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2022 DIGILAW 326 (BOM)

State Of Goa v. Kenneth Ian Stewar Silveira

2022-02-01

MANISH PITALE

body2022
JUDGMENT 1. The State of Goa has filed the present application seeking quashing and setting aside of an order dtd. 21/10/2021, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, (FTC) at Mapusa, Goa (hereinafter referred to as the "Sessions Court") whereby anticipatory bail application filed by the respondent was allowed. According to the State, the order is unsustainable, as it is against the tenets governing grant of an application for anticipatory bail. It is specifically contended that the facts of the present case were not taken into consideration in the proper perspective by the Sessions Court while granting relief to the respondent. 2. On 22/1/2018, FIR No. 11/2018 came to be registered at Pernem Police Station, North Goa, against the respondent and five others for offences under Ss. 193, 209, 205, 404, 406, 419, 420, 465, 466, 468, 471 read with Sec. 34 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). 3. The said FIR came to be registered on the basis of the written complaint dtd. 20/1/2018, submitted by the Director of Civil Aviation, Government of Goa, before the aforesaid police station. The allegations in the said complaint, in brief, were that the respondent along with the other accused persons, particularly accused no. 2 Francy Gonsalves had fabricated documents in order to illegally usurp compensation for acquisition of land, thereby causing huge loss to the Government exchequer. It was alleged that the respondent along with co-accused Francy Gonsalves, prepared a fabricated power of attorney dtd. 29/7/2007, concerning land admeasuring 74800 sq. mts. The original owner, one Laxmibai Madival, was purported to have executed the said power of attorney in favour of the co-accused Francy Gonsalves. It was alleged that the said power of attorney was got executed by impersonating the said Laxmibai Madival. The power of attorney was merely notarised. 4. Although notification under Sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was issued on 25/7/2008 and notification under Sec. 6 thereof was issued on 28/7/2009, for Mopa Airport Project, on the basis of the aforesaid alleged fabricated power of attorney, on 29/7/2010, the co-accused Francy Gonsalves executed sale deed in respect of the said land in favour of the respondent. It has come on record that the aforesaid sale deed was executed, on the respondent giving two cheques of Rs.50.00 lakhs each and cash amount of Rs.19,68,000.00 towards consideration. The said cheques were never encashed. It has come on record that the aforesaid sale deed was executed, on the respondent giving two cheques of Rs.50.00 lakhs each and cash amount of Rs.19,68,000.00 towards consideration. The said cheques were never encashed. The respondent claimed that the cheques were never encashed because he came to know that the land was under acquisition and there was understanding between the parties that the said property was now being sold only for Rs.13.00 lakhs, due to which the said Laxmibai Madival allegedly refunded the amount of Rs.6,68,000.00 to the respondent. It has also come on record that the respondent wrote a letter, much later, on 13/8/2012 to the Special Land Acquisition Officer that he had only very recently i.e. on 11/8/2012 realised that the land was under acquisition and that he ought to be given full market value of the land under acquisition, as he had a ready purchaser of the property for about Rs.15.00 crores. 5. The Director of Civil Aviation, in the complaint, specifically stated that there was a conspiracy to cause loss to the Government exchequer because the respondent had already picked up the compensation amount awarded by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, to the tune of Rs.49,83, 709.00 and as per Government policy three times the awarded compensation was also likely to be disbursed to the respondent. It was stated in the complaint that the said enhanced amount was sanctioned as per the policy to all claimants, in which name of the respondent was included. It was then stated that since a complaint was received on 7/11/2017 from one Suresh Chopdenkar about the manner in which the respondent and co-accused Francy Gonsalves had conspired in the present case, the enhanced amount was not disbursed and the complaint was filed before the Police. 6. The police undertook investigation upon registration of FIR and efforts were made to locate the said Laxmibai Madival. During the course of investigation, it was claimed that the address of Laxmibai Madival was shown to be that of Andheri, Mumbai. On verification of the said address it was found that no such building existed and that it was already demolished. 7. In the interregnum, since the respondent was called upon by the police to respond during the course of investigation, he moved an application for anticipatory bail before the Sessions Court. By an order dtd. On verification of the said address it was found that no such building existed and that it was already demolished. 7. In the interregnum, since the respondent was called upon by the police to respond during the course of investigation, he moved an application for anticipatory bail before the Sessions Court. By an order dtd. 9/2/2018, the application for anticipatory bail was disposed of by recording that the investigation was in preliminary stage. It was also recorded that the Investigating Officer would give a notice of 48 hours to the respondent if he concludes that custodial interrogation of the respondent was necessary. 