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2022 DIGILAW 315 (UTT)

Ashok Khurana v. State of Uttarakhand

2022-09-23

SHARAD KUMAR SHARMA

body2022
JUDGMENT : Sharad Kumar Sharma, J. It is painful for the Court too, to proceed to dictate a judgment of this nature, which shaken up the very consciousness of the High Court and its sanctity of the fraternity, particularly when the fraternity from which I too hail, and its most revered members resort to a recourse to deliberately misleading the Court, for the undisclosed, reasons best known to them and that too when this percept and mode is adopted by none other than a Senior Counsel, whose dignity is being reckoned by the Full Court at the stage of his designation. 2. In present C-482 application, the applicants have put a challenge to the summoning order dated 27.03.2017 and 28.08.2017, which was passed by the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, District Nainital, in Criminal Case No.1089 of 2017, State Vs. Ashok Khurana and others, in a pending trial for the proceedings under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of IPC, which was got registered by way of FIR No.21 of 2015 at P.S. Bhowali, District Nainital. The investigation was carried and the Investigation Officer has submitted the Charge Sheet No.01/17 dated 10.01.2017 and Charge Sheet No.1A/17 05.08.2017, on which the cognizance have been taken by the court, vide its orders of 27.03.2017 and 28.08.2017. 3. There was a whole bunch of assisting counsels, who would be deemed to have been instrumental in drawing the pleadings of the C-482 application, who were almost about half a dozen of them in the C-482 application precisely the case of the present applicants, was that no sanctity, could be attached to the FIR registered against them for the reason being that the so called agreement dated 10.10.2012, which was in relation to Plot No.12, (Old No.1139) situated in village Rihad Bhowali, it was said to be in the name of one Servari Begam, who had subsequently let out the property to Dr. Vidhya Joshi, who had transferred the property to the different persons from time to time. It was referred to therein particularly in para 2 of present C482 application that as a consequence of the aforesaid transactions several “civil disputes are pending consideration in the court of Civil Judge, Nainital” it was alleged that respondent no.3 had succeeded to get a lease deed executed on 10.10.2012 from the son of Mr. It was referred to therein particularly in para 2 of present C482 application that as a consequence of the aforesaid transactions several “civil disputes are pending consideration in the court of Civil Judge, Nainital” it was alleged that respondent no.3 had succeeded to get a lease deed executed on 10.10.2012 from the son of Mr. Kiran Mehreshm, it was said that it was executed in collusion with the Sub Registrar of Naintal. It was referred thereto, therein that the description of the property given in the lease deed was contrary to its actual dimensions existence on the spot. In the FIR thus registered, there had been references made to the various endeavours, which were said to have been made to usurp the property, which was said to be constituted to be a part of Plot No.24, of which the lease was said to have been executed for 99 years in favour of Dr. Vidhya Joshi. It is contended in the FIR that Dr. Vidhya Joshi, had later on appointed one Priya Sharma, as a Managing trustee and Meera Ahuja, as a trustee of the property and accordingly, the property was directed to be dealt with. In furtherance of the said transaction, it was said that the aforesaid Mr. Meera Ahuja and Gaurav Ahuja got themselves mutated in order to fortify the fact, that they are the established owners under the garb of which a money transaction which took place by creating an interest over the property in favour of Mr. N.S. Hoon. 4. There are various facets of the transaction which has been referred to in the FIR and if on its simplicitor reading, if it is taken into consideration any prudent and sane person will come to a conclusion, that it was nothing but an apparent civil dispute, which has been given a criminal colour to it. The matter was investigated and during the course of investigation, the Investigating Officer after examination of as many as 11 witnesses; had submitted a charge sheet observing thereof that the allegations levelled therein were with regards to the different conveyances, referred to in the FIR and the consequential sale deeds, which were said to have been executed, the offence which was complaint of, in the FIR was shown to have been apparently established against the named accused persons, which included the name of the present applicant no.1. The charge sheet, further it refers to certain benefits, which were accrued to applicant no.2. There was yet another charge sheet, which was submitted being I.A. No.17 dated 05.08.2017 showing Mr. Ankur Khurana, the applicant no.2 as to be a person who was instrumental, who after excluding the present applicant had projected Kashmir Singh, as to be the person in whose interest the property stood vested. Be that as it may. 5. This Court at this stage is not required to venture into the civil blend of the FIR and the consequential submission of the charge sheet on which the cognizance was taken resulting into registration of a Criminal Case No.1089 of 2017 State vs. Ashok Khurana and others, where the cognizance have been taken for the offence under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of IPC. 6. Putting a challenge to it, the instant C-482 application was instituted by the present applicant before the Registry of this Court on 15.11.2017. What is more agonising to this Court and even to our most revered fraternity, are the pleading of para 5 and 6 of the C-482 application, which are extracted hereunder:- “5. That the case was filed by the applicant no.1 before the Ld. Civil Judge (S.D.) Nainital for the permanent injunction against Smt. Brij @ Meera Ahuja which was registered as Civil Suit No.12 of 2010, “Ashok Khurana Vs. Smt. Brij @ Meera Ahuja.’’ On 19.07.2010 the Ld. Lower Court has passed the order in the favour of applicant no.1 and allow the application of the applicant no.1 of temporary injunction. A copy of the order dated 19.07.2010 is being annexure herewith and marked as Annexure No.4 to this affidavit. 6. That against the aforesaid order dated 19.07.2010 Smt. Brij @ Meera Ahuja has filed an appeal before the Additional District Judge/Ist Fast Track Court Nainital. On 18.06.2011 the Ld. Lower Court has partly allow the appeal of Smt. Brij@Meera Ahuja and directed her that she cannot evict to the plaintiff Ashok Khurana from the land measuring 525 sq. meter without adopting the legal process. A copy of the order dated 18.06.2011 is being annexed herewith and marked as Annexure No.5 to this affidavit.” 7. On 18.06.2011 the Ld. Lower Court has partly allow the appeal of Smt. Brij@Meera Ahuja and directed her that she cannot evict to the plaintiff Ashok Khurana from the land measuring 525 sq. meter without adopting the legal process. A copy of the order dated 18.06.2011 is being annexed herewith and marked as Annexure No.5 to this affidavit.” 7. If the pleading of para 5 and 6 of the present C-482 application, which has been extracted above is read in co-relation to the pleadings raised in para 2 of the C-482 application it was a deliberate effort to impress upon the Court, that the controversy relates to a civil dispute, on which the cognizance on the criminal side, ought not to be taken. But what is more painful is that in order to substantiate the aforesaid arguments about the dispute being of a civil nature, the applicants have appended annexure 4 and 5 to the 482 application, which happens to be a plaint of Civil Suit No.12 of 2020 Ashok Khurana vs. Smt. Brij @ Meera Ahuja. In the said suit of which the present applicants were the plaintiff; have sought a decree of permanent injunction in relation to the property, which was described at the foot of the plaint and the said suit was instituted on 11.05.2010. 8. The suit accompanied with it an application under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 of the C.P.C., in which the learned trial court vide its order of 19.07.2010, had allowed the application under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 of C.P.C., being aggrieved against which the defendant to the suit Smt. Brij @ Meera Ahuja, had preferred a Misc. Appeal No.37 of 2010 by invoking the provisions contained Order 43 (1)(r) of C.P.C. and it was this Misc. Civil Appeal, which was considered by the civil appellate forum of Additional District Judge Ist Fast Tract Court, Nainital as it was decided on 18.06.2011. The intentional clever device adopted by the applicants, in order to justify their arguments, that it is rather a pure civil dispute they have made plaint as part of the 482 application; they have also made part of the copy of the judgment which was passed in Misc. Civil Appeal under Order 43 Rule (1)(r) of C.P.C.; they have made a pleading in para 3 of the present C-482 application, that this is a civil dispute. Civil Appeal under Order 43 Rule (1)(r) of C.P.C.; they have made a pleading in para 3 of the present C-482 application, that this is a civil dispute. Normally in a writ courts or court exercising their inherent powers, which happens to be akin in exercise of powers of 482 jurisdiction, to that of Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, mostly the matters are decided based upon the affidavits, which are filed by the respective parties to the proceedings. The affidavits are taken as to be a foundation to decide a matter, on which the courts normally believe to be true on the face of it, unless established otherwise. 9. The date when the 482 application was instituted and when it was argued, that it was a civil dispute, which is pending consideration before the civil court, the reference of which was made by placing the plaint and the misc appellate order of the injunction court, on record, the impression which was created by applicant was that since it is a civil dispute, it cannot be agitated by way of registration of FIR for the offence for which the cognizance have been taken to initiate criminal trial against the applicant. 10. Normally, we the Judges of High Court, do believe in the statement of the counsels. We do believe the documents, which they place on record and are relied owing to the trust, which we share in the interest of the fraternity, which in the instant case has been apparently betrayed. It’s rather exclusively based upon the said impression, that it is a civil dispute, the Coordinate Bench was impressed upon to pass an interim order on 15.11.2017, making a specific observation based on the argument which was extended by the counsel representing the applicants to the effect that since there is already a “civil suit going on between the parties” apparently by the use of this term, that the suit is going on, the Court was made to believe upon, the trust which was reposed on the counsels that there is a pending civil suit, which called for an interference and interim order was granted on 15.11.2017, which persisted to continue to operate after its extension of interim order from time to time, when the extensions were granted by the other Coordinate Benches till the matter was ultimately taken up by this Court on 15.09.2022. At the time when this Court was going through the records and had found reference of a plaint and had also found reference of the appellate order passed in Misc. Civil Appeal, due to its normal anxiety the Court had directed the Registrar Judicial, to get the details, about the present status of Suit No.12 of 2010. The said status was thus provided by the Registrar of this Court. After getting its detail from the official web site of the District Courts and it was then only it had come to the knowledge of this Court, that the suit which was referred too in pleadings, stood decided by the Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), as