ORDER : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. The State of Jharkhand is in appeal against the order dated 21st March 2014 passed in W.P.(S) No.977 of 2012. 2. By the order dated 21st March 2014, the writ Court accepted the claim of the writ petitioner (hereinafter referred to as “respondent”) that he is entitled for the arrears of salary accrued on account of his substantive promotion with retrospective dates on the post of Deputy Director, Mines as well as Additional Director, Mines. 3. In the present appeal, the aforesaid order passed in W.P.(S) No.977 of 2012 was stayed by this Court by the order dated 13th March 2018. 4. Briefly stated, the respondent who was working on the post of District Mining Officer, Dumka was transferred and posted as Deputy Director, Mines by an order dated 15th December 1999. The respondent was given additional charge of the post of Additional Director, Mines by notification dated 31st July 2000 and he assumed charge of the said post which is evident through charge report dated 31st July 2000. The respondent was promoted on the post of Deputy Director, Mines w.e.f 15th November 2000 and on the post of Additional Director, Mines w.e.f 15th November 2004 with retrospective effect and thereafter he raised a claim for payment of difference of salary on the assertion that the post of Deputy Director was the next promotional post to the post of District Mining Officer and pursuant to the order dated 15th December 1999 he was given full fledged charge of the post of Deputy Director, Mines on which post he discharged duties and responsibilities of the said post. As regards additional charge given to him on the post of Additional Director, Mines, the respondent made similar assertions to claim salary admissible to the said post from the date he assumed additional charge on the post of Additional Director, Mines. 5. Before the writ Court, the respondent placed reliance on the judgment in W.P.(S) No.2986 of 2010 (titled “Jaiprakash Singh v. State of Jharkhand & Ors.”) to lay support to his claim for payment of arrears of salary on account of difference in pay scale for the post of District Mining Officer, Deputy Director, Mines and Additional Director, Mines. 6. 5. Before the writ Court, the respondent placed reliance on the judgment in W.P.(S) No.2986 of 2010 (titled “Jaiprakash Singh v. State of Jharkhand & Ors.”) to lay support to his claim for payment of arrears of salary on account of difference in pay scale for the post of District Mining Officer, Deputy Director, Mines and Additional Director, Mines. 6. The State of Jharkhand placed reliance on Rule 58 of the Jharkhand Service Code and Rule 74 of the Finance Rules to put forth its stand that a government servant is entitled to draw salary and other allowances attached to the post from the date he is promoted on such post and no financial benefit can be extended to the government servant from a retrospective date. 7. On a glance at the order dated 21st March 2014 passed in W.P.(S) No.977 of 2012, we gather that the writ Court placed complete reliance on the order dated 20th August 2013 passed in the case of “Jaiprakash Singh”. 8. The writ Court has recorded that: “in the wake of the aforesaid admitted facts, the issues raised in the present writ petition appears to have drawn attention of this Court in a similar matter, which was decided in the case of “Jaiprakash Singh” (supra) vide judgment dated 20th August 2013.” 9. The writ Court proceeded further and extracted relevant paragraphs from the judgment in “Jaiprakash Singh” to hold that the stand taken by the respondent-State to refuse the arrears of difference of salary to the post of Deputy Director, Mines w.e.f 15th November 2000 and Additional Director, Mines w.e.f 15th November 2004 was not sustainable in law and, accordingly, quashed the order dated 3rd February 2012 vide Annexure-12 to the writ petition by which claim of the respondent was refused by the respondent-State. 10. The judgment in “Jaiprakash Singh” was challenged by the State of Jharkhand in L.P.A No.162 of 2014 and by judgment dated 12th January 2015 the order passed in W.P.(S) No.2986 of 2010 (titled “Jaiprakash Singh v. State of Jharkhand & Ors.”) has been set-aside by a Division Bench of this Court. 11. Mr. 10. The judgment in “Jaiprakash Singh” was challenged by the State of Jharkhand in L.P.A No.162 of 2014 and by judgment dated 12th January 2015 the order passed in W.P.(S) No.2986 of 2010 (titled “Jaiprakash Singh v. State of Jharkhand & Ors.”) has been set-aside by a Division Bench of this Court. 11. Mr. Kalyan Roy, the learned counsel for the respondent draws our attention to the order dated 17th August 2016 passed in Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s).11169 of 2015 by which Special Leave to Appeal against the judgment in L.P.A No.162 of 2014 has been granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and now the Special Leave Petition has been converted into Civil Appeal No.8247 of 2016. 12. The learned counsel for the respondent placing reliance on the judgments in “Arindam Chattopadhyay & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors.” (2013) 4 SCC 152 , “State of U.P & Ors. v. B.B.S. Rathore” (Civil Appeal No.3041 of 2010) and “State of Punjab & Anr. v. Dharam Pal” (2017) 9 SCC 395 submits that the respondent who continued on the post of Deputy Director, Mines and Additional Director, Mines for about nine years, in view of the aforesaid judgments, is entitled for scale of pay admissible to the post of Deputy Director, Mines and Additional Director, Mines on which post he was granted substantive promotion with retrospective dates. 