JUDGMENT : S. Manikumar, J. Instant Public Interest writ petition is filed for the following reliefs: (i) To issue a writ of quo warranto directing respondents 3 and 4, viz., Ajay Kumar, Geologist, Office of the Director of Mining and Geology, Department of Mining & Geology, Thiruvananthapuram; and Bijumon, Geologist, Office of the Geologist, Kottayam, to show under what authority they have been functioning as Geologist in the Department of Mining and Geology, State of Kerala; (ii) Declare that respondents 3 and 4 are liable to be discharged under Rule 19(b)(ii) of Part II of KS & SSR for want of test qualification; (iii) Declare that the orders issued by respondents 3 and 4, while functioning as Geologists, are nonest in the eye of law and that they are not liable to be acted upon. 2. Facts leading to the filing of the instant writ petition are, petitioner is the Honorary Secretary of Idukki District Tourism Promotion Co-operative Society Ltd., No.1-631, a society formed to promote tourism in Idukki district. He is also the former State Secretary of Kerala NGO Front, an organization of Non-Gazetted employees of the State Government. He has taken up various causes against illegal quarrying in the State, as also against the unscrupulous officers of the mining and geology department, who according to the petitioner, have been instrumental in issuance of illegal mining permits. 3. Petitioner has further stated that the post of Geologist is governed by the Kerala Geology Service Rules, 2009, published as per SRO No.647/2009 dated 20.07.2009. According to the petitioner, as per the said rules, the post of Geologist is to be filled up by promotion from among Assistant Geologist and in the absence of suitable candidates for transfer by direct recruitment. 4. Petitioner has further stated that the 3rd respondent is presently working as Geologist, in the office of the 2nd respondent, viz., the Director of Mining and Geology, Department of Mining and Geology, Thiruvananthapuram. According to him, respondent No.3 had commenced service as Assistant Geologist on 11.07.2003 and was promoted and posted as Geologist as per Government Order dated 22.09.2016 (Exhibit-P2). 5. Petitioner has further stated that 4th respondent is also presently working as Geologist in District Office, Kottayam. Respondent No.4 had commenced service as Assistant Geologist on 13.08.2003 and was promoted as Geologist as per Government Order dated 20.02.2020 (Exhibit-P3) and posted at District Office, Kozhikode. 5. Petitioner has further stated that 4th respondent is also presently working as Geologist in District Office, Kottayam. Respondent No.4 had commenced service as Assistant Geologist on 13.08.2003 and was promoted as Geologist as per Government Order dated 20.02.2020 (Exhibit-P3) and posted at District Office, Kozhikode. The predominant contention advanced is that, as per Exhibit-P1 rules, respondents 3 and 4 have to pass Account Test (Lower) or (Higher), within a period of one year on duty, within a continuous period of two years from their date of appointment as Geologist, if they have not already passed the test. According to the petitioner, respondents 3 and 4 did not possess the said qualification whey they were appointed as Geologists as per Exhibits-P2 and P3 Government orders. 6. Petitioner has further stated that respondents 3 and 4 ought to have passed Account Test (Lower) or (Higher) on or before 22.09.2017 and 20.02.2021 respectively. However, they have not passed either of the tests even now and that their probation period has not been extended under Rule 21. Hence, petitioner contended that they are liable to be discharged in terms of Rule 19(b)1 of Part II KS & SSR. 7. Petitioner has further stated that while continuing as Geologist, the respondents 3 and 4 had issued a number of sanction orders, lease recommendations and approval of mining plans. In support of the same, petitioner has produced Exhibits-P8 to P22. That apart, the 4th respondent has also approved similar mining plans while working as Geologist at Kozhikode and Kottayam. According to the petitioner, the said plans were approved after acceptance of illegal gratification. Petitioner, in fact, submitted Exhibit-P23 complaint dated 30.05.2020 in that regard to the 2nd respondent-the Director of Mining and Geology, and the Vigilance and Anticorruption Bureau. 8. However, they have not acted upon it, and therefore, filed W.P.(C) No.21089 of 2020 before this Court and a learned single Judge disposed of the said writ petition by judgment dated 06.11.2020 (Exhibit-P24), directing the Director, Vigilance and Anti-corruption Bureau to take appropriate action in accordance with law, within 3 months. 9. Petitioner has further stated that pursuant to the direction in Exhibit-P24 judgment, he was called for a hearing before the State of Kerala, represented by its Secretary, Department of Industries and Commerce, Thiruvananthapuram, respondent No.1, on 01.10.2020 and 16.10.2020. 9. Petitioner has further stated that pursuant to the direction in Exhibit-P24 judgment, he was called for a hearing before the State of Kerala, represented by its Secretary, Department of Industries and Commerce, Thiruvananthapuram, respondent No.1, on 01.10.2020 and 16.10.2020. He appeared before the 1st respondent on 16.10.2020 and submitted all particulars, including the documents available. However, no further communication has been received by him. Petitioner, therefore, submitted another representation dated 01.03.2021 (Exhibit-P26). Aggrieved by the reluctance on the part of the 1st respondent to act upon his complaint, petitioner has filed the instant writ petition for the reliefs stated supra. 10. In support of the prayers sought for, petitioner has raised the following grounds: A. The continuance of respondents 3 and 4 as Geologists in the Department of Mining and Geology despite being disqualified is arbitrary, illegal and unsustainable. Exhibit-P1 rules mandate a pass in Account Test (lower/higher), within a period of one year from joining duty as Geologists, if the concerned persons have not passed the test. Exhibits-P4 to P7 reveal that respondents 3 and 4 have not passed the Accounts Test lower, either at the time of joining as Geologists or later. Respondents 3 and 4 were appointed as Geologists as per Exhibits P-2 and P-3 Government orders dated 22/9/2016 and 20/2/2020 respectively. The one year period within which respondents 3 and 4 ought to have passed the Accounts Test expired 22/9/2017 and 20/2/2021 respectively. However, they are still continuing as Geologists despite the lack of requisite Account Test qualification. Their continuance as Geologists is without authority, against the mandate of the regular statute and thus illegal. B. Referring to Rule 16 of Part II KS & SSR, petitioner has submitted that no person shall be eligible for appointment to any service, class, category or grade or any post borne on the cadre thereof unless he possesses such special qualification and has passed such special tests prescribed in the special rules. Exhibit P-1 special rules prescribes pass in Account Test (Lower) or (Higher), for appointment as Geologist. Neither the 3rd respondent, nor the 4th respondent have passed the Account Test (Lower) or (Higher), as prescribed in Exhibit P-1 rules. Respondents 3 and 4, therefore, are ineligible to be appointed as Geologist and their continuance in service is without authority. Exhibit P-1 special rules prescribes pass in Account Test (Lower) or (Higher), for appointment as Geologist. Neither the 3rd respondent, nor the 4th respondent have passed the Account Test (Lower) or (Higher), as prescribed in Exhibit P-1 rules. Respondents 3 and 4, therefore, are ineligible to be appointed as Geologist and their continuance in service is without authority. C. Referring to Rule 19(b)(ii) of Part II of the KS & SSR, petitioner has contended that a probationer who fails to pass the Special test prescribed in the special rules within the period of probation, then he is liable to be discharged unless the period of probation is extended under Rule 21. It is also contended that respondents 3 and 4 have not passed Accounts Test (Lower) or (higher), either before promotion as Geologist, or during the prescribed probation period of one year. The period of probation of respondents 3 and 4 have not been extended under Rule 21 as well. Therefore, they are liable to be discharged, in terms of Rule 19(b) (ii) of Part ll of the KS & SSR. D. Respondents 3 and 4 while functioning as Geologists, without the requisite qualification, had recommended grant of mining lease in more than 100 cases. The Director of Mining and Geology had acted upon such recommendations and granted mining leases to various persons. The said mining leases were granted on the basis of a report submitted by respondents 3 and 4, who had no authority to continue in the post. Similarly, respondents 3 and 4 had also sanctioned hundreds of mining plans without authority. Therefore, the mining leases issued pursuant to the recommendations made by respondents 3 and 4 and mining plans are non est in the eye of law. 11. Refuting the averments made in the writ petition, the Under Secretary, Industries (A) Department, Government Secretariat, Thiruvananthapuram, respondent No.1, has filed a counter affidavit contending, inter alia, as under: A. It is respectfully submitted that without prejudice to other contentions on merit, the above writ petition styled as Public Interest Litigation is liable to be dismissed on the ground that the writ petition is filed to settle personal disputes and to wreak vengeance on respondents 3 and 4. The said fact is clear from the averments made by the petitioner in paragraphs 12 to 15, wherein he had narrated the steps, including initiation of criminal proceedings, that have been undertaken as against respondents 3 and 4. The 1st respondent has relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of West Bengal [ (2004) 3 SCC 349 ]. B. Respondent No.1 has further contended that respondents 3 and 4 entered into service as Assistant Geologist on 11.07.2003 and 06.09.2003 respectively. Thereupon, as per Exhibits-P12 and P13, the respondents 3 and 4 were promoted as Geologist w.e.f. 23.09.2016 and 02.03.2020 respectively. At the time of entry into service as per special rules then in force, Account Test (Lower and Higher) were not mandatory to declare probation in the cadre of Assistant Geologist. Hence, their probation has been declared. Referring to Rule 7 of Exhibit-P1 Special Rules, which came into force on 25.07.2009, it is submitted that every person appointed to any of the categories shall be from the date on which he joined duty be on probation, -if appointed by direct recruitment or by transfer from any other service, for a total period of 2 years on duty within a continuous period of 3 years. C. Respondent No.1 has further contended that thereafter, the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules were amended on 19.03.2013, whereby a proviso was included to Rule 28(a) (iii), Part II of KS&SSR w.e.f. 01.04.2010. As per the said proviso, the period of probation for