JUDGMENT : N.K. CHANDRAVANSHI, J. 1. Present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been instituted by the petitioner/convict, who is undergoing sentence of imprisonment for life upon being convicted for commission of offence punishable, inter-alia, under Sections 147, 148, 302/149, 120-B read with Section 302 of the IPC for following reliefs: “10.1 That the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire records pertaining to the case of petitioner, if it is available. 10.2 That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to set aside court's opinion dated 28/06/2021 and 17/08/2021. 10.3 That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct respondent authorities for releasing the petitioner under Section 432 of Cr.P.C. as well as, as per other existing law. 10.4 That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to pass any order in nature of the case.” 2. Factual background of the instant case is that vide judgment dated 08.03.2007 passed by 12th Upper Sessions Judge (FTC), Raipur in Sessions Trial No. 44/2006, the petitioner has been convicted for commission of offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 302/149 and Section 120-B read with Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo RI for two year, RI for two year, life imprisonment with fine of Rs.500 and life imprisonment with fine of Rs.500/- respectively and all the sentenced were ordered to run concurrently. Criminal Appeal No. 275/2007 preferred by the petitioner has been dismissed by High Court of C.G. vide order dated 26.07.2018 and Special Leave to Appeal (Cri.) No. 10634/2018 preferred by the petitioner before the Hon'ble Supreme Court against the order dated 26.7.2018 passed by the High Court has also been dismissed. After completion of 15 years of imprisonment without remission, the petitioner submitted an application for premature release before the respondent authorities, hence, Superintendent, Central Jail Raipur sent memo in compliance of Section 432 (2) of the Cr.P.C. to the concerned Presiding Judge for his opinion. Order sheet dated 28.6.2021 (Annexure P-2) reveals that since petitioner was convicted for heinous offences and his appeal and SLP were also rejected by this Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court, hence, he opined that, in view of above, grant of remission to the petitioner does not seem to be appropriate. Vide memo dated 28.6.2021, learned Presiding Judge informed his aforesaid opinion to Jail Superintendent, Central Jail, Raipur, District Raipur. Vide memo dated 28.6.2021, learned Presiding Judge informed his aforesaid opinion to Jail Superintendent, Central Jail, Raipur, District Raipur. Order sheet dated 17.8.2021 (Annexure R-2) shows that petitioner approached to Secretary, District Legal Services Authority, Raipur, hence, Secretary also sent letter of request to concerned Presiding Judge to extend his opinion with regard to grant of remission to the petitioner, but learned Presiding Judge has stuck on his earlier negative opinion for grant of remission to the petitioner. Vide Annexure R-3, Jail Superintendent, Central Jail, Raipur forwarded the relevant documents to the Director General, Jail and Correctional Services, Jail Headquarter, Raipur with regard to proposal for grant of remission to the petitioner under Section 432 of the Cr.P.C. 2. (A) Vide Annexure R-4, Director General, Jail & Correctional Services sent proposal to Upper Chief Secretary, Home (Jail) Department, Govt. of Chhattisgarh for grant of remission under Section 432 (1) of the Code to the petitioner in compliance of direction dated 07.07.2021 of Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.L.P. (Cr.) No. 529/2021 for grant of remission to those jail inmates, who have completed 20 years in between 30th August, 2021 to 31st January, 2022. Despite proposal sent by Director General, Jail & Correctional Services, respondents No. 1 & 2 have not decided the petitioner's application for grant of remission under Section 432 (2) of the Cr.P.C. Hence, the instant writ petition under Article 226 has been filed. 3. Return has been filed by the State authority stating inter alia that looking to the gravity of the offence, which the petitioner has committed, learned Presiding Judge has declined to give positive opinion for premature release of the petitioner and due to such opinion, the matter of the petitioner for grant of remission is pending consideration before the Government. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that application for grant of remission to the petitioner is pending before the respondents authorities since more than one year, despite that respondents authorities have not decided the same. It seems that since the learned Presiding Judge has given the negative opinion under section 432(2) of the Code with regard to petitioner's application for grant of remission to him, therefore, respondent authorities have not decided the said application. It seems that since the learned Presiding Judge has given the negative opinion under section 432(2) of the Code with regard to petitioner's application for grant of remission to him, therefore, respondent authorities have not decided the said application. It is further submitted that learned Presiding Judge has given no objection for grant of remission to two co-accused persons namely Bachhu @ Izrial and Anwar @ Bafati, who were also convicted in the same sessions trial and they have been granted remission, but without considering provisions contained in Rule 358 of Chhattisgarh Prisons Rule, 1968, learned Presiding Judge forwarded his negative opinion merely because heniousness of the crime and appeal being dismissed by the High Court and Supreme Court, whereas negative opinion of the court is not a sole factor to deny remission to the petitioner. He would next submit that in large number of decisions rendered by Hon'ble Courts, it has been held that opinion of the Court given under Section 432(2) of the Code is not binding on the appropriate Government for giving remission, despite that, till date no order has been passed by the Competent Authority in respect of the petitioner's application for grant of remission, hence, it is prayed that relief, as sought, may be granted to the petitioner. 