JUDGMENT : Goutam Bhaduri, J. Heard. 1. The present appeal is against the judgment and decree dated 16th of March, 2017 passed in Civil Suit No.101-A/2015 by Sixth Additional District Judge, Durg, District Durg (C.G.), whereby the civil suit filed by the appellant for declaration and permanent injunction was dismissed. The present appeal is by the plaintiff. 2. (a) The brief facts as pleaded that the appellant/plaintiff is a trust registered under the Chhattisgarh Public Trusts Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act, 1951') and is a charitable trust. It was further pleaded that on 07.04.1980 a lease deed was executed in between the plaintiff/appellant and the respondent, wherein the trust was granted 14 acres of land at Bhilai and the total rent of the entire land for the first 10 years was fixed at Rs.912.50 and subsequently after ten years, there would be an increase of 20 percent in the amount of the said rent, this increase would continue for thirty years. After thirty years the lease would be renewed for further 30 years. Pursuant thereto, the respondent No. 1 allotted 14 acres of land to the appellant on 15.09.1980, the initial period of which was from 1980 to 14.09.2010. After the plaintiff came into possession, the superstructure of the college building along with appurtenant ancillary staff office, library, meeting hall etc. was raised. 2 (b) As pleaded, before the expiry of initial lease on 14.09.2010 prior to six months, on 15.03.2010 an application was given to the respondent for renewal of the lease. The plaintiff was informed to get the evaluation of the land, for which an amount of Rs.2,50,000/- was paid and accordingly on 15.03.2010, the option of renewal of the lease was done. It is pleaded in reply thereto he was served with a letter to pay an amount of Rs.6,05,93,702/-, the plaintiff awaited with hope that the renewal of the amount would be according to the terms of the lease and he was not required to pay the amount. Thereafter, notice was served under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act, 1971') to vacate the premises. The notice was replied but eventually the event of renewal of lease did not take place. Thereafter, notice was served under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act, 1971') to vacate the premises. The notice was replied but eventually the event of renewal of lease did not take place. Since the issue of renewal of lease was not been acted upon, a writ petition bearing WPC No.1507 of 2015 was filed before this Court and this Court by order dated 22.09.2015 directed the plaintiff to approach the civil Court and temporary protective order against the eviction was granted. Subsequently, the present civil suit was filed, wherein the declaration and permanent injunction was sought for with a prayer that the lease granted to the plaintiff should be renewed as per the terms of the lease deed dated 07.04.1980. 3. In response to the said plaint, the defendant avered that the plaint was filed by one Surendra Gupta, who has no locus standi for the reason that no document to show that he is the Trustee & Secretary has been filed. It was further stated that the resolution to file the suit was also not filed. Further the specific averment was made that as per the information of the Registrar, Public Trusts vide letter dated 14.02.2011, the alleged trust was not registered. It was further stated that since demand of Rs.6,05,93,702/- was claimed to be annulled, the necessary advolerum court fee was not paid. It was further stated that having served with the notice under the Act, 1971, the civil suit would be barred. Defendant further averred that as per terms & condition No.5 (1) (1A) of the initial lease deed, the option to exercise the renewal should have been exercised not later than six months prior to the expiration of the existing lease and the lease of the plaintiff which commenced on 15.09.1980, the option to renew was not made within the stipulated prior period of time. Consequently, in order to grant afresh lease, the defendant was also not bound by the terms of the lease. 4. Learned Court below framed six issues including the fact that whether plaintiff can file a suit for permanent injunction and declaration and it was held in negative. Further the Court also held that he is not entitled for declaration for renewal of the lease deed. 4. Learned Court below framed six issues including the fact that whether plaintiff can file a suit for permanent injunction and declaration and it was held in negative. Further the Court also held that he is not entitled for declaration for renewal of the lease deed. The Court also further held that the suit would be barred under Section 15 of the Act, 1971. Being aggrieved by the said order, the present appeal has been filed. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the lease in the instant case (Ex. P-1) was executed on 07th of April, 1981 and the period of lease was for thirty years and the lease rent was payable in the April, 1982. It is further submitted that the option of renewal of lease was exercised in terms of clause 5 (1) (1A) of the lease on 15.03.2010 vide Ex. D-3, therefore, the exercise of renewal was made much prior to the date of expiration of six months, since the lease otherwise would have expired on 06.04.2011. He would further submit that even if it is admitted that the said letter was received on 16.04.2010, it was filed within the specified period for exercise of renewal option. Consequently, the defendant was bound by the lease agreement to renew it for a further period of 30 years on the same terms on which the initial grant was made. He would further submit that series of dispute and the filing of the writ petition and the order of the High Court on the earlier occasion before filing the civil suit would show that the plaintiff was continuously prosecuting his cause but the defendant never acted upon such application for renewal, instead the notices were served to pay amount of more than Rs.6 crores, which is completely illegal and would be against the terms of agreement of lease. He would further submit that if the renewal of lease was exercised within the stipulated period of time, then the finding of the Court below that the suit is barred under the Act, 1971 is perverse as parties were bound by the lease deed. He would therefore submit that the judgment and decree of the Court below be set aside. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent would submit that the lease commenced from 15.09.1980, which would be evident from Ex. P-2. He would therefore submit that the judgment and decree of the Court below be set aside. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent would submit that the lease commenced from 15.09.1980, which would be evident from Ex. P-2. He would further submit that as per the document, the possession of the entire land in different parts was given to the appellant/plaintiff, therefore, it would be wrong to assert that the lease commenced from 07.04.1981. It is further submitted that since the lease commenced from 15.09.1980 it would expire on 14.09.2010 and prior to six months when the option was required to be exercised would fall on 14.03.2010, which the plaintiff failed to exercise. Referring to the document Ex. D-3, he would submit that the option of renewal was never submitted on 15.03.2010 but instead the endorsement of the evidence of DW-1 would show that it was received on 16.04.2010. Consequently, there was a gross violation of clause 5 (1) (1A) of the renewal clause of the lease. He would further submit that the suit was filed by a Trust, it is submitted that the status of the plaintiff was denied and the plaintiff failed to place any document to show that this is a registered Trust and Surendra Gupta is a trustee, who is been authorized to file the suit. Therefore, in absence of any document, the finding of the learned Court below is well merited that the suit was not properly filed. It is further submitted that having not exercised option to renew the lease as per the terms of the lease deed, the possession of the plaintiff would be only unauthorised. Under these circumstances, when he was served with a notice to pay part of the amount of premium of the lease land, the plaintiff acceded to it, therefore, he himself admitted the fact that he is only an unauthorised occupier. He would further submit that in the background of this when the proceedings were commenced under the Act, 1971, any civil suit to arrest the same would be barred under Section 15 of the Act, 1971. Consequently, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the documents. 8. Perusal of the plaint shows that it was filed under the caption Bhilai Education Trust, through Surendra Gupta being the Secretary & Trustee of the said Trust. Consequently, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the documents. 8. Perusal of the plaint shows that it was filed under the caption Bhilai Education Trust, through Surendra Gupta being the Secretary & Trustee of the said Trust. The defendant in reply denied the existence of such trust. The plaintiff (PW-1) has claimed that he is the Trustee & Secretary of Bhilai Education Trust and averred that a trust deed was executed in the year 1978. No certificate of registration has been placed before the Court. In the teeth of specific denial of averments, the issue was framed that whether the plaintiff was entitled to bring the suit or not? No document showing registration of trust or resolution to file the suit by Surendra Gupta was filed before Court. In the cross-examination too of the plaintiff PW-1 admitted to have not filed any documents regarding trust deed or any resolution to file the suit. 9. In respect of a trust the provisions are governed by Chhattisgarh Public Trusts Act, 1951. The relevant section to bring a suit by a trust is governed by Section 32 of the Act, 1951. For sake of brevity Section 32 of the Act, 1951 is reproduced hereunder:- “32. Bar to hear or decide suits.