persons who were appointed on or after the 1st April, 2010 to the selections posts in State service, by promotion or by transfer, within the department where direct recruitment is not one of the method of appointment as per the Special Rules, shall be 6 months on duty within a continuous period of one year. As pointed out earlier, at the time of entry of respondents 3 and 4 into service, on account of the existing service rules, passing the Account Test was not mandatory, and therefore, they were promoted as Geologist. As pointed out earlier, at the time of entry of respondents 3 and 4 into service, on account of the existing service rules, passing the Account Test was not mandatory, and therefore, they were promoted as Geologist. D. Referring to Rule 13 of Part II of KS & SSR, respondent No.1 has further contended that no person shall be eligible for appointment to any service class category or grade or any post borne on the cadre thereafter unless he possess such special qualification and has passed such special test as may be prescribed in that behalf. As per Exhibit-P1 Special Rules, no person shall be appointed to the post of Geologist unless he/she possesses the qualification of M.Sc. or equivalent degree in Geology or Applied Geology or Bachelors Degree in Mining Engineering from a recognized University or B.Sc. equivalent Degree in Geology from a recognized University and 5 years' experience in the category of Assistant Geologist. E. According to the 1st respondent, respondents 3 and 4 possess the prescribed qualification as provided in the Special Rules. Further, as per Rule 21, in case of any probationer, the appointing authority may extend his probation to enable him to acquire special qualifications or pass the prescribed test to enable the appointing authority to decide whether the probationer is suitable for full membership or not. Both the respondents through the 3rd respondent have requested the Government, the appointment authority, to extend their period of probation and the same is being considered by the Government. Under such circumstances, it is clear that respondents 3 and 4 are not usurpers in the post they are holding and they were legally appointed to the post they are holding based on qualifications spelt out as per the Special Rules and that their request for extension of probation is being considered by the Government. F. As regards the averment in paragraph 15 to the effect that pursuant to the hearing conducted on 16.10.2020, no further communication have been received, respondent No.1 has contended that at the time of hearing, the petitioner had stated that his complaint with respect to the promotion granted to respondent No.3 need only be pursued and that the complaint as regards the approval given to the quarries need not be proceeded with because, he had filed a writ petition before this Court. Going through the above, petitioner has not made out a case for issuance of a writ of quo warranto and, therefore, respondent No.1 has prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 12. Respondent No.3 has filed a counter affidavit, contending, inter alia, as under: “A. The petitioner, totally a stranger, has filed the above writ petition concerning the service matter of the 3rd respondent. The writ petitioner is not only a stranger, but he is not an aggrieved person also. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dr. Duryodhan Sahu and Others v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra and others reported in (1998) 7 SCC 273 held that in a service matter, public interest litigation at the instance of a stranger is not maintainable. This Court in R. Ajaykumar v. State of Kerala and others, after referring to a number of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, rejected a similar matter relating to service issues. B. He further contended that petitioner is working as a clerk in the Irrigation Department of Government of Kerala. Being a Government servant, petitioner ought to have obtained written permission of his Head of Office before initiating a litigation in which he has no direct personal interest. The Government Service Conduct Rules, 1960 is as follows: "22 — Litigation — No Government servant shall without a written permission of the Head of Office in the case of a non-Gazetted servant of Government and in the case of Gazetted servant — (i) Take or transfer any claim in actionable claim or decree, or, (ii) Concern himself in any litigation in which he has no direct personal interest". The petitioner, though a Government servant, has not obtained any written permission from the Head of Office for filing such a writ petition. At the same time, as per Rule 146A, of the Rules of High Court of Kerala, 1971, in the case of public interest litigation, it shall be specifically averred in affidavit in support of the writ petition that the petitioner is not having any personal or private interest in the matter. Though he has stated in the affidavit that he has no personal or private interest in the matter, he has not obtained written permission from the Head of Office. There is no averment with regard to the same in the affidavit or in the writ petition. Hence, the writ petition is not maintainable. Though he has stated in the affidavit that he has no personal or private interest in the matter, he has not obtained written permission from the Head of Office. There is no averment with regard to the same in the affidavit or in the writ petition. Hence, the writ petition is not maintainable. C. It is further contended that the writ petitioner has filed the instant writ petition against the 3rd respondent, due to personal vendetta. The petitioner had lodged a complaint against the 3rd respondent, while he was working as District Geologist at Idukki, with regard to the functioning of two quarries. Based on the said complaint preferred by the writ petitioner, the Director of Mining & Geology called for reports from the Geologist, Idukki. In the capacity of Geologist, the 3rd respondent submitted a report with regard to the complaint, before the Director, Mining & Geology stating that the complaint is baseless and actuated by ulterior motives, as evident from Exhibit R-3(a). True English translation of Ext.R-3(a) is produced herewith and marked as Ext.R-3(a)-1. D. The department accepted the report submitted by the 3rd respondent as District Geologist and the proceedings were closed. Subsequently, the writ petitioner filed another complaint dated 30-5-2021 against the 3rd respondent before the Director, Vigilance & Anti-Corruption, Thiruvananthapuram raising allegation of corruption, as evident from Exhibit R-3(b). E. The petitioner also sent a copy of the said complaint to the Principal Secretary, Department of Industries (A), Government of Kerala, Thiruvananthapuram, as well as Director of Mining & Geology, Thiruvananthapuram. Pursuant to the above, the Department of Industries (A) Government of Kerala conducted a personal hearing and the 3rd respondent was directed to submit a reply statement in the matter. The petitioner filed W.P.(C) No.21089 of 2020 before this Court as seeking for a direction to the Director, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau to act upon his complaint. This Court vide judgment dated 06-11-2020 disposed of the writ petition, directing the Director, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau, to consider the complaint and take proper action, in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible, within three months from the date of the order. It was also ordered that the result of the action taken may be intimated to the petitioner within that time. It was also ordered that the result of the action taken may be intimated to the petitioner within that time. True copy of the judgment dated 6-11-2020 in Writ Petition No.21089 of 2020 passed by the High Court of Kerala is produced herewith and marked as Exhibit R-3(c). F. Pursuant to the above judgment dated 06.11.2020, the 3rd respondent submitted a reply statement dated 12-01-2021 before the Secretary, Industries Department, Government of Kerala through proper channel. True copy of the reply statement dated 12-1-2021 submitted by me and covering letter issued by the Director, Mining & Geology bearing No.8827/E1/2020 dated 9-2-2021 forwarding the same to the Principal Secretary, Industries (A) Department, Thiruvananthapuram are produced herewith and marked as Exhibit R-3(d). It was found therein that the complaint preferred by the writ petitioner was devoid of merits and further proceedings were, therefore, closed by the Government. G. It is further contended that the writ petitioner is a very close associate of the former Director-In-Charge of Mining & Geology C.K. Baiju, who was removed from the post of Director-In-Charge, Mining & Geology. The petitioner approached the 3rd respondent seeking for help in getting his landed properties in Muttam Village, Idukki District, sold to some quarry operators. The 3rd respondent did not comply with his request. Hence, the petitioner filed the above writ petition, in order to wreak vengeance against the 3rd respondent. H. The 3rd respondent joined the service as Assistant Geologist based on the order of appointment dated 24-06-2003, issued by the Director, Mining & Geology, as evident from Exhibit R-3(e). He joined service on 11-07-2003 and has successfully completed probation. The Director of Mining & Geology, Thiruvananthapuram as per order dated 06-10-2005 declared the probation of respondent No.3, in the post of Assistant Geologist, as evident from Exhibit-R3(f) order. I. It is further contended that the 3rd respondent was promoted as Geologist by the Government of Kerala as per recommendation of the Departmental Promotion Committee. True copy of the GO(P) No.16/2016/ID dated 5-6-2016 issued by the Government of Kerala and published in the Kerala Gazette Extraordinary dated 7-7-2016 Vol. V publishing the select list prepared by the Departmental Promotion Committee and approved by the Government of Kerala for the year 2016 is produced herewith and marked as Exhibit R-3(2). True copy of the GO(P) No.16/2016/ID dated 5-6-2016 issued by the Government of Kerala and published in the Kerala Gazette Extraordinary dated 7-7-2016 Vol. V publishing the select list prepared by the Departmental Promotion Committee and approved by the Government of Kerala for the year 2016 is produced herewith and marked as Exhibit R-3(2). Pursuant to the select list, as per G.O(Rt) No.949/2016/ID dated 22-09-2016, Government promoted the 3rd respondent to the post of Geologist, as evident from Exhibit R-3(h). J. It is further contended that at the time of my appointment as Assistant Geologist, on 24-06-2002, and on my joining service as Assistant Geologist on 11-07-2003, Account Test (Lower and Higher) were not mandatory for declaration of probation in the cadre of Assistant Geologist, as per the Special Rules then in force. Accordingly, the probation of the 3rd respondent was declared in the cadre of Assistant Geologist on 06-10-2005, vide Exhibit R-3(f) order. K. It is further submitted that the Special Rules came into