back as on 15.02.2013. Meaning thereby apparently at the stage when the 482 application was filed in 2017, and when it was argued as pleaded in para 2, that the suit is pending and when the plaint was made as part of the records of 482 application alongwith the misc appellate order, which has been passed in an interlocutory stage of injunction, it was an apparent false statement which made by the applicants on affidavit, because at the stage when 482 application was filed on 15.11.2017, in fact there was no suit as such, which was pending at all, as it already stood dismissed, even much prior to it. Since the plaintiff and the present applicants were common, the knowledge of the dismissal of the suit will be presumed to be there with the applicants, that the suit was already dismissed in 2013 and still he ventured to gather that courage to portray that the suit is pending on the basis of an interlocutory order, it was not even discloses in the pleading, that the suit was already dismissed on 15.02.2013. 11. 11. The issue would be that in what manner the Court should deal with such type of litigants or the counsels too, who conceal a material fact which would be having a vital bearing on the decision making process of the Court or the decision itself, which would have played a material role in deciding, as to whether at all the 482 application entailed a question, which related to a civil dispute, non disclosure of the vital date of the decision of the suit i.e. 10.02.2013, itself is deliberate and fatal to the conduct of counsel, for the applicants, to the institution and to the applicants themselves. It needs no reference that the Hon’ble Apex Court time and again has provided, that an equitable jurisdiction of the constitutional courts exercising their inherent powers, is only available to be extended to those litigants, who fairly approached the Court with clean hands, by disclosing all the true and correct facts, which may have a vital bearing over the controversy or over the ultimate decision, which is to be taken on it by the High Court. The malafides of the applicants is apparent, when they had succeeded to persuaded the Court in getting the interim order on 15.11.2017, under the pretext of pendency of a civil suit, as it has been observed in the orders itself which was a fact which was at the relevant time was non-existent on the date when the interim order was passed. This conduct of the applicants its Senior Counsel, and the battery of counsel who were representing him is deprecated. In order to substantiate the conduct of the counsels, as to in what manner such type of litigant has to be dealt with by the Constitutional courts, it becomes inevitable for this Court to make reference to few judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court, which had laid down as to how and in what manner a deliberate act of conduct of mis-leading statement or concealment of material facts has to be dealt by the writ courts or the courts exercising its inherent jurisdiction. 12. 12. That exercise of inherent powers under Section 482, it basically intends to avoid an abuse of process of the court of law, but the wide umbrella of the exercise of powers where the High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., it cannot be permitted to be abused, to be exercised by those litigants, who file a frivolous and vexatious proceedings and that too while taking their defence which is based upon a document! in order to oust the criminal jurisdiction! when it is based upon a document, which otherwise has no judicial life left with it! as a consequence of its prior culmination of proceedings and that to particularly when the factum of culmination of proceedings and to what end it had met with is a fact, which was otherwise legally required to be pleaded to be brought on record. This aspect of exercising of inherent powers in a vexatious or frivolous proceedings has been considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a judgment reported in AIR 1999 Supreme Court 2459 (2249) Airfreight Ltd. vs. State of Karnataka and Others, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court in the following paras has considered that inherent powers of the Court are ment to be exercised for securing ends of justice and not to abuse it. The Court will not interfere in its exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to set aside an order or a proceedings as prayed for, once it is cleverly intended to mis-lead the Court by bringing, it under one of the exceptional parameters provided by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment of Bhajan Lal (Supra), which it the instant case has been attempted to be resorted to by the counsel for the applicants, while placing his arguments that the proceedings are of civil nature based upon the plaint and the orders passed in the proceedings under Section 43 Rule 1 (r) of C.P.C., which too will have no relevance owing to the fact that since the suit itself stood, decided prior in time and in the absence of any pleading to that effect that whether those proceedings still continued before any superior forum or not after the decision of 2013, in its absence and particularly the fact when the applicants and the plaintiffs are common, was reasonably expected from the members of the bar and in particular the counsels who were representing they ought to have assured to make a pleading to the effect as to what destiny did the civil proceedings have been judicially assigned to. 13. This aspect of a person, to appear before the Court with clean hands, invoking the exercise of inherent powers by the High Court, may be it in a civil or criminal jurisdiction because the provisions contained under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, are to be read in parlance of the provisions contained under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. with the only difference that the field of its operation are distinct. The various High Courts in their respective Full Bench judgments as