JUDGMENT : SONGKHUPCHUNG SERTO, J. 1. Heard Mr. Temjen, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and also heard Ms. Inaholi, learned Government Advocate appearing for the state respondents. The brief facts and circumstances leading to the filing of this writ petition by the petitioners are as follows: On 28.8.2017 an advertisement inviting eligible candidates for recruitment to 91 posts of Graduate Teachers in Mathematics subject and 53 posts of Graduate Teachers in Science subject was published by the Principal Director, School Education, Government of Nagaland and in that the scale of pay for the post advertised was given as P.B. Rs. 9,300-34,800 G.P. Rs. 4200/-. Thereafter, another advertisement was issued on 20.10.2017 by the same Principal Director inviting eligible candidates from 6 tribes of ENPO areas for filling up 23 post of Graduate Teachers in Mathematics and 13 post of Graduate Teachers in Science subject. However, in the second advertisement, no pay scale was given unlike in the first advertisement. Following the publication of the advertisement the petitioners applied for the post and they were selected by the Selection Board, and after their selection, appointment orders were issued on 18.9.2018 with the same terms and conditions but as for the pay and allowances it was clearly mentioned in the appointment orders that they shall be paid in the pay matrix level 9 plus all other allowances as admissible under the rules in Nagaland from time to time with effect from the date of joining the post. After receiving the appointment orders, the petitioners joined their respective post. But not being satisfied with the pay scale mentioned in their appointment orders, they submitted a representation dated 5.10.2018 to the Principal Secretary, School Education, Government of Nagaland and the Director of School Education, Government of Nagaland requesting them to rectify the same as per the pay scale mentioned in the first advertisement i.e. the advertisement dated 28.8.2017. Since no positive response was received they once again submitted another representation on 30.11.2018 to the same authorities. But this time also no positive response was received by them hence, they are here before this Court praying for issuance of appropriate writ or order or direction directing the respondents to pay their monthly salaries as per the pay scale mentioned in the first advertisement dated 28.8.2017. 2. The case of the petitioners as submitted by their learned counsel Mr. 2. The case of the petitioners as submitted by their learned counsel Mr. Temjen is as follows: (i) That since the advertisement has specifically mentioned the scale of pay for the post of Graduate Teachers and, no further notification was issued changing or altering the same, the respondents are bound by the advertisement issued by them and they cannot change the same any longer, particularly when the examination has been conducted in pursuance of the advertisement and results have been declared. (ii) That the respondents had committed illegality in having changed the pay scale of the petitioners inasmuch as no notice or opportunity was given to them before the same was given effect to. (iii) That while giving higher scale to teachers who are appointed on contract basis, the pay of the petitioners have been lowered even though they are regularly appointed, therefore, the same is liable to be rectified. (iv) That the two advertisements issued for recruitment to the post of Graduate teachers in the subjects; Mathematics and Science were issued on 28.8.2017 and 20.10.2017 under which the new pay scale was introduced whereas the Nagaland School Education Service Rules 2017 came into force only on 29.11.2017. Therefore, the provisions of the Rules could not have been applied in the case of the petitioners since doing so would mean applying the same retrospectively. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioners referred to some judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in support of his submission and the same are reproduced here-below: (1) Secretary A.P. Public Service Commission vs. B. Swapna and Others, (2005) 4 SCC 154 , Paragraph 14, 16, 17 “14. The High Court has committed an error in holding that the amended rule was operative. As has been fairly conceded by learned counsel for the applicant-respondent No. 1 it was un-amended rule which was applicable. Once a process of selection starts, the prescribed selection criteria cannot be changed. The logic behind the same is based on fair play. A person who did not apply because a certain criteria e.g. minimum percentage of marks can make a legitimate grievance, in case the same is lowered, that he could have applied because he possessed the said percentage. Rules regarding qualification for appointment if amended during continuance of the process of selection do not affect the same. A person who did not apply because a certain criteria e.g. minimum percentage of marks can make a legitimate grievance, in case the same is lowered, that he could have applied because he possessed the said percentage. Rules regarding qualification for appointment if amended during continuance of the process of selection do not affect the same. That is because every statute or statutory rule is prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective effect. Unless there are words in the Statute or in the Rules showing the intention to affect existing rights the rule must be held to be prospective. If the Rule is expressed in a language which is fairly capable of either interpretation it ought to be considered as prospective only. 16. In State of U.P. vs. Rafiquddin and Others, 1987 (Supp.) SCC 401, it was inter-alia, held as follows: “Before we close we would like to refer certain aspects which came to our notice during the hearing of the case relating to the functioning of the Public Service Commission, selection of candidates and their appointment to the Judicial Service. We were distressed to find that the Public Service Commission has been changing the norms fixed by it for considering the suitability of candidates at the behest of the State Government after the declaration of results. We have noticed that while making selection for appointment to the U.P. Judicial Service the Commission had initially fixed 40 per cent aggregate marks and minimum 35 per cent marks for viva voce test and on that basis it had recommended list of 46 candidates only. Later on at the instance of the State Government it reduced the standard of 40 per cent marks in aggregate to 35 per cent and on that basis it forwarded a list of 33 candidates to the government for appointment to the service. Again at the behest of the State Government and with a view to implement the decision of the high level committee consisting of Chief Justice, Chief Minister and the Chairman of the Commission forwarded name of 37 candidates in 1974 ignoring the norms fixed by it for judging the suitability of candidates. The Commission is an independent expert body. It has to act in an independent manner in making the selection on the prescribed norms. The Commission is an independent expert body. It has to act in an independent manner in making the selection on the prescribed norms. It may consult the State Government and the High Court in prescribing the norms for judging the suitability of candidates if no norms are prescribed in the Rules. Once the Commission determines the norms and makes selection on the conclusion of the competitive examination and submits list of the suitable candidates to the government it should not reopen the selection by lowering down the norms at the instance of the Government. If the practice of revising the result of competitive examination by changing norms is followed there will be confusion and the people will lose faith in the institution of Public Service Commission and the authenticity of selection.” 17. In Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and Others vs. Rajendra Bhimrao Mandve and Others, 2001 (10) SCC 51 , it was held as under: “It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the rules of the game, meaning thereby, that the criteria for selection cannot be altered by the authorities concerned in the middle or after the process of selection has commenced. Therefore, the decision of the High Court, to the extent it pronounced upon the invalidity of the circular orders dated 26.6.1996, does not merit acceptance in our hand and the same are set aside.” (2) N.T. Devin Katti and Others vs. Karnataka Public Service Commission, (1990) 3 SCC 157 , Paragraphs 11, 12, 13 “11. There is yet another aspect of the question. Where advertisement is issued inviting applications for direct recruitment to a category of posts, and the advertisement expressly states that selection shall be made in accordance with the existing rules or government orders, and if it further indicates the extent of reservations in favour of various categories, the selection of candidates in such a case must be made in accordance with the then existing Rules and government orders. Candidates who apply and undergo written or viva voice test acquire vested right for being considered for selection in accordance with the terms and conditions contained in the advertisement, unless the advertisement itself indicates a contrary intention. Candidates who apply and undergo written or viva voice test acquire vested right for being considered for selection in accordance with the terms and conditions contained in the advertisement, unless the advertisement itself indicates a contrary intention. Generally, a candidate has right to be considered in accordance with the terms and conditions set out in the advertisement as his right crystallises on the date of publication of advertisement; however he has no absolute right in the matter. If the recruitment Rules are amended retrospectively during the pendency of selection, in that event selection must be held in accordance with the amended Rules. Whether the Rules have retrospective effect or not, primarily depends upon the language of the Rules and its construction to ascertain the legislative intent. The legislative intent is ascertained either by express provision or by necessary implication; if the amended Rules are not retrospectively in nature the selection must be regulated in accordance with the rules and orders which were in force on the date of advertisement. Determination of this question largely depends on the facts of each case having regard to the terms and conditions set out in the advertisement and the relevant rules and orders. Lest there be any confusion, we would like to make it clear that a candidate on making application for a post pursuant to an advertisement does not acquire any vested right for selection, but if he is eligible and is otherwise qualified in accordance with the relevant rules and the terms contained in the advertisement, he does acquire a vested right for being considered for selection in accordance with the rules as they existed on the date of advertisement. He cannot be deprived of that limited right on the amendment of rules during the pendency of selection unless the amended rules are retrospective in nature. 