pleaded not guilty to both the charges and claimed a trial. 6. During trial, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate recorded the evidence of 3(three) prosecution witnesses. And I do hereby direct that you be tried on the said charges.' Petitioner pleaded not guilty to both the charges and claimed a trial. 6. During trial, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate recorded the evidence of 3(three) prosecution witnesses. Thereafter, by order dated 22.03.2013, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate made over the case to the Court of The Judicial Magistrate of the First Class at Kailashahar who conducted the rest of the trial, recorded the evidence of 12 (twelve) more witnesses and delivered the judgment. 7. The witnesses who have been examined on behalf of the prosecution at the trial Court are Sri Bipul Sharma [PW-1], a staff member of Gournagar R.D. Block who identified the relevant cash book, counterfoils of the defrauded cheques and the impugned cheques which were seized during the investigation of the case from the concerned bank. Smt. Chabi Sarkar [PW-2] was a Panchayat Secretary of Gournagar R.D. Block at the relevant time. In her presence police seized the leave applications of the accused petitioner. Layla Begam [PW-3] was a Lower Division Clerk (L.D.C.) in the office of the Gournagar R.D. Block who also witnessed the seizure of the leave applications of the accused petitioner. Sri Amiya Roy [PW-4] was a Dealing Assistant in Gournangar R.D. Block in whose presence various incriminating documents were seized by police. Sri Tapas Das [PW-5] was also another Dealing Assistant in the said office and witnessed the seizure of the impugned cheques and other incriminating documents. Sri Nilkanta Sinha [PW-6] was an Officer of Tripura Gramin Bank at Kailashahar in which the impugned cheques were encashed by the accused petitioner. Smt. Sadhana Malakar [PW-7] was in Charge of the whole Establishment section in the Gournagar R.D. Block at the relevant time who proved the contents and signature of the leave applications of the accused petitioner. Sri Uttam Kr. Sinha [PW-8] was a Clerk-cum-Cashier in the Tripura Gramin Bank in its Kailashahar branch at the material time. Sri Biswadeb Datta Choudhury [PW-9] was also in the Tripura Gramin Bank at Kailashahar branch as a Branch Manager. Sri Debashish Dutta Roy [PW-10] was a Panchayat Extension Officer at Gournagar R.D. Block who supported the allegation that excess amount of Rs. 1,01,700/- was fraudulently withdrawn by the accused petitioner. Mina Begum Choudhury [PW-11] was a UDC in Gournagar R.D. Block who also supported the allegations labeled against the accused petitioner. Sri Debashish Dutta Roy [PW-10] was a Panchayat Extension Officer at Gournagar R.D. Block who supported the allegation that excess amount of Rs. 1,01,700/- was fraudulently withdrawn by the accused petitioner. Mina Begum Choudhury [PW-11] was a UDC in Gournagar R.D. Block who also supported the allegations labeled against the accused petitioner. Sri Krishnendu Choudhury [PW-12] was the Chairperson of the Panchayat Samity in Gournagar R.D. Block who supported the allegations against the petitioner. Sri Partha Kishore Banik [PW-13] was working as a Special Assistant in Tripura Gramin Bank at its Kailashahar branch who also supported the prosecution case. Sri Sudhangshu Sarkar [PW-14] is the then Block Development Officer (B.D.O.) of Gournagar R.D. Block who lodged the FIR against the accused petitioner and SI Badal Datta [PW-15] is the investigating officer of the present case. 8. Apart from adducing the oral evidence of 15 (fifteen) prosecution witnesses as stated above, prosecution also introduced various documentary evidence [Exbt. 1-Exbt. 15/1]. 9. After the prosecution evidence was closed, the trial Court examined the accused petitioner under section 313 Cr.P.C. and prepared a Memorandum of such examination. It would appear from the said Memo of her examination under section 313 Cr.P.C. that the petitioner had denied all the charges and claimed that a false case was foisted on her under the instruction of the first informant who actually tempered with the cheques by interpolation. She was actually examined twice under section 313 Cr.P.C. Once she was examined on 05.12.2014. Thereafter, she was subjected to further examination under section 313 Cr.P.C. on 29.05.2015 when she made the following statement in answer to question No. 4: 'Q. No. 4. PW14 further deposed in his re-examination that he is well acquainted with your signature due to his association with you as a colleague and he identified your signature on the reply of show cause notice (Exbt. 14) which was already marked as Exbt. 14/1 on identification. Do you have anything to say in this regard? Ans.-PW 14 identified a forged signature on a false and fabricated document.' 10. The learned trial Court framed the following points for determination of the case: '(i) Whether during the period from 4.11.2009 to 31.03.2010 the accused person namely Sujata Ghosh while posted as Upper Division Clerk-cum-Cashier of Gournagar R.D. Block, Kailashahar and in that capacity of a public servant being entrusted to encash six nos of cheques had withdrawn Rs. The learned trial Court framed the following points for determination of the case: '(i) Whether during the period from 4.11.2009 to 31.03.2010 the accused person namely Sujata Ghosh while posted as Upper Division Clerk-cum-Cashier of Gournagar R.D. Block, Kailashahar and in that capacity of a public servant being entrusted to encash six nos of cheques had withdrawn Rs. 13,050/- against the cheque bearing No. 630821 dated 4.11.09 for Rs. 3050/-; Rs. 13,044/- against the cheque bearing No. 799113 dated 18.11.09 for Rs. 1344/-; Rs. 21,545/- against the cheque bearing No. 799147 dated 21.12.2009 for Rs. 1545/-; Rs. 17360/- against the cheque bearing No. 799169 dated 25.1.2010 for Rs. 7360/-, Rs. 20,650/- against the cheque bearing No. 802486 dated 22.03.2010 for Rs. 650/- and Rs. 31,650/- against the cheque bearing No. 802510, dated 31.03.2010 for Rs. 1650/-, and thereby in total had withdrawn an amount of Rs. 1,17,299/- instead of Rs. 15,599/- and had committed criminal breach of trust with respect to excess amount of Rs. 1,01,700/-? (ii) Whether on the above mentioned period and in the same capacity the accused Sujata Ghosh had forged the cheques No. 630821, dated 04.11.09 for Rs. 3050/- by making it Rs. 13,050/-; No. 799113, dated 18.11.09 for Rs. 1344/- by making it Rs. 13,044/-; No. 799147, dated 21.12.09 for Rs. 1545/- by making it Rs. 21,545/-; No. 799169 dated 25.01.2010 for Rs. 7360/- by making it Rs. 17,360/-; No. 802486 dated 22.03.2010 for Rs. 650/- by making it Rs. 20,650/- and No. 802510 dated 31.03.2010 for Rs. 1650/- by making it Rs. 31,650/-?' 11. Having appreciated the evidence and submissions made on behalf of the parties by their respective counsel, the trial Judge was of the view that at the relevant time commencing from 04.11.2009 to 31.03.2010, accused petitioner Smt. Sujata Ghosh was working as a Cashier in Gournagar Panchayat Samity under Gournagar R.D. Block. At that time, the impugned cheques of varying amounts was issued to her for encashment from Tripura Gramin Bank who was the banker of Gournagar R.D. Block. The accused fabricated the figures appearing on those cheques by interpolation and managed to withdraw a sum of Rs. 1,17,299/-. The cheque amount was only Rs. 15,599/- whereas by fraudulently withdrawing a sum of Rs. 1,17,299/- she had withdrawn an excess amount of Rs. 1,01,700/- and misappropriated the said excess amount. The accused fabricated the figures appearing on those cheques by interpolation and managed to withdraw a sum of Rs. 1,17,299/-. The cheque amount was only Rs. 15,599/- whereas by fraudulently withdrawing a sum of Rs. 1,17,299/- she had withdrawn an excess amount of Rs. 1,01,700/- and misappropriated the said excess amount. The trial Court held that opinion of the handwriting expert supported the allegation that all interpolations on the impugned cheques were made by none other than by the petitioner with her own handwriting. Trial Court also relied on the reply of the accused petitioner to the show cause notice wherein she categorically admitted that she had drawn the excess amount of Rs. 1,01,700/- against the impugned cheques due to sudden collapse of her brain. The trial Court viewed that charges under sections 409 and 468 IPC were proved against the petitioner for which she was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment with fine as stated above. 12. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment of the trial Court, accused preferred an appeal in the Court of the learned Sessions Judge, Unakoti Judicial District at Kailashahar which was registered as Criminal Appeal No. 07(3) of 2015. Learned Sessions Judge after re-appreciation of evidence and submissions made on behalf of the parties agreed with the decision of the trial Court and declined to interfere with the impugned judgment in appeal. 13. As stated above, petitioner has challenged the judgment dated 17.06.2016 passed by the learned Sessions Judge in Criminal Appeal No. 07(3) of 2015 by means of filing this criminal revision petition. 14. Heard Mr. S. Kar Bhowmik, learned senior advocate appearing for the petitioner along with Mr. A. Bhattacharjee and Mr. J. Das, learned advocates. Also heard Mr. R. Datta, learned P.P. representing the State. 15. The petitioner has assailed the impugned judgment mainly on the following grounds: (i) The trial Court came to an erroneous decision without proper appreciation of evidence. (ii) The trial Court as well as the Appellate Court did not take any notice of the fact that the guilt of the petitioner was not proved beyond reasonable shadow of doubt. (iii) Even though, the alleged embezzlement took place between the period 04.11.2009 to 31.03.2010, FIR was lodged on 04.09.2010 and no explanation was offered on behalf of the prosecution to explain such inordinate delay in lodging the FIR. (iii) Even though, the alleged embezzlement took place between the period 04.11.2009 to 31.03.2010, FIR was lodged on 04.09.2010 and no explanation was offered on behalf of the prosecution to explain such inordinate delay in lodging the FIR. (iv) The trial Court as well as the Appellate Court did not appreciate the fact that the accused petitioner was never given the formal charge of Cashier because there was no handing over and taking over of charge of Cashier in prescribed format. Even in the charge framed against her by the trial Court, she was stated to be an Upper Division Clerk. Therefore, question of her handling cash did not arise. (v) It was not appreciated by the Courts below that all the impugned cheques were signed by the BDO which was also counter signed by the Chairman of the concerned Panchayat Samity and therefore, petitioner alone cannot be held responsible for fraudulent withdrawal of money against those cheques. (vi) The trial Court relied on the extra judicial confession of the petitioner which was also approved by the learned Sessions Judge in appeal. The Courts below did not appreciate the fact that the alleged extra judicial confession is not admissible in evidence. 