8. The investigation was taken forward, but beyond a point, the police could not make any progress. In this situation, the police sought to interrogate co-accused Francy Gonsalves in connection with the allegations that he had caused the fabricated power of attorney to be executed by impersonating some other lady as Laxmibai Madival. The said co-accused had filed an application for anticipatory bail before the Sessions Court, which was rejected. Thereafter, the said co-accused filed Criminal Application Bail no. 34 of 2021, before this Court seeking anticipatory bail. On 22/9/2021, the said anticipatory bail application was dismissed, as a consequence of which the said co-accused Francy Gonsalves was taken into custody. 9. Upon custodial interrogation, the said co-accused Francy Gonsalves divulged the details of the lady who had impersonated Laxmibai Madival. As a consequence, the statement of the said lady was recorded and even statement under Sec. 164 of the Cr.P.C of the said lady and her son came to be recorded before the Magistrate. It is in this backdrop that the police issued notice to respondent under Sec. 41(A) of Cr.P.C. on 2/10/2021 to remain present at the office of the Crime Branch on 5/10/2021. The said notice was received on behalf of the respondent by one Mr. Silveira stating that the respondent was not at home and that the notice would be handed over to him. On 5/10/2021, the respondent moved anticipatory bail application before the Sessions Court. On 6/10/2021, the Sessions Court, granted interim relief in favour of the respondent, directing him to report to the office of the crime branch. There was no reason recorded by the Sessions Court in the said order dtd. 6/10/2021, as to why it was thought fit that the respondent deserved interim relief in his favour. 10. On 6/10/2021, the Sessions Court, granted interim relief in favour of the respondent, directing him to report to the office of the crime branch. There was no reason recorded by the Sessions Court in the said order dtd. 6/10/2021, as to why it was thought fit that the respondent deserved interim relief in his favour. 10. Aggrieved by the order dtd. 6/10/2021, the State of Goa had filed Criminal Application Main No.693/2021/F before this Court. The respondent appeared on the very first day of listing of the application on 14/10/2021, through Counsel. This Court disposed of the said application by recording that the Sessions Court ought not to have passed a cryptic order granting interim order to the respondent, in the absence of recording any reasons for grant of interim relief. It was also recorded that such an order was in the teeth of settled law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court. But, since the anticipatory bail application itself was listed before the Sessions Court on 21/10/2021, this Court directed the Sessions Court to dispose of the said application on the very same day. 11. On 21/10/2021, the Sessions Court passed the impugned order allowing the application for anticipatory bail and granted relief to the respondent by imposing certain conditions. 12. Mr. S. G. Bhobe, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the applicant/State of Goa submitted that the impugned order passed by the Sessions Court is perverse, illegal and wholly unjustified in the facts and circumstances of the present case. It is submitted that a perusal of the impugned order running into 47 pages and as many as 96 paragraphs would show that a major part of the order is devoted to discussion on the concept of per incuriam. It is submitted that the Sessions Court has completely misdirected itself in rendering findings based on the concept of per incuriam and holding that three judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in the cases of State Rep. By CBI Vs Anil Sharma, (1997) 7 SCC 187 ; Dukhishyam Benupani VS Arun Kumar Bajoria, (1998) 1 SCC 52 and Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2020) 10 SCC 118 , are per incuriam. The learned Public Prosecutor was at pains to highlight that the Sessions Court completely failed to appreciate the reason why the prosecutor appearing before the Sessions Court had relied upon the said judgments. State of Maharashtra, (2020) 10 SCC 118 , are per incuriam. The learned Public Prosecutor was at pains to highlight that the Sessions Court completely failed to appreciate the reason why the prosecutor appearing before the Sessions Court had relied upon the said judgments. It was further submitted that the Sessions Court then devoted remaining portion of the order on recording a diatribe against the investigating officer and giving a finding that the very registration of the FIR was suspicious. 