5. On the other hand, Mr. Vimlesh Bajpai, learned Govt. Advocate for the State/respondents, would submit that looking to the gravity of the offence, which the petitioner has committed and undergoing sentence, though the Director General, Jail has forwarded proposal for remission of jail sentence, but the Presiding Judge, who has convicted the petitioner, has not recommended to grant remission, therefore, application filed by the petitioner for remission is pending consideration before the Government. He would further submit that petitioner has no vested right to be granted remission and remission of balance sentence cannot be claimed as a matter of right. It is well settled proposition of law that grant or non-grant of remission is the prerogative to be exercised by the competent authority and it is not for the court to supplant that procedure. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 7. In order to consider the plea raised at the Bar, it would be appropriate to notice Station 432 of the Cr.P.C. which states as under: “432. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 7. In order to consider the plea raised at the Bar, it would be appropriate to notice Station 432 of the Cr.P.C. which states as under: “432. Power to suspend or remit sentences: (1) When any person has been sentenced to punishment for an offence, the appropriate Government may, at any time, without conditions or upon any conditions which the person sentenced accepts, suspend the execution of his sentence or remit the whole or any part of the punishment to which he has been sentenced. (2) Whenever an application is made to the appropriate Government for the suspension or remission of a sentence, the appropriate Government may require the presiding Judge of the Court before or by which the conviction was had or confirmed, to state his opinion as to whether the application should be granted or refused, together with his reasons for such opinion and also to forward with the statement of such opinion a certified copy of the record of the trial or of such record thereof as exists. (3) to (7) xxx xxx xxx” 8. The power to consider remission under Section 432(1) of the Cr.P.C. has been conferred to the appropriate Government to consider and suspend the execution of his sentence or to remit the whole or any part of the punishment to which the accused person has been sentenced i.e. the petitioner in this case. 9. It is well settled that Section 432 of the Cr.P.C. has application only in two situations firstly, where a convict is to be given “additional” remission or remission for a period over and above the period that he is entitled to or he is awarded under a statutory rule framed by the appropriate Government or under the Jail Manual, and secondly, where a convict is sentenced to life imprisonment, which is for an indefinite period, subject to procedural and substantive checks. [See Sangeet and Another vs. State of Haryana, AIR 2013 SC 447 ] 10. [See Sangeet and Another vs. State of Haryana, AIR 2013 SC 447 ] 10. It is also settled that a convict undergoing life imprisonment is expected to remain in custody till the end of his life, subject to any remission granted by the appropriate Government under Section 432 of the Cr.P.C. which in turn is subject to the procedural checks mentioned in the said provision and further substantive check in Section 433A of the Cr.P.C. [See Mohinder Singh vs. State of Punjab, 2013 Cri. L.J. 1559] 11. The question as to whether the Court can act directly for grant of remission to convicted persons has been considered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Rajan vs. Home Secretary, Home Department of Tamil Nadu, (2019) 14 SCC 114 which have been referred again by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Ram Chander vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Another, AIR 2022 SC 2017 in paragraph 14, which reads thus: “14. In Rajan (supra), the court observed that while the grant of remission is the exclusive prerogative of the executive and the court cannot supplant its view, the Court can direct the authorities to re-consider the representation of the convict. The Court made the following observations: “18. The petitioner would, however, rely on the unreported decision of this Court in Ram Sewak vs. State of U.P. 2018 SCC Online SC 2012, to contend that this Court may direct the authorities to release the petitioner forthwith and that there is no point in directing further consideration by the State as the petitioner had already undergone over 30 years of sentence and with remission, over 36 years. The order passed by this Court in Ram Sewak vs. State of U.P. 2018 SCC Online SC 2012, is obviously in the facts of that case. As a matter of fact, it is well settled by now that grant or non-grant of remission is the prerogative to be exercised by the competent authority and it is not for the court to supplant that procedure. As a matter of fact, it is well settled by now that grant or non-grant of remission is the prerogative to be exercised by the competent authority and it is not for the court to supplant that procedure. Indeed, grant of premature release is not a matter of privilege but is the power coupled with duty conferred on the appropriate Government in terms of Sections 432 and 433 Cr.P.C. to be exercised by the competent authority after taking into account all the relevant factors, such as it would not undermine the nature of crime committed and the impact of the remission that may be the concern of the society as well as the concern of the State Government. ........... 