16. In the course of their arguments, learned counsel representing the parties had taken the Court through the prosecution evidence. 17. As discussed, the trial Court has convicted and sentenced the petitioner for criminal breach of trust punishable under section 409 IPC and she has been separately convicted and sentenced for committing forgery punishable under section 468 IPC. For the purpose of establishing the impropriety of the conviction and sentence of the petitioner, her counsel has taken this Court through the evidence on record. 18. Sri Sudhangshu Sarkar [PW-14] who lodged the FIR [Exbt. 10] against the petitioner stated that at the material time, petitioner Smt. Sujata Ghosh was working as a Cashier in Gournagar R.D. Block between 04.11.2009 to 31.03.2010. The PW issued 6 (six) Nos. of cheque [Exbt. 7/5 series] in the name of petitioner Smt. Sujata Ghosh. 3 (three) of those cheques were account payee cheques and the other 3 (three) cheques were bearer's cheques. It was stated by the PW that the cheques were issued for withdrawing the cheque amount for payment of honorarium to the members of the Panchayat Samity for attending Panchayat meetings. 7/5 series] in the name of petitioner Smt. Sujata Ghosh. 3 (three) of those cheques were account payee cheques and the other 3 (three) cheques were bearer's cheques. It was stated by the PW that the cheques were issued for withdrawing the cheque amount for payment of honorarium to the members of the Panchayat Samity for attending Panchayat meetings. According to the PW, cheque No. 630821 dated 04.11.2009 was of an amount of Rs. 3050/- and it was an account payee cheque. But the petitioner forged the said cheque by raising the amount to Rs. 13,050/- by interpolation and got the amount deposited in her account. Similarly, cheque No. 799113 dated 18.11.2009 was issued for an amount of Rs. 1344/- which was also an account payee cheque but the petitioner raised the cheque amount to Rs. 13,044/- and got the amount deposited in her account. Office bearer's cheque No. 799147 dated 21.12.2009 was issued for a sum of Rs. 1545/- which was made Rs. 21,545/- and the amount was withdrawn by her. Office bearer's cheque No. 799169 dated 25.01.2010 of a sum of Rs. 7360/- was also issued to the petitioner. She changed the figure to Rs. 17,360/- and had withdrawn the said sum of money from the bank. Another office bearer's cheque No. 802486 dated 22.03.2010 was issued for a sum of Rs. 650/-. The PW stated that petitioner changed the amount to Rs. 20,650/- and she had withdrawn the said amount of money from the bank. The amount in account payee cheque No. 802510 dated 31.03.2010 of a sum of Rs. 1650/- was changed to Rs. 31,650/-. Petitioner got the amount deposited in her account. The PW identified the said cheques at the trial Court and said that the cheques contained his signature and the signature of convict petitioner Sujata Ghosh and that of the Chairperson of Gournagar Panchayat Samity. It was further stated by the PW that issuance of cheque is always followed by pay orders. In the present case also the PW issued 6 (six) pay orders. The cheques were issued in terms of those pay orders. The PW stated that he issued pay order of a sum of Rs. 2500/- dated 28.01.2010, pay order dated 25.01.2010 of a sum of Rs. 4860/-, pay order dated 18.11.2009 of a sum of Rs. 3550/-, pay order dated 31.03.2010 of a sum of Rs. The cheques were issued in terms of those pay orders. The PW stated that he issued pay order of a sum of Rs. 2500/- dated 28.01.2010, pay order dated 25.01.2010 of a sum of Rs. 4860/-, pay order dated 18.11.2009 of a sum of Rs. 3550/-, pay order dated 31.03.2010 of a sum of Rs. 1650/-, pay order dated 18.11.2009 of a sum of Rs. 1344/- and pay order dated 28.03.2010 of a sum of Rs. 650/-. The PW stated that against those pay orders the cheques were issued by him for encashment of a total sum of Rs. 15,599/- but the petitioner had actually withdrawn a sum of Rs. 1,17,299/- fraudulently. She had thus withdrawn an excess amount of Rs. 1,01,700/- and misappropriated the said amount. The PW also stated that he had issued show cause notice to the petitioner on 21.08.2010. In her reply dated 26.08.2010, accused petitioner confessed her guilt and sought for time to refund the excess amount withdrawn by her. Thereafter the PW lodged the FIR against her. During cross-examination of the PW, accused petitioner tried to establish that she was never entrusted with the cash of the Gournagar R.D. Block by a written order. The PW stated to the cross-examiner that he did not mention in his FIR that petitioner was working as a Cashier at the relevant time. He, however, denied the suggestion of the accused that there was no entrustment of cash to her. It was suggested to the PW that the accused petitioner did not put any extra figure in the impugned cheques which was denied by the PW. 19. Sri Sudhangshu Sarkar [PW-14] was allowed to be re-examined by the prosecution. The reply of the petitioner to the show cause notice issued to her by PW-14 was taken into evidence and marked as Exbt. 14 subject to objection by the other side. The PW was also cross-examined after his re-examination. The accused suggested to the PW that the signature appearing on the reply to the show cause notice was not of her. The PW denied the suggestion. The PW also denied the suggestion that he had fabricated the reply of the petitioner to the show cause notice. 20. Counsel of the petitioner has also taken the Court to the evidence of the investigating officer who has been examined as PW-15. The PW denied the suggestion. The PW also denied the suggestion that he had fabricated the reply of the petitioner to the show cause notice. 20. Counsel of the petitioner has also taken the Court to the evidence of the investigating officer who has been examined as PW-15. The investigating officer stated before the trial Court that he seized the impugned cheques during his investigation which were marked as Exbt. 7 series. He also seized 5 (five) Nos. of casual leave and earned leave applications of the petitioner which were marked as Exbt. 3/1 series at the trial Court. He forwarded the impugned cheques along with the leave applications of the petitioner to the State Forensic Science Laboratory for comparison of the handwriting of the petitioner to prove the authenticity of her signature and handwriting appearing on the impugned cheques. The investigating officer stated that the forensic report [Exbt. I series] confirmed that the impugned signature and handwriting appearing on the said cheques were of the petitioner. The investigating officer stated that having been convinced that petitioner defrauded her department by drawing money in excess of the cheque amount and misappropriating the same, he submitted charge sheet against her. The investigating officer was also cross-examined by the petitioner's counsel on the forensic report. He admitted the fact that in the forensic report it was opined that author of the writings marked as Exbt. Q4/1, Q5/1, Q6/1 and Q1/2 to Q6/2 appearing on the cheques could not be established. He also admitted that on perusal of the forensic report he found that no reason was assigned in the report for the affirmative opinion of the forensic expert. He, however, denied the suggestion of the accused that she was never entrusted with the charge of cash in Gournagar R.D. Block and one Dipak Das was discharging the duties of Cashier. 21. Among the other witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution, Sri Nilkanta Sinha [PW-6], Sri Uttam Kr. Sinha [PW-8], Sri Biswadeb Datta Choudhury [PW-9] and Sri Partha Kishore Banik [PW-13] were bank officials of Tripura Gramin Bank, Kailashahar branch where the impugned cheques were presented for encashment. 22. Sri Nilkanta Sinha [PW-6] stated before the trial Court that he was a Deputy Manager of the bank. In his presence police seized the impugned cheques and procured his signature on the seizure list. 22. Sri Nilkanta Sinha [PW-6] stated before the trial Court that he was a Deputy Manager of the bank. In his presence police seized the impugned cheques and procured his signature on the seizure list. Police also seized the bank statement of accused petitioner Sujata Ghosh of the relevant period of her SB account No. 26335 containing two pages [Exbt. 8 series]. 23. Sri Uttam Kr. Sinha [PW-8] stated that he was a Clerk-cum-Cashier in the bank. On 30.12.2009, he paid Rs. 21,545/- in cash to the petitioner against cheque No. 799147 and later on he heard that the petitioner had overdrawn a total sum of Rs. 1,01,700/- by forging 6 (six) No. of cheques. 24. Sri Biswadeb Datta Choudhury [PW-9], the Branch Manager of the bank identified the bank statement [Exbt. 8 series] of the petitioner which showed that amount of Rs. 13,044/-, Rs. 13,050/- and Rs. 31,650/- against the impugned account payee cheques were transferred to the personal account of petitioner Smt. Sujata Ghosh from the account of Gournagar Panchayat Samity. 25. Sri Partha Kishore Banik [PW-13], who was a Special Assistant in the Tripura Gramin Bank of Kailashahar branch also supported the fact that after the 3 (three) account payee cheques were cleared by the Branch Manager for payment, the amounts of those cheques were transferred to the personal account of the petitioner. In his cross-examination, the PW denied the suggestion of the accused petitioner that the impugned cheques were not produced by the designated Cashier. 26. Among the other witnesses, Sri Bipul Sharma [PW-1] was an employee of Gournagar R.D. Block in whose presence the cheque book containing the counterfoils of the impugned cheques was seized by police. The documents were marked as Exbt. 1 series during the trial. In his cross-examination, the PW stated that he did not have a thorough idea of the said document. 