ORDER : M.A. Chowdhary, J.-Through the medium of instant petition quashment of detention order bearing No. DIVCOM-K/121/2020 dated 18.02.2020, (hereafter referred as impugned order) passed by respondent No. 2 (Divisional Commissioner, Kashmir) (hereafter referred as Detaining Authority) against Shamas-ud-din Lone @ Sabha, S/O Mehraj-ud-din Lone R/O Duderhama, Ganderbal (hereinafter referred as the detenue) is being sought by the petitioner as also a writ of mandamus for his release and a compensation of Rs. 10.00 lakh for his illegal detention. 2. Petitioner has asserted that he had been accused and prosecuted in cases registered at Police Station, Ganderbal, vide FIR NO. 99/2012 under Section 3/7 EC Act, 18/07 D&C Act and FIR No. 202/2013 under Section 8/21 NDPS Act and after trial was acquitted in both these cases, whereas, he has again been implicated in case FIR No. 196/2018 under Section 8/21 NDPS Act registered at Police Station Ganderbal and that he had been also admitted to bail in this case. It was alleged that after a delay of four months the Detaining Authority has passed the detention of the petitioner based on his alleged involvement in the aforesaid three cases. 3. The petitioner has assailed the impugned order on the following grounds:- a) that the Detaining Authority has passed the order impugned without application of mind which vitiates the detention of the petitioner. b) that the Detaining Authority has not assigned the compelling reasons for passing the order of detention. c) That the Detaining Authority has failed to observe the mandatory constitutional/statutory safeguards while passing the detention order and has detained the detenue under the preventive detention without any subjective satisfaction which is sine-qua-non for passing the detention order. d) That the detenue has not been furnished the order of detention and other relevant documents, thereby violating his rights with regard to furnishing of all the documents and subsequent right of representation against the detention order which are guaranteed to a detenue under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India. e) That the grounds of detention are vague, irrelevant and non-existent, the allegations being bereft of specific details and without any reference to the past conduct of the detenue. 4. Respondents filed the counter affidavit through respondent Detaining Authority, which inter-alia reveals that all statutory requirements and constitutional guarantees had been fulfilled and complied with, while detaining the detenue. e) That the grounds of detention are vague, irrelevant and non-existent, the allegations being bereft of specific details and without any reference to the past conduct of the detenue. 4. Respondents filed the counter affidavit through respondent Detaining Authority, which inter-alia reveals that all statutory requirements and constitutional guarantees had been fulfilled and complied with, while detaining the detenue. The detenue is a member of an organized drug trafficking gang working in Ganderbal area who is involved in procuring, transporting and sale of psychotropic substance and is carrying such activities from a pretty long time. The detenue was ordered to be detained on basis of the contraband material seized in cases registered vide FIR No. 99/2012 under Section 3/7 EC Act, 18/07 DC Act, FIR No. 202/2013 under Section 8/21 NDPS Act and FIR No. 196/2018 against the detenue at Police Station Ganderbal. 5. Heard learned counsel for parties and also perused the detention record. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has highlighted various grounds while seeking quashment of impugned order but the main grounds on which stress has been laid during the course of arguments are that there has been total non-application of mind while passing the impugned detention order, inasmuch as at the time of passing the detention order, the detenue was already implicated in case FIR No.196/2018 for offence under Section 8/21 of NDPS Act of P/S Ganderbal and that there were no compelling reasons for the Detaining Authority to make the impugned detention order and the Detaining Authority has not spelt out the compelling reasons for detaining the detenue under preventive detention laws; that the material on the basis of which impugned detention order has been passed has not been supplied to the detenue thereby disabling him from making an effective representation against his detention. 7. Learned counsel for the respondents ex adverso argued that the petitioner being a member of the drug gang, operating in District Ganderbal has been spoiling the younger generation by making them addict and is involved in three criminal cases. Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that there is sufficient material and justification for preventive detention of the petitioner and that the order impugned has been passed perfectly in consonance with law and prayed that it may not be interfered with and prayed for its dismissal. 8. Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that there is sufficient material and justification for preventive detention of the petitioner and that the order impugned has been passed perfectly in consonance with law and prayed that it may not be interfered with and prayed for its dismissal. 