20. Thus understood, we cannot countenance the relief claimed by the petitioner to direct the respondents to release the petitioner forthwith or to direct the respondents to remit the remaining sentence and release the petitioner. The petitioner, at best, is entitled to the relief of having directions issued to the respondents to consider his representation dated 5-2-2018, expeditiously, on its own merits and in accordance with law. We may not be understood to have expressed any opinion either way on the merits of the claim of the petitioner. The fact that the petitioner's request for premature release was already considered once and rejected by the Advisory Board of the State Government, in our opinion, ought not to come in the way of the petitioner for consideration of his fresh representation made on 5-2-2018............” 12. In the instant case, it seems that since Presiding Judge has given the negative opinion under section 432(2) of the Code with regard to petitioner's application for grant of remission to him, hence, the respondents authorities have not decided the case of the petitioner. Whether opinion of the Presiding Judge is binding on the competent authority to grant remission or not has been considered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC 1 which has also been considered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Ram Chander vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Another (supra) in paragraph 17, which reads thus: “17. In Sriharan (supra) a Constitution Bench of this Court held that the procedure stipulated in Section 432(2) is mandatory. In Sriharan (supra) a Constitution Bench of this Court held that the procedure stipulated in Section 432(2) is mandatory. The Court did not specifically hold that the opinion of the presiding judge would be binding, but it held that the decision of the government on remission should be guided by the opinion of the presiding officer of the concerned court. The Court had framed the following question: “143. Whether suo motu exercise of power of remission under Section 432 (1) is permissible in the scheme of the section, if yes, whether the procedure prescribed in sub-section (2) of the same section is mandatory or not?” Answering the above question, the Court held as follows: “148. Keeping the above principles in mind, when we analysis Section 432 (1) Cr.P.C. it must be held that the power to suspend or remit any sentence will have to be considered and ordered with much more care and caution, in particular the interest of the public at large. In this background, when we analyse Section 432(1) Cr.P.C. we find that it only refers to the nature of power available to the appropriate Government as regards the suspension of sentence or remission to be granted at any length. Extent of power is one thing and the procedure to be followed for the exercise of the power is different thing. There is no indication in Section 432(1) that such power can be exercised based on any application. What is not prescribed in the statute cannot be imagined or inferred. Therefore, when there is no reference to any application being made by the offender, that cannot be taken to mean that such power can be exercised by the authority concerned on its own. More so, when a detailed procedure to be followed is clearly set out in Section 432(2). It is not as if by exercising such power under Section 432(1), the appropriate Government will be involving itself in any great welfare measures to the public or the society at large. It can never be held that such power being exercised suo motu any great development act would be the result. After all, such exercise of power of suspension or remission is only going to grant some relief to the offender who has been found to have committed either a heinous crime or at least a crime affecting the society at large. After all, such exercise of power of suspension or remission is only going to grant some relief to the offender who has been found to have committed either a heinous crime or at least a crime affecting the society at large. Therefore, when in the course of exercise of larger constitutional powers of similar kind under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution it has been opined by this Court to be exercised with great care and caution, the one exercisable under a statute, namely, under Section 432(1) Cr.P.C. which is lesser in degree should necessarily be held to be exercisable in tune with the adjunct provision contained in the same section. Viewed in that respect, we find that the procedure to be followed whenever any application for remission is moved, the safeguard provided under Section 432(2) Cr.P.C. should be the sine qua non for the ultimate power to be exercised under Section 432(1) CrPC. 149. By following the said procedure prescribed under Section 432(2), the action of the appropriate Government is bound to survive and stand the scrutiny of all concerned, including the judicial forum. It must be remembered, barring minor offences, in cases involving heinous crimes like, murder, kidnapping, rape, robbery, dacoity, etc. and such other offences of such magnitude, the verdict of the trial court is invariably dealt with and considered by the High Court and in many cases by the Supreme Court. Thus, having regard to the nature of opinion to be rendered by the Presiding Officer of the court concerned will throw much light on the nature of crime committed, the record of the convict himself, his background and other relevant factors which will enable the appropriate Government to take the right decision as to whether or not suspension or remission of sentence should be granted. It must also be borne in mind that while for the exercise of the constitutional power under Articles 72 and 161, the Executive Head will have the benefit of act and advice of the Council of Ministers, for the exercise of power under Section 432(1) Cr.P.C. the appropriate Government will get the valuable opinion of the judicial forum, which will definitely throw much light on the issue relating to grant of suspension or remission. 150. 