27. Smt. Chabi Sarkar [PW-2] was a Panchayat Secretary in Gournagar R.D. Block in whose presence police seized the leave applications of the accused petitioner which were later forwarded by the investigating officer to the State Forensic Science Laboratory for comparison. The said documents have been marked as Exbt. 3 series. In cross-examination, the PW categorically stated that she did not have acquaintance with the handwriting of the accused petitioner. 28. Same is the evidence of Layla Begam [PW-3] who was a Lower Division Clerk in Gournagar R.D. Block. The said documents have been marked as Exbt. 3 series. In cross-examination, the PW categorically stated that she did not have acquaintance with the handwriting of the accused petitioner. 28. Same is the evidence of Layla Begam [PW-3] who was a Lower Division Clerk in Gournagar R.D. Block. She stated that in her presence the leave applications of the petitioner were seized by police. 29. Sri Amiya Roy [PW-4] was a dealing Assistant in Gournagar R.D. Block at the material time. He stated that various documents including Volume 1 and 2 of the cashbook, the cheque register, 6 (six) pay orders issued by the BDO, counterfoils of the impugned cheques were seized by police in his presence. The PW further stated that accused was assigned the job of Cashier in Gournagar R.D. Block who had defrauded the office by withdrawing huge amount of money by interpolating the figure of the cheque amount in 6 (six) No. of cheques issued in her name. The PW further stated that accused embezzled total amount of Rs. 1,01,700/- from the Panchayat Samity office of Gournagar R.D. Block. In the cross-examination, the PW categorically stated that at the relevant time Dipak Das was the Cashier of Gournagar R.D. Block. He, however, denied the suggestion of the accused that petitioner did not embezzle any fund from Gournagar R.D. Block. 30. Sri Amiya Roy [PW-4] was re-examined by the prosecution. Reply of the accused to the show cause notice was produced before the trial Court which was marked as Exbt. 14 subject to objection of the other side. The PW stated that the said document was handwritten by the petitioner and since the PW was acquainted with the handwriting of the petitioner, he identified the document. 31. PW-5 and PW-7 were staff members of Gournagar R.D. Block. Sri Tapas Das [PW-5] stated that the police seized some documents from the Gournagar R.D. Block in his presence and he signed the seizure list. During his cross-examination, he stated that Smt. Sujata Ghosh, petitioner was a staff member of Panchayat Department. 32. Smt. Sadhana Malakar [PW-7] witnessed the seizure of the leave applications of the petitioner. As a witness, she signed the seizure list. In her cross-examination, the PW denied the suggestion of the petitioner that no amount of money was overdrawn by the petitioner from Gournagar Panchayat Samity. 32. Smt. Sadhana Malakar [PW-7] witnessed the seizure of the leave applications of the petitioner. As a witness, she signed the seizure list. In her cross-examination, the PW denied the suggestion of the petitioner that no amount of money was overdrawn by the petitioner from Gournagar Panchayat Samity. The PW, however, said that she would not be able to identify any writing or signature of the petitioner. 33. Sri Debashish Dutta Roy [PW-10] was a Panchayat Extension Officer in Gournagar R.D. Block. He stated in his examination-in-chief that he came to know that some cheques were issued to Smt. Sujata Ghosh who was a Cashier in the office of the Panchayat Samity under Gournagar R.D. Block. She tempered with the figure of the cheque amounts and misappropriated a sum of Rs. 1,01,700/-. In his cross-examination, the PW stated that the impugned cheques were signed together by the Chairman, Executive Officer as well as by the Cashier. The PW further stated in cross that one Dipak Das was the Cashier of the BDO office at that time and the accused was the Cashier in the office of the Panchayat Samity. The PW further stated that he was not aware as to who was the exclusive Cashier in the office of the Panchayat Samity. 34. Mina Begum Choudhury [PW-11] was an Upper Division Clerk who stated in her examination-in-chief that she worked as a Cashier of Gournagar Panchayat Samity along with miscellaneous works from 28.08.2010 to 04.08.2012. She gave the following evidence in her examination-in-chief: 'I know the informant Sudhangshu Sarkar as he was the BDO of Gournagar RD Block & I also know the accused Sujata Ghosh as she was my colleague. Before taking charge as a Cashier I came to know from the then BDO Sudhangshu Sarkar that the accused Sujata Ghosh had overdrawn Rs. 1,01,700/- (Rupees one lakh one thousand and seven hundred) only by 6 Nos. of cheques from the Account of Panchayat Samity vide No. SB 8197. The cheques are usually issued on the strength of pay order. The cheques are usually prepared by the Cashier including posting of figure of amount. The amount of cheques are also recorded in the Cheque Register & Cash Book. The counter foils of cheques are used to keep with the Cashier. Before preparation of cheques I prepared 6 nos of pay orders amounting to Rs. 2,500/-, Rs. 4,860/-, Rs. The cheques are usually prepared by the Cashier including posting of figure of amount. The amount of cheques are also recorded in the Cheque Register & Cash Book. The counter foils of cheques are used to keep with the Cashier. Before preparation of cheques I prepared 6 nos of pay orders amounting to Rs. 2,500/-, Rs. 4,860/-, Rs. 3,550/-, Rs. 1,344/-, Rs. 1,650/- & Rs. 650/-. I came to know from the informant that the accused overdrew the amount by tempering the figure of the cheques. I came to know that a show-cause letter was issued by the BDO to the accused for such overdrawn of money & the accused submitted a reply of show-cause. On 10.09.2010 Police seized 2 Nos. of Cash Books-Vol I & Vol II, one Cheque issue Register, 6 Nos. of original copies of Pay Order Book, Counter foil of Cheque book in my presence and I put my signature in the seizure list. This is my signature in the seizure list, on identification marked as Exbt. 4/2. These are the seized papers. The witness identified Exbt. 5 before this Court. The pay orders were prepared & signed by me.' In her cross-examination, the PW stated that prior to petitioner Sujata Ghosh, Dipak Das was the Cashier. Sujata had taken over the charge of Cashier from Dipak Das. The PW, however, stated that she was not aware as to whether the audit team had made any observation about the said defalcation of fund. She denied the suggestion of the accused that petitioner Sujata Ghosh was not the Cashier of the Panchayat Samity office under Gournagar R.D. Block. At the end of her cross-examination, the witness volunteered to the Court to state that in the audit observation it was said that the petitioner had overdrawn a sum of Rs. 1,01,700/- from Gournagar Panchayat Samity. 35. Sri Krishnendu Choudhury [PW-12] was the Chairperson of the Gournagar Panchayat Samity at the material time. In his examination-in-chief, the PW stated that every cheque carries the signatures of the BDO, Chairperson and the Cashier. The impugned cheques also carried the signatures of the BDO, Chairperson and the Cashier. The PW stated that accused petitioner misappropriated a sum of Rs. 1,01,700/- by forging the impugned cheques and later when she was asked to show cause, she admitted her guilt and begged for pardon in her reply. The impugned cheques also carried the signatures of the BDO, Chairperson and the Cashier. The PW stated that accused petitioner misappropriated a sum of Rs. 1,01,700/- by forging the impugned cheques and later when she was asked to show cause, she admitted her guilt and begged for pardon in her reply. In his cross-examination, the PW stated that audit was carried out in the office of the Panchayat Samity for the period from 04.11.2009 to 31.03.2010 and there was no objection from the audit team. The PW further stated that when the cheques were placed before him for signature, he did not find any overwriting on the impugned cheques. The PW categorically stated that Dipak Das was the designated Cashier of the Gournagar R.D. Block during the period in question. The PW, however, denied the suggestion of the accused that she never worked as a Cashier. The PW told the Court that petitioner Sujata Ghosh was deputed to the Panchayat Samity office as a Cashier by an office order issued by the BDO. 36. Appearing for the petitioner, Mr. S. Kar Bhowmik, learned senior advocate has argued that the petitioner never confessed her guilt to anyone. She had denied the charges altogether and even during her examination under section 313 Cr.P.C., she categorically stated that a false case was filed against her in connivance with the informant who actually tempered with the cheques and inflated the figures therein. Counsel has further contended that reply of the petitioner to the show cause notice dated 21.08.2010 [Exbt. 14] was never signed by the petitioner. The document was manufactured to implicate her in a false case. The petitioner denied the contents of the document and her signature thereon and in this regard specific suggestion was made to the complainant [PW-14] that signature appearing on the reply of the show cause notice was not the signature of the petitioner. It was also suggested to PW-14 that he purportedly fabricated the contents of reply of the show cause notice [Exbt. 14]. The suggestions were, however, disputed by PW-14. This apart, counsel of the petitioner argued that the said document [Exbt. 14] was admitted into evidence subject to objection raised by the counsel of the petitioner but merit of the objection was never examined by the trial Court either before the judgment or in the judgment. Counsel argued that the document [Exbt. The suggestions were, however, disputed by PW-14. This apart, counsel of the petitioner argued that the said document [Exbt. 14] was admitted into evidence subject to objection raised by the counsel of the petitioner but merit of the objection was never examined by the trial Court either before the judgment or in the judgment. Counsel argued that the document [Exbt. 14] was never sent to forensic expert to ascertain whether signature of the petitioner appearing on the document was genuine. Counsel has further argued that even though the impugned cheques were sent to forensic expert and a report of the forensic expert was also procured by the investigating agency, admission of the forensic report into evidence was completely illegal because the forensic expert was not examined as a witness and moreover the accused petitioner did not get any opportunity to cross-examine the forensic expert on his report. 