force on 25-7-2009. As per the Rule 7 of the Ext.P-1 Special Rules, every person appointed to any of the categories therein shall be on probation from the date on which he joins duty, if appointed by direct recruitment or by transfer from any other service, for a total period of two years on duty within a continuous period of three years and if appointed by promotion, for a total period of one year on duty within a continuous period of two years. L. It is further submitted that the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as "KS & SSR") were amended on 19-3-2013 with effect from 1-4-2010, whereby a proviso was included to Rule 28(a)(iii), Part II of the KS & SSR. As per the said proviso, the period of probation for persons who were appointed on or after 1st April, 2010 to the selection posts in the State service, by promotion or by transfer, within the department where direct recruitment is not one of the methods of appointment as per Special Rules, shall be six months on duty within a continuous period of one year. M. It is further submitted that as per Rule 13, Part II of KS & SSR, no person shall be eligible for appointment to any service, class, category or grade or any post borne on the cadre thereafter unless he possesses such Special qualification and has passed such special test as may be prescribed in that behalf in the Special Rules. According to the 3rd respondent, as per Exhibit P-1 Special Rules, no person shall be eligible to be appointed, unless he possesses the qualification of M.Sc or equivalent degree in Geology or Applied Geology or Bachelor's Degree in Mining Engineering from a recognized University or B.Sc or equivalent degree in Geology from a recognized University and 5 years' experience, in the category of Assistant Geologist in the department. The 3rd respondent possesses the said qualification prescribed in the Special Rules. N. It is further submitted that as per Rule 21, Part II of KS & SSR, in case of any probationer, the appointing authority may extend his probation to enable him to acquire special qualifications or pass the prescribed test to enable the appointing authority to decide whether the probationer is suitable for being granted full membership to the service or not. On 16-6-2020, the 3rd respondent applied to the Director of Mining & Geology, Thiruvananthapuram for extending the period of probation due to non-qualifying the Account test. As a matter of fact, though he applied to participate in the account test conducted by the Public Service Commission, the 3rd respondent could not attend the same as my father fell ill due to a stroke. In such circumstances, the 3rd respondent could not qualify the account test. True copy of letter dated 16-6-2020 submitted by the 3rd respondent to the Director of Mining & Geology, Thiruvananthapuram is produced herewith and marked as Exhibit R-3(i). O. The Director of Mining & Geology, Thiruvananthapuram as per Exhibit-R3(j) letter bearing No. DMG/8081/ 2021/E1 dated Nil/09/2021 forwarded the application of the 3rd respondent to the Principal Secretary II, Industries Department (A), Thiruvananthapuram, and the same is pending consideration before the Government. It is also submitted that the Director of Mining & Geology based on a letter dated 10-2-2021 issued from the Government, directed the 3rd respondent to apply to the Departmental Promotion Committee and produce the certificate, as evident from Exhibit R-3(k) notice. It is also submitted that the Director of Mining & Geology based on a letter dated 10-2-2021 issued from the Government, directed the 3rd respondent to apply to the Departmental Promotion Committee and produce the certificate, as evident from Exhibit R-3(k) notice. P. On 2-7-2021, the Kerala Public Service Commission issued a notification for conducting the Account test. Based on the said notification, the 3rd respondent applied for the Departmental test. Accordingly, he was invited for the Departmental Test by the Kerala Public Service Commission, by issuing an Admission Ticket. True copy of the Admission Ticket No.243038 dated 13-9-2021 issued by the Kerala Public Service Commission in favour of the 3rd respondent is produced herewith and marked as Exhibit R-3(l). Q. Thereafter, the 3rd respondent participated in the written test conducted during the period from 15-9-2021 to 13-10-2021 and appeared for both Account test (lower) and Accountant test (higher). Result of the departmental test is yet to be declared by the Public Service Commission. The 3rd respondent is awaiting the result of the Departmental Test. It is also submitted that In the event of passing the departmental test, the Government is having powers to declare the probation of the 3rd respondent. The Government is empowered under Rule 21 Part-II KS & SSR 1958 to extend the period of probation. The 3rd respondent bona fide believes that the Public Service Commission will declare the result shortly. R. It is further contended by the 3rd respondent that in the letter dated Nil/9/2021 issued by the Director of Mining & Geology, Thiruvananthapuram to the Government forwarding his application for extending the period of probation, the Director has stated that the service of the 3rd respondent in the post of Geologist and conduct as such, are satisfactory and that the 3rd respondent has participated in the departmental test and the result is yet to be published. Thus, the Head of the Department has reported to the Government that the service and conduct of the 3rd respondent is satisfactory. In the above fact situation, the 3rd respondent is not an usurper in the post. He was legally appointed to the post based on the qualifications prescribed under the Special Rules. Therefore, it cannot be said that the 3rd respondent is continuing in the service without any authority and that he should be discharged from service. In the above fact situation, the 3rd respondent is not an usurper in the post. He was legally appointed to the post based on the qualifications prescribed under the Special Rules. Therefore, it cannot be said that the 3rd respondent is continuing in the service without any authority and that he should be discharged from service. S. It is further contended that the writ petition is not maintainable as it is for the Government to consider extension of his period of probation considering the fact that the 3rd respondent has appeared for the departmental test and awaiting the outcome of the same. The Government has the powers to exercise its discretion in extending the probation period and to declare my probation on the basis of the departmental test. T. It is further contended that in his total service in the department, till this date, there is no disciplinary action initiated against the 3rd respondent nor there is any judicial proceedings against him. After joining service as Assistant Geologist, the 3rd respondent did Ph.D and was awarded Ph.D by Mahatma Gandhi University in 2010. True copy of the Ph.D Certificate dated 9th February,, 2011, obtained by the 3rd respondent from Mahatma Gandhi University in the year 2010 is produced herewith and marked as Exhibit R-3(m). U. The averment contained in paragraph 11 of the writ petition that the 3rd respondent has been allowed to continue as Geologist in blatant violation of the rules, despite my ineligibility on account of his influence amongst the Government officials and political masters, is absolutely incorrect, baseless and unsustainable. First of all, the 3rd respondent is eligible to continue as Geologist as was duly appointed as Geologist by way of promotion. Merely because his request for extension of period of probation by the competent authority, the Government of Kerala, is pending consideration, it cannot be said that he is ineligible to continue as Geologist. For the aforesaid reasons, the 3rd respondent prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 13. Respondent No.4 has filed a counter affidavit dated 31.10.2021 contending, inter alia, that the 4th respondent is promoted as Geologist with effect from 20.02.2020. He admitted that in order to declare probation, he has to pass Account Test, within a period of one year on duty in a continuous period of two years. 14. 13. Respondent No.4 has filed a counter affidavit dated 31.10.2021 contending, inter alia, that the 4th respondent is promoted as Geologist with effect from 20.02.2020. He admitted that in order to declare probation, he has to pass Account Test, within a period of one year on duty in a continuous period of two years. 14. Respondent No.4 has further contended that he has applied for the Departmental Test in July, 2021 and appeared for the examinations during September, 2021, as evidenced by Exhibit-R4(a). The result of the examination has not been published so far. In the meantime, the 4th respondent has submitted a representation before the 2nd respondent requesting extension of time for a period of one year to declare his probation, as evidenced by Exhibit-R4(b). In such circumstances, he prayed for dismissal of the W.P(C). 15. In reply to the contentions raised by both the State, as well as party respondents, in their respective counter affidavits, petitioner has filed a reply affidavit. 16. Heard the learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the material on record. 17. Exhibit-P1 is the Kerala Geology Service Special Rules, 2009, published as per SRO No.647/2009 dated 20/07/2009. Exhibit-P1 rules is issued in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Kerala Public Services Act, 1968 (19 of 1968), in supersession of all the existing Rules and Orders issued on the subject. Rule 3 of the Rules, 2009 speaks about the Method of Appointment and it reads thus: “3. Method of Appointment.-Appointment to the various categories of posts mentioned in column (1) of the Table Below shall be made by the method of appointment specified in column (2) thereof, namely:- Category Method of appointment 1. Additional Director of Mining and Geology (1) By promotion from the category of Deputy Director of Mining and Geology. (2) In the absence of suitable candidates for promotion by direct recruitment. 2. Deputy Director of Mining and Geology (1) By promotion from the category of Geologist. (2) In the absence of suitable candidates for promotion by direct recruitment. 3. Geologist (1) By promotion from the category of Assistant Geologist. (2) In the absence of suitable candidates for promotion, by direct recruitment. 4. Assistant Geologist By direct recruitment 5. Assistant Drilling Engineer By direct recruitment xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 18. (2) In the absence of suitable candidates for promotion by direct recruitment. 3. Geologist (1) By promotion from the category of Assistant Geologist. (2) In the absence of suitable candidates for promotion, by direct recruitment. 