12. In B.N. Nagarajan vs. State of Mysore, 1966 (3) SCR 682 the dispute related to the validity of appointment of Assistant Engineers. The Public Service Commission invited applications by issuing notifications for appointment to the post of Assistant Engineers in October 1958, May 1959 and April 1960. The Commission made selection interviewed the candidates and sent the select list to the government in October/November 1960. The Public Service Commission invited applications by issuing notifications for appointment to the post of Assistant Engineers in October 1958, May 1959 and April 1960. The Commission made selection interviewed the candidates and sent the select list to the government in October/November 1960. But before the appointment could be made the Mysore Public Works Engineering Department Services (Recruitment) Rules 1960 came into force which prescribed different provisions than those prescribed in the earlier notifications in pursuance whereof the Public Service Commission had made the selection. The validity of the appointments made by the government on the basis of the selection made by the Commission was challenged. The High Court quashed the selection and appointment made in pursuance thereof. On appeal before this Court, validity of the appointments was assailed on the ground that since the appointments had been made after the amendment of the Rules the appointments should have been made in accordance with the amended Rules. A Constitution Bench of this Court rejected the contention holding that since the whole procedure of issuing advertisement, holding interviews and recommending the names having been followed in accordance with the then existing Rules prior to the enforcement of the amended Rules the appointments made on the basis of the recommendation made by the Public Service Commission could not be rendered invalid. 13. In Y.V. Rangaiah vs. J. Sreenivasa Rao, (1983) 3 SCC : 1983 SCC (L&S) 382 similar question arose relating to recruitment by promotion. The question was whether promotion should be made in accordance with the Rules, in force on the date the vacancies occurred or in accordance with the amended Rules. The Court observed as under (SCC p. 289, Para 9) “The vacancies which occurred prior to the amended rules would be governed by the old rules and not by the amended rules. It is admitted by counsel for both the parties that henceforth promotion to the post of Sub-Registrar Grade II will be according to the new rules on the zonal basis and not on the state-wide basis and, therefore, there was no question of challenging the new rules. But the question is of filling the vacancies that occurred prior to the amended rules. But the question is of filling the vacancies that occurred prior to the amended rules. We have not the slightest doubt that the posts which fell vacant prior to the amended rules would be governed by the old rules and not by the new rules.” *** *** *** The same view was taken in P. Ganeshwar Rao vs. State of Andhra Pradesh. Similar view was taken in A.A. Calton vs. Director of Education. It is a well accepted principle of construction that a statutory rule or government order is prospective in nature unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective effect. Where proceedings are initiated for selection by issuing advertisement, the selection should normally be regulated by the then existing rules and government orders and any amendment of the rules or the government order pending the selection should not affect the validity of the selection made by the selecting authority or the Public Service Commission unless the amended Rules or the amended government orders, issued in exercise of its statutory power either by express provision or by necessary intendment indicate that amended Rules shall be applicable to the pending selection.” (3) Calton vs. The Director of Education and Another, AIR 1983 SC 1143 , Paragraph-5 “5. It is no doubt true that the Act was amended by U.P. Act 26 of 1975 which came into force on August 18, 1975 taking away the power of the Director to make an appointment under section 16-F (4) of the Act in the case of minority institutions. The amending Act did not, however, provide expressly that the amendment in question would apply to pending proceedings under section 16-F of the Act. Nor do we find any words in it which by necessary intendment would affect such pending proceedings. The process of selection under section 16-F of the Act commencing from the stage of calling for applications for a post upto the date on which the Director becomes entitled to make a selection under Section 16-F(4) (as it stood then) is an integrated one. At every stage in that process certain rights are created in favour of one or the other of the candidates. Section 16-F of the Act cannot, therefore, be construed as merely a procedural provision. It is true that the Legislature may pass laws with retrospective effect subject to the recognised constitutional limitations. At every stage in that process certain rights are created in favour of one or the other of the candidates. Section 16-F of the Act cannot, therefore, be construed as merely a procedural provision. It is true that the Legislature may pass laws with retrospective effect subject to the recognised constitutional limitations. But it is equally well settled that no retrospective effect should be given to any statutory provision so as to impair or take away an existing right, unless the statute either expressly or by necessary implication directs that it should have such retrospective effect. In the instant case admittedly the proceedings for the selection had commenced in the year 1973 and after the Deputy Director had disapproved the recommendations made by the Selection Committee twice the Director acquired the jurisdiction to make an appointment from amongst the qualified candidates who had applied for the vacancy in question. At the instance of the appellant himself in the earlier