General Manager, Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (Villupuram) Limited, Vellore v. Special Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Chennai
2022-09-13
M.S.RAMESH
body2022
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT (Prayer: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying to issue a Writ of Certiorari, to call for the records of the order passed by the 1st respondent in Approval Petition in A.P.No.446 of 2011 dated 11.07.2013 and to quash the same as illegal.) 1. Based on certain proven charges, the second respondent herein, who was employed as a conductor in the petitioner/Transport Corporation, was dismissed from service on 04.11.2011. Along with the order of dismissal, the petitioner/Transport Corporation had enclosed a cheque of Rs.5,954/- towards the one month wages and on the same day i.e. on 04.11.2011, had preferred an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, before the first respondent/Authority seeking for approval of the order of dismissal. On 11.07.2013, their application came to be rejected through the order impugned in the present Writ Petition, predominantly on the grounds that there was no prima facie case for dismissal before the Domestic Tribunal; that there was victimisation and unfair labour practices; and there was a shortfall of the payment of one month wages that was not paid along with the order of dismissal and that the second respondent was entitled for a monthly payment of Rs.6,870/- instead of Rs.5,954/-. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner/Transport Corporation raised several grounds touching upon the order of the Authority and submitted that the order requires interference. According to the petitioner, there was a prima facie case before the Inquiry Officer and that this is not a case of either victimisation or unfair labour practices. 3. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of 'Lalla Ram Vs. D.C.M. Chemical Works Ltd. & another' reported in '(1978) 3 Supreme Court Cases 1' has laid down certain guidelines on the scope of interference to an application under Section 33 (2)(b) of the Act. As per the decision, when any one of these guidelines are not adopted, the application seeking for approval itself is liable to be rejected, which portion of the order reads as follows:- ...... “12.
As per the decision, when any one of these guidelines are not adopted, the application seeking for approval itself is liable to be rejected, which portion of the order reads as follows:- ...... “12. The position that emerges from the above quoted decisions of this Court may be stated thus : In proceedings under section 33(2)(b) of the Act, the jurisdiction of the industrial Tribunal is confined to the enquiry as to (i) whether a proper domestic enquiry in accordance with the relevant rules/Standing Orders and principles of natural justice has been held; (ii) whether a prima facie case for dismissal based on legal evidence adduced before the domestic tribunal is made out; (iii) whether the employer had come to a bona fide conclusion that the employee was guilty and the dismissal did not amount to unfair labour practice and was not intended to victimise the employee regard being had to the position settled by the decisions of this Court in Bengal Bhatdee Coal Co, v. Ram Probesh Singh(1), Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. Ram Naresh Kumar(2), Hind Construction & Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen(3), Workmen of Messrs Firestone Tyre & Rubber Company of India (P) Ltd. v. Management & Ors(4), and Eastern Electric and Trading Co. v. Baldev Lal(5) that though generally speaking the award of punishment for misconduct under the Standing Orders is a matter for the management to decide and the Tribunal is not required to consider the propriety or adequacy of the punishment or whether it is excessive or too severe yet an inference of mala fides may in certain cases be drawn from the imposition of unduly harsh, severe, unconscionable or shockingly disproportionate punishment; (iv) whether the employer has paid or offered to pay wages for one month to the employee and (v) whether the employer has simultaneously or within such reasonably short time as to form part of the game transaction applied to the authority before which the main industrial dispute is pending for approval of the action taken by him. If these conditions are satisfied, the Industrial Tribunal would grant the approval which would relate back to the date from which the employer had ordered the dismissal.
If these conditions are satisfied, the Industrial Tribunal would grant the approval which would relate back to the date from which the employer had ordered the dismissal. If however, the domestic enquiry suffers from any defect or infirmity, the labour authority will have to find out on its own assessment of the evidence adduced before it whether there was justification for dismissal and if it so finds it will grant approval of the order of dismissal which would also relate back to the date when the order was passed provided the employer had paid or offered to pay wages for one month to the employee and the employer had within the time indicated above applied to the authority before which the main industrial dispute is pending for approval of the action taken by him.” 4. In the instant case, the second respondent claims his one month wages to be at Rs.6,870/- by claiming that he was a daily wage paid conductor at the rate of Rs.229/- and whereas the writ petitioner/Transport Corporation has only paid Rs.5,954/-. The petitioner/Transport Corporation had not produced any documentary evidence before the Authority nor had let in oral evidence to substantiate the quantum of the one month wages paid by them. Having failed to do so, it would not be open to them to now raise a ground before this Court to reappraise such a factual aspect. When one of these grounds itself is sufficient enough to hold the order of the Authority as valid, I do not intend to go into the other grounds raised by the petitioner/Transport Corporation challenging the impugned order. As such, no interference is required to the same. 5. It is needless to point out that in view of the impugned order rejecting the petitioner's application for approval, the second respondent is deemed to be in service from the date of dismissal i.e. from 04.11.2011 onwards. Accordingly, there shall be a direction to the petitioner/Transport Corporation to forthwith reinstate the second respondent back into service together with continuity of service and all other service and monetary benefits including back wages, with effect from 04.11.2011 onwards. Such order shall be passed atleast within a period of four (4) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 6. With the above direction, this Writ Petition stands dismissed. No costs. Connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.