37. Mr. S. Kar Bhowmik, learned senior advocate has further argued that conviction and sentence of the petitioner under section 409 IPC is completely against the law because section 409 IPC provides punishment for criminal breach of trust and the gravamen of the offence is entrustment of the property to the accused allegedly defrauded by him/her. Counsel has argued that petitioner was never officially entrusted with the responsibility of the Cashier in the office of the Panchayat Samity under Gournagar R.D. Block because PW-12, the Chairperson of the said Panchayat Samity has categorically stated in his cross-examination at the trial Court that 'one Dipak Das was the designated cashier of the Gournagar R.D. Block during the period in question'. Counsel has contended that prosecution could not produce any documentary evidence to prove that the cash of the Panchayat Samity under Gournagar R.D. Block was ever entrusted to the petitioner and as such her conviction and sentence under section 409 IPC is liable to be set aside. Counsel further argued that the charge of forgery having not been proved against the petitioner, her conviction and sentence under section 468 IPC is equally bad in law which is liable to be set aside. It is submitted by Mr. Counsel further argued that the charge of forgery having not been proved against the petitioner, her conviction and sentence under section 468 IPC is equally bad in law which is liable to be set aside. It is submitted by Mr. Kar Bhowmik, learned senior advocate that even though the documents were sent to Forensic Science Laboratory for forensic opinion about the authenticity of the handwriting of the petitioner, the forensic expert who authored the report having not been examined during the trial, the trial Court should not have relied on his report. 38. To nourish his contention, Mr. Kar Bhowmik, learned senior advocate has relied on the following decisions: [1] Chandradhar Goswami & Ors. v. Gauhati Bank Ltd. reported in AIR 1967 SC 1058 . [2] O. Bharathan v. K. Sudhakaran & Anr. reported in (1996) 2 SCC 704 . [3] Ajit Savant Majagvai v. State of Karnataka reported in (1997) 7 SCC 110 . [4] State of M.P. v. Nisar reported in AIR 2007 SC 2316 . [5] Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer & Ors. reported in AIR 2015 SC 180 . [6] Ahmedabad New Textile Mills, Ahmedabad v. Rajubhai Dalchandbhai reported in 1999 AIR (Guj) 148. [7] Rina Laskar & Ors. v. Rabindra Chandra Das & Anr. reported in (2013) 2 TLR 467. [8] Kajal Dey v. State of Tripura reported in 2014 CRI.L.J. 3367. [9] Amiya Ranjan Chakraborty & Ors. v. State of Tripura reported in (2014) 1 TLR 456. [10] G. Subbaraman & Ors. v. State reported in 2018 CRI.L.J. 2377. [11] Manik Lal Majumder v. State of Tripura reported in 2019 Legal Eagle (TRI) 366. 39. In order to nullify the contention of the prosecution that the amount defrauded by the petitioner was deposited in her individual bank account and the entries in her bank statement [Exbt. 8 series] established these facts, Mr. Kar Bhowmik, learned senior advocate having relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Chandradhar Goswami & Ors. (Supra), has contended that the entries in the books of account/statement alone shall not be sufficient evidence to find the petitioner guilty of the offence. Learned counsel has referred to paragraph 6 of the judgment wherein the Apex Court has held as under: '6. The main question urged before us is that there is no evidence besides the certified copy of the account to prove that a sum of Rs. Learned counsel has referred to paragraph 6 of the judgment wherein the Apex Court has held as under: '6. The main question urged before us is that there is no evidence besides the certified copy of the account to prove that a sum of Rs. 10,000/- was advanced to the appellants and, therefore, in view of S. 34 of the Evidence Act the appellants cannot be saddled with liability for that amount. Section 34 is in these terms:- 'Entries in books of account, regularly kept in the course of business, are relevant whenever they refer to a matter into which the Court has to inquire, but such statements shall not alone be sufficient evidence to charge any person with liability.' It is clear from a bare perusal of the section that no person can be charged with liability merely on the basis of entries in books of account, even where such books of account are kept in the regular course of business. There has to be further evidence to prove payment of the money which may appear in the books of account in order that a person may be charged with liability thereunder, except where the person to be charged accepts the correctness of the books of account and does not challenge them. In the present case, however, the appellants did not accept the correctness of the books of account. We have already indicated that they went to the length of saying that the accounts were not correctly kept, and were fraudulent. They also said that no money had been taken by them after March 1, 1947. This being their pleading, the trial Court rightly framed the third issue relating to the total amount due from the appellants to the bank. But unfortunately it overlooked to go into that issue specifically and we have already indicated how it made a mistake in arriving at the amount due when considering the issue relating to relief. In any case as the appellants had not admitted the correctness of the accounts filed by the bank, particularly after March 1, 1947, the bank had to prove payment of Rs. 10,000/- on March 19, 1947 if it wanted to charge the appellants with liability for that amount. But all that the bank did was to produce a certified copy of account under S. 4 of the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, No. XVIII of 1891. 10,000/- on March 19, 1947 if it wanted to charge the appellants with liability for that amount. But all that the bank did was to produce a certified copy of account under S. 4 of the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, No. XVIII of 1891. Section 4 of that Act reads thus- 'Subject to the provisions of this Act, a certified copy of any entry in a banker's book shall in all legal proceedings be received as prima facie evidence of the existence of such entry, and shall be admitted as evidence of the matters, transactions and accounts therein recorded in every case where, and to the same extent as, the original entry itself is now by law admissible, but not further or otherwise'. It will be clear that S. 4 gives a special privilege to banks and allows certified copies of their accounts to be produced by them and those certified copies become prima facie evidence of the existence of the original entries in the accounts and are admitted as evidence of matters, transactions and accounts therein, but such admission is only where, and to the same extent as, the original entry itself would be admissible by law and not further or otherwise. Original entries alone under S. 34 of the Evidence Act would not be sufficient to charge any person with liability and as such copies produced under S. 4 of the Bankers' Books Evidence Act obviously cannot charge any person with liability. Therefore, where the entries are not admitted it is the duty of the bank if it relies on such entries to charge any person with liability, to produce evidence in support of the entries to show that the money was advanced as indicated therein and thereafter the entries would be of use as corroborative evidence. But no person can be charged with liability on the basis of mere entries whether the entries produced are the original entries or copies under S. 4 of the Banker's Books Evidence Act.......................................' 40. Counsel has contended that since the petitioner has vehemently denied the entries, she cannot be held guilty on the basis of the entries in her bank statement without further corroborative evidence. 41. Counsel has contended that since the petitioner has vehemently denied the entries, she cannot be held guilty on the basis of the entries in her bank statement without further corroborative evidence. 41. With regard to the proof of the disputed signatures appearing on the impugned cheques, petitioner's counsel has relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of O. Bharathan (Supra), wherein the Apex Court has held that it is not advisable that a Judge should take upon himself the task of comparing disputed signatures and the prudent course is to obtain the opinion and assistance of an expert. Findings of the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph 18 is as under: '18. The learned Judge in our view was not right either in brushing aside the principles laid down by this Court in Pali Ram [ AIR 1979 SC 14 ] on the ground that it was not a criminal case or taking upon himself the hazardous task of adjudicating upon the genuineness and authenticity of the signatures in question even without the assistance of a skilled and trained person whose services could have been easily availed of. Annulling the verdict of popular will is as much a serious matter of grave concern to the society as enforcement of laws pertaining to criminal offences, if not more. Though it is the province of the expert to act as judge or jury after a scientific comparison of the disputed signatures with admitted signatures, the caution administered by this Court is to the course to be adopted in such situations could not have been ignored unmindful of the serious repercussions arising out of the decision to be ultimately rendered. To quote, it has been held in Pali Ram [ AIR 1979 SC 14 ]; 'The matter can be viewed from another angle, also. Although there is no legal bar to the Judge using his own eyes to compare the disputed writing with the admitted writing, even without the aid of the evidence of any handwriting expert, the Judge should, as a matter of prudence and caution, hesitate to base his finding with regard to the identify of a handwriting which forms the sheet - anchor of the prosecution case against a person accused of an offence, solely on comparison made by himself. It is therefore, not advisable that a Judge should take upon himself the task of comparing the admitted writing with the disputed one to find out whether the two agree with each other: an the prudent course is to obtain the opinion and assistance of an expert.' 