writ petition filed by him the High Court had directed the Director to exercise that power. Although the Director in the present case exercised that power subsequent to August 18, 1975 on which date the amendment came into force, it cannot be said that the selection made by him was illegal since the amending law had no retrospective effect. It did not have any effect on the proceedings which had commenced prior to August 18, 1975. Such proceedings had to be continued in accordance with the law as it stood at the commencement of the said proceedings. We do not, therefore, find any substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the law as amended by the U.P. Act 26 of 1975 should have been followed in the present case.” 4. Against the submission of the learned counsel of the petitioners, the learned Government Advocate Ms. Inaholi submitted as follows: (i) That while the recruitment process to the post of Graduate Teachers in Mathematics and Science was going on, the Nagaland School Education Service Rules 2017 wherein a new pay scale was provided for Graduate Teachers came into existence and the same was made effective from the date it was notified in the official Gazette i.e. 29.11.2017. Following the new development a policy decision was taken to give the newly selected teachers as per the pay scale provided therein, after the recruitment process was completed, the appointment orders of the petitioners were issued by giving them the new pay scale introduced in the new Rules. That determination of conditions of services including pay scale for Government employees is within the policy making domain of the State Government therefore, Government servants including Teachers have no legal right to challenge the same. Further, since the petitioners herein have not been appointed before the new Rules came into existence, they have no legal right whatsoever to claim the old scale of pay mentioned in the advertisement. (ii) That the service condition of Government servants is determined by service rules and not by advertisement. Therefore, the petitioners’ claim for the pay scale given in the advertisement is not tenable as per the settled principle of law. (iii) That appointment order issued by Government to an individual is a contract, therefore, once the employees accepts the appointment order and joined, they cannot question the terms and conditions mentioned therein, as they are barred by law of equeisence. (iv) Lastly, that no challenge has been made by the petitioners against the new service rules under which their pay scale has been given, therefore the prayer of the petitioners asking for payment of their salaries under the old pay scale given in the advertisement cannot be upheld. 5. In support of her submissions given above the learned Government Advocate cited few judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the same are reproduced here-below: 1. State of Orissa and Another vs. Rajkishore Nanda and Others, (2010) 6 SCC 777 , Paragraph 14 “14. A person whose name appears in the select list does not acquire any indefeasible right of appointment. Empanelment at the best is a condition of eligibility for purpose of appointment and by itself does not amount to selection or create a vested right to be appointed. The vacancies have to be filled up as per the statutory rules and in conformity with the constitutional mandate.” Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others vs. Syed Yousuddin Ahmed, (1997) 7 SCC 12. Paragraph 4 “4. The vacancies have to be filled up as per the statutory rules and in conformity with the constitutional mandate.” Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others vs. Syed Yousuddin Ahmed, (1997) 7 SCC 12. Paragraph 4 “4. So far as the contention raised by the counsel appearing for the respondent that the amended Rule 31 of the Pension Rules will have no application to the existing employees of the Government is concerned, we do not find any substance in the same. The Pension Rules is a Rule framed by the Governor in exercise of the power under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. The relationship between the Government and its servant is not like and ordinary contract of service between a master and servant but a legal relationship something in the nature of status. Origin of Government service is contractual. But once appointed to his post or office, the government servant acquires a status and his rights and obligations are no longer determined by consent of both parties, but by statute or statutory rules which may be framed and altered unilaterally by the Government. The Legislature under Article 309 of the Constitution and the Governor under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution can make law determining the service conditions of the Government employees and such law can also be retrospectively made. But in the case in hand question of retrospective application of the amended provisions of Rule 31 of the Revised Pension Rules really does not arise. It becomes applicable to all the employees who were in service on the date the amended rules came into force for the purpose of finding out the meaning of the expression 'emoluments' on the basis of which the pension of the employee has to be calculated on superannuation. In this view of the matter the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that Rule 31 would apply only to those employees who joined service after the amended rules came into force is wholly without substance and the same is accordingly rejected.” 