- (1) No suit to enforce a right on behalf of a public trust which has not been registered under this Act shall be heard or decided in any court. (2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply to claim or set off or other proceedings to enforce a right on behalf of such public trust.” 10. Reading of Section 32 of the Act, 1951 purports that it creates a bar to hear or decide suits. It purports that no suit to enforce a right on behalf of a public trust which has not been registered under this Act shall be heard or decided in any Court. Therefore, if the plaintiff is in hold of the document in the backdrop of the fact that entire existence of the fact was denied in the written-statement and on enquiry it was found that no such trust is registered, it was necessary on part of plaintiff to prove the existence of registered trust and the plaintiff Surendra Gupta has been authorized to file a suit on behalf of the trust. In absence thereof it cannot be said that the suit was properly filed before the Court. 11. Now turning to the point as to the commencement of the lease deed, Ex. P-2 dated 3rd of December, 1981 would show it records the fact of past transaction that the plaintiff was put in possession to the part of 14 acres of land in the manner hereinafter reproduced:- Steel Authority of India Ltd. Bhilai Steel Plant. No.TAS- 6 (3)13-81/924 Bhilai, dated the 3rd Dec., 1981. To, The Managing Trustee (Shri Prakash Bhatia), Bhilai Education Trust, Room No.21, Ispat Bavan, Bhilai-490001 (MP). Sub:- Allotment of land on lease in Hospital Sector, Bhilai Township, for educational purpose. Dear Sir, On your having agreed to the terms and conditions of lease, The Managing Director, Bhilai Steel Plant, is pleased to allot you14.00 acres of land on lease in the Hospital Sector/Bhilai Township, for educational purpose, the details of which are given below:- S. No. Purpose of allotment. Area allotted. Period of lease. 1. For construction of Mahila Maha Vidyalaya, bldg. 7.00 acres 30 years, w.e. from 15.9.80. 2. For construction of Hostel bldg. 1.00 acres - do- 3. For construction of Staff Quarters. 1.50 acres -do- 4. Play-ground 4.50 acres -do- The possession of land as mentioned above has already been taken over by you from our Town Engg. Deptt. On 15.9.80. Yours faithfully, For Steel Authority of India Ltd., Bhilai Steel Plant. SD/- (M.K. Bhattacharya) Asstt. Manager (Estate-LV). Copy to :- 1) Sr. Arch. Planner (R). 2) Zonal Egineer (Civil) (Shri Subbarao), TED. 3) Asstt. Manager (Finance – Township). 4) Asstt. Manager (Estate- Rent). Annual ground rent and service charges may please be charged as per rules in force. SD/- (M.K. Bhattacharya) Asstt. Manager (Estate-LV). 12. The plaintiff contended that lease came into existence on 07th day of April, 1980 for a period of 30 years. The deed is Ex. P-1, in such lease the renewal clause 5 (1) (1A) would be relevant to decide the lease and is reproduced hereinunder:- “5. Provided Always and it is hereby expressly agreed between the parties hereto as follows :- 1) The lessor shall be entitled to enhance the rent after every ten years during the period of the lease. Provided that such increase shall in no event exceed 20% of the previous rent. Provided Always and it is hereby expressly agreed between the parties hereto as follows :- 1) The lessor shall be entitled to enhance the rent after every ten years during the period of the lease. Provided that such increase shall in no event exceed 20% of the previous rent. 1A) The lease shall be renewable at the option of either party for a further period of Thirty years on the same terms and conditions as herein without the covenant for renewal provided the party desiring such extension gives to the other party during the last year of the initial term of this lease but not later than six months prior to the expiration of the said term notice of its intention of such renewal.” 13. Clause 2 of the lease deed which shows a bifurcation of the different land would show that lands marked as letters A,B,C and in the plan enclosed at Annexure A is granted for thirty years for the purpose of college building, hostel building and staff quarters of the trust and 4.50 acres of land is shown as letter D is given for the purpose of playground for a period of 5 years from 15th day of September, 1980. The reading of the said clause would show that entire commencement of the lease was specifically from 15th September, 1980. This is also fortified by Annexure P-2, which is been filed by plaintiff and narrated in the preceding para to show that the possession of the land was given from particular date. The document Ex. P-2 also engrafts the fact that the lease was with effect from 15.09.1980 which was also engrafted in the lease deed reciprocate each other. The contents of lease deed shows a specific date of commencement of lease. The land was given in two parts, one for college & another for play ground. However, the date of commencement was same of 15.09.1980 as per document Ex. P-2. 