reported in AIR 1956 Jammu and Kashmir 17 (V 43 C 2 June) (Full Bench), Ghulam Rasul vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1970 Kerala 110 (112) (V 57 C 21) (Full Bench) G. Appukkuttan Pillai vs. Government of India and others, AIR (88) 1951 Allahabad 746 (Full Bench), Asiatic Engineering Co. vs. Achhru Ram and Others, it has laid down that the basic fundamental principle that if an applicant under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India, which for the said purpose will also have to be read with Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. if a person approaching the Court is found to be guilty of suppression of a material fact in his application and for an attempt is made to mis-lead the Court, in order to, derive an order in his favour, the application itself deserves to be rejected because it will amount to be rather an apparent abuse of process by the party himself, who while soliciting to invoke an inherent jurisdiction of the High Courts. The Punjab & Haryana High Court in AIR 1978 Punjab & Haryana 225, (Full Bench) Sundar Dass and others vs. Gurpartap Dass, the Full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court has provided that a party who seeks an equitable relief by invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, must without any excuse should come with clean hands and cannot be allowed to play hide and seek with the High Court for getting an order by misleading or distortion of facts and it has to be dismissed outrightly when some material facts is not disclosed and a benefit is attempted to be taken therefrom. 14. The Hon’ble Apex Court in a judgment of 2007 AIR SCW 5350 (5359, 5360) M/s. Prestige Lights Ltd. vs. State Bank of India, had laid down that the petitioner or an applicant who approaches the Court, must placed all the true and correct facts before the Court without, any reservations or restrictions, and if it is ultimately later found that there is suppression of material fact, on part of the petitioner or an applicant or the facts were deliberately twisted in its pleading, which has been placed before the Court, the High Court exercising its inherent powers to safeguard, the Constitutional mandate and the laws framed under, it may refuse to entertain a petition or dismissed it even without venturing into the merits of the matter. The facts pertaining to the pendency of a petition, the facts pertaining to the pendency of a litigation and its ultimate effect, which it would have on the invocation of an extra ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court, a very scruples fair regard to the truthfulness of the statement and the averments made in the petition or in return is its expected. The facts which falls to be a suppression of material facts by the party to the proceedings is a serious matter, which itself excludes the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction and the discretion, which has been contemplated in the aforesaid provisions, it could be even refused to be exercised to a party if he makes a false statement or a suppression of fact. 15. The Allahabad High Court in a judgment reported in 1990 All.L.J. 693, Rahul Prasad vs. Institute of Medical Sciences, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi and others had gone even further to observe that a writ petition, which is foundationed upon the suppression of a material fact, which may have a bearing and a toll upon a judgment which has to be rendered ultimately by the High Courts, it should not be exercised in favour of the counsel for the parties approaching the Court, which may ultimately result to be polluting the ultimate decision, on the basis of its procurement of a judgment which is based on a false document because the court’s judgment or the Court’s proceedings cannot be permitted to be polluted by the party and the High Court, cannot be a party to the polluted proceedings, resorted to by the concealment of facts. 16. 16. This aspect about the suppression of fact has also to be co-related to be scrutinized as to whether the suppression of a fact is intentional or unintentional, but when it is ultimately proved to be based upon the material placed on record by the proceedings, if it is found that the proceedings are based upon a deliberate suppression, which happens to be in the instant case, owing to the fact as already expressed earlier that the plaintiff to the suit and the applicant to the 482 application being the same person, the presumption would be that the knowledge of the civil proceedings, was very well attributed and was in the knowledge of the applicants particularly when it stood decided much prior in time in 2013, and knowing the aforesaid fact that if it is disclosed, that the civil suit is pending it will amount to be a deliberate attempt of suppression of a material fact and any such attempt has to be foiled which has been made to mislead the Court by making deliberate and false statement of fact by the counsel for the applicants and that is why, it has been laid down that the High Court should refuse to exercise the jurisdiction for permitting such a litigant to participate in a proceedings, who have not approached the Court with clean hands where there is suppression or non statement of material fact in the petition and it was with an intention on part of the applicants to mis-lead the Court or to deceive the Court, the Court should be inclined to inflict on him the dire consequence of having an application rejected without considering the same on its merits. That is what has been laid down by the Allahabad High Court in a judgment reported in 2006 (1) AWC 440 (LB), Tanda Textiles and Processing Mills (P.) Ltd. vs. State of U.P. and others. 17. In this context there happens to be yet another judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court as reported in 1996 (Supplement) Supreme Court Cases 336, which has provided that when a petitioner is making an incorrect statement in a petition and the way in which the proceedings are conducted on behalf of the petitioner or an applicant, it should be dealt with strictly in order to avoid its recurring resort to the proceedings based upon a mis-leading fact. 18. 