13. It was then submitted that the question regarding necessity of custodial interrogation was cursorily referred in the impugned order, thereby demonstrating that the Sessions Court committed a grave error in allowing the application filed by the respondent. It was submitted that the necessity for custodial interrogation in the backdrop of progress of the investigation after the arrest of coaccused Francy Gonsalves was not taken into consideration by the Sessions Court at all. Much emphasis was placed on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court wherein it has been laid down that orders granting anticipatory bail or bail to the accused can be set aside if the superior Court finds that such orders have been passed in a perverse, illegal or unjustified manner. In this regard, reliance was placed on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mahipal V/s Rajesh Kumar & Ors., 2020 (2) SCC 118 ; Prashant Singh Rajput V/s State of M.P, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 919;State of Kerala V/s Mahesh, 2021 SCC OnLine Sc 308, Mahadev Meena V/s Praveen Rathore & Ors., 2021 SCC OnLine Sc 804; Supreme Bhiwandi Wada Manor Infrastructure Pvt Ltd. V/s State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2021 (8) SCC 753 and Dr. Naresh Kumar Mangla V/s Anita Agarwal & Ors. 2020 SCC Online SC 1031. 14. On the other hand, Mr. Nigel Costa Frias, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that the impugned order could be interfered with only if the applicant State was able to demonstrate the necessity of custodial interrogation of the respondent. It was submitted that the FIR was registered as far back as on 22/1/2018 and that the applicant/State failed to demonstrate why the necessity to arrest the respondent had arisen after such a long period of time. It was submitted that the FIR was registered as far back as on 22/1/2018 and that the applicant/State failed to demonstrate why the necessity to arrest the respondent had arisen after such a long period of time. The learned Counsel further submitted that the very registration of the FIR and initiation of the investigation, at the behest of the Director of Civil Aviation was rendered suspicious because there was material to indicate that the person who purportedly sent the complaint to the Director of Civil Aviation had stated that he had never lodged such a complaint. It was sought to be indicated that the respondent was made an accused due to political reasons and that since conditions were imposed on the respondent while granting anticipatory bail, no case was made out for interference in the present application. It was further submitted that the documents in custody of the respondent were already handed over to the investigating officer and there was no ground for seeking his custody. Reliance was placed on judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhadresh Bipinbhai Shethu V. State of Gujarat & Anr., (2016)1 SCC 152 ; Siddharth V. State of Uttar Pradesh,2021 SCC online SC 615; Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2012)1 SCC 40 ; Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Ors Vs. State of Punjab (1980)2 SCC 565 . 15. Before proceeding to consider the contention raised on behalf of the rival parties, it would be appropriate to refer to the position of law concerning the circumstances in which an order granting anticipatory bail could be interfered with. In the case of Mahipal V/s Rajesh Kumar & Ors. (supra), the Supreme Court considered the said aspect of the matter and held as follows at paragraphs 14, 15 and 16:- "14 The provision for an accused to be released on bail touches upon the liberty of an individual. It is for this reason that this Court does not ordinarily interfere with an order of the High Court granting bail. However, where the discretion of the High Court to grant bail has been exercised without the due application of mind or in contravention of the directions of this Court, such an order granting bail is liable to be set aside. However, where the discretion of the High Court to grant bail has been exercised without the due application of mind or in contravention of the directions of this Court, such an order granting bail is liable to be set aside. The Court is required to factor, amongst other things, a prima facie view that the accused had committed the offence, the nature and gravity of the offence and the likelihood of the accused obstructing the proceedings of the trial in any manner or evading the course of justice. The provision for being released on bail draws an appropriate balance between public interest in the administration of justice and the protection of individual liberty pending adjudication of the case. However, the grant of bail is to be secured within the bounds of the law and in compliance with the conditions laid down by this Court. It is for this reason that a court must balance numerous factors that guide the exercise of the discretionary power to grant bail on a case by case basis. Inherent in this determination is whether, on an analysis of the record, it appears that there is a prima facie or reasonable cause to believe that the accused had committed the crime. It is not relevant at this stage for the court to examine in detail the evidence on record to come to a conclusive finding. 15. The decision of this Court in Prasanta has been consistently followed by this Court in Ash Mohammad vs. Shiv Raj Singh, Ranjit Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh8, Neeru Yadav vs. State of U.P., Virupakshappa Gouda vs. State of Karnataka10, and State of Orissa vs. Mahimananda Mishra. 