42. Counsel has relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ajit Savant Majagvai (Supra), wherein the Apex Court reiterated that the Court should not normally take upon itself the responsibility of comparing the disputed signature with that of the admitted signature or handwriting and in the event of the slightest doubt, leave the matter to the wisdom of experts. Counsel has relied on paragraph 38 of the judgment which reads as under: '38. As a matter of extreme caution and judicial sobriety, the Court should not normally take upon itself the responsibility of comparing the disputed signature with that of the admitted signature or handwriting and in the event of the slightest doubt, leave the matter to the wisdom of experts. But this does not mean that the Court has not the power to compare the disputed signature with the admitted signature as this power is clearly available under Section 73 of the Act.' 43. Relying on the decision of the Apex Court in State of M.P. v. Nisar (Supra), counsel of the petitioner has argued that the prosecution story about the extra judicial confession of the petitioner in her show cause reply [Exbt. 14] about her guilt is not acceptable firstly because it was denied by the petitioner and secondly because it was not mentioned in the FIR. Counsel contends that in the case of State of M.P. v. Nisar (Supra), the Apex Court in paragraph 8 of the judgment has categorically held that if there was any confession as claimed that would have been the first thing to be mentioned in the FIR. 44. Questioning the validity of the bank statement [Exbt. 8 series] which contains the entries with regard to the defrauded amount, counsel of the petitioner submits that the document is not admissible in evidence since the conditions laid down under section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act were not satisfied. In support of his contention, learned counsel has relied on paragraphs 13 and 14 of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer & Ors. In support of his contention, learned counsel has relied on paragraphs 13 and 14 of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer & Ors. (Supra) which are as under: '13. Any documentary evidence by way of an electronic record under the Evidence Act, in view of Sections 59 and 65A, can be proved only in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Section 65B. Section 65B deals with the admissibility of the electronic record. The purpose of these provisions is to sanctify secondary evidence in electronic form, generated by a computer. It may be noted that the Section starts with a non obstante clause. Thus, notwithstanding anything contained in the Evidence Act, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer shall be deemed to be a document only if the conditions mentioned under sub-section (2) are satisfied, without further proof or production of the original. The very admissibility of such a document, i.e., electronic record which is called as computer output, depends on the satisfaction of the four conditions under Section 65B(2). Following are the specified conditions under Section 65B(2) of the Evidence Act: (i) The electronic record containing the information should have been produced by the computer during the period over which the same was regularly used to store or process information for the purpose of any activity regularly carried on over that period by the person having lawful control over the use of that computer; (ii) The information of the kind contained in electronic record or of the kind from which the information is derived was regularly fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activity; (iii) During the material part of the said period, the computer was operating properly and that even if it was not operating properly for some time, the break or breaks had not affected either the record or the accuracy of its contents; and (iv) The information contained in the record should be a reproduction or derivation from the information fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activity. 14. 14. Under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act, if it is desired to give a statement in any proceedings pertaining to an electronic record, it is permissible provided the following conditions are satisfied: (a) There must be a certificate which identifies the electronic record containing the statement; (b) The certificate must describe the manner in which the electronic record was produced; (c) The certificate must furnish the particulars of the device involved in the production of that record; (d) The certificate must deal with the applicable conditions mentioned under Section 65B(2) of the Evidence Act; and .....................................' 45. Counsel of the petitioner further contends that mere production of a document does not mean admission of the document into evidence unless the document is proved in terms of the provisions of the Evidence Act. Counsel refers to paragraph 4 of the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ahmedabad New Textile Mills, Ahmedabad (Supra), which reads as under: '4.......................Mere production of document does not mean, admission of the document in evidence. In order to admit the document in evidence, the document must be proved as per the provisions of Evidence Act or it must be admitted by the other side in evidence. Therefore, mere production of the document will not make the admission of the document in evidence. Similarly, merely proving the signature on the document will not also amount to proving of the whole of the document........................' 46. Counsel has relied on the decision of this High Court in the case of Rina Laskar & Ors. (Supra), and contended that mere marking of a document as an exhibit does not necessarily prove the content of the document. Counsel has referred to paragraph 5 of the judgment wherein this High Court has held as under: '5. According to law, mere marking of a document as exhibit does not necessarily prove the content of the document. The contents of the document is to be proved according to the procedure prescribed by law. Exbt. 2 is a document alleged to have issued by respondent No. 1 but except his signature at the bottom he denied the other contents of the document. The claimant-petitioners, admittedly, failed to prove the contents of the document by examining the writer or scribe of the document or any other witness. Exbt. 2 is a document alleged to have issued by respondent No. 1 but except his signature at the bottom he denied the other contents of the document. The claimant-petitioners, admittedly, failed to prove the contents of the document by examining the writer or scribe of the document or any other witness. The contents of the documents, therefore, cannot be read as an item of evidence for taking into consideration to determine the quantum of compensation.............................' 47. It is argued by Mr. Kar Bhowmik, learned senior advocate that two of the vital lacunas of the prosecution case are that prosecution could not establish that the money allegedly defalcated was actually entrusted to the petitioner. Counsel contends that in absence of such entrustment which is a sine qua non for an offence punishable under section 409 IPC, conviction and sentence under section 409 IPC is liable to be set aside. Pointing out to the other lacuna of the prosecution case, counsel contends that the trial Court accepted and relied on the report of the handwriting expert without examining the handwriting expert and giving an opportunity to the accused to cross-examine the expert which is not permissible. Counsel has relied on paragraphs 34 and 35 of the judgment of this High Court in the case of Kajal Dey (Supra) to establish his contention wherein this High Court has held as under: '34. To prove the evidence under Section 409 of the IPC the prosecution has first to prove that the property alleged to have been defalcated was entrusted with the accused appellant who dishonestly misappropriated or converted the said property for his own use. In absence of such entrustment which is sine qua non for an offence regarding the defalcation, the court is to disbelieve the story of defalcation. 35. As the handwriting expert was not admittedly examined, the report of the handwriting expert (Exbt. In absence of such entrustment which is sine qua non for an offence regarding the defalcation, the court is to disbelieve the story of defalcation. 35. As the handwriting expert was not admittedly examined, the report of the handwriting expert (Exbt. 47 series), cannot be relied upon for the purpose of conviction in view of the decision of the Apex Court in Magan Bihari Lal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1977 SC 1091 : 1977 Cri.L.J. 711, wherein the Apex Court taking note of its earlier decision that the expert evidence as to handwriting being opinion evidence can rarely, if ever, take the place of substantive evidence and before accepting on such an evidence, it would be desirable for the court to see as to whether such evidence of expert is otherwise corroborated either by direct evidence or by substantial evidence. In Magan Bihari Lal (supra), the Apex Court held as under: 'In Magan Bihari Lal ( AIR 1977 SC 1091 : 1977 Cri.L.J. 711) (supra), the Apex Court while discussing regarding evidence of expert opinion took note of the earlier decision of the Apex Court in Ram Chandra v. State of U.P. AIR 1957 SC 381 (1957 Cri.L.J. 559) as well as the decision in Ishwari Prasaad Mishra v. Md. Isa, AIR 1963 SC 1728 wherein it has been stated that the expert evidence of handwriting can never be conclusive because it is, after all, opinion evidence, and the said view of the Apex Court was also reiterated in the case of Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1964 SC 529 wherein it has been pointed out by the Apex Court that the expert evidence as to handwriting being opinion evidence can rarely, if ever, take the place of substantive evidence and before acting on such evidence, it would be desirable to consider whether it is corroborated either by the clear direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. The Apex Court in the case of Fakhruddin v. State of M.P., AIR 1967 SC 1326 (1967 Cri.L.J. 1197) also considered the evidentiary value of expert opinion in regard to handwriting and it uttered a note of caution pointing out that it would be risky to found a conviction solely on the evidence of a handwriting expert and before acting upon such evidence, the Court must always try to see whether it is corroborated by other evidence, direct or circumstantial. The Apex Court also