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2022 DIGILAW 321 (JHR)

Basant Tiwary @ Basant Kumar Tiwary v. State of Jharkhand

2022-03-22

RAVI RANJAN, SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

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JUDGMENT : The instant intra-court appeal, under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, is directed against the order/judgment dated 06.12.2021 passed by learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 6547 of 2011 whereby and whereunder the writ petition was dismissed declining to interfere with order dated 16.04.2004 passed in Confiscation Revision Case No. 18/2003 by Commissioner-cum-Revisional Authority, against order dated 24.03.2003 in Confiscation Appeal No. XV/57/2001-2002, by which the revision application was allowed and order passed in Confiscation Appeal was set aside. 2. The brief facts of the case, as per pleadings made in the writ petition, which require to be enumerated read as hereunder: The writ petitioner-appellant, who claims to be the owner of Truck bearing Registration No. BRC/7521, purchased some Sagwan wood on 22.08.1999 for his own use from M/s Dayal Timber Works, Timber Merchant & Order Supplier, Upper Bazar, Ranchi on cash payment vide Bill No. 133/1999-2000 and 134/99- 2000. It is alleged that the petitioner, after purchase of the said wood, carried out the wood by bus to Daltonganj and from Daltonganj Bus Stand, he carried the said Teak wood Planks by his Truck bearing Registration No. BRC-7521 to his residential house but in the way the police seized the said truck along with 17 pieces of Teak Wood Planks. It is stated that though the petitioner tried his best to convince the police party that the seized woods are not illegal and purchased from authorized Timber Merchant but the police lodged an F.I.R. being Sadar (Daltonganj) P.S. Case No. 287 of 1999 under Sections 413/414 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 33 of the Forest Act. Subsequently, the Officer-in-Charge, Sadar (Daltonganj) communicated a report vide letter no. 1311 dated 05.09.1999 to the Divisional Forest Officer, Daltonganj, basis upon which Confiscation Case No. 9 of 1999 was initiated against the petitioner, in which, the authority concerned passed order on 29.05.2000 directing to confiscate the Truck bearing Registration No. BRC-7521 as also 17 planks of Sagwan woods, as seized by the police. Aggrieved thereof, the petitioner preferred appeal, before the Deputy Commissioner, Palamau, being Confiscation Appeal No. XV/7/2000-2001, which was disposed of vide order dated 12.09.2001 remanding the matter for passing fresh order in respect of the offence committed. Aggrieved thereof, the petitioner preferred appeal, before the Deputy Commissioner, Palamau, being Confiscation Appeal No. XV/7/2000-2001, which was disposed of vide order dated 12.09.2001 remanding the matter for passing fresh order in respect of the offence committed. Pursuant to the aforesaid order a fresh order was passed by the Confiscation Authority on 06.11.2001 in the said Confiscation Case No. 9 of 1999, by which, again the order of confiscation of truck as also 17 planks of Sagwan was passed. Being aggrieved, the petitioner again preferred appeal being Confiscation Appeal No. XV/57/2001-2002, which was allowed by the appellate authority- Deputy Commissioner, Palamau vide order dated 24.03.2003 setting aside the order passed in Confiscation Case. It is further case of the writ petitioner that after disposal of appeal, being Confiscation Appeal No. XV/57/2001-2002, the petitioner filed a petition before learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Palamau on 28.03.2003 for release of confiscated truck along with 17 pieces of Sagwan woods, which was allowed vide order dated 17.04.2003 and the seized truck along with wood was released in favour of petitioner on 24.04.2003 on furnishing of required security bond. In the meantime, the respondents-authority preferred revision, before the Commissioner-cum- Secretary-cum-Revisional Authority, Department of Forest & Environment, being Confiscation Revision No. 18/2003 which was allowed vide order dated 16.04.2004, by which, the petitioner was directed to surrender the confiscated truck. The writ petitioner, being aggrieved with the aforesaid order approached this Court by filing writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 6547 of 2011 on the ground that the revisional authority did not consider the fact that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Palamau vide order dated 17.04.2003 in G.R. Case No. 942 of 1999 had already passed order for release of truck in question as also for 17 pieces of Sagwan plank; further the fact that pieces of Sagwan planks were purchased vide genuine challans/bills from M/s Dayal Timber Works, Timber Merchant & Order Supplier, Upper Bazar, Ranchi on 22.08.1999 on cash payment vide Bill No. 133/1999-2000 and 134/99-2000. On the other hand, the State had taken the ground that the wood in question was carried out by the petitioner without proper permit and at the time of seizure he failed to produce any valid challan/bill and failed to establish that the seized materials were purchased from M/s Dayal Timber Works, Upper Bazar, Ranchi. On the other hand, the State had taken the ground that the wood in question was carried out by the petitioner without proper permit and at the time of seizure he failed to produce any valid challan/bill and failed to establish that the seized materials were purchased from M/s Dayal Timber Works, Upper Bazar, Ranchi. The learned Single Judge, taking into consideration the aforesaid aspect of the matter, refused to interfere with the order passed by the revisional authority, which is the subject matter of present intra-court appeal. 