4. Assistant Geologist By direct recruitment 5. Assistant Drilling Engineer By direct recruitment xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 18. As per Rule 4(2) of the Kerala Geology Service Special Rules, 2009, which states about other qualifications, no person shall be eligible for appointment to any of the categories mentioned in column (1) of the Table given below, by the method of appointment specified in the corresponding entry in column (2), unless possess the qualifications specified in the corresponding entry in column (3) thereof. Category Method of appointment Qualification 1. Additional Director of Mining and Geology (1) By promotion (1) M.Sc. or equivalent Degree in Geology or Applied Geology or Bachelors Degree in Mining Engineering from a recognised University. (2) 12 years total experience in the category not below the rank of Assistant Geologist. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 3. Geologist (1) By promotion (1) M.Sc. or equivalent Degree in Geology or Applied Geology or Bachelors Degree in Mining Engineering from a recognised University. OR B.Sc. or equivalent Degree in Geology from a recognised University and 5 years minimum experience in the category of Assistant Geologist in the Department. (b) By direct recruitment (1) M.Sc. or equivalent Degree (first or second class) in Geology or Applied Geology or Bachelors Degree in Mining Engineering from a recognised University. (2) 3 years experience in Geological field work in a responsible post in Central/ State Government Department Organisation. Note:-In the case of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes candidates for direct recruitment M.Sc. or equivalent Degree (first or second class) in Geology or Applied Geology or Bachelors Degree in Mining Engineering from a recognised University. The selected candidates shall be on training for a period of one year and during the period of training, he/she shall be paid the minimum of the scale of pay and allowances attached to the post. His/her probation in the post would commence only after completion of training. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Note:-(1) The experience prescribed for direct recruitment to the various categories shall be acquired after obtaining the basic academic qualification fixed for the respective categories. (2) Omission of B.Sc. His/her probation in the post would commence only after completion of training. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Note:-(1) The experience prescribed for direct recruitment to the various categories shall be acquired after obtaining the basic academic qualification fixed for the respective categories. (2) Omission of B.Sc. (Hons.) Degree in Geology from the educational qualifications prescribed for appointment by promotion to certain categories shall not adversely affect the promotion of the persons who are in service as on 29th September, 1986. 19. As per Rule 6 of Exhibit-P1 special rules, the appointing authority for the categories of Assistant Geologist, Junior Chemist, Assistant Drilling Engineer and Audit Officer shall be the Director of Mining and Geology. For all other categories, the appointing authority shall be Government. 20. Rule 7 of the Rules, 2009 speaks about probation. As per Rule 7, every person appointed to any of the categories shall be from the date on which he joins duty be on probation. (i) If appointed by direct recruitment or by transfer from any other service, for a total period of two years on duty within a continuous period of three years, and (ii) If appointed by promotion, for a total period of one year on duty within a continuous period of two years. 21. As per Rule 8 of Exhibit-P1 rules, which speaks about the test, every person appointed to any of the categories shall within the prescribed period of probation pass the Account Test (Lower) or (Higher) if he has not already passed the same. 22. Exhibit-P2 is the Government order in G.O.(Rt) No.949/2016/ID dated 22.09.2016 issued by the Deputy Secretary to the Government, Industries (A) Department, Government of Kerala. Relevant portion of the same, in regard to the promotion of respondent No.3 and others, is extracted hereunder : “GOVERNMENT OF KERALA Abstract Industries Department-Establishment of Mining and Geology -Promotion, Transfer and posting in the cadre of Additional Director, Deputy Director, and Geologist in the Department of Mining and Geology -Orders issued. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- INDUSTRIES (A) DEPARTMENT G.O.(Rt.) No.949/2016/ID Dated, Thiruvananthapuram, 22.09.2016 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Read:-(1) G.O.(P) No.16/2016/ID dated 05.06.2016. (2) G.O.(Rt) No.895/2016/ID dated 07.09.2016. (3) Letter No.2780/E1/2016 dated 26.07.2016 from the Director of Mining and Geology, Thiruvananthapuram. ORDER The following promotions, transfers and postings are ordered in the category of Additional Director, Deputy Director and Geologist in the Department of Mining and Geology for public interest and for administrative convenience. (2) G.O.(Rt) No.895/2016/ID dated 07.09.2016. (3) Letter No.2780/E1/2016 dated 26.07.2016 from the Director of Mining and Geology, Thiruvananthapuram. ORDER The following promotions, transfers and postings are ordered in the category of Additional Director, Deputy Director and Geologist in the Department of Mining and Geology for public interest and for administrative convenience. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Promotion in the cadre of Geologist under Rule 28(a)((i) Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules Scale of Pay Rs.40,500-85,000/- Sl. No. Name and Designation Promoted and posted as 1. Smt. Sheeja S., Assistant Geologist Geologist in the District Office of the Department of Mining & Geology, Pathanamthitta in the existing vacancy. 2. Smt. N.B. Preeja, Assistant Geologist Geologist in the Directorate of Mining & Geology, Thiruvananthapuram in the existing vacancy. 3. Dr. Reena Thomas, Assistant Geologist Geologist in the District Office of the Department of Mining & Geology, Alappuzha vice Sri. K.K. Sajeevan, Geologist transferred to the District Office of the Department of Mining & Geology, Palakkad. 4. Sri. Sooraj S., Assistant Geologist District Office of the Department of Mining & Geology, Thrissur vice Sri. Sheljumon T.M., Geologist transferred to the District Office of the Department of Mining & Geology, Wayanad. 5. Dr. B. Ajayakumar, Assistant Geologist Geologist in the Directorate of Mining & Geology, Thiruvananthapuram in the existing vacancy. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 23. Exhibit-P3 is the order dated 20.02.2020 issued by the Joint Secretary, Industries (A) Department, Government of Kerala, and its English Translation is reproduced: “GOVERNMENT OF KERALA Abstract Industries Department - Mining & Geology - Service Approving the appointment, transfer and promotion of Geologist - Orders issued ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Industries (A) Department GO(Ord.) No.155/2020/ID Dated, Thiruvananthapuram 20/2/2020 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Ref: 1. GO(P) No.26/2019/ID dated 23/11/2019 2. Letter Nos.11712/E1/2019 dated 9/1/2020, 17/12/2019 of Director of Mining & Geology. ORDER The current order of transfer and promotion is issued considering the administrative exigencies and common interest of the Mining and Geology Department. TRANSFER xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx PROMOTION Sri. P.N. Bijumon, Smt. Sukhada Pradeep, Smt. P.C. Reshmi, who were the Assistant Geologists in the Mining & Geology Department are being promoted to the post of Geologist in the salary scale of 40,500/--85,000/- subject to the conditions in Rule 28(b)(1) as per the Kerala State & Subordinate Service Rules, 1958 as mentioned below: 1. Sri. P.N. Bijumon, the Assistant Geologist as Geologist, Pathanamthitta District Office is promoted and posted to Kozhikode District Office in the vacancy of Sri. Ebrahim Kunji, Geologist, Kozhikode District Office. 2. Sri. P.N. Bijumon, the Assistant Geologist as Geologist, Pathanamthitta District Office is promoted and posted to Kozhikode District Office in the vacancy of Sri. Ebrahim Kunji, Geologist, Kozhikode District Office. 2. Smt. Sukhada Pradeep, Asst. Geologist in the Head Office of Mining & Geology Department is promoted as Geologist and posted in the vacancy of Dr. Sajikumar, Geologist in the Head Office of Mining & Geology Department. 3. Smt. P.C. Reshmi, Assistant Geologist, Kozhikode District Office is promoted to the post of Geologist and posted in the vacant post of Kerala Mineral Squad (North Region). By order of the Governor) Mohanaraj M. Joint Secretary” 24. Exhibits-P4 and P5 are the relevant pages of the service books of respondents 3 and 4 respectively, from where service details of the said respondents could be seen; Exhibit-P6 is the query dated 4.8.2021 submitted by the petitioner under the Right to Information Act, 2005; and Exhibit-P7 is the reply to Exhibit-P6 dated 11.08.2021 of the Public Information Officer, from where it is discernible that the probation of the 3rd respondent has not been declared. 25. Proceedings of the Director of Mining and Geology vide No.158/2003-04/5545/E1/2002/DMG. dated 24.06.2003 as regards appointment of Assistant Geologist is extracted hereunder : “ORDER The Secretary, Kerala Public Service Commission, Thiruvananthapuram vide reference 1st cited has advised Sri. B. Ajayakumar, Koovakkattu House, Ezhacherry P.O., Anthinadu (Via.), Kottayam-686651, for appointment as Asst. Geologist on Rs.6675-10550 against the existing vacancy in this Department subject to Rule 3(c) of the General Rules of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules, 1958. Accordingly, Sri. B. Ajaykumar is appointed as Assistant Geologist on Rs.6675-10550 under Rule 9(a)(1) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules, 1958 as provided for in Rule 10(b) of those Rules and posted in the District Office of this Department at Wayanad. Sri. B. Ajaykumar is directed to report for duty before the Geologist, District Office, Department of Mining and Geology, PBM Building, Meenangadi-673571, Wayanad District within 15 days from the date of receipt of the order with original documents to prove age, community and educational qualifications along with a Medical Fitness Certificate duly obtained from a Medical Officer not below the rank of a Civil Surgeon, failing which the appointment offered will be cancelled and alternate arrangements made without further notice. The candidate will have to undergo probation for a period of two years on duty within a continuous period of three years service. The candidate will have to submit the enclosed proforma duly filled in (in duplicate) at the time of reporting duty. The temporary appointment of Shri B. Ajaykumar will be regularised only after satisfactory report of Police verification regarding his character and antecedents. The candidate should make an application for correction of date of birth, if any, within five years of his entry in Government service as contemplated in the G.O.