noted the observation of the Supreme Court of Michigan in the case of Alfred Foster's Will wherein the Supreme Court of Michigan noted that 'Everyone knows how very unsafe it is to rely upon any one's opinion concerning the niceties of penmanship opinions are necessarily received, and may be valuable, but at best this kind of evidence is a necessary evil.' The Apex Court taking note of the aforesaid observation of the Supreme Court of Michigan stated that 'we need not subscribe to the extreme view expressed by the Supreme Court of Michigan, but there can be doubt that this type of evidence, being opinion evidence is by its very nature, weak and infirm and cannot of itself form the basis for a conviction'. The case of Magan Bihari Lal ( AIR 1977 SC 1091 : 1977 Cri.L.J. 711) (supra) has also been followed in the case of S. Gopal Reddy ( AIR 1996 SC 2184 : 1996 Cri.L.J. 3237) (supra) as evident from paras 28 and 29 of the report which are reproduced hereunder: '28. Thus, the evidence of PW-3 is not definite and cannot be said to be of a clinching nature to connect the appellant with the disputed letters. The evidence of an expert is a rather weak type of evidence and the Courts do not generally consider it as offering conclusive proof and therefore safe to rely upon the same without seeking independent and reliable corroboration. In Magan Bihari Lal v. State of Punjab (1977) 2 SCC 210 , while dealing with the evidence of a handwriting expert this court opined: ...We think it would be extremely hazardous to condemn the appellant merely on the strength of opinion evidence of a handwriting expert. It is now well settled that expert opinion must always be received with great caution and perhaps none so with more caution than the opinion of a handwriting expert. There is a profusion of presidential authority which holds that it is unsafe to base a conviction solely on expert opinion without substantial corroboration. This rule has been universally acted upon and it has almost become a rule of law. There is a profusion of presidential authority which holds that it is unsafe to base a conviction solely on expert opinion without substantial corroboration. This rule has been universally acted upon and it has almost become a rule of law. It was held by this Court in Ram Chandra v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 381 , that it is unsafe to treat expert handwriting opinion as sufficient basis of conviction, but it may be relied upon when supported by other items of internal and external evidence. This Court again pointed out in Ishwari Prasad Misra v. Mohd. Isa, AIR 1963 SC 1728 that expert evidence of handwriting can never be conclusive because it is, after all, opinion evidence, and this view, was reiterated in Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1964 SC 529 where it was pointed out by this Court that ex-pert's evidence as to handwriting being opinion evidence can rarely, if ever, take the place of substantive evidence and before acting on such evidence, it would be desirable to consider whether it is corroborated either by clear direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. This Court had again occasion to consider the evidentiary value of expert opinion in regard to handwriting in Fakhruddin v. State of M.P., AIR 1967 SC 1326 : (1967 Cri.L.J. 1197) and it uttered a note of caution pointing out that it would be risky to found a conviction solely on the evidence of a handwriting expert and before acting upon such evidence, the Court must always try to see whether it is corroborated by other evidence, direct or circumstantial.' 48. In the case of Amiya Ranjan Chakraborty & Ors. (Supra), one of the issues which were examined by this Court was whether the trial Court was correct in relying upon the report of the handwriting expert who was not examined as a witness by the prosecution. After examining the issue, this High Court made the following observations in paragraphs 44 and 45 of the judgment which is as under: '44. After examining the issue, this High Court made the following observations in paragraphs 44 and 45 of the judgment which is as under: '44. The learned counsel for the appellant, Sri Amiya Ranjan Chakraborty has relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Keshav Dutt v. State of Haryana reported in (2010) 9 SCC 286 , where the Apex Court while considering the question whether without examining the handwriting expert his report could have been admitted into evidence or not has answered the issue in the following manner: '9. The other question raised was whether without examining the handwriting expert his report could have been admitted into evidence and relied upon although the same formed the main basis of conviction. In this regard, the learned counsel placed reliance on the decision of this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Damu, (2000) 6 SCC 269 wherein while considering the case of abducting the triple infanticide, this Court had occasion to consider whether reliance could be placed on the opinion of the Assistant State Examiner of Documents without examining him as a witness in Court. This Court held that from the opinion itself it could not be gathered whether his office would fall within the purview of Section 293 Cr.P.C. Accordingly, the Court observed that without examining him as an expert witness, no reliance could be placed on his opinion. The learned counsel urged that the conviction of the appellant on the basis of the above could not be sustained.' [Emphasis added] 45. It has been further observed by the Apex Court in Keshav Dutt (supra) as under: '15. In the instant case, the report of the handwriting expert who had not been examined indicates that a specimen writing had been given by the Appellant and on a comparison of the same with the writings in Ex. PR, the handwriting expert had come to the conclusion that they had been written by the same person. The Trial Court skirted the issue by holding that the defence counsel could have examined in their defence to rebut the findings of the Assistant Director, Forensic Science Laboratory, Haryana. The High Court also skirted the issue by observing that the science of handwriting being imperfect and inaccurate, it is very difficult, if not impossible to give the opinion that the writings were in the hand of one and the same persons. The High Court also skirted the issue by observing that the science of handwriting being imperfect and inaccurate, it is very difficult, if not impossible to give the opinion that the writings were in the hand of one and the same persons. The High Court went on to observe that the Appellant did not have the courage to examine any counter expert in rebuttal of the report. The High Court recorded that the report having gone unrebutted could be relied upon without any demur. 16. We are afraid that we cannot concur with the views either of the Trial Court or of the High Court in the above regard. When the Trial Court chose to rely on the report of the handwriting expert (Ex. PR), it ought to have examined the handwriting expert in order to give an opportunity to the Appellant and the other accused to cross-examine the said expert. There is nothing on record to show that the Appellant and the other respondents had admitted to the report of the handwriting expert. 17. In our view, the Trial Court ought to have allowed the Appellant an opportunity to cross-examine the expert and both the Trial Court and the High Court erred in denying him such opportunity and shifting the onus on the accused to disprove Ex. PR which had not been formally proved by the prosecution. The decision cited on behalf of the Appellant regarding reliance on the opinion of an expert who had not been examined as a witness, however, includes an Assistant Director of the State Forensic Science Laboratory in Clause (e) of Sub-section (4) of Section 293 Cr.P.C.' 49. Counsel contends that the documents produced by the prosecution are mostly photocopies of the original documents which have been taken into evidence by the learned trial Court. Counsel relies on the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of G. Subbaraman & Ors. (Supra) and contends that in the said judgment it has been held by the Madras High Court that secondary evidence, as a general rule is admissible only in the absence of primary evidence and such secondary evidence may be given only in absence of primary evidence when a proper explanation about the absence of primary evidence is given. (Supra) and contends that in the said judgment it has been held by the Madras High Court that secondary evidence, as a general rule is admissible only in the absence of primary evidence and such secondary evidence may be given only in absence of primary evidence when a proper explanation about the absence of primary evidence is given. Counsel contends that in the instant case, secondary evidence were admitted into evidence without any explanation as to why the primary evidence was not given. 50. At the end, counsel of the petitioner argued that the basic elements of section 409 IPC could not be proved against the petitioner. Relying on the decision of this High Court in the case of Manik Lal Majumder (Supra), counsel argued that prosecution could not lead any direct evidence to prove that the petitioner was entrusted dominion over the property which was allegedly defalcated by her and she actuated such property by dishonest intention or converted the same to her own use. According to learned counsel, in absence of such proof, the charge under section 409 IPC does not survive and the other charge brought against her also becomes insignificant. Counsel urges the Court to set aside the impugned judgment and allow the criminal revision petition. 