150. Therefore, it can safely be held that the exercise of power under Section 432(1) should always be based on an application of the person concerned as provided under Section 432(2) and after duly following the procedure prescribed under Section 432(2). We, therefore, fully approve the declaration of law made by this Court in Sangeet vs. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 452 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 611 in Para 61 that the power of appropriate Government under Section 432(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be suo motu for the simple reason that this section is only an enabling provision. We also hold that such a procedure to be followed under Section 432(2) is mandatory. The manner in which the opinion is to be rendered by the Presiding Officer can always be regulated and settled by the High Court concerned and the Supreme Court by stipulating the required procedure to be followed as and when any such application is forwarded by the appropriate Government. We, therefore, answer the said question to the effect that the suo motu power of remission cannot be exercised under Section 432(1), that it can only be initiated based on an application of the persons convicted as provided under Section 432(2) and that ultimate order of suspension or remission should be guided by the opinion to be rendered by the Presiding Officer of the court concerned.” (Emphasis supplied) 13. In an Identical case like case at hand, have also reached before Hon'ble Supreme Court in case Ram Chander vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Another (supra) wherein the petitioner of that case was convicted for the offence under Sections 147, 148, 302/149 and 324/149 of the IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment. The sentence was confirmed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh on 10th May, 2013 [2013 Cri. L.J. 4902 (Chh)]. Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, the petitioner preferred a special leave before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which was also dismissed. After completion of 16 years of imprisonment without remission, the petitioner filed an application for premature release before the respondents authorities under Rule 358 of the Chhattisgarh Prisons Rule, 1968. The Jail Superintendent of the Central Jail, Durg sought the opinion of the Special Judge, Durg that whether the petitioner can be released on remission. After completion of 16 years of imprisonment without remission, the petitioner filed an application for premature release before the respondents authorities under Rule 358 of the Chhattisgarh Prisons Rule, 1968. The Jail Superintendent of the Central Jail, Durg sought the opinion of the Special Judge, Durg that whether the petitioner can be released on remission. Special Judge has given negative opinion, which is reproduced below: “...Perused the document filed alongwith the present application. Perused the judgment dated 07.12.2010 passed in Special Case No. 16/2006, State vs. Anil and Others under Section 147, 148, 302/149, 302/149, 307/149 and 3(2)(5) of the Scheduled Caste and the Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Accused Ramchander son of Khajaan Singh alongwith 8 other co-accused persons has assembled against the law and by using dead weapons swrod, axe, wooden stick (Danda), has killed Kartikram and Puneet, in relation to this case the accused is undergoing imprisonment. Then in this situation keeping in view all the facts and circumstances, it does not seem appropriate to allow remission of the remaining sentence of the above prisoner, therefore, not recommending for the same.” 14. On being opinion sought from Law Department, it also given negative opinion twice in light of negative opinion given by the Presiding Judge, for grant of remission to the petitioner. On the basis of above factual background, the petitioner filed writ petition [Ram Chander vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Another] under Article 32 of the Constitution of India before Hon'ble Supreme Court, in which, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, while considering series of judicial pronouncement, has observed as under: “20. In Sriharan (supra), the Court observed that the opinion of the presiding judge shines a light on the nature of the crime that has been committed, the record of the convict, their background and other relevant factors. Crucially, the Court observed that the opinion of the presiding judge would enable the government to take the ‘right’ decision as to whether or not the sentence should be remitted. Hence, it cannot be said that the opinion of the presiding judge is only a relevant factor, which does not have any determinative effect on the application for remission. Crucially, the Court observed that the opinion of the presiding judge would enable the government to take the ‘right’ decision as to whether or not the sentence should be remitted. Hence, it cannot be said that the opinion of the presiding judge is only a relevant factor, which does not have any determinative effect on the application for remission. The purpose of the procedural safeguard under Section 432 (2) of the Cr.P.C. would stand defeated if the opinion of the presiding judge becomes just another factor that may be taken into consideration by the government while deciding the application for remission. It is possible then that the procedure under Section 432 (2) would become a mere formality. 21. However, this is not to say that the appropriate government should mechanically follow the opinion of the presiding judge. If the opinion of the presiding judge does not comply with the requirements of Section 432 (2) or if the judge does not consider the relevant factors for grant of remission that have been laid down in Laxman Naskar vs. Union of India, (2000) 2 SCC 595 the government may request the presiding judge to consider the matter afresh. 