(P) No.45/91/P&ARD dt. 30.12.1991. He is further informed that in the event of discharge from service for want of vacancy, he may either re-register his name in the office of Kerala Public Service Commission from where he was advised and got himself re-appointed on further advice by the PSC or he may wait for his turn for reappointment to the post in this Department in case he desires to continue as a probationer in the post from which he is discharged. Sd/- N. KRISHNAKUMAR DIRECTOR OF MINING AND GEOLOGY” 26. Proceedings of the Director of Mining and Geology vide No.374/2005-06/5890/E1/2005/DMG dated 06.10.2005 declaring probation in the post of Assistant Geologist, is extracted hereunder: “ORDER The Geologist Special Office, Cherthala vide reference 4th cited has requested to declare the probation of Shri B. Ajayakumar, Assistant Geologist of that office since he has completed two years in the post of Assistant Geologist. On verification of the Service Book, it is found that Shri B. Ajayakumar has joined as Assistant Geologist in the District Office of this Department at Wayanad on 11/7/2003 FN as per the advice of KPSC and orders issued vide reference 1st cited. His appointment was regularised w.e.f. 11/7/2002 FN vide reference 2nd cited. Subsequently he was transferred and posted as such in the Special Office of this Department at Cherthala vide reference 3rd cited. As per rules he has to undergo probation for a period of two years within a continuous period of 3 years service in this Department. As such Sri. B. Ajayakumar has completed two years continuous service on the AN of 10/7/2005. During the above period he has not availed himself of any kind of leave which extends the period of probation. His work and conduct during the probation period were satisfactory. As such Sri. B. Ajayakumar has completed two years continuous service on the AN of 10/7/2005. During the above period he has not availed himself of any kind of leave which extends the period of probation. His work and conduct during the probation period were satisfactory. In the above circumstances, the following orders are issued: The probation of Shri B. Ajayakumar, in the post of Assistant Geologist on Rs.6675-10550 is declared to have been completed satisfactorily w.e.f. 11/7/2005 FN. He is entitled to get his second increment in the post of Assistant Geologist w.e.f. 11/7/2005 FN. Accordingly his second increment of Rs.175/- in the post of Assistant Geologist on Rs.6675-10550 is sanctioned w.e.f. 11/7/2005 FN raising his basic pay from Rs.6850 to Rs.7025. Sd/- N. KRISHNA KUMAR DIRECTOR OF MINING AND GEOLOGY.” 27. Notification dated 5.6.2016 issued in G.O.(P) No.162/2016/ID. by the Principal Secretary to Government, Industries (A) Department, Government of Kerala, is extracted hereunder : “GOVERNMENT OR KERALA Industries (A) Department NOTIFICATION G.O.(P) No. 16/2021/ID. Dated, Thiruvananthapuram, 5th June, 2016 The following are the Select Lists of Officers for promotion to the categories of Additional Director, Deputy Director and Geologist in the Department of Mining and Geology prepared by the Departmental Promotion Committee (Higher) met on 30-5-2016 and approved by Government for the year 2016. I. Additional Director Sri. T.K. Ramakrishnan II. Deputy Director Sri. C. Thambu Cherian III. Geologist 1. Smt. Sheeja S., 2. Smt. Preeja N.B. 3. Dr. Reena Thomas 4. Sri. Sooraj S., 5. Dr. B. Ajayakumar P.H. KURIAN Principal Secretary to Government and Convenor, DPC (Higher)” 28. Letter dated 16.06.2020 submitted by the 3rd respondent to the Director of Mining and Geology, Thiruvananthapuram [Exhibit-R3(i)] is extracted hereunder : “From Dr. B. Ajayakumar, Geologist, Department of Mining and Geology, District Office, Kottayam. To The Director of Mining and Geology Thiruvananthapuram. Sir, Sub:-Probation period-Request for extension of time-Reg. Ref:-G.O(Rt.) No. 969/2016/ID dated 22.09.2016. Kind attention is invited to the above. I have been promoted as Geologist vide reference cited (1) above. Since I could not complete my probation period successfully due to non-qualifying the Accountant test, I humbly request that necessary steps may kindly be taken to extend my probation period. Yours faithfully Dr. B. Ajaykumar.” 29. Ref:-G.O(Rt.) No. 969/2016/ID dated 22.09.2016. Kind attention is invited to the above. I have been promoted as Geologist vide reference cited (1) above. Since I could not complete my probation period successfully due to non-qualifying the Accountant test, I humbly request that necessary steps may kindly be taken to extend my probation period. Yours faithfully Dr. B. Ajaykumar.” 29. Letter issued by the Director of Mining and Geology to the Principal Secretary II, Industries Department (a), Thiruvananthapuram dated Nil/9/21 [Exhibit-R3(j)] is extracted hereunder : “xxxxxxxxxxx Dated: /09/2021 Number: DMG/8081/2021-E1 Director Principal Secretary II, Industrial (A) Department Sir, Sub:-Mining and Geology Department-employment matters Sri. Bijumon P.N. Geologist, Dr. Ajaykumar B., Geologist – extension of probation period readings. Ref: 1. G.O dated 20.02.2020 bearing no.G.O(Rt.) 155/2020/ID 2. G.O dated 22.09.2016 bearing no G.O (Rt.) 949/ 2016/ID 3. Request dated 16.06.2020 from Dr. B. Ajaykumar, Geologist. 4. Request dated 14.09.2021 from Sri. Biju Mon P.N., Geologist. The Government's attention is drawn to the above reference. Mr. Bijumon PN, was the Assistant Geologist in the Department. Dr. Ajayakumar B, was promoted to the post of Geologist as per reference Nos.1, 2 and entered the job on 02.03.2020 and 23.09.2016 respectively. As per G.O. (P) No.42/10/P&ARD of 20.12.2020, the probation period in the post of Geologist is six months in a row. However, in the departmental examination required to declare probation, Mr. Bijumon PN and Dr. Ajayakumar B have not yet passed. The work and conduct of Sri. Bijumon PN and Dr. Ajayakumar B., in the post of Geologist are satisfactory. Dr. Ajayakumar B., Geologist has informed that he has written the last departmental examination, but the result has not come. In the above circumstances, the requests as per references (3,4) for taking follow-up action regarding extension of the probation period of Dr. Ajayakumar B., Geologist and Sri. Bijumon PN, Geologists are included herewith.” 30. To put it short, the sum and substance of one of the contentions advanced by the petitioner is that respondents 3 and 4 have not passed the Department test, while promoting them as Geologist, from the post of Assistant Geologist; and the second contention is that they are continuing in the said post without declaring the probation. Said submission is made on the ground that continuance of respondents 3 and 4 in the post of Geologist is clear violation of the provisions of Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules, 1958. Said submission is made on the ground that continuance of respondents 3 and 4 in the post of Geologist is clear violation of the provisions of Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules, 1958. Therefore, according to the petitioner, unqualified persons are illegally performing the functions of District Geologist, in violation of the KS & SSR and Mining and Geology Department Service Rules. 31. It is the case of the petitioner that even though complaints were filed before the Secretary, Industries Department, and hearing was conducted on 16.10.2020, no orders were passed. It is also submitted that in the reply received under the Right to Information Act, 2005, it is stated that respondents 3 and 4 have not passed the Department test and, therefore, petitioner contended that whatever orders passed by the respondents 3 and 4 granting permits and approving mining plans are illegal and liable to be interfered with. It is also contended that respondents 3 and 4 are usurpers in the post of Geologist and, therefore, remedy of the petitioner being a dutiful citizen is to seek for a writ of quo warranto to discharge the party respondents from the post held by them, in terms of the provisions of Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules. 32. From the detailed counter affidavit filed by the State Government, in stark distinction to the contentions raised by the petitioner, it could be deduced that at the time of entering into service by respondents 3 and 4 as per the Special Rules then in force, i.e., Kerala Geology Service Rules, 1981, there was no requirement for passing of Account Test (Lower and Higher) to declare promotion in the cadre of Assistant Geologist. However, as per Rule 7 of Exhibit-P1 Special Rules, 2009, which come into force on 20.07.2009, every person appointed to any of the categories prescribed therein shall be from the date on which he/she joins duty, shall be on probation,-(i) if appointed by direct recruitment by transfer from any other service, for a total period of two years on duty within a continuous period of three years; and (ii) if appointed by promotion, for a total period of one year on duty within a continuous period of two years. 33. Admittedly, Part-II of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules, 1958 was amended on 19.03.2013 wherein, a proviso was included to Rule 28(a)(iii) on and with effect from 1.4.2010. 33. Admittedly, Part-II of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules, 1958 was amended on 19.03.2013 wherein, a proviso was included to Rule 28(a)(iii) on and with effect from 1.4.2010. As per the said proviso, the period of probation for persons who were appointed on or after the 1st April, 2020 to selection posts in the State Service by promotion or by transfer within the Department where direct recruitment is not one of the methods of appointment as per the Special Rules, shall be six months on duty within a continuous period of one year. It is also clear from the submissions made by the State, as well as respondents 3 and 4, that the party respondents are fully qualified to the post of Geologist in view of the qualification prescribed as per Exhibit-P1 Special Rules. Therefore, according to the State Government, there is not even a scintilla of truth in the contentions advanced by the petitioner. 34. It is further submitted that the probation of respondents 3 and 4 were not declared in the post of Geologist, since the Departmental test prescribed as per Exhibit-P1 Special Rules, is not passed by respondents 3 and 4. However, it is stated that as per Rule 21, Part II of KS & SSR, extension is sought for to acquire special qualifications or pass the prescribed test to enable the appointing authority to decide as to whether the probationer is suitable for full membership or not. It is also submitted that the said requests made by the party respondents are under consideration of the State Government. 