JUDGMENT : Vipin Sanghi, J. The present Special Appeal is directed against the order dated 11.05.2018 rendered by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (S/S) No. 73 of 2012 preferred by the respondent. 2. The respondent had preferred the said Writ Petition to challenge the order of dismissal passed against him by the appellant no. 2, i.e. the Deputy Inspector General, I.T.B.P. Head Quarter, Bukhara Camp Bareilly. 3. The brief background facts are that the respondent was serving in the I.T.B.P as HC/ Driver. He was driving a vehicle, with several I.T.B.P. personnel in it. He met with an accident, which resulted in death of three I.T.B.P. personnel and injuries to thirteen others. The respondent himself was injured in the accident. When he was medically examined, it was found that he was in an inebriated state. He was placed under suspension on 22.12.2010, and charges were framed against him for his aforesaid misconduct on 17.01.2011. He was subjected to a Summary Force Court Marshall, and was found guilty. The proceedings of the Summary Force Court were confirmed on 24.02.2011, and his name was ordered to be struck off from the Unit w.e.f. 25.02.2011. Consequently, he was dismissed from service vide order dated 24.02.2011. 4. The respondent, thereafter, preferred a departmental appeal against his dismissal, which was also dismissed on 30.09.2011. The respondent then preferred the Writ Petition in question, wherein the impugned order has been passed. The learned Single Judge has allowed the Writ Petition with the following reasoning :- “Attention of this Court has been drawn to Page 165 of the paper book, which clearly shows that the petitioner was a meritorious employee. He has been awarded cash rewards on 09.10.1999, 29.11.1999, 28.02.2007, 11.02.2003, 03.09.2002 and 11.02.2003. The fact of the matter is that taking into consideration the previous merit and unblemished record of the petitioner, the penalty other than dismissal could be imposed upon him by the Disciplinary Authority. The penalty imposed must commensurate with the alleged misconduct. The scope of judicial review in these matters is limited but once a conscience of the Court is pricked, the Court can order the Disciplinary Authority to reconsider the imposition of penalty by also taking into consideration the previous conduct of the employee. The penalty imposed must commensurate with the alleged misconduct. The scope of judicial review in these matters is limited but once a conscience of the Court is pricked, the Court can order the Disciplinary Authority to reconsider the imposition of penalty by also taking into consideration the previous conduct of the employee. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of with the direction to the Disciplinary Authority to re-consider and to impose any penalty other than dismissal on the basis of his previous record.” 5. At the outset, the learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the present Special Appeal is not maintainable. In this regard, he places reliance on Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, as applicable to this Court. Rule 5, on which reliance is placed, reads as follows :- “5. Special appeal.-An appeal shall lie to the Court from a judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction) in respect of a decree or order made by a Court subject to the superintendence of the Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction or in the exercise of its power of superintendence or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction or in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution in respect of any judgment, order or award - (a) of a tribunal, Court or statutory arbitrator made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction under any Uttarakhand Act or under any Central Act, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, or (b) of the Government or any officer or authority, made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any such Act of one Judge.” 6. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent is that, since the present Special Appeal arises from an order passed in Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, wherein the respondent had challenged the order passed by any officer or authority in exercise of appellate jurisdiction, the present Special Appeal is barred, and not maintainable. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent is that, since the present Special Appeal arises from an order passed in Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, wherein the respondent had challenged the order passed by any officer or authority in exercise of appellate jurisdiction, the present Special Appeal is barred, and not maintainable. He has placed reliance on the judgments of this Court in Dinesh Kumar Sharma v. State of Uttaranchal and Ors., AIR 2005 UTR 61, and Tapendra Singh Rana v. Mussoorie Dehradun Development Authority and others, (Special Appeal No. 104 of 2022) decided on 06.06.2022, in support of his submissions. 7. We may first deal with the aforesaid preliminary objection of learned counsel for the respondent. A perusal of Rule 5 shows that it opens with affirmative words, inasmuch, as it states that “An appeal shall lie to the Court……”. It, thereafter, proceeds to carve out exceptional situations, in which a Special Appeal would not lie to the Court. First and foremost, the aforesaid structure of Rule 5 tells us that the limitation on the maintainability of a Special Appeal – which is in the nature of a Proviso, has to be construed narrowly, since Rule 5 itself opens with affirmative words. 8. We now proceed to examine, in what cases a Special Appeal would not be maintainable. First and foremost, a Special Appeal would not be maintainable from a judgment passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Secondly, an appeal in respect of a decree, or order made by a Court (which is subject to the superintendence of this Court) would not be maintainable, if such an order, is an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction; in the exercise of its power of superintendence, or; in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction. A Special Appeal would also not lie against an order made by a Court in the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution of India in certain circumstances. A Special Appeal would also not lie against an order made by a Court in the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution of India in certain circumstances. These circumstances/ situations are, where the judgment or order of the High Court under Article(s) 226/227 are passed “in respect of any judgment, order or award – (a) of a tribunal, Court or statutory arbitrator made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction under any Uttarakhand Act or under any Central Act, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution”. Therefore, for a Special Appeal to be barred against a judgment/ order passed in exercise of powers under Article(s) 226/227, it would be necessary that the judgment, order or award - which is examined in proceedings under Article(s) 226/ 227 of the Constitution of India, should have been made by a Tribunal, Court or Statutory Arbitrator. Thus, orders passed by an Authority which cannot be called either a “Tribunal”, or “Court”, or “Statutory Arbitrator”, when examined by the High Court under Article(s) 226/227, would be open to further examination in a Special Appeal, as a Special Appeal against the order/ judgment of the High Court in exercise of powers under Article(s) 226/ 227 is not barred. That is not the case in hand, as the appellate authority, which dismissed the respondent’s appeal, was neither a “Tribunal”, nor a “Court”, nor a “Statutory Arbitrator”. These expressions have a definite legal meaning and connotation. We are presently not going into the said aspect, as we do not consider it necessary to do so in the facts of this case. 9. Moreover, the appellate order, against which the respondent preferred the Writ Petition, though made in the exercise of jurisdiction under a Central Act, i.e. the ITBPF Act, 1992, was not made in respect of any of the matters enumerated in the State List, or the Concurrent List, in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. A perusal of the Seventh Schedule shows that Entry 2 in List I—Union List reads, “naval, military and air forces; any other armed forces of the Union”. The I.T.B.P. is an armed force of the Union, constituted under the Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force Act, 1992 (ITBPF Act, 1992) passed by the Parliament. A perusal of the Seventh Schedule shows that Entry 2 in List I—Union List reads, “naval, military and air forces; any other armed forces of the Union”. The I.T.B.P. is an armed force of the Union, constituted under the Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force Act, 1992 (ITBPF Act, 1992) passed by the Parliament. Consequently, the Central Act in question, i.e. the Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force Act, 1992, not being an Act in respect of any matter enumerated either in the State List, or the Concurrent List, in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the exercise of its authority by the appellate authority, under the said Act – dismissing the respondent’s appeal, would not bar the maintenance of the Special Appeal against the judgment rendered in a writ proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, wherein such appellate order was assailed. 10. The last clause, with which we are now concerned, is Clause (b) of the aforesaid Rule 5. At the cost of repetition, we may reproduce Clause (b), which reads:- “……(b) of the Government or any officer or authority, made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any such Act of one Judge.” 11. The important words in Clause (b) for our purpose, are “any such Act”. The words “any such Act” would have to take their meaning from the Act referred to in Clause (a), which is “any Uttarakhand Act”, or, “any Central Act”, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List, or the Concurrent List, in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. 12. As we have already seen, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force Act, 1992 does not qualify as an Act covered by Clause (a) aforesaid. That being the position, even Clause (b) is not attracted in this case. Thus, we find no merit in the submission of learned counsel for the respondent, premised on Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, as applicable to this Court. 13. The aforesaid two decisions of this Court, relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent, have not considered the language employed in Rule 5 in its entirety. They stop short of considering the complete Rule and, therefore, cannot be considered to be binding authorities. We, therefore, reject the submission of counsel for the respondent premised on the aforesaid decisions. 14. The aforesaid two decisions of this Court, relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent, have not considered the language employed in Rule 5 in its entirety. They stop short of considering the complete Rule and, therefore, cannot be considered to be binding authorities. We, therefore, reject the submission of counsel for the respondent premised on the aforesaid decisions. 14. On merits, the submission of learned counsel for the respondent is that the service record of the respondent was meritorious before he got involved in the accident in question. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the respondent had been given cash rewards on seven occasions between 1999 and 2003. He had also secured one good entry on 14.10.2005. He had NIL punishments against his name. His general character had been found to be satisfactory. He has served for 15 years, 06 months & 27 days in the rank of HC/ Driver as on 24.02.2011. Learned counsel submits that the respondent is now driving a private taxi. He has two children to support, and he is somehow making his ends meets. He, therefore, submits that the punishment of dismissal was rightly found to be harsh and disproportionate by the learned Single Judge. 15. We have considered the submissions of learned counsels, and we find that the impugned order summarily returns a finding that the respondent’s misconduct did not deserve the penalty of dismissal from service. On that premise, the learned Single Judge directed the Disciplinary Authority to reconsider the imposition of penalty by taking into account his previous good conduct. 16. Unfortunately, the impugned order, apart from stating that the conscience of the Court is pricked because of imposition of the penalty of dismissal upon the respondent, does not state anything further. The grave facts of the case that the respondent was found in an inebriated condition, while driving the vehicle, which resulted in death of three ITBP personnel, apart from injuring thirteen others, were not taken into consideration. Pertinently, the respondent admitted his guilt in the inquiry proceedings initiated against him. He was a member of a disciplined force, wherein even higher standards of discipline are expected to be adhered to. The respondent did not appreciate and understand the gravity of his responsibility in transporting the members of the force from one place to another. Pertinently, the respondent admitted his guilt in the inquiry proceedings initiated against him. He was a member of a disciplined force, wherein even higher standards of discipline are expected to be adhered to. The respondent did not appreciate and understand the gravity of his responsibility in transporting the members of the force from one place to another. Such a person, as the respondent, could not have been trusted for assignment of any responsibility by the force. Condonation of such conduct by reduction of penalty is bound to have the effect of lowering the disciplinary standards maintained by, and required in the Armed Force. It would send a very damaging message, and the deterrence against such misconduct would be lost. The ITBP is deployed on higher reaches in mountainous terrains. There has to be zero tolerance when it comes to their efficiency and discipline. Otherwise, the results can be disastrous – as it happened in this case. 17. Keeping in view the aforesaid, we are of the view that the impugned order cannot be sustained, as the same is cryptic and virtually unreasoned. We, accordingly, allow the present Special Appeal, and set aside the impugned order. 18. In sequel thereto, pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.