51. Mr. R. Datta, learned P.P. while vehemently opposing the contention of petitioner's counsel contends that it is not expected that all details of the prosecution case shall be reflected in the FIR. It is enough if the broad facts of the case are stated in the FIR. Therefore, the extra judicial confession made by the accused in her reply to the show cause notice [Exbt. 14] cannot be disbelieved on the ground that it does not find mention in the FIR. Counsel has relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of V.K. Mishra & Anr. v. State of Uttarakhand & Anr. reported in (2015) 9 SCC 588 wherein the Apex Court in paragraph 13 of the judgment has held as under: '13. FIR is not meant to be an encyclopaedia nor is it expected to contain all the details of the prosecution case. It may be sufficient if the broad facts of the prosecution case are stated in the FIR..............................' 52. Mr. FIR is not meant to be an encyclopaedia nor is it expected to contain all the details of the prosecution case. It may be sufficient if the broad facts of the prosecution case are stated in the FIR..............................' 52. Mr. Datta, learned P.P. contends that to establish the charge of criminal breach of trust, prosecution is not obliged to prove the precise mode of misappropriation by the accused of the property entrusted to him. Failure to account for the property is enough to hold the accused guilty of offence for criminal breach of trust punishable under section 409 IPC. Counsel contends that in the given case, accused was a Cashier in Panchayat Samity office under Gournagar R.D. Block. She was entrusted for encashment of the impugned cheques. She was under an obligation to disburse the cheque amount to the beneficiaries for whom those cheques were issued but in criminal breach of trust she had withdrawn excess amount from the bank and converted the same for her personal gain. Counsel contends that this is a clear case of criminal breach of trust for which conviction of the petitioner and sentence awarded to her was absolutely justified. To nourish his contentions learned P.P. has relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Jaikrishnadas Manohardas Desai & Anr. v. State of Bombay reported in AIR 1960 SC 889 wherein the Apex Court has held as under: '6.............................to establish a charge of criminal breach of trust, the prosecution is not obliged to prove the precise mode of conversion, misappropriation or misapplication by the accused of the property entrusted to him or over which he has dominion. The principal ingredient of the offence being dishonest misappropriation or conversion which may not ordinarily be a matter of direct proof, entrustment of property and failure in breach of an obligation to account for the property entrusted, if proved, may in the light of other circumstances, justifiably lead to an inference of dishonest misappropriation or conversion. The principal ingredient of the offence being dishonest misappropriation or conversion which may not ordinarily be a matter of direct proof, entrustment of property and failure in breach of an obligation to account for the property entrusted, if proved, may in the light of other circumstances, justifiably lead to an inference of dishonest misappropriation or conversion. Conviction of a person for the offence of criminal breach of trust may not, in all cases, be founded merely on his failure to account for the property entrusted to him, or over which he has dominion, even when a duty to account is imposed upon him, but where he is unable to account or renders an explanation for his failure to account which is untrue, an inference of misappropriation with dishonest intent may readily be made.' 53. Mr. R. Datta, learned P.P. has also argued that a defective investigation cannot be put against the prosecution case. Counsel contends that if the Court is convinced on the basis of the testimony of the witnesses that the facts are genuine, prosecution case cannot be doubted or discarded for a faulty investigation. Counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Hema v. State through Inspector of Police, Madras reported in (2013) 10 SCC 192 wherein the Apex Court in paragraph 17 of the judgment has held as under: '17........................................................................................... 32. In State of Karnataka v. K. Yarappa Reddy this Court occasioned to consider the similar question of defective investigation as to whether any manipulation in the station house diary by the investigating officer could be put against the prosecution case. This Court, in para 19, held as follows: '19. But can the above finding (that the station house diary is not genuine) have any inevitable bearing on the other evidence in this case? If the other evidence, on scrutiny, is found credible and acceptable, should the court be influenced by the machinations demonstrated by the investigating officer in conducting investigation or in preparing the records so unscrupulously? It can be a guiding principle that as investigation is not the solitary area for judicial scrutiny in a criminal trial, the conclusion of the court in the case cannot be allowed to depend solely on the probity of investigation. It can be a guiding principle that as investigation is not the solitary area for judicial scrutiny in a criminal trial, the conclusion of the court in the case cannot be allowed to depend solely on the probity of investigation. It is well-nigh settled that even if the investigation is illegal or even suspicious the rest of the evidence must be scrutinised independently of the impact of it. Otherwise the criminal trial will plummet to the level of the investigating officers ruling the roost. The court must have predominance and pre-eminence in criminal trials over the action taken by the investigating officers. The criminal justice should not be made a casualty for the wrongs committed by the investigating officers in the case. In other words, if the court is convinced that the testimony of a witness to the occurrence is true the court is free to act on it albeit the investigating officer's suspicious role in the case. ...............................................................................................' 54. Learned P.P. submits that in the instant case signatures of the accused petitioner were procured in Court which were sent to Forensic Science Laboratory for comparison by expert. The expert opinion [Exbt. I series] was taken into evidence through examination of the investigating officer. Counsel of the accused also cross-examined the I.O. on the expert opinion. Now they cannot challenge the expert opinion on the ground that the expert was not called as a witness during trial. Counsel contends that the other witnesses who were colleagues of the accused petitioner and familiar with her handwriting also came forward and identified the disputed signatures to be of the accused. Counsel submits that the evidence of the colleagues of the accused who identified her disputed signatures is acceptable in the eye of law. In support of his contention, learned P.P. placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Ajit Savant Majagvai (Supra) wherein the Apex Court has held as under: '36. The original records were also placed before us and we have perused those records. Since the learned counsel for the appellant contended that the appellant had not stayed in 'Ashoka Lodge', we looked into the 'Register of Lodgers'. It contains the relevant entry against which the signature of the appellant also appears. His signature also appears on the 'Vakalatnama' filed by him in this appeal. Since the learned counsel for the appellant contended that the appellant had not stayed in 'Ashoka Lodge', we looked into the 'Register of Lodgers'. It contains the relevant entry against which the signature of the appellant also appears. His signature also appears on the 'Vakalatnama' filed by him in this appeal. In the presence of the learned counsel for the parties, we compared the signature of the appellant on the 'Vakalatnama' with the signature in the 'Register of Lodgers'. A mere look at the signatures was enough to indicate the similarity which was so apparent that it required no expert evidence. This comparison was done by us having regard to the provisions of Section 73 of the Evidence Act, 1872 which provides as under:- '73. Comparison of signature, writing or seal with others admitted or proved.-In order to ascertain whether a signature, writing or seal is that of the person by whom it purports to have been written or made, any signature, writing or seal admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the court to have been written or made by that person may be compared with the one which is to be proved, although that signature, writing or seal has not been produced or proved for any other purpose. The court may direct any person present in court to write any words or figures for the purpose of enabling the court to compare the words or figures so written with any words or figures alleged to have been written by such person.' 37. This section consists of two parts. While the first part provides for comparison of signature, finger impression, writing etc. allegedly written or made by a person with signature or writing etc. admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the Court to have been written by the same person, the second part empowers the Court to direct any person including an accused, present in court, to give his specimen writing or fingerprints for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare it with the writing or signature allegedly made by that person. The section does not specify by whom the comparison shall be made. The section does not specify by whom the comparison shall be made. However, looking to the other provisions of the Act, it is clear that such comparison may either be made by a handwriting expert under Section 45 or by anyone familiar with the handwriting of the person concerned as provided by Section 47 or by the Court itself.' 55. Mr. Datta, learned P.P. has also contended that the accused did not raise any objection to the mode of admissibility when some of the incriminating documents were admitted into evidence and marked as exhibits by the trial Judge. The accused according to learned counsel should have raised her objection as to the admissibility of such documents at the time of tendering the document and marking the same by the trial Judge. Now, at the time of argument such objections tendered on behalf of the accused are not acceptable. Counsel has relied on the judgment of the Gauhati High Court in the case of Shri Biharilal Agarwalla & Anr. v. Shri Tamizul Haque reported in (1988) 1 GLR 76 as well as the decision of this High Court in Prativa Dey (Deb) v. Saraswati Joy & Anr. reported in (2016) 1 TLR 869 in support of such contention. 56. Mr. Datta, learned P.P. has concluded his arguments by saying that the accused who was a government servant defalcated huge amount of public money and committed criminal breach of trust by her conduct. Learned P.P. contends that prosecution has proved the charges against her by adducing sufficient and trustworthy evidence at the trial Court. Judgment of the trial Court was also confirmed by the Appellate Court and there is no ground to interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts below. Mr. Datta, learned P.P., therefore, urges the Court to reject the criminal revision petition filed by the convict petitioner. 