16. The considerations that guide the power of an appellate court in assessing the correctness of an order granting bail stand on a different footing from an assessment of an application for the cancellation of bail. The correctness of an order granting bail is tested on the anvil of whether there was an improper or arbitrary exercise of the discretion in the grant of bail. The test is whether the order granting bail is perverse, illegal or unjustified. On the other hand, an application for cancellation of bail is generally examined on the anvil of the existence of supervening circumstances or violations of the conditions of bail by a person to whom bail has been granted. The test is whether the order granting bail is perverse, illegal or unjustified. On the other hand, an application for cancellation of bail is generally examined on the anvil of the existence of supervening circumstances or violations of the conditions of bail by a person to whom bail has been granted. In Neeru Yadav v State of Uttar Pradesh, the accused was granted bail by the High Court. In an appeal against the order of the High Court, a two Judge Bench of this Court surveyed the precedent on the principles that guide the grant of bail. Justice Dipak Misra (as the learned Chief Justice then was) held: "12...It is well settled in law that cancellation of bail after it is granted because the accused has misconducted himself or of some supervening circumstances warranting such cancellation have occurred is in a different compartment altogether than an order granting bail which is unjustified, illegal and perverse. If in a case, the relevant factors which should have been taken into consideration while dealing with the application for bail and have not been taken note of, or bail is founded on irrelevant considerations, indisputably the superior court can set aside the order of such a grant of bail. Such a case belongs to a different category and is in a separate realm. While dealing with a case of second nature, the Court does not dwell upon the violation of conditions by the accused or the supervening circumstances that have happened subsequently. It, on the contrary, delves into the justifiability and the soundness of the order passed by the Court." 16. The aforesaid position of law was reiterated in the case of Prashant Singh Rajput V/s State of M.P (supra), wherein an order granting anticipatory bail to the accused was set aside. This position was further followed in the case of State of Kerala V/s Mahesh(supra). It is significant that in the said case the order granting bail was set aside and it was directed that the accused shall be taken into custody, despite the fact that the order granting bail to the accused had been passed about three months earlier. In the case of Supreme Bhiwandi Wada Manor Infrastructure Pvt Ltd. V/s State of Maharashtra & Ors. (supra), the Supreme Court considered challenge to an order granting anticipatory bail to the accused therein who were facing prosecution for offences, inter alia, under Ss. In the case of Supreme Bhiwandi Wada Manor Infrastructure Pvt Ltd. V/s State of Maharashtra & Ors. (supra), the Supreme Court considered challenge to an order granting anticipatory bail to the accused therein who were facing prosecution for offences, inter alia, under Ss. 467, 468 and 471 of IPC, as in the present case. The Supreme Court relied upon the aforementioned position of law and after referring to judgment in case of Myakala Dharmarajam Vs. State of Telangana, (2020) 2 SCC 743 held as follows: - "26. An appellate court or a superior court can set aside the order granting bail if the court granting bail did not the relevant factors. In Myakala Dharmarajam v. The State of Telangana this Court has held : ?9. It is trite law that cancellation of bail can be done in cases where the order granting bail suffers from serious infirmities resulting in miscarriage of justice. If the court granting bail ignores relevant material indicating prima facie involvement of the Accused or takes into account irrelevant material, which has no relevance to the question of grant of bail to the Accused, the High Court or the Sessions Court would be justified in cancelling the bail. 27. There are serious allegations against the respondent - accused of a fraudulent misappropriation of amounts intended to be paid by the company to the farmers affected by the work of road widening being undertaken by the complainant. The FIR sets out details of the alleged acts of fraud and misappropriation of funds, as explained earlier. Having regard to the seriousness of the allegations no case for anticipatory bail was made out. The High Court has erred both in law and in its evaluation of the facts. 28. We accordingly allow these appeals and set aside the orders of the High Court. The orders granting anticipatory bail under Sec. 438 to the respondent- accused shall accordingly stand set aside. The appeals are disposed of in the above terms." 17. In the case of Dr. Naresh Kumar Mangla Vs. Anita Agarwal & Ors (supra), the Supreme Court reiterated the aforesaid position of law and set aside the order passed by the High Court granting anticipatory bail to the accused therein. The appeals are disposed of in the above terms." 17. In the case of Dr. Naresh Kumar Mangla Vs. Anita Agarwal & Ors (supra), the Supreme Court reiterated the aforesaid position of law and set aside the order passed by the High Court granting anticipatory bail to the accused therein. It is significant that the Supreme Court set aside the order granting anticipatory bail after referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre Vs State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694 . 