35. The counter affidavit filed by respondents 3 and 4 further makes it clear that the respondents have submitted applications for granting exemption to declare the probation, in contemplation of Rule 21 of Part II KS & SSR and in fact, both of them have participated in the Departmental test, as is evident from the Admission Ticket dated 13.09.2021 issued by the Kerala Public Service Commission [Exhibit-R3(l)]. Therefore, the basic contention advanced by the petitioner that the probation of respondents 3 and 4 were not declared in the post of Assistant Geologists, cannot be sustained, in view of the fact that as per the then existing Special Rules, there was no requirement for passing the Account Test (Lower and Higher) for the purpose of declaring probation. Therefore, the basic contention advanced by the petitioner that the probation of respondents 3 and 4 were not declared in the post of Assistant Geologists, cannot be sustained, in view of the fact that as per the then existing Special Rules, there was no requirement for passing the Account Test (Lower and Higher) for the purpose of declaring probation. That apart, the contention of the petitioner that respondents 3 and 4 are continuing in the post of Geologist, without securing extension of probation, in contemplation of Rule 21 of Part II KS & SSR, 1958 also cannot be sustained, for the reason that respondents 3 and 4 had already applied for extension, which is pending consideration before the Government, and further, they have already participated in the Department test and results are awaited. 36. In order to understand the real implication of the issues raised, reference to some of the relevant statutory provisions is fruitful. 37. Rule 20 of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958 deals with probationer’s suitability for full membership. Sub-rule (a) of Rule 20 clearly states that at the end of the prescribed or extended period of probation, as the case may be, the Appointing Authority shall consider the probationer’s suitability for full membership of the service, class or category for which he was selected. The proviso thereto specifies that in case the probation was extended under Rule 21, solely to enable the probationer to acquire the special qualifications or to pass the prescribed tests, the Appointing Authority shall consider the probationer’s suitability for full membership of the service, class or category as soon as the probationer has acquired the special qualifications or has passed the prescribed tests. Other methods are also prescribed in the matter of discharging the probationer from the post held by him/her. 38. Rule 28 of Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules, 1958 deals with promotion. Clause (i) to Rule 28(a) specifies that except in the case of appointment to the posts of Heads of Departments, no member of a service or class of a service shall be eligible for promotion from the category in which he was appointed to the service unless he has satisfactorily completed his probation in that category. Clause (i) to Rule 28(a) specifies that except in the case of appointment to the posts of Heads of Departments, no member of a service or class of a service shall be eligible for promotion from the category in which he was appointed to the service unless he has satisfactorily completed his probation in that category. Further, the proviso makes it clear that a probationer in a class, category or grade shall not be superseded for promotion to a higher class, category or grade by his junior, if the vacancy in the higher class, category or grade arises within the period specified in the Special Rules for completion of probation in the class, category or grade in which he is probationer and if he has passed the test or tests prescribed for successful completion of probation and is otherwise eligible and suitable for such promotion: but his promotion shall be subject to the condition that he satisfactorily completes the probation in the class, category or grade from which he was promoted within the period prescribed therefor, and for this purpose the period of service put in by him in the higher class, category or grade shall be reckoned towards probation in the class, category or grade from which he was promoted and also in the class, category or grade to which he was promoted. The said rule is discussed because, as pointed out above, as per the Kerala Geology Service Rules, 1981, there was no mandatory requirement for passing of Account Test (Lower and Higher) for declaring probation, and therefore the probation of the party respondents were declared on completion of two years service in the post of assistant geologists, and in that view of the matter the promotion of respondents 3 and 4 to the next higher post of Geologist was in accordance with law. 39. It is evident from Rule 21 of KS & SSR that extension of probation is possible. Rule 21 states that in the case of any probationer falling under sub-rule (b) or Rule 19 or sub-rule (c) of Rule 20; the Appointing Authority may extend his probation for a minimum period of one year to enable him to acquire special qualifications or pass the prescribed tests, as the case may be, or to enable the appointing authority to decide whether the probationer is suitable for full membership or not. The second limb of Rule 21 makes it clear that extension of probation beyond one year may, however, be ordered by the Government if found necessary. 40. Going through the counter affidavit of respondents 3 and 4, as well as the State, it is clear that the applications submitted by respondents 3 and 4 under Rule 21 of KS & SSR are pending consideration before the Government and the party respondents have participated in the Departmental test, as evident from the documents produced by the respondents 3 and 4 and it stands undisputed. 41. Even though in the reply affidavit filed by the petitioner, it is stated that the application for extension was submitted after the filing of instant writ petition, we do not find much force in the said contention because, the Government is vested with powers as per Rule 21 of KS & SSR, to extend the period of probation exceeding one year. Said application is pending consideration before the State Government. 42. The next contention raised by the petitioner is that respondents 3 and 4 are usurpers in the post of Geologist. Analysing the above said aspects, we have no doubt that since the 3rd and 4th respondents have appeared for the departmental test and result is awaited, the Government is having sufficient powers to extend the probation period and for that purpose their applications are pending. Hence, the party respondents cannot be said to be usurpers, as contended by the petitioner. They were legally appointed to the posts in question on the basis of the qualifications prescribed under the Special Rules and their service is regulated as per the provisions of law discussed above. 43. Now, let us consider a few decisions as to when a writ of quo warranto can be issued. (i) In B.R. Kapur v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. [ (2001) 7 SCC 231 ], at paragraph Nos.79 to 81, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- “79..............A writ of quo warranto is a writ which lies against the person, who according to the relator is not entitled to hold an office of public nature and is not an usurper of the office. It is the person, against whom the writ of quo warranto is directed, who is required to show, by what authority that person is entitled to hold the office. It is the person, against whom the writ of quo warranto is directed, who is required to show, by what authority that person is entitled to hold the office. The challenge can be made on various grounds, including on the grounds that the possessor of the office does not fulfill the required qualifications or suffers from any disqualification, which debars the person to hold such office. So as to have an idea about the nature of action in a proceedings for writ of quo warranto and its original form, as it used to be, it would be beneficial to quote from Words and Phrases, Permanent Edn., Vol. 35-A, p. 648. It reads as follows: “The original common-law writ of quo warranto was a civil writ at the suit of the Crown, and not a criminal prosecution. It was in the nature of a writ of right by the King against one who usurped or claimed franchises or liabilities, to inquire by what right he claimed them. This writ, however, fell into disuse in England centuries ago, and its place was supplied by an information in the nature of a quo warranto, which in its origin was a criminal method of prosecution, as well to punish the usurper by a fine for the usurpation of the franchise, as to oust him or seize it for the Crown. Long before our revolution, however, it lost its character as a criminal proceeding in everything except form, and was applied to the mere purposes of trying the civil right, seizing the franchise, or ousting the wrongful possessor, the fine being nominal only and such, without any special legislation to that effect, has always been its character in many of the States of the Union, and it is therefore a civil remedy only. Ames v. State of Kansas 4 S.Ct. 437, 442 : 111 US 449 : 1 Ed 482 (1884), People v. Dashaway Assn. 24 P 277, 278 : 84 Cal 114.” 80. Ames v. State of Kansas 4 S.Ct. 437, 442 : 111 US 449 : 1 Ed 482 (1884), People v. Dashaway Assn. 24 P 277, 278 : 84 Cal 114.” 80. In the same volume of Words and Phrases, Permanent Edn., at p. 647 we find as follows: “The writ of 'quo warranto' is not a substitute for mandamus or injunction nor for an appeal or writ of error, and is not to be used to prevent an improper exercise of power lawfully possessed, and its purpose is solely to prevent an officer or corporation or persons purporting to act as such from usurping a power which they do not have. State Ex inf. McKittrick v. Murphy 148 SW 2d 527, 529, 530 : 347 Mo 484.” Information in nature of 'quo warranto' does not command performance of official functions by an officer to whom it may run, since it is not directed to officer as such, but to person holding office or exercising franchise, and not for purpose of dictating or prescribing official duties, but only to ascertain whether he is rightfully entitled to exercise functions claimed. State ex inf. Walsh v. Thatche 102 SW 2d 937, 938 : 340 Mo 865. (emphasis supplied) 81. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Reissue Vol. I, p. 368, para 265 it is found as follows: “266. In general --An information in the nature of a quo warranto took the place of the obsolete writ of quo warranto which lay against a person who claimed or usurped an office, franchise, or liberty, to inquire by what authority he supported his claim, in order what the right to the office or franchise might be determined.” (emphasis supplied) (ii) In Raju Puzhankara v. Kodiyeri Balakrishnan and Ors. [2009 KHC 244], a Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court at paras 5 to 10, held as under: “5. The next question is whether a Minister is holding a public office, so that a quo warranto writ can be issued, if he is functioning as a Minister without any legal authority. Another incidental question is, even if his initial assumption is valid in law, whether if he subsequently disqualify to hold office, can a writ of quo warranto be issued. There is no dispute that if a Minister is holding his office against law, a quo warranto writ can be issued. Another incidental question is, even if his initial assumption is valid in law, whether if he subsequently disqualify to hold office, can a writ of quo warranto be issued. There is no dispute that if a Minister is holding his office against law, a quo warranto writ can be issued. In S.R. Chowdhury v. State of Punjab and Ors. [ AIR 2001 SC 2707 ], quo warranto writ was issued by the Supreme Court. In that case, a person who was not a member of the legislative assembly was appointed as Chief Minister. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that even though under Article 164(4) of the Constitution of India, he can be appointed for an initial period of six months, he cannot be repeatedly continued to hold the office beyond the period of six months and, therefore, after the first six months, he cannot be appointed again and in that particular case quo warranto writ was issued. The Court also noticed that if he is repeatedly appointed to the above post, it will be flouting the constitutional scheme and mandate. In B.R. Kapur v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr. ( AIR 2001 SC 3435 ), the Hon'ble Supreme Court also held that even if a person is disqualified to become a member of the legislature, he cannot be appointed as a Minister or Chief Minister under the guise of Article 164(4) and a quo warranto writ can be issued to oust such person from office. In that case, Smt. Jayalalitha, who was convicted and sentenced by a Court of law for imprisonment for more than two years, without becoming a member of the Legislative Assembly occupied office of Chief Minister of Tamilnadu by virtue of Article 164(4) of the Constitution. The Apex Court held that if she is not qualified to become a member of the Legislative Assembly, she cannot be appointed as a Minister or a Chief Minister. The Hon'ble Apex Court held as follows: “50. ...The Constitution prevails over the will of the people as expressed through the majority party. The will of the people as expressed through the majority party prevails only if it is in accord with the Constitution. The Governor is functionary under the Constitution and is sworn to 'preserve, protect and define the Constitution and the laws' (Article 159). ...The Constitution prevails over the will of the people as expressed through the majority party. The will of the people as expressed through the majority party prevails only if it is in accord with the Constitution. The Governor is functionary under the Constitution and is sworn to 'preserve, protect and define the Constitution and the laws' (Article 159). The Governor cannot, in the exercise of his discretion or otherwise, do anything that is contrary to the Constitution and the laws. It is another thing that by reason of the protection the Governor enjoys under Article 361, the exercise of the Governor's discretion cannot be questioned. We are in no doubt at all that if the Governor is asked by the majority party in the legislature to appoint as Chief Minister a person who is not qualified to be a member of the legislature or who is disqualified to be a member of the legislature or who is disqualified to be such, the Governor must having due regard to the Constitution and the laws, to which he is subject, decline and the exercise of discretion by him in this regard cannot be called in question. 51. If perchance, for whatever reason, the Governor does appoint as Chief Minister a person who is not qualified to be a member of the legislature or who is disqualified to be such, the appointment is contrary to the provisions of Article 164 of the Constitution, as we have interpreted it, and the authority of the appointee to hold the appointment can be challenged in quo warranto proceedings. That the Governor has made the appointment does not give the appointee any higher right to hold the appointment. If the appointment is contrary to the constitutional provisions it will be struck down. The submission to be contrary-unsupported by any authority-must be rejected. 52. The judgment of this Court in Shri Kumar Padma Prasad v. Union of India [ (1992) 2 SCC. 428 ] is a case on point. One K.N. Srivastava was appointed a Judge of the Gauhati High Court by a warrant of appointment signed by the President of India. Before the oath of his office could be administered to him, quo warranto proceedings were taken against him in that High Court. An interim order was passed directing that the warrant of appointment should not be given effect to until further orders. Before the oath of his office could be administered to him, quo warranto proceedings were taken against him in that High Court. An interim order was passed directing that the warrant of appointment should not be given effect to until further orders. A transfer petition was then filed in this Court and was allowed. This Court, on examination of the record and the material that it allowed to be placed before it, held that Srivastava was not qualified to be appointed a High Court Judge and his appointment was quashed. This case goes to show that even when the President, or the Governor, has appointed a person to a constitutional office, the qualification of that person to hold that office can be examined in quo warranto proceedings and the appointment can be quashed. 6. As far as the present case is concerned, the first Respondent was elected as the Member of the Legislative Assembly and he became the Home Minister after complying with all legal formalities. There is no dispute with regard to his initial appointment and there is no contention that he was disqualified under any of the provisions of the enactments or the Constitution. The only contention is that he has violated the oath of secrecy which was taken at the time of assumption of office. The form of oath of office to be taken at the time of assumption of office is as follows: “I.....swear in the name of God/solemn affirm that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established, that I will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India, that I will faithfully and conscientiously discharge my duties as a Minister for the (State of Kerala) and that I will do right to all manner of people in accordance with the Constitution and the law without fear or favour, affection or ill-will.” The oath of secrecy to be taken is as follows: “I.....swear in the name of God/solemnly affirm that I will not directly or indirectly communicate or reveal to any person or persons any matter which shall be brought under my consideration or shall become known to me as a Minister for the (State of Kerala) except as may be required for the due discharge of my duties as such Minister.” In this case, CBI prepared a final report after investigation. Two Government officers and one ex-Minister are arrayed as accused. C.B.I., has sought sanction to prosecute them and the Minister. It is stated in Ext. P-2 paper report that the first Respondent has stated that cases are not new to Pinarayi and they will fight the case politically. According to the Petitioner, by the above statement, the Minister has divulged the information that Pinarayi, an ex-minister, is an accused and thereby violated the oath. The violation of oath of office is a very serious matter. But the questions are whether there is any violation, and even if there is violation of oath, who is the authority to take action and whether writ of quo warranto will lie. When final report was filed levelling charges against an ex-Minister, a spontaneous reaction was made by the first Respondent. Whether such expression by the Home Minister before consideration of the issue by the Cabinet is improper is not a question to be considered by us. Impropriety of a statement by the Minister is nonjusticiable. Violation of oath is different from impropriety. In any event, a writ of quo warranto cannot be issued on the ground of impropriety and, in any view, for the impropriety in the conduct of a Minister writ of quo warranto will be issued by the Court sparingly in very special circumstances. It is a discretionary remedy. Even though the CBI has filed charges against the ex-Minister, unless he is found guilty by the Court, he is deemed to be innocent. Prima facie, we are of the opinion that the observations made by the Minister are not a violation of oath. This is only a prima facie opinion, as we are not called upon to give a verdict on that aspect in this proceedings. 7. Even assuming that there is violation of oath, a Full Bench of this Court in K.C. Chandy v. R. Balakrishna Pillai [1985 K.L.T. 762 F.B.] held that quo warranto cannot be issued in such a situation. The Court held that breach of oath is different from absence of oath and if there is breach of oath, action has to be exercised by the appointing authority under the Constitution. Whether breach of oath of office and of secrecy committed by a minister is outside the judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Full Bench held as follows: “7. Whether breach of oath of office and of secrecy committed by a minister is outside the judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Full Bench held as follows: “7. Breach of oath may thus be a betrayal of faith. The appointing authority, the Governor, in such cases, can consider whether there was, in fact, any breach of oath. It is not for this Court to embark on any such enquiry. 8. Breach of oath is different from absence of oath. Absence of oath prevents entry into office while breach affects the continuance after a valid entry. If no oath is taken before assumption of office as enjoined by the Constitution, there is no legal title to hold that office and a writ of quo warranto will naturally go from this Court. Similarly, a Minister, who, for any period of six consecutive months, is not a member of the Legislature of the State shall, at the expiration of that period, cease to be a Minister. This is the mandate of Article 164 of the Constitution. A person without authority cannot function; and the jurisdiction under Article 226 could be invoked to prevent that usurper in office from functioning. 9. Breach of oath requires a termination of the tenure of office. This power can be exercised by the appointing authority under the Constitution and according to the procedure, if any, prescribed therein. The termination of that tenure is not the function of a Court; and it would not be appropriate to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 in such cases. Proceedings under Article 226 in such cases do not lie. It was Jefferson who said: “Our peculiar security is in the possession of a written Constitution; let us not make it a blank paper by construction.(Government by Judiciary-Raoul Berger – p.304.) 10. The question as to whether there was breach of oaths of office and of secrecy committed by a Minister is outside judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution.” (iii) In N. Kannadasan and Ors. v. Ajoy Khose and Ors. reported in [ (2009) 7 SCC 1 ], on the issuance of a writ of quo warranto, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: “148. v. Ajoy Khose and Ors. reported in [ (2009) 7 SCC 1 ], on the issuance of a writ of quo warranto, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: “148. Concedingly, judicial review for the purpose of issuance of writ of Quo Warranto in a case of this nature would lie: (A) in the event the holder of a public office was not eligible for appointment ; (B) Processual machinery relating to consultation was not fully complied. 