3. Mr. Ajay Kumar Trivedi, learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant, assailing the order passed by learned Single Judge, has taken the plea that once the order was passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Palamau ordering to release the truck as well as goods in question in favour of writ petitioner, it was not available for the revisional authority to reverse the order passed by the confiscation authority. Further submission has been made that the bills/challans were produced before the confiscating authority to substantiate the purchase of Sagwan (teak) planks from M/s Dayal Timber Works, Timber Merchant & Order Supplier, Upper Bazar, Ranchi vide Bill No. 133/1999- 2000 and 134/99-2000 but the same has not been appreciated by the revisional authority as also by the learned Single Judge. 4. Mr. Jagdeesh, learned A.C. to S.C. I, appearing for the respondents-State has submitted that there is no infirmity in the impugned order, reason being that the learned Single Judge has taken into consideration the finding recorded by the revisional authority as also by the confiscation authority, wherein consideration has been given about submission of bills/challans, which was found to be procured later only in order to substantiate the case of writ petitioner and even accepting the case of the writ petitioner that he had purchased the teak wood from M/s Dayal Timber Works, Upper Bazar, Ranchi, the bill shows only four pieces of teak wood but the Forest Department had seized 17 pieces of teak wood, as such the seized articles cannot be said to be the material as mentioned in the bills. It has further been submitted that so far contention raised by writ petitioner about order passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Palamau is concerned, such order is always considered to be provisional subject to final outcome of the case, as such it is of no help to the writ petitioner. It has further been submitted that so far contention raised by writ petitioner about order passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Palamau is concerned, such order is always considered to be provisional subject to final outcome of the case, as such it is of no help to the writ petitioner. In the backdrop of these facts, submission has been made that there is no infirmity in the impugned order, as such impugned order may not be interfered with. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the materials available on record as also finding recorded by learned Single Judge. 6. We, before appreciating the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties, deem it fit and proper to refer certain undisputed facts, as per the prosecution report, which led to filing of present intra-court appeal. 7. On 22.08.1999, the Special Patrolling Party, upon confidential information, seized Truck bearing Registration No. BRC-7521 containing 17 pieces of hand-finished Teak Wood Sleeper (Sagwan Sleeper) near Redma Bypass Road, Palamau. On demand of paper and permit from the truck driver, as required under Transit Rules, he failed to produce the same, as such the truck driver was arrested on spot and truck along with forest produce was seized. Subsequently, a case was registered being Sadar Sahar Thana Case No. 287 of 1999. On receipt of seizure from the police, a confiscation proceeding under Section 52(3) of the Indian Forest Act was initiated against the seized property by registering Confiscation Case No. 09 of 1999, in which, the Authorized Officer-cum- Divisional Forest Officer, Daltonganj North Division, after hearing the parties and perusing the documents, came to the conclusion that the bills submitted by the writ petitioner were managed and procured once and after-thought of the owner of the truck and more so the contents of the bill and those of seizure-list were at variance with each, both in number, size and volume, as such ordered for confiscation of the truck in question as well as Sagwan planks and disposed of the confiscation case vide order dated 29.05.2000 ordering confiscation of Truck bearing Registration No. BRC-7521 as also 17 planks of Sagwan wood, as seized by the police. Against this, appeal was preferred by the writ petitioner, being Confiscation Appeal XV-7/2000-2001, which was disposed of vide order dated 12.09.2001 setting aside the order passed by the confiscation authority and the matter was remanded for fresh hearing in respect of offence committed. Pursuant thereto, Confiscation Case No. 09 of 1999 was heard and again order was passed for confiscation of seized truck and Sagwan planks vide order dated 06.11.2001, against which, the petitioner again preferred appeal being Confiscation Appeal No.XV-57/2001-2002, which was allowed vide order dated 24.03.2003 setting aside the order passed by the Authorised Officer-cum- Divisional Officer, Daltonganj. Being aggrieved with the order passed by the appellate authority, the Forest Officials preferred revision being Revision Case No. (C) 18 of 2003, which was allowed vide order dated 16.04.2004 affirming the order passed by the Authorised Officer ordering for confiscation of the truck as well planks of Sagwan wood and quashed the order passed by the appellate authority. The writ petitioner, being aggrieved with the order passed by the revisional authority approached this Court by filing writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 6547 of 2011 on the ground that the revisional authority had completely ignored the judicial order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Palamau of the release of the vehicle in question as well as Sagwan planks and further the writ petitioner had valid document with regard to four pieces of sagwan wood, which was endorsed by the Range Officer and out of those four pieces the seized 17 pieces of teak wood were carved out, as such finding recorded by the confiscation authority about variance of bills so far number and size of sagwan (teak) planks by the confiscation authority is not worth to be considered; but the said ground has been discarded by the learned Single Judge on the ground that no material has been brought on record by the petitioner to substantiate that those four pieces were converted into 17 pieces and considered it a disputed question of fact which cannot be gone into by the writ Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Learned Single Judge has further taken note of the fact that the petitioner has failed to establish that the seized materials were transported with transit permit and the teak wood in question was properly purchased from the authorized vendor. 