18. In the case of State Rep. By CBI Vs Anil Sharma(supra), the Supreme Court made following observations as regards the aspect of custodial interrogation: - "6. We find force in the submission of the CBI that custodial interrogation is qualitatively more elicitation- oriented than questioning a suspect who is well ensconced with a favorable order under Sec. 438 of the code. In a case like this effective interrogation of a suspected person is of tremendous advantage in disinterring many useful informations and also materials which would have been concealed. Success in such interrogation would elude if the suspected person knows that he is well protected and insulated by a pre-arrest bail order during the time he is interrogated. Very often interrogation in such a condition would reduce to a mere ritual. The argument that the custodial interrogation is fraught with the danger of the person being subjected to third degree methods need not be countenanced, for, such an argument can be advanced by all accused in all criminal cases. The court has to presume that responsible Police Officers would conduct themselves in a responsible manner and that those entrusted with the task of disinterring offences would not conduct themselves as offenders." 19. In the case of Dukhishyam Benupani VS Arun Kumar Bajoria(supra), the Supreme Court set aside an order passed by the High Court granting anticipatory bail, by relying upon the aforesaid position of law laid down in the case of State Rep. By CBI Vs Anil Sharma(supra). In the case of P. Chidambaram V/s Directorate of Enforcement (2019) 9 SCC 24 , the Supreme Court confirmed the order passed by the High Court rejecting anticipatory bail. By CBI Vs Anil Sharma(supra). In the case of P. Chidambaram V/s Directorate of Enforcement (2019) 9 SCC 24 , the Supreme Court confirmed the order passed by the High Court rejecting anticipatory bail. In this judgment the Supreme Court referred to the Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Others V/s State of Punjab, as also judgments in the cases of Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre Vs State of Maharashtra(supra), Dukhishyam Benupani VS Arun Kumar Bajoria(supra) and State Rep. By CBI Vs Anil Sharma(supra). After discussing the said judgments and other judgments on the aspect of grant of anticipatory bail, it was laid down that ordinarily arrest is a part of process of investigation intended to secure several purposes and that there may be circumstances in which the accused may provide information leading to discovery of material facts and relevant information. It was further observed that in such circumstances grant of anticipatory bail may hamper investigation. Although it was recorded that the introduction of Sec. 438 of Cr.P.C. is to safeguard the personal liberty of an individual, a balance has been struck between the right of individual to personal freedom and the right of the investigating agency to interrogate the accused as to the material so far collected and to collect more information which may lead to recovery of relevant information. 20. It is in the backdrop of the aforesaid position of law laid down and reiterated by the Supreme Court that the correctness or otherwise of the impugned order passed by the Sessions Court needs to be examined. 21. A perusal of the impugned order shows that the Sessions Court has recorded the allegations that led to registration of the FIR dtd. 22/1/2018 in the present case. Thereafter, the said Court has referred to the allegations made by the respondent that the Director of Civil Aviation i.e. the officer who submitted complaint leading to registration of FIR, was demanding commission for release of compensation amount. Thereafter, the Sessions Court has referred to the political angle claimed by the respondent and further reference is made to transcript of alleged phone conversation between the respondent and the said Suresh Chopdenkar, to claim that he had never submitted complaint dtd. 7/11/2017 to the Director of Civil Aviation. Thereafter, the Sessions Court has referred to the political angle claimed by the respondent and further reference is made to transcript of alleged phone conversation between the respondent and the said Suresh Chopdenkar, to claim that he had never submitted complaint dtd. 7/11/2017 to the Director of Civil Aviation. It is then recorded with surprise that the Investigating officer was present with his say before the Sessions Court when the application was taken up for consideration. The Sessions Court has then proceeded to analyse the say submitted on behalf of the Investigating officer in detail, further recording that since the investigating officer was unable to satisfy the Court about the need for custodial interrogation, interim relief was granted to the respondent. It is significant, as noted above, that in the interim order dtd. 6/10/2021, the Sessions Court had not recorded any reason for granting blanket interim relief to the respondent. 22. Be that as it may, the Sessions Court further proceeded to record that questions were put to the investigating officer with regard to the progress of the investigation about details that had come on record so far and it was recorded that the investigating officer was giving vague replies, thereby showing that custodial interrogation of the respondent was not necessary. 23. Thereafter, the Sessions Court has referred to three judgments of Supreme Court upon which the applicant/State placed reliance i.e. State Rep. By CBI Vs Anil Sharma, Dukhishyam Benupani VS Arun Kumar Bajoria and Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra(supra). 