8. It has been contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the Detaining Authority could not have passed an order of detention on the ground of commission of acts within the meaning of the Act of 1988. In order to test the merit of this contention of learned counsel for the petitioner, the object and scope of Section 3 of the Act of 1988 is required to be appreciated. The said provision provides that a detention order can be made by the Government or any specially empowered officer of the Government of a particular rank with a view to prevent a person from committing any of the acts within the meaning of “illicit traffic” as defined in clause (c) of Section 2 of the Act, which reads as under: (c) “Illicit traffic” means – (i) cultivating any coca plant or gathering any portion of coca plant; (ii) cultivating the opium, poppy or any cannabis plant; (iii) engaging in the production, manufacture, possession, sale, purchase, transportation, warehousing, concealment, use or consumption, import, inter-State, export inter-State or transshipment of narcotic drugs of psychotropic substances; (iv) dealing in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances otherwise than as provided in sub-clause (i) and (iii); (v) handling or letting any premises for use for any of the purposes referred to in sub-clauses (i) to (iv); (vi) financing any activity by himself or through any other person in furtherance or in support of doing any of the aforesaid acts’ (vii) harbouring persons engaged in any of the activities specified in sub-clauses (i) to (iv); or (viii) abetting or conspiring in the furtherance or in support of doing any of the aforesaid acts; except to the extent permitted under the Narcotic Drugs and psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, or any rule or order made, or any condition of any licence, permit or authorization issued thereunder.” 9. In the instant case, the Detaining Authority has passed the order of detention in the following terms: “I am satisfied that in order to prevent Shamas-ud-din Lone S/o Mehaj-ud-din Lone R/o Duderhama Ganderbal District Ganderbal from committing any of the acts within the meaning of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, Central 1988, and for maintenance of Public order, it is necessary to detain him;” 10. The detention record shows that the detenue was detained in connection with FIR No. 99/2012 under Section 3/7 EC Act, 18/07 DC Act, FIR No. 202/2013 under Section 8/21 NDPS Act and FIR No. 196/2018 under Section 8/21 NDPS Act of Police Station Ganderbal for offence under Section. So far as the grounds of detention are concerned, the same are based upon the said FIRs but it is nowhere mentioned that the detenue stands already acquitted in the said cases registered vide FIR’s No. 99/2012 & 202/2013. There was no material on record suggestive of the fact, which would have compelled the Detaining Authority to pass the impugned detention order against the detenue who was already facing trial in connection with FIR No. 196/2018 of NDPS Act. 11. The detenue in connection with FIR No. 99/2012 under Section 3/7 EC Act, 18/07 DC Act, FIR No. 202/2013 under Section 8/21 NDPS Act and FIR No. 196/2018 under Section 8/21 NDPS Act of Police Station Ganderbal was taken into custody, whereas he was acquitted in the cases FIR Nos. 99/2012 and 202/2013, by the competent court and in regard to FIR No. 196/2018, he was admitted to bail by the Court of learned Sessions Judge Ganderbal, however, in the grounds of detention, it is nowhere mentioned that the detenue has either been acquitted or admitted to bail in the aforesaid criminal cases. 12. It means either the Detaining Authority has not applied its mind or the full material relatable to the detenue had not been placed before it. So the non-application of mind is explicit which renders the order of detention illegal. This is my view is fortified by the judgment rendered in the case captioned Anant Sakharam Raut Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors reported as AIR 1987 SC 137 . 13. Making of an effective representation by a detenu is a very vital constitutional safeguard against the preventive detention. This is my view is fortified by the judgment rendered in the case captioned Anant Sakharam Raut Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors reported as AIR 1987 SC 137 . 13. Making of an effective representation by a detenu is a very vital constitutional safeguard against the preventive detention. In the absence of the material on the basis of which grounds of detention have been formulated, the detenu has been rendered handicapped and hampered in making an effective representation against the order of detention. The violation of this vital safeguard by the respondents renders the impugned order of detention unsustainable in law. I am supported in my aforesaid view by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ibrahim Ahmad Bhatti alias Mohd. Akhtar Hussain alias Kandar Ahmad Wagher alias Iqbal alias Gulam Vs. State of Gujarat and others”, (1982) 3 SCC 440 . 