14. As per Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as 'the T.P. Act, 1882) the commencement of the lease must be certain in the first instance. Section 110 of the T.P. Act, 1882 purports that when the date of commencement is not stated then it would normally be from the date of execution. But when the certainty of the date is already been made in the lease deed itself (Ex. Section 110 of the T.P. Act, 1882 purports that when the date of commencement is not stated then it would normally be from the date of execution. But when the certainty of the date is already been made in the lease deed itself (Ex. P-1) and undisputably the possession was taken from 15.09.1980 as per the document Ex. P-2 which is been produced by the plaintiff himself, we hold it that the commencement of the lease was from 15.09.1980. The phrase of id certum est quod certum reddi potest' is "that is sufficiently certain which can be made certain." can be applied in the given facts of this case. It is therefore, held that when the period of capable of being ascertained which would reflect as per reading of Ex. P-2 produced by the plaintiff, reading of this would show that the lease commenced from 15.09.1980 but execution of the lease deed was made on 07.04.1981. Consequently, we have no hesitation to hold that certainty of the date having been engrafted in the lease deed, further supported by the act of the parties i.e. the plaintiff, who was put into possession of the subject land, the execution of the lease deed cannot be the date of commencement. 15. According to the plaintiff, the right to renewal of lease was exercised on 15.03.2010. If the lease is said to have been commenced from 15.09.1980, it would expire on 14.09.2010 and as per Section 110 of the T.P. Act, 1882 the commencing day shall be excluded. According to the plaintiff, the renewal of lease was exercised on 15.03.2010, whereas the document Ex. D-3 which is produced by the defendant, shows that an endorsement of receipt was made on 16.04.2010 and the averments also to this effect is made by DW-1. Though the letter appears to be dated 15.03.2010, but nothing on record is placed to appreciate the fact that it was actually delivered on 15.03.2010. Consequently, the facts of this case would show that the plaintiff failed to exercise his option as per clause 5 (1) (1A) of the lease deed to renew his lease prior to six months of the expiration. 16. Another factor which comes to the fore would show that a part of land which is comprised in the lease deed admeasuring 4.50 acres was initially given on lease for 5 years from 15.09.1980. 16. Another factor which comes to the fore would show that a part of land which is comprised in the lease deed admeasuring 4.50 acres was initially given on lease for 5 years from 15.09.1980. In respect of the said lease, when the demand was made by respondent, after expiry the plaintiff made a payment of Rs.2,19,483/- towards the head of ground rent and service charges. The lease property comprised in a one single lease deed. On one hand the plaintiff averred that the lease was for thirty years and has exercised the right to renew within stipulated time, but at the same time a part of the property which is a part and parcel of the property of the same lease deed when the demand was made after expiry of the lease, the amount was paid by the plaintiff. So there cannot be a splitting of lease deed for different purpose. The act of the plaintiff of payment would show that he accepted the fact the lease has come to an end as such fresh ground rent was paid. So by conduct of plaintiff, it would show that the plaintiff virtually accepted the fact that for a part of property lease having been expired/faced with no option of renewal of lease the amount as demanded by respondent was paid. It would also act as a estoppal to say the lease commenced from 07.04.1981. 17. Having held that the lease having been expired, the application for renewal of lease was not made within time, the occupation of the plaintiff would be that of the unauthorized occupier, which is defined under the Act, 1971. Therefore, when a notice is served to the plaintiff (Ex. P-15), under Section 15 of the Act, 1971, it creates a bar of jurisdiction of any civil Court to adjudicate such issues. Having the lease expired in 2010 and the notice Ex. P-15 being served as per Section 15 of the Act, 1971, the civil Court would not have jurisdiction to entertain the plea against the eviction. Accordingly, the finding reached by the learned Court below that the suit is barred under Section 15 of the Act, 1971 appears to be correct. 18. In a result, the appeal sans merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. 19. A decree be drawn accordingly.