22. In the present case, there is nothing to indicate that the presiding judge took into account the factors which have been laid down in Laxman Naskar v. Union of India (supra). These factors include assessing (i) whether the offence affects the society at large; (ii) the probability of the crime being repeated; (iii) the potential of the convict to commit crimes in future; (iv) if any fruitful purpose is being served by keeping the convict in prison and (v) the socio-economic condition of the convict’s family. In Laxman Naskar vs. State of West Bengal, (2000) 7 SCC 626 and State of Haryana vs. Jagdish, (2010) 4 SCC 216 this Court has reiterated that these factors will be considered while deciding the application of a convict for pre-mature release. 23. In his opinion dated 21 July 2021 the Special Judge, Durg referred to the crime for which the petitioner was convicted and simply stated that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case it would not be appropriate to grant remission. The opinion is in the teeth of the provisions of Section 432 (2) of the Cr.P.C. which require that the presiding judge’s opinion must be accompanied by reasons. The opinion is in the teeth of the provisions of Section 432 (2) of the Cr.P.C. which require that the presiding judge’s opinion must be accompanied by reasons. Halsbury’s Laws of India (Administrative Law) notes that the requirement to give reasons is satisfied if the concerned authority has provided relevant reasons. Mechanical reasons are not considered adequate....... 24. Thus, an opinion accompanied by inadequate reasoning would not satisfy the requirements of Section 432 (2) of the Cr.P.C. Further, it will not serve the purpose for which the exercise under Section 432 (2) is to be undertaken, which is to enable the executive to make an informed decision taking into consideration all the relevant factors. 25. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the petitioner’s application for remission should be re-considered. We direct the Special Judge, Durg to provide an opinion on the application afresh accompanied by adequate reasoning that takes into consideration all the relevant factors that govern the grant of remission as laid down in Laxman Naskar vs. Union of India (supra). The Special Judge, Durg must provide his opinion within a month of the date of the receipt of this order. We further direct the State of Chhattisgarh to take a final decision on the petitioner’s application for remission afresh within a month of receiving the opinion of the Special Judge, Durg.” 15. In view of above discussions, observations and judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in above-referred cases, it is quite vivid that grant or non-grant of remission is the prerogative to be exercised by the competent authority and the Court cannot supplant its view, although the Court has power to review the decision of the Government with regard to the fact that whether acceptance or rejection of an application for remission under Section 432 of the Cr.P.C. is arbitrary in nature and in appropriate cases, the Court is empowered to direct the Government to reconsider its decision. It is also well settled that seeking of opinion of concerned Presiding Judge under Section 432(2) of the Code for grant of remission is also mandatory because opinion of the Court concerned tell about the nature of crime committed, record of convicted person, his background and other relevant factors, which would be helpful for the competent authority to take the right decision for accepting or rejection of application for suspension or remission of sentence. 16. 16. As has been stated above, in the instant case, it seems that since concerned Court has given negative opinion under Section 432 of the Code, therefore, competent authority has not decided the case of the petitioner. So far as opinion given by the Presiding Judge is concerned, it seems that learned Presiding Judge of the convicting Court has given his opinion without considering the necessary factors, which have been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Laxman Naskar vs. Union of India (supra), which has further been reiterated by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Chander vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Another (supra) to be considered while giving opinion under Section 432 (2) of the Code. In other words, Presiding Judge of the convicting Court is required to consider all the factors, which have been laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Laxman Naskar vs. Union of India (supra) while giving opinion under Section 432 (2) of the Code. 17. Accordingly, it is directed that the State Government shall consider and dispose of the application filed by the petitioner for his premature release after calling fresh opinion of the Presiding Judge of the convicting Court within a period of two months from the releasing of this order. It shall be open to the State Government to reach to its own conclusion as to whether the benefit of premature release should be extended to the petitioner or not having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case. The State Government may also take into consideration the decision rendered by this Court in the matter of Amarnath Pandey vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Others passed in W.P. (PIL) No. 78/2017, decided on 2.5.2019. 18. It is pertinent to mention here that if competent authority/Jail Authority sought such fresh opinion from the concerned Presiding Judge of the Convicting Court, then Presiding Judge will give his opinion, considering the mandate given by the Supreme Court in the matter of Laxman Naskar vs. Union of India (supra) and further followed in the case of Ram Chander vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Another (supra), under Section 432(2) of the Code within a period of one month after receiving of memo with regard to fresh opinion sought by the aforesaid authority. 19. 19. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the matter and the authority concerned is free to decided the case of the petitioner on its own merit in accordance with law. 20. With the aforesaid observations, the writ petition stands finally disposed of. No order as to costs.