14. Another ground that has been urged by learned counsel for the petitioner during the course of argument is that there were no compelling reasons for the detaining authority to pass the order of detention against the petitioner because he was already acquitted in the FIR No. 99/2012 under Section 3/7 EC Act, 18/07 DC Act, FIR No. 202/2013 under Section 8/21 NDPS Act and in FIR No. 196/2018 he had been granted bail by the learned Sessions Judge, Ganderbal and there was no apprehension that he may jump over the concession of bail or the conditions on the basis of which bail was granted. In this regard it may be noted that preventive detention orders can be passed even when a person is in police custody or involved in a criminal case but for doing so, there must be compelling reasons for the detaining authority to do so. The Detaining Authority is bound to record the compelling reasons as to why the detenue could not be deterred from indulging in subversive activities by resorting to normal law and in the absence of these reasons, the order of detention becomes unsustainable in law. This view is fortified in my aforesaid view by the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Surya Prakash Sharma v. State of U. P. & Ors, reported as 1994 SCC (Cri) 1691. 15. This view is fortified in my aforesaid view by the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Surya Prakash Sharma v. State of U. P. & Ors, reported as 1994 SCC (Cri) 1691. 15. Besides this in the case at hand, though a detailed reply has been filed, yet delay has not been explained in passing the detention order and its execution when the detenue was regularly facing the trial in connection with FIR No. 196/2018. The judgments referred to hereinabove support the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner and render the order impugned bad in the eyes of law. 16. The observations of the Supreme Court made in paragraph No.15 of the judgment in the case of Adishwar Jain v. Union of India and another, (2006) 11 SCC 339 are noteworthy and are reproduced hereunder: - “15. Delay, as is well known, at both stages has to be explained. The court is required to consider the question having regard to the overall picture. We may notice that in SK. Serajul v. State of West Bengal [ (1975) 2 SCC 78 ], this Court opined: “There was thus delay at both stages and this delay, unless satisfactorily explained, would throw considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate, Burdwan recited in the order of detention. It would be reasonable to assume that if the District Magistrate of Burdwan was really and genuinely satisfied after proper application of mind to the materials before him that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner, he would have acted with greater promptitude both in making the order of detention as also in securing the arrest of the petitioner, and the petitioner would not have been allowed to remain at large for such a long period of time to carry on his nefarious activities...” 17. From the judgment aforesaid, more particularly the observations made in paragraph No.15, it is abundantly clear that the delay at both stages has to be explained and unless this delay is satisfactorily explained, it will throw considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction derived by the Detaining Authority. Delay, whether it is in making the detention order or it pertains to its execution, both are required to be satisfactorily explained. Delay, whether it is in making the detention order or it pertains to its execution, both are required to be satisfactorily explained. To the similar effect is the legal position summed up in para 11 of the judgment in KPM Basheer [ (1975) 2 SCC 78 ]. For ready reference, para 11 of the judgment is reproduced hereunder:- “11. Under these circumstances, we are of the view that the order of detention cannot be sustained since the `live and proximate link’ between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention is snapped on account of the undue and unreasonable delay in securing the appellant/detenu and detaining him. As we have now come to the conclusion that the order of detention is liable to be set aside on this ground alone we are not dealing with other contentions raised in the Memorandum of Appeal as well as in the writ petition.” 18. On perusal of the record, produced by the respondent there is nothing with regard to the execution of the order impugned and as to what material/record had been made available to the detenue at the time of his detention and in what language the same has been explained to him, though the detention order had been directed to be executed through Senior Superintendent of Police Ganderbal with the direction to read over and explain the order in the language, the detenue understands. It appears that the order has been executed by the police with regard to detention but there is nothing to suggest as to what material had been furnished to the detenue and whether the detention order alongwith grounds of detention had been explained to him so as to facilitate him to make an effective and meaningful representation in view of his constitutional rights as discussed above. On this count the impugned detention order is not sustainable, vitiating the same. 19. For the afore-stated reasons, the petition is allowed and the order of detention bearing No. DIVCOM-“K”/121/2020 dated 18.02.2020, issued by the Divisional Commissioner, Kashmir, is quashed. Detenue, Shamas-ud-din Lone @ Sabha, S/O Mehraj-ud-din Lone R/O Duderhama, Ganderbal is directed to be released from the preventive custody forthwith provided he is not required in connection with any other case. 20. Petition is disposed of as granted.