57. Perused the entire facts and circumstances of the case and considered the submissions made by the counsel representing the parties. 58. The gist of the allegation against the convict petitioner is that the impugned cheques containing a total sum of Rs. 15,599/- was issued in the name of the petitioner for encashment from Tripura Gramin Bank, Kailashahar branch for the purpose of paying honorarium to the members of the Panchayat Samity for attending the Panchayat Samity meetings. 58. The gist of the allegation against the convict petitioner is that the impugned cheques containing a total sum of Rs. 15,599/- was issued in the name of the petitioner for encashment from Tripura Gramin Bank, Kailashahar branch for the purpose of paying honorarium to the members of the Panchayat Samity for attending the Panchayat Samity meetings. Among the 6 (six) cheques, 3 (three) cheques were account payee cheques and the other 3 (three) cheques were bearer's cheques. It is not understandable as to why for the amount payable to the Panchayat Samity members the cheques were issued in the name of the petitioner. For argument's sake, even if it is conceded that for convenience, office entrusted the cheques to the Cashier for withdrawal of the money in her name from bank and then disburse the same to the beneficiaries, then all the 6 (six) cheques could have been bearer's cheques for cash withdrawal and disbursement. Normally, the cheques should have been issued in the name of the beneficiaries. PW-14 stated that he issued the cheques. He did not say as to why he issued 3 (three) account payee cheques and 3 (three) bearer's cheques. Moreover, each of the 6 (six) impugned cheques contains the signatures of the DDO who is the Block Development Officer of Gournagar R.D. Block as well as signature of the Chairperson of Gournagar Panchayat Samity. Both the BDO [PW-14] and the Chairperson of Gournagar Panchayat Samity [PW-12] have admitted their signatures on the impugned cheques. PW-12 categorically stated in his cross-examination that he put his signature on the cheques at the end and he did not find anything doubtful in the impugned cheques while he signed those cheques. Similarly, the DDO [PW-14] also categorically stated in his cross-examination that he signed all the 6 (six) impugned cheques. He never stated that blank cheques were produced before him for signature. 59. It was also stated by PW-14 in his examination-in-chief that before issuing cheques, pay orders were issued and for each of the impugned cheques there were separate pay orders mentioning the specific amount for which those cheques were issued. The 6 (six) pay orders which are available on record have been marked as Exbt. 5 series. According to PW-14, counterfoils of the cheques contain the original and correct cheque amount which are Rs. 3050/-, Rs. 1344/-, Rs. 1545/-, Rs. 7360/-, Rs. 650/-, Rs. 1650/-. The 6 (six) pay orders which are available on record have been marked as Exbt. 5 series. According to PW-14, counterfoils of the cheques contain the original and correct cheque amount which are Rs. 3050/-, Rs. 1344/-, Rs. 1545/-, Rs. 7360/-, Rs. 650/-, Rs. 1650/-. Therefore, the pay orders [Exbt. 5 series] must contain the same figure because pursuant to the 6 (six) pay orders, the 6 (six) impugned cheques were issued but the figures appearing in 3 (three) of the pay orders are Rs. 2500/-, Rs. 4860/- and Rs. 3550/-. No cheque against these pay orders were issued. There are only 3 (three) matching pay orders which are of the amount of Rs. 1344/-, Rs. 650/- and Rs. 1650/-. Thus, the prosecution could not produce any pay order for the cheque amount of Rs. 3050/-, Rs. 1545/- and Rs. 7360/-. The statement of PW-14 that for each of the impugned cheques there were pay orders does not appear to be true. Even though the bank statement of the convict petitioner [Exbt. 8 series] goes to show that the amount of the 3 (three) account payee cheques were deposited in her account in Tripura Gramin Bank at its Kailashahar branch, petitioner cannot be held guilty unless it is established that she raised the cheque amount by interpolation for her personal gain. Only the deposit of the amount in her account is not the sufficient proof of her culpability because admittedly those were account payee cheques issued in her name and naturally the amount would be credited to her account. The charge against her cannot survive unless it is established that she inflated the cheque amount by manipulating the cheques with an intention to defraud her employer. To prove that she raised the figure in all the 6 (six) impugned cheques, prosecution mainly relied on two documents, one is her reply to the show cause notice [Exbt. 14] which is straightaway denied by the convict petitioner and the other document is the expert opinion [Exbt. I series]. Petitioner raised serious objections against the admission and reliability of the expert opinion [Exbt. I series] in absence of examination of the expert who authored the document. Her counsel has also referred to several judgments to show that expert's evidence cannot be accepted without examination of the expert. However, a bare reading of the expert's opinion [Exbt. I series]. Petitioner raised serious objections against the admission and reliability of the expert opinion [Exbt. I series] in absence of examination of the expert who authored the document. Her counsel has also referred to several judgments to show that expert's evidence cannot be accepted without examination of the expert. However, a bare reading of the expert's opinion [Exbt. I series] would reveal that the expert could not ascertain the authorship of the writings marked as Q 4/1, Q 5/1, Q 6/1 and Q 1/2 to Q 6/2. Q 4/1 is the initial of the Cashier (petitioner) on the impugned cheque containing the defrauded amount of Rs. 17,360/-. Q 5/1 is also initial of the Cashier on one of the impugned cheques containing the defrauded amount of Rs. 20,650/- and Q 6/1 is her initial on the impugned cheque containing defrauded amount of Rs. 31,650/-. The expert could not ascertain as to whether the initials of the Cashier appearing in those cheques were of the convict petitioner. Q 1/2 to Q 6/2 are the figures appearing on the cheques which were allegedly raised by the convict petitioner by interpolation to commit the fraud. The expert could not also express any opinion about the authorship of the writings marked as Exbt. Q 1/2 to Q 6/2 which has made the case against the petitioner more doubtful. This apart, the alleged reply of the petitioner to the show cause notice also appears to be doubtful because this is a typed document containing the signature of the accused. Accused denied her signature on the said document. The signature was never sent for comparison and expert opinion. Even there is no seal and signature and date of receipt of the said document in the office of Block Development Officer, Gournagar R.D. Block. There is no proof as to when the document was actually received in the office of the Block Development Officer. Considered in the totality of the circumstances, this document appears to be very doubtful. 60. This apart, there are plenty of circumstances which have raised doubt about the veracity of the prosecution case. Despite noticeable interpolations in some of the impugned cheques, those were cleared by the bank without any objection which is unusual. The petitioner has consistently pleaded that she was never entrusted with the office of the Cashier. 60. This apart, there are plenty of circumstances which have raised doubt about the veracity of the prosecution case. Despite noticeable interpolations in some of the impugned cheques, those were cleared by the bank without any objection which is unusual. The petitioner has consistently pleaded that she was never entrusted with the office of the Cashier. PW-4, a dealing Assistant of Gournagar R.D. Block categorically stated that at the relevant time one Dipak Das was the Cashier. Even PW-12, the Chairperson of Gournagar Panchayat Samity also stated in his cross-examination that at the relevant time Dipak Das was the designated Cashier. This apart, prosecution could not adduce any documentary evidence to prove that the cash was actually entrusted to the petitioner. The inordinate delay in lodging the FIR also affects the veracity of the prosecution case. The occurrence took place between the period from 04.11.2009 to 31.03.2010 but the FIR was lodged on 04.09.2010. It is no case of the prosecution that due to delayed detection of the offence, lodging of the FIR was delayed. The cheques were issued for payment of honorarium to the Panchayat members for attending Panchayat meetings. Admittedly, their honorarium were paid in time and none of the members lodged any complaint. The Chairperson of the Panchayat Samity [PW-12] has also stated that there was no objection from the audit team and no liability was fixed on the matter. Even no disciplinary proceeding is stated to have been initiated against the petitioner after the occurrence. 61. In order to bring home the charge under section 409 IPC to the accused, prosecution must prove beyond reasonable shadow of doubt that the property in respect of which the offence was committed was actually entrusted to the accused. In absence of such proof, conviction and sentence of the petitioner under section 409 IPC cannot be sustained. 62. Similarly, prosecution could not adduce sufficient evidence to attribute forgery to the petitioner as a result of which her conviction and sentence for commission of forgery for the purpose of cheating punishable under section 468 IPC cannot also be upheld. 63. On the basis of the aforesaid discussions, it is apparent that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable shadow of doubt. As such, the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of doubt. 63. On the basis of the aforesaid discussions, it is apparent that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable shadow of doubt. As such, the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of doubt. Resultantly, her petition stands allowed and she is acquitted of the charges of offence punishable under sections 409 and 468 IPC. Her bail bond stands discharged. The impugned judgment is set aside and the criminal revision petition is disposed of. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. Send down the LCR.