18. This controversy has to be looked into from yet another prospective as to what would be the material fact, the suppression of which may have a bearing on the ultimate decision to be taken by the High Courts. The material fact would be in accordance with the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court as reported in 2007 AIR SCW 4609 Arunima Baruah v. Union of India & Others that a material fact would be that which has a bearing on the ultimate decision, which would disentitle a petitioner who depends or has foundations the proceedings upon the fact and the circumstances of the case. Para 12, 22 and 23 of the said judgment are extracted hereunder:- “12. It is trite law that so as to enable the court to refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction suppression must be of material fact. What would be a material fact, suppression whereof would disentitle the appellant to obtain a discretionary relief, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Material fact would mean material for the purpose of determination of the lis, the logical corollary whereof would be that whether the same material for grant or denial of the relief. If the fact suppressed is not material for determination of the lis between the parties, the court may not refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. It is also trite that a person invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of the court cannot be allowed to approach it with a pair of dirty hands. But even if the said dirt is removed and the hands become clean, whether the relief would still be denied is the question. 22. Ubi jus ibi remedium is a well known concept. The court while refusing to grant a relief to a person who comes with a genuine grievance in an arguable case should be given a hearing. [See Bhagubhai Dhanabhai Khalasi (supra)] In this case, however, the appellant had suppressed a material fact. It is evident that the writ petition was filed only when no order of interim injunction was passed. It was obligatory on the part of the appellant to disclose the said fact. 23. In this case, however, suppression of filing of the suit is no longer a material fact. It is evident that the writ petition was filed only when no order of interim injunction was passed. It was obligatory on the part of the appellant to disclose the said fact. 23. In this case, however, suppression of filing of the suit is no longer a material fact. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court may be correct that, in a case of this nature, the court’s jurisdiction may not be invoked but that would not mean that another writ petition would not lie. When another writ petition is filed disclosing all the facts, the appellant would be approaching the writ court with a pair of clean hands, the court at the point of time will be entitled to determine the case on merits having regard to the human right of the appellant to access to justice and keeping in view the fact that judicial review is a basic feature of the Constitution of India.” 19. This Court is of the view that a person who approaches the High Court to invoke an inherent jurisdiction, has no option to pick and choose according to his own wisdom on the facts or to determine in advance, as to what is relevant and irrelevant material and omit the same to be placed on record, as per his own perception, which may not be relevant because its implication will always fall to be within the domain of a judicial interpretation, which has to be ultimately concluded after hearing the parties concerned on its merits, as to in what manner the fact concealed or the material has been resisted to be brought on record would have on the proceedings. The bonafide thought or even an un true statement omitted to be brought to the knowledge of the Court all the proceeding or the orders, which are passed at different stages up to the stage of its final adjudication, it would be an act in nullity. 20. In a recent judgment as reported in 2021 SCC Online SC 206 Preeti Saraf and Another vs. State of NCT of Delhi and Another. 20. In a recent judgment as reported in 2021 SCC Online SC 206 Preeti Saraf and Another vs. State of NCT of Delhi and Another. It was a case, which was emanating from the prospective under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. where a cognizance to the proceedings have been taken under Section 420, 406 and 34 of IPC, which was sought to be quashed and their orders be set aside whereby the applicants had been summoned after taking of cognizance of the offence as referred to above. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the said judgment in para 22 and para 25, which is extracted hereunder:- “22. After the conclusion of the submissions, an IA has been filed at the instance of the 2nd respondent for initiating proceedings under Section 340 read with Section 195 CrPC, in which it has been alleged that the appellants have not only concealed the documents but has made false statement and it has been prayed that proceedings under Section 340 CrPC may be initiated against the appellants. 