8. Learned Single Judge has further taken note of the fact that the petitioner has failed to establish that the seized materials were transported with transit permit and the teak wood in question was properly purchased from the authorized vendor. 8. This Court, on the basis of the material produced before the Confiscating Authority, is of the view that when the vehicle was intercepted it was incumbent upon the driver of the vehicle in question to produce proper challan/bill as also transit permit in proof of purchase of Sagwan planks in question and proper permit to ply with the said Sagwan wood, but, he failed to do so, therefore, Officer-in-Charge Daltonganj Town Police Station lodged an F.I.R and communicated the same vide letter dated 1311 dated 05.09.1999 to the Confiscating Authority, who registered Confiscation Case No. 9 of 1999, wherein as discussed above, on the basis of evidence, oral as well as documentary, order of confiscation of truck and Sagwan planks was passed, which was affirmed by the revisional authority. 9. Aggrieved thereof, the writ petitioner preferred the writ petition for issuance of writ of certiorari for quashing the order passed by the revisional authority. It is settled position of law that a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court and the findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. However, an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ Court. Reference, in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Syed Yakoob Vrs. K.S. Radhakrishnan & Ors, [A.I.R. 1964 477 Supreme Court], wherein at paragraph no. 7 their Lordships have been pleased to held as under:- “7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. 7 their Lordships have been pleased to held as under:- “7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point 11 and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.” In another judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sawarn Singh & Anr. Vrs. State of Punjab & Ors [ (1976) 2 SCC 868 ] while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 of Constitution of India for issuance of writ of certiorari has been pleased to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as under: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court in writ proceedings under Article 226. It is well settled that certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob case, “this limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be.” “13. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be.” “13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” Likewise, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Pepsico India Holding Private Limited Vrs. Krishna Kant Pandey [ (2015) 4 SCC 270 ] while discussing the scope of Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the matter of interference with the finding recorded by the tribunal has been pleased to hold by placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao Vrs. Ashalata S. Guram reported in (1986) 4 SCC 447 at paragraph 14 as under:- “14.While discussing the power of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution interfering with the facts recorded by the courts or the tribunal, this Court in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram [ (1986) 4 SCC 447 ], held as under: “17. In case of finding of facts, the Court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta [ (1975) 1 SCC 858 : AIR 1975 SC 1297 ] where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and reappreciating. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and reappreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at AIR p. 1301 of the Report as follows: ‘7. The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath [ AIR 1954 SC 215 ] (AIR p. 217, para 14) that the “power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee [ AIR 1951 Cal 193 ], to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors”. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. of Hills Division [ AIR 1958 SC 398 ] and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the Court in that case: (AIR p. 413, para 30) “30. … It is, thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226, the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” It is evident from the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex court in the judgments referred hereinabove that the scope of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with respect to exercise of power of judicial review on the finding of the Tribunal or inferior Court is very limited. 10. 10. This Court, after discussing the facts in entirety, as also the case laws, as referred hereinabove, has gone across the order passed by the learned Single Judge and found therefrom that the learned Single Judge considering these facts did not interfere with the order passed by the revisional authority, which in our considered view cannot be faulted with. Therefore, the order passed by learned Single Judge suffers from no infirmity and requires no interference by this Court. 11. Accordingly, the appeal fails, and is dismissed.