24. The Sessions Court then proceeded to refer to each of the three judgments and gave findings that the said judgments could be distinguished on facts. It is then recorded by referring to the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra (supra), that "the point of law of not passing blanket orders is duly noted". The Sessions Court then referred to Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia Vs State of Punjab(supra) and judgment i Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre VS State of Maharashtra and ors(supra). The Sessions Court also referred to a number of judgments on the concept of per incuriam and at the end of discussion on this aspect, recorded that the three judgments of the Supreme Court specifically referred to above were per incuriam. 25. The Sessions Court also referred to a number of judgments on the concept of per incuriam and at the end of discussion on this aspect, recorded that the three judgments of the Supreme Court specifically referred to above were per incuriam. 25. This Court is surprised that when the Sessions Court in the impugned order gave a finding that the aforesaid three judgments were distinguishable on facts and that they would not support the contention raised on behalf of the State, what was the need for proceeding to devote paragraph after paragraph to the concept of per incuriam. A perusal of the discussion by the Sessions Court on this aspect further indicates that it has completely misdirected itself in indulging in such a long discussion. Even otherwise the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of State Rep. By CBI Vs Anil Sharma, Dukhishyam Benupani VS Arun Kumar Bajoria and Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra(supra) are on the aspect of the qualitative difference between interrogation of accused while in custody as opposed to the situation where the accused is enjoying an order of protection from arrest granted by a Court. In these three judgments, there is no quarrel at all with the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia Vs State of Punjab(supra) or subsequent judgment in case of Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre Vs State of Maharashtra and ors.(supra) as regards law governing anticipatory bail applications filed under Sec. 438 of the Cr.P.C. Hence, there is no question of the aforesaid three judgments of the Supreme Court being per incuriam in the backdrop of the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia Vs State of Punjab and subsequent judgment in the case of Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre Vs State of Mahrashtra and ors(supra). 26. In the opinion of this Court, the aforesaid findings rendered by the Sessions Court on the concept of per incuriam were wholly unnecessary and that the said Court was wholly unjustified in making comments on the aforesaid three judgments of the Supreme Court. The Sessions Court completely misdirected itself while indulging in such analysis, thereby rendering its findings totally perverse and wholly unsustainable. 27. The Sessions Court completely misdirected itself while indulging in such analysis, thereby rendering its findings totally perverse and wholly unsustainable. 27. The Sessions Court thereupon proceeded in a manner as if to grill the investigating officer as regards the allegations made by the respondent about the alleged falsity of the complaint filed by the Director of Civil Aviation. The Sessions Court proceeded to find faults with the investigating officer about the physical verification and investigation regarding the purported address of the said Laxmibai Madival at Andheri, Mumbai, being nonexistent and that the building in question being government property, which was already demolished. The approach of the Sessions Court appears to be one of picking holes in the progress of investigation and reaching a finding that the very registration of the FIR and initiation of the investigation was false and unsustainable. 28. This Court is unable to appreciate the approach adopted by the Sessions Court in reaching such findings, when the State represented through the prosecutor was at pains to point out that after dismissal of the application for anticipatory bail filed by the co-accused Francy Gonsalves, his arrest and information divulged in the course of custodial interrogation, had led to a situation where custodial interrogation of the respondent had become necessary. There is no reference made by the sessions Court to the order passed by this Court, while rejecting the anticipatory bail application of the co-accused Francy Gonsalves, despite the fact that it was placed on record and relied upon by the prosecution. The Sessions Court was wholly unjustified in adopting such an approach and in further going to the extent of giving a finding that there was nothing to establish that Laxmibai Madival had already died. 29. Thereafter, the Sessions Court referred to the judgments upon which the respondent had placed reliance and proceeded to record that the investigating officer had failed to demonstrate as to why the custodial interrogation of the respondent was necessary. On this basis, the application of the respondent was allowed by imposing certain conditions. 30. This Court has taken into consideration the entire material placed on record on behalf of the applicant/State, as also the material relied upon by the respondent. On this basis, the application of the respondent was allowed by imposing certain conditions. 