2. P.U. Joshi and Others vs. Accountant General, Ahmedabad and Others, (2003) 2 SCC 632, Paragraph 10 “10. We have carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of both parties. P.U. Joshi and Others vs. Accountant General, Ahmedabad and Others, (2003) 2 SCC 632, Paragraph 10 “10. We have carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of both parties. Questions relating to the constitution, pattern, nomenclature of posts, cadres, categories, their creation/abolition, prescription of qualifications and other conditions of service including avenues of promotions and criteria to be fulfilled for such promotions pertain to the field of Policy and within the exclusive discretion and jurisdiction of the State, subject, of course, to the limitations or restrictions envisaged in the Constitution of India and it is not for the Statutory Tribunals, at any rate, to direct the Government to have a particular method of recruitment or eligibility criteria or avenues of promotion or impose itself by substituting its views for that of the State. Similarly, it is well open and within the competency of the State to change the rules relating to a service and alter or amend and vary by addition/subtraction the qualifications, eligibility criteria and other conditions of service including avenues of promotion, from time to time, as the administrative exigencies may need or necessitate. Likewise, the State by appropriate rules is entitled to amalgamate departments or bifurcate departments into more and constitute different categories of posts or cadres by undertaking further classification, bifurcation or amalgamation as well as reconstitute and restructure the pattern and cadres/categories of service, as may be required from time to time by abolishing existing cadres/posts and creating new cadres/posts. There is no right in any employee of the State to claim that rules governing conditions of his service should be forever the same as the one when he entered service for all purposes and except for ensuring or safeguarding rights or benefits already earned, acquired or accrued at a particular point of time, a Government servant has no right to challenge the authority of the State to amend, alter and bring into force new rules relating to even an existing service.” 6. I have considered the submissions of both the learned counsels and perused the judgments submitted by them in support of their respective submissions. I have considered the submissions of both the learned counsels and perused the judgments submitted by them in support of their respective submissions. There is no dispute on the fact that in the advertisement dated 28.8.2017, the pay scale given for the Graduate Teachers in Mathematics and Science subjects was P.B. 9300-34800, G.P. 4200 and, there is also no dispute on the facts that the Nagaland School Education Service Rules 2017 came into force on 29.11.2017 and the appointment orders of the petitioners was issued only thereafter i.e. on 18.9.2018. From this it is clear that though the advertisements were issued before the service rules of 2017 came into force the appointment orders were issued only after the same Rules of 2017 came into force. It is settled principle of law that service conditions of Government servants are determined by statues or statutory rules which are unilaterally framed by the Governments concerned. And such statues or statutory rules are made under Article 309 of the Constitution either by the Legislature or the Governor of the State. Making of such statues or statutory rules are within the purview of the policy making domain of the Governments concerned and Courts cannot interfere in that. Such rules in fact can even be given retrospective effect in their implementations. In this case no appointment order had been issued in favour of the petitioners by which the pay scale mentioned in the advertisement was given. Therefore, the Government was very much within its authority to make the new rules applicable on the petitioners. It has been explained by the respondents that though the advertisement was issued before the new rule came into existence but while the recruitment process was going on the rule came into existence and the Government took a policy decision to make it applicable in the case of the petitioners whose appointment orders were yet to be issued. I find nothing wrong in the explanation given by the respondents because it was very much within the domain and authority of the Government to take such policy decision. I find nothing wrong in the explanation given by the respondents because it was very much within the domain and authority of the Government to take such policy decision. Further there is no dispute on the fact that the pay scale given to the petitioners in their appointment orders was as per the Nagaland School Education Service Rules 2017 which came into effect while the recruitment process was going on therefore, this Court is of the view that the respondents have not committed any illegality in giving the same pay scale to the petitioners as provided in the rules. 7. The submission of the learned counsel of the petitioners that since the pay scale of P.B. 9300-34800 with G.P. 4200/- was given in the advertisement the same cannot be change does not seem to hold much water because of what has been stated above. Further, the grievance of the petitioners is on the change of pay scale and not on the criteria or conditions for selection methods in the advertisement. Had that been so their claim that rule of the game cannot be changed when the game has started would have applied but that is not the issue in this case. So that principle of law will not apply in this case. 8. In view of what has been stated above, I am of the view that the petitioners have not made out a case for this Court to interfere in the policy making domain of the State respondents. Therefore, the writ petition is dismissed.