13. The learned counsel for the respondent would further submit that in the face of the order dated 17th August 2016 passed in Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s).11169 of 2015 (now converted into Civil Appeal No.8247 of 2016), the judgment passed in L.P.A No.162 of 2014 cannot affect outcome of the present Letters Patent Appeal. 14. In short, the submission raised on behalf of the respondent is that the order passed in L.P.A. No. 162 of 2014 which according to him has been passed in ignorance of the aforesaid judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is not a binding precedent and liable to be ignored. 15. We are not inclined to examine the matter on merits as Mr. Kalyan Roy, the learned counsel for the respondent would try to persuade the Court. The judicial discipline and propriety are foundations of any legal system. 15. We are not inclined to examine the matter on merits as Mr. Kalyan Roy, the learned counsel for the respondent would try to persuade the Court. The judicial discipline and propriety are foundations of any legal system. It is necessary to uphold the rule of law and maintain uniformity in the judicial system that judgment of a Division Bench of this Court is followed by another Division Bench – with exception of reference to a larger Bench. Furthermore, the respondent has not brought to our notice two conflicting judgments by Division Bench of this Court on the issue that an employee becomes entitled for difference of salary after his promotion on the substantive post on which he was working in officiating capacity or of which he was given additional charge. Even further, the question of legality of the order passed in L.P.A No.162 of 2014 cannot be agitated before a Bench of equal strength and, in our opinion, on the basis of the judgments cited on behalf of the respondent the present Letters Patent Appeal cannot be referred to a larger Bench on the ground that the view taken in L.P.A No.162 of 2014 is contrary to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases. 16. In “Chandra Prakash v. State of U.P” (2002) 4 SCC 234 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: “22. …….The doctrine of binding precedent is of utmost importance in the administration of our judicial system. It promotes certainty and consistency in judicial decisions. Judicial consistency promotes confidence in the system, therefore, there is this need for consistency in the enunciation of legal principles in the decisions of this Court. It is in the above context, this Court Raghubir Singh held that a pronouncement of law by a Division Bench of this Court is binding on a Division Bench of the same or smaller number of Judges. .....” 17. Immediately after “Chandra Prakash”, in “State of Bihar v. Kalika Kuer” (2003) 5 SCC 448 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: “10. ……. .....” 17. Immediately after “Chandra Prakash”, in “State of Bihar v. Kalika Kuer” (2003) 5 SCC 448 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: “10. ……. an earlier decision may seem to be incorrect to a Bench of a coordinate jurisdiction considering the question later, on the ground that a possible aspect of the matter was not considered or not raised before the court or more aspects should have been gone into by the court deciding the matter earlier but it would not be a reason to say that the decision was rendered per incuriam and liable to be ignored. The earlier judgment may seem to be not correct yet it will have the binding effect on the later Bench of coordinate jurisdiction. Easy course of saying that earlier decision was rendered per incuriam is not permissible and the matter will have to be resolved only in two ways — either to follow the earlier decision or refer the matter to a larger Bench to examine the issue, in case it is felt that earlier decision is not correct on merits. ……….” 18. As we have noticed, the impugned order dated 21st March 2014 has been passed by the writ Court relying on the order passed in another writ petition filed by Jaiprakash Singh, but, now since the judgment in “Jaiprakash Singh” has been set-aside by a Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A No.162 of 2014, the very foundation on which the order dated 21st March 2014 was made has gone. The judicial discipline and propriety require that we should follow the judgment passed in L.P.A No.162 of 2014 notwithstanding grant of Leave by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.8247 of 2016. We would observe that in the order dated 17th August 2016 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court operation of the order passed in L.P.A No.162 of 2014 has not been stayed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and, moreover, merely for the reason that Civil Appeal No.8247 of 2016 is pending final consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court it would not be proper for this Court not to follow the judgment in L.P.A No.162 of 2014 – the Courts do not act on probability [refer, “Razia Begum v. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum” AIR 1958 SC 886 1]. 19. For the aforesaid reasons, L.P.A No.235 of 2014 is allowed and, consequently, W.P.(S) No.977 of 2012 is dismissed. 20. 19. For the aforesaid reasons, L.P.A No.235 of 2014 is allowed and, consequently, W.P.(S) No.977 of 2012 is dismissed. 20. I.A No.4851 of 2021 stands disposed of.