25. In this backdrop, the scope and ambit of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC has been examined in the judgment of this Court in State of Haryana and Others Vs. Bhajan Lal and Others(supra). The relevant para is mentioned hereunder:- “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 21. It has dealt with an aspect as to what bearing would the suppression of fact would have even on the proceeding under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. In the light of the aforesaid judgment too, the wider guidelines which has been extracted in its para 25 based upon the judgment of State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal as reported in (1992) Supp. (1) SCC 335, the exception clauses for invoking Section 482 of Cr.P.C. will not permit an applicant to approach the Court, not with clean hands. Bhajan Lal as reported in (1992) Supp. (1) SCC 335, the exception clauses for invoking Section 482 of Cr.P.C. will not permit an applicant to approach the Court, not with clean hands. Similar view was expressed by the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court as reported in (2015) 11 SCC 519 M. Mahendra Kumar vs. M. Mani and others, in which too was a proceedings arising out of Section 482 of Cr.P.C. where an aspect of concealment of fact and making a misleading statement in obtaining a relief while getting the matter decided. The Hon’ble Apex Court in para 8 and 9 of the judgment, has laid down that the suppression of a fact about the earlier proceedings on some legal issues and its effect on the decision, the High Court should not have ventured on the merits of the matter. Para 8 and 9 are extracted hereunder:- “8. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 1 submitted that the impugned order would advance the cause of justice and therefore requires no interference by this Court. However, he could not meet the allegation and the submission that Respondent No. 1 did not disclose material facts which could have revealed that his earlier application for further investigation by CBCID had been rejected at all stages and the S.L.P. had also been dismissed by this Court. The impugned order further discloses that the learned Single Judge was not properly assisted in the matter and he could not notice that Crime No. 147 of 2009 was no longer pending in the file of Dy. S.P. of Police or any other police authority because investigation had been completed and chargesheet was submitted long back. It was clearly on account of non application of mind to such relevant fact that the impugned order came to be passed at the initial stage of admission without noticing any counter affidavit or reply and/or its absence. 9. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are constrained to and hereby set aside the impugned order as it has been passed on account of suppression of material facts and under a wrong impression that Crime No. 147 of 2009 was still pending before the police authorities at the investigation stage. Accordingly, the appeal stands allowed.” 22. 9. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are constrained to and hereby set aside the impugned order as it has been passed on account of suppression of material facts and under a wrong impression that Crime No. 147 of 2009 was still pending before the police authorities at the investigation stage. Accordingly, the appeal stands allowed.” 22. In the matters of A.V. Mohan Rao and Another vs. M. Kishan Rao and Another as reported in (2002) 6 SCC 174 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has dealt with as to what impact would the concealment or making a mis statement or suppression of material fact would have, over a judicial action which is subjected to scrutinization in an inherent exercise of powers by the High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. In the aforesaid judgment the Hon’ble Apex Court about the effect to concealment of material fact has laid down the wider principles though depending upon the peculiar facts of the said case, but still the principles of mis representation or a false representation or a concealment of fact was considered in para 4, 20 and 21 of the said judgment. “4. The complainant further alleged that the Managing Director of the Power Company received a letter dated 26.6.1997 said to have been sent in the name of Spectrum NRI Investors the substance of which is that the NRIs are anxiously waiting for the Indian Company's share offer and public issue. The said letter was received by some persons claiming to be NRI investors of the Power Company. In the background of the above mentioned facts on which the complaint in question came to be filed the gist of which may be stated thus: "From the above material and conclusive evidence, it is clear that Accused Nos. 1 and 2 grossly misrepresenting by false representations, induced most of the unknown investors outside the county to invest monies by issuing a circular, offer documents, and dishonestly concealing the material facts and those monies were appropriated into the account of the Accused persons and the Accused persons' Companies were allotted shares and the NRIs were not given any shares, even though claim is made that 130 shares holders from the United States of America are the investors of the said monies. The said modus operandi and actions of the two Accused constitute offences under Section 60 63 68 and 68A of the Companies Act of 1956 and accordingly this Hon'ble Court is requested to proceed according to law.” 20. Section 63 of the Act makes provision regarding criminal liability for mis-statements in the prospectus. In sub-section (1) thereof it is laid down that: “63. (1) "where a prospects issued after the commencement of this Act includes any untrue statement, every person who authorised the issue of the prospectus shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to fifty thousand rupees, or with both, unless he proves either that the statement was immaterial or that he had reasonable ground to believe, and did up to the time of the issue of the prospectus believe, that the statement was true." 21. Section 68 of the Act makes provision regarding penalty for fraudulently inducing persons to invest money. It is said down therein: “68. Any person who, either by knowingly or recklessly making any statement, promise or forecast which is false, deceptive or misleading, or by any dishonest concealment of material facts, induces or attempts to induce another person to enter into, or to offer to enter into- (a) any agreement for, or with a view to, acquiring, disposing of, subscribing for, or underwriting shares or debentures; or (b) any agreement the purpose or pretended purpose of which is to secure a profit to any of the parties from the yield of shares or debentures, or by reference to fluctuations