30. This Court has taken into consideration the entire material placed on record on behalf of the applicant/State, as also the material relied upon by the respondent. It is found that as per the FIR and the progress of the investigation so far, the present case prima facie does indicate that transactions were undertaken by the accused, particularly the respondent and co-accused Francy Gonsalves, in respect of the land in question to cause serious loss to the Government exchequer. This included preparation of a notarised power of attorney by impersonating the original owner of the land. Notarised power of attorney was used by the coaccused Francy Gonsalves to execute sale deed dtd. 29/7/2010 in favour of the respondent. Although it was claimed that two cheques of Rs.50.00 lakhs each and cash of Rs.19,68,000.00 was given to the said Laxmibai Madival, it was claimed that since the respondent came to know that the land was under acquisition, he asked said Laxmibai Madival not to encash the two cheques of Rs.50.00 lakhs each. In fact, the respondent further went on to claim that said Laxmibai Madival "refunded" Rs.6,68,000.00 to him, thereby indicating that the consideration amount was only Rs.13.00lakhs for the entire land. 31. But, according to documents on record, the respondent himself claimed in the letter dtd. 13/8/2012 addressed to the Land Acquisition Officer that he became aware about the land having come under acquisition only on 11/8/2012, when he saw that the name of the Director of Transport was in the list of occupants. If this was true, then the assertion of the respondent is wholly unbelievable that he had told the original owner Laxmibai Madival not to deposit the cheques of Rs.50.00 lakhs each, given towards consideration when the sale deed dtd. 29/7/2010 was executed, because he became aware that the land had come under acquisition. It cannot be believed that if such cheques of Rs.50.00lakhs each were indeed given, the person would have waited for more than two years and would not deposit the cheques. This clearly indicates the suspicious nature of the entire transaction and the prima facie involvement of the applicant in such serious acts of usurping the amount of compensation under the land acquisition proceeding, further claiming three times the compensation under the Government policy, thereby defrauding the Government exchequer. 32. This clearly indicates the suspicious nature of the entire transaction and the prima facie involvement of the applicant in such serious acts of usurping the amount of compensation under the land acquisition proceeding, further claiming three times the compensation under the Government policy, thereby defrauding the Government exchequer. 32. The Sessions Court clearly erred in not even referring to the order passed by this Court dismissing the anticipatory bail application of the co-accused Francy Gonsalves, because various aspects were discussed in detail by this Court while rejecting the anticipatory bail application. The effect on progress of the investigation upon arrest of the co-accused Francy Gonsalves was also not taken in the account by the Sessions Court. Due to information revealed by the co-accused Francy Gonsavles upon arrest and interrogation, the lady who had impersonated the original owner Laxmibai Madival was traced. Her statement and that of her son were also recorded under Sec. 164 of Cr.P.C. 33. In this situation, the investigating agency was justified in claiming that the custody of the respondent was required to confront him with such information, now revealed after custodial interrogation of co-accused Francy Gonsalves. The Sessions Court itself has recorded that the investigating officer had brought to its notice that the respondent was called upon, by the notice date 2/10/2021, to join the investigation and face interrogation due to urgency in the matter as remand of co-accused Francy Gonsalves was expiring on 5/10/2021. Even after recording this fact, the Sessions Court failed to appreciate why custodial interrogation of the respondent was necessary. The record shows that when notice under Sec. 41(A) of the Cr.P.C. dtd. 2/10/2021 was issued to the respondent, to remain present before the Crime Branch on 5/10/2021, he moved the Court on 5/10/2021 and interim order was passed on 6/10/2021. This Court is not further commenting upon the manner in which blanket order dtd. 6/10/2021 was passed by the Sessions Court without recording any reason for grant of such interim relief. 34. Much is sought to be stated on behalf of the respondent on the aspect that even though FIR was registered in 2018, the investigating officer was seeking custody of the respondent in October,2021. But, the record shows that in the year 2018 itself the respondent had filed an application for anticipatory bail before the Sessions Court, which was disposed of by order dtd. 9/2/2018. But, the record shows that in the year 2018 itself the respondent had filed an application for anticipatory bail before the Sessions Court, which was disposed of by order dtd. 9/2/2018. In the said order, it was recorded that investigation was at preliminary stage and that notice of 48 hours would be issued to the respondent, if the investigating officer concluded that custodial interrogation was required. It is matter of record that this Court has passed at least two judgments, circulated to the Sessions Courts in the State of Goa that such orders granting notice of 48 hours to the accused regarding custodial interrogation are not contemplated in law and such orders have been deprecated. 