149. The writ of quo warranto proceedings affords a judicial remedy by which any person who holds an independent substantive public office is called upon to show by what right he holds the same so that his title to it may be duly determined and in the event it is found that the holder has no title he would be directed to be removed from the said office by a judicial order. The proceedings not only give a weapon to control the executive from making appointments to public office against law but also tend to protect the public from being deprived of public office to which it has a right. 150. It is indisputably a high prerogative writ which was reserved for the use of Crown. 151. The width and ambit of the writ, however, in the course of practice, have widened and it is permissible to pray for issuance of a writ in the nature of quo warranto. 152. In Corpus Juris Secundum [74 C.J.S. Quo Warranto § 14], 'Quo Warranto' is defined as under: Quo warranto, or a proceeding in the nature thereof, is a proper and appropriate remedy to test the right or title to an office, and to remove or oust an incumbent. It is prosecuted by the state against a person who unlawfully usurps, intrudes, or holds a public office. The relator must establish that the office is being unlawfully held and exercised by respondent, and that realtor is entitled to the office. 153. In the Law Lexicon by J.J.S. Wharton, Esq., 1987, 'Quo Warranto' has been defined as under: QUO WARRANTO, a writ issuable out of the Queen's Bench, in the nature of a writ of right, for the Crown, against him who claims or usurps any office, franchise, or liberty, to enquire by what authority he supports his claim, in order to determine the right. It lies also in case of non-user, or long neglect of a franchise, or mis-user or abuse of it; being a writ commanding the defendant to show by what warrant he exercises such a franchise having never had any grant of it, or having forfeited it be neglect or abuse. 154. Indisputably a writ of Quo Warranto can be issued inter alia when the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules as has been held by this Court in High Court of Gujarat v. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat, (supra) and R.K. Jain v. Union of India and Ors. (1993) 4 SCC 119 . See also Mor Modern Coop. Transport Society Ltd. v. Financial Commr. & Secy.[2002] SUPP 1 SCR 87. 155. In Dr. Duryodhan Sahu and Ors. v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra and Ors. (1998) II LLJ 1013 SC, this Court has stated that it is not for the court to embark upon an investigation of its own to ascertain the qualifications of the person concerned. [See also Arun Singh alias Arun Kr. Singh v. State of Bihar and Ors. AIR 2006 SC 1413 ] 156. We may furthermore notice that while examining if a person holds a public office under valid authority or not, the court is not concerned with technical grounds of delay or motive behind the challenge, since it is necessary to prevent continuance of usurpation of office or perpetuation of an illegality. [See Dr. Kashinath G. Jalmi and Anr. v. The Speaker and Ors. [1993] 2 SCR 820]. 157. Issuance of a writ of quo warranto is a discretionary remedy. Authority of a person to hold a high public office can be questioned inter alia in the event an appointment is violative of any statutory provisions. 163. It was held that a Writ of Quo Warranto can be issued even when the President or the Governor had appointed a person to a constitutional office. It was furthermore held that the qualification of that person to hold that office can be examined in a quo warranto proceedings and the appointment can be quashed.” (iv) In Hari Bansh Lal v. Sahodar Prasad Mahto and Ors. [ (2010) 9 SCC 655 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: “10. Writ of quo warranto lies only when appointment is contrary to a statutory provision. In High Court of Gujarat and Anr. v. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat and Ors. [ (2010) 9 SCC 655 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: “10. Writ of quo warranto lies only when appointment is contrary to a statutory provision. In High Court of Gujarat and Anr. v. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat and Ors. (2003) 4 SCC 712, (three-Judges Bench) Hon'ble S.B. Sinha, J. concurring with the majority view held: “22. The High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction in a matter of this nature is required to determine at the outset as to whether a case has been made out for issuance of a writ of certiorari or a writ of quo warranto. The jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of quo warranto is a limited one. While issuing such a writ, the Court merely makes a public declaration but will not consider the respective impact of the candidates or other factors which may be relevant for issuance of a writ of certiorari. (See R.K. Jain v. Union of India, SCC para 74.) 23. A writ of quo warranto can only be issued when the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules. (See Mor Modern Coop. Transport Society Ltd. v. Financial Commr. & Secy. to Govt. of Haryana) 11. In Mor Modern Cooperative Transport Society Ltd. v. Financial Commissioner & Secretary to Govt. of Haryana and Anr. [ (2002) 6 SCC 269 ], the following conclusion in para 11 is relevant. “11. ... The High Court did not exercise its writ jurisdiction in the absence of any averment to the effect that the aforesaid officers had misused their authority and acted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the appellants. In our view the High Court should have considered the challenge to the appointment of the officials concerned as members of the Regional Transport Authority on the ground of breach of statutory provisions. The mere fact that they had not acted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the appellant could not lend validity to their appointment, if otherwise, the appointment was in breach of statutory provisions of a mandatory nature. It has, therefore, become necessary for us to consider the validity of the impugned notification said to have been issued in breach of statutory provision.” 12. In B. Srinivasa Reddy v. Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage Board Employees Assn. and Ors. (2006) 11 SCC 731 , this Court held: “49. It has, therefore, become necessary for us to consider the validity of the impugned notification said to have been issued in breach of statutory provision.” 12. In B. Srinivasa Reddy v. Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage Board Employees Assn. and Ors. (2006) 11 SCC 731 , this Court held: “49. The law is well settled. The High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction in a matter of this nature is required to determine, at the outset, as to whether a case has been made out for issuance of a writ of quo warranto. The jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of quo warranto is a limited one which can only be issued when the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules. It is clear from the above decisions that even for issuance of writ of quo warranto, the High Court has to satisfy that the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules. In the later part of our judgment, we would discuss how the appellant herein was considered and appointed as Chairman and whether he satisfied the relevant statutory provisions. 20. From the discussion and analysis, the following principles emerge: (a) Except for a writ of quo warranto, PIL is not maintainable in service matters. (b) For issuance of writ of quo warranto, the High Court has to satisfy that the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules. (c) Suitability or otherwise of a candidate for appointment to a post in Government service is the function of the appointing authority and not of the Court unless the appointment is contrary to statutory provisions/rules.” (v) In Mahesh Chandra Gupta v. Union of India, [ (2014) 1 SCC 161 ] Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paragraph (26), held as under: “26. ....... writ of quo warranto can be issued only when person holding public office lacks eligibility or when appointment is contrary to statutory rules and held as under in paragraph 21:- "21. From the aforesaid exposition of law it is clear as noonday that the jurisdiction of the High Court while issuing a writ of quo warranto is a limited one and can only be issued when the person holding the public office lacks the eligibility criteria or when the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules. From the aforesaid exposition of law it is clear as noonday that the jurisdiction of the High Court while issuing a writ of quo warranto is a limited one and can only be issued when the person holding the public office lacks the eligibility criteria or when the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules. That apart, the concept of locus standi which is strictly applicable to service jurisprudence for the purpose of canvassing the legality or correctness of the action should not be allowed to have any entry, for such allowance is likely to exceed the limits of quo warranto which is impermissible. The basic purpose of a writ of quo warranto is to confer jurisdiction on the constitutional courts to see that a public office is not held by usurper without any legal authority." (vi) In Renu and Ors. v. District and Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari and Ors. [ (2014) 14 SCC 50 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: “15. Where any such appointments are made, they can be challenged in the court of law. The quo warranto proceeding affords a judicial remedy by which any person, who holds an independent substantive public office or franchise or liberty, is called upon to show by what right he holds the said office, franchise or liberty, so that his title to it may be duly determined, and in case the finding is that the holder of the office has no title, he would be ousted from that office by judicial order. In other words, the procedure of quo warranto gives the Judiciary a weapon to control the Executive from making appointments to public office against law and to protect a citizen from being deprived of public office to which he has a right. These proceedings also tend to protect the public from usurpers of public office who might be allowed to continue either with the connivance of the Executive or by reason of its apathy. It will, thus, be seen that before a person can effectively claim a writ of quo warranto, he has to satisfy the Court that the office in question is a public office and is held by a usurper without legal authority, and that inevitably would lead to an enquiry as to whether the appointment of the alleged usurper has been made in accordance with law or not. For issuance of writ of quo warranto, the Court has to satisfy that the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules and the person holding the post has no right to hold it. (Vide: The University of Mysore and Anr. v. C.D. Govinda Rao and Anr. ( AIR 1965 SC 491 ); Shri Kumar Padma Prasad v. Union of India