in the value of shares or debentures; shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine which may extend to one lakh rupees, or with both.”, 23. The Hon’ble Apex Court in a judgment reported in AIR 1991 Supreme Court 1726 G. Narayanaswammy Reddy (dead) by L.Rs. and another vs. Government of Karnataka and Another had dealt with the aspect as to how a litigant has to be dealt with, when he has deliberately made a suppression of material facts which is vital to a case and non disclosure of a fact and obtaining an interim order by the High Court, that in itself was held to be liable to be dismissed. The Hon’ble Apex Court has observed, that exercising its discretionary powers under Article 136, the writ courts under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, and the High Court exercising its inherent powers on a criminal side under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. the litigants must come up with frank, full and true disclosure of all the vital facts, which may have a potential affect on a judgment as it has been observed in para 2 of the said judgment, which is extracted hereunder:- “2. The notification making the declaration under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the lands in question was made on September 20, 1977. On September 20, 1984 Section 11-A which introduced into the Land Acquisition Act by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, was brought into force. Under the first proviso to Section 11-A it was prescribed that where the said declaration (under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act) has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award must be made within a period of two years from such commencement. Thus, the award should have been made within two years from September 20, 1984. On September 11, 1985, the petitioners obtained an interim order from this Court directing status quo with regard to the possession of the lands in question in Special Leave Petition No. 294 of 1985 preferred against the order of the Karnataka High Court dated August 14, 1984, with which we are not directly concerned here. The said Special Leave Petition No. 294 of 1985 was dismissed on April 29, 1987. On December 16-17, 1987, two writ petitions were filed by the respective petitioners in the Karnataka High Court challenging the acquisition on the ground that the awards were not made within the stipulated time. In these two writ petitions, the Karnataka High Court granted interim stay of further proceedings in respect of the acquisition of the said lands. These petitions were dismissed by a learned Single Judge of that High Court on November 29, 1988. Appeals against the decision of a learned Single Judge were dismissed by the Karnataka High Court on October 6, 1989, by a Division Bench of that High Court. The petitioners preferred these Special Leave Petitions, namely S.L.P. Nos. These petitions were dismissed by a learned Single Judge of that High Court on November 29, 1988. Appeals against the decision of a learned Single Judge were dismissed by the Karnataka High Court on October 6, 1989, by a Division Bench of that High Court. The petitioners preferred these Special Leave Petitions, namely S.L.P. Nos. 823 and 824 of 1990 against the decision of the Division Bench of that High Court, and obtained an interim stay of dispossession therein. Whatever the ultimate effect of the stay orders, in view of the provisions of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, to which we have already referred earlier, it is beyond dispute that the fact of the stay orders was highly material in the determination of these Special Leave Petitions. Curiously enough, there is no reference in the Special Leave Petitions to any to the stay orders and we came to know about these orders only when the respondents appeared in response to the notice and filed their counter affidavit. In our view, the said interim orders have a direct bearing on the question raised and the non-disclosure of the same certainly amounts to suppression of material facts. On this ground alone, the Special Leave Petitions are liable to be rejected. It is well-settled in law that the relief under Article 136 of the Constitution is discretionary and a petitioner who approaches this Court for such relief must come with frank and full disclosure of facts. If he fails to do so and suppresses material facts, his application is liable to be dismissed. We accordingly dismiss the Special Leave Petitions. 24. The Hon’ble Apex Court has gone to the extent that even such type of litigants should not be even permitted to even address the Court on merits of the matter where there is a concealment of a material fact which would have a direct bearing on the merits of the matter, pending consideration before the court. 25. 24. The Hon’ble Apex Court has gone to the extent that even such type of litigants should not be even permitted to even address the Court on merits of the matter where there is a concealment of a material fact which would have a direct bearing on the merits of the matter, pending consideration before the court. 25. In another judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a judgment reported in AIR 1993 Supreme Court 852, The Ramjas Foundation and others vs. Union of India and others, has almost dealt with the similar situation as to what would be the effect when the proceedings are being are held by concealment of material and relevant, fact, which will be material to the decision making process because if the said fact is left missing to be brought to the knowledge of the Court, it would vitiate the judgment itself, if it is subsequently put to challenge before a superior forum. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the said judgment has rather taken a consideration of an aspect that when in any litigation before the Constitutional Court, reaches to such a situation, which indulges consideration of an aspect of concealment and approaching the writ courts with clean hands, at a later stage, even a request for withdrawal of the proceedings is not to be granted. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment as contained in para 11, is extracted hereunder:- 11. The delay and laches in the case before us are even worse than those in the above cited Aflatoon's case. The appellants had initially filed a writ petition No. 213/73 challenging the notification dated 13.11.1959 under Section 4 of the Act and notification dated 27.4.1968 under Section 6 of the Act with respect to 245 bighas and 1 biswas of land situated in the revenue estate of Sadhurakhurd and the notices dated 27.12.1972 under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act issued by the Land Acquisition Collector, Delhi with respect to Khasra No. 1040/353 (12 bighas and 8 biswas). On 30.3.1977 Shri M.C. Gupta, Learned counsel for the Ramjas Foundation stated that he had instructions from his clients to state that they did not want to press the petition and wish to withdraw it. The statement of Sh. Gupta had been separately recorded. The Court, in these circumstances permitted to withdraw the petition and dismissed the same as withdrawn. On 30.3.1977 Shri M.C. Gupta, Learned counsel for the Ramjas Foundation stated that he had instructions from his clients to state that they did not want to press the petition and wish to withdraw it. The statement of Sh. Gupta had been separately recorded. The Court, in these circumstances permitted to withdraw the petition and dismissed the same as withdrawn. It is important to note that in the statement Sh. M.C. Gupta, Learned counsel for the petitioners stated as under: “I may be permitted to withdraw this petition in view of the Judgment delivered by Hon. Mr. Justice Awadh Behari in Suit No. 451 of 1971 decided on 21st March, 1977, between the parties, wherein the contentions urged were precisely the same as urged in this petition, my clients reserved the opportunity to file a fresh suit if so necessitated by the circumstances in future.” 26. The Hon’ble Apex Court in yet another judgment reported in (1994) 6 Supreme Court Cases 620, K.R. Srinivas vs. R.M. Premchand and others though it was dealing with an issue of public interest litigation, in para 7, it has been observed that the writ courts are only available to the litigant, who is fair to the Court and approaches the Court with clean hands without concealment of the material facts. It has gone to an extent to observe that a person should come with clean heart, mind and clean objective too and if any of these elements are lacking, the proceedings drawn at the behest of such a litigant is to be dismissed even without stepping on its merits. Para 7 of the judgment is extracted hereunder:- “7. In cannot be forgotten that a writ petitioner who comes to the Court for relief in public interest must come not only with clean hand, like any other writ petitioner, but must further come with a clean heart, clean mind and a clean objective. We cannot assumed that Dr. R.M. Premchand, who at the relevant time was a Research Scholar and part and parcel of the University, did not know the regulations whereunder the answer books are destroyed within six months from the examination under formal orders of the functionaries. We cannot assume that Dr. R.M. Premchand did not know about the destruction of the answer books of Srinivas at the time when he moved the High Court in public interest. We cannot assume that Dr. R.M. Premchand did not know about the destruction of the answer books of Srinivas at the time when he moved the High Court in public interest. If this be our impression Dr. R.M. Premchand had no locus standi to move the High Court in public interest at that belated point of time. Therefore, we allow the appeal of Srinivas, set aside the order of the Division Bench of the High Court dated 17.12.1993 in W.A. No. 53/1993 and restore the operative part of the order of the Single Bench of the High Court, added with the ground that Dr. R.M. Premchand had no locus standi to move the High Court, in view of the facts and circumstances afore mentioned. As a sequel all remarks against Professor K.V. Ramana in the Judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court not only get expunged but the whole basis on which they rest stands effaced. His appeal too is allowed.” 27. The Hon’ble Apex Court in a judgment reported in (1996) 10 Supreme Court Cases 73 V.K. Ramamurthy vs. Union of India and Another has taken a similar view that the litigant who is not fair to the Court and who does not discloses the true and correct facts and is able to procure an order by concealment of material fact no solace is to be extended to such type of litigant by the writ courts in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, which as per the opinion of this Court, this is a fit case where a fact based on which the interim order was procured was a non existing or a distorted concealed fact even as per the principles of merger when the principle suit itself was decided, it goes without saying that the interlocutory orders passed on an application under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 of C.P.C. or a consequential appellate order, stands merged and it could not have been extracted to be relied without even reference to the final adjudication rendered in 2013 i.e. much prior in time, and that too in a case where the applicant is the plaintiff. 28. 28. For the aforesaid reasons exclusively, this Court is not inclined to interfere in C-482 Application and just to create an exemplar for other such similar litigants and the members of the bar too, to be fair to the Court whosoever make an attempt to mis-lead the Court, a cost of Rs.50,000/- is imposed upon the applicants which is to be deposited in High Court Bar Association Advocates Welfare Fund within one month from the date of judgment; because procuring an interim order by deliberate and intentional concealment of fact of the earlier proceedings of the Civil Suit of which they were plaintiffs. 29. Accordingly, the C-482 Application is dismissed.