35. Be that as it may, the said order dtd. 9/2/2018, was passed by the Sessions Court in connection with the respondent herein. Therefore, merely because the FIR was registered in the year 2018, the respondent cannot contend that the investigating officer could not claim custody for interrogation in the present case. The Sessions Court completely failed to appreciate the progress of investigation and the impact of further information revealed after dismissal of the anticipatory bail application of the co-accused Francy Gonsalves and upon his custodial interrogation. It has to be taken into account that arrest is part of progress of investigation and it is intended to secure several purposes. The Sessions Court failed to appreciate that grant of anticipatory bail had the effect of hampering the investigation, in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In the backdrop of the coaccused being arrested and information being divulged, there is every possibility of the respondent providing further information, leading to discovery of material facts and relevant information. The respondent can certainly be confronted with the information divulged during the course of investigation. In this backdrop, it becomes clear that the Sessions Court committed a grave error in rendering a finding that the investigating officer had failed to demonstrate the reasons for custodial interrogation of the respondent. 36. The Sessions Court also erred in discussing in detail the material that had come on record during the investigation up till now, to render findings which amounted to discrediting the investigation and the very initiation thereof by registration of the FIR. 36. The Sessions Court also erred in discussing in detail the material that had come on record during the investigation up till now, to render findings which amounted to discrediting the investigation and the very initiation thereof by registration of the FIR. The Sessions Court could not have placed unnecessary emphasis on purported suspicious nature of the manner in which the complaint was filed by the Director of Civil Aviation, leading to registration of the FIR by relying on the claims made by the respondent that the aforementioned Suresh Chopendkar had never filed any complaint on 7/11/2017 with the Director of Civil Aviation. The reference to the alleged transcribed telephonic conversation between the respondent and said Suresh Chopdenkar was wholly unnecessary. In fact, if nothing else, such material indicated the manner in which the respondent was seeking to influence potential witnesses in the present case. The Sessions Court also failed to appreciate that the complaint lodged by the Director of Civil Aviation had set the criminal law in motion and that investigation had revealed the prima facie material against the respondent. This further demonstrates the errors committed by the Sessions Court while passing the impugned order. 37. As regards the judgments on which learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance, suffice it to say that there can be no quarrel with the propositions laid down. In the said judgments, it has been laid down that personal liberty is an important aspect of our constitutional mandate and merely because an arrest can be made because it is lawful, does not mandate that arrest must be made. This Court is of the opinion that even in the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia Vs State of Punjab (supra), it is not laid down as a proposition of law that in no case the investigating agency can arrest an accused. As laid down in the case of P. Chidambaram VS. Directorate of Enforcement(supra), a balance is to be struck between the right of the individual to personal freedom and the right of the investigating agency to interrogate the accused, as to the material so far collected and to collect more information, which may lead to recovery of relevant information. The Supreme Court has clearly held in State Rep. Directorate of Enforcement(supra), a balance is to be struck between the right of the individual to personal freedom and the right of the investigating agency to interrogate the accused, as to the material so far collected and to collect more information, which may lead to recovery of relevant information. The Supreme Court has clearly held in State Rep. By CBI Vs Anil Sharma (supra) that custodial interrogation is qualitatively more elicitation oriented than questioning a suspect who is well ensconced with a favourable order of anticipatory bail. 38. The Sessions Court in the present case completely failed to appreciate these aspects of the matter and therefore, the impugned order is found to be perverse and unjustified. 39. As per the law laid down and reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Mahipal Vs Rajesh Kumar and ors (supra), once it is found that the order granting bail is perverse, illegal and unjustified, it deserves to be set aside. This Court holds that the impugned order passed by the Sessions Court is not only perverse but, it is wholly unjustified, in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 40. Hence, the present application filed by the State is allowed and the impugned order granting anticipatory bail to the respondent is quashed and set aside. 41. Application stands disposed of accordingly. 42. Upon pronouncement of the order, the learned Counsel for the respondent prays for stay of the order passed today. This Court has recorded detailed reasons as to why the impugned order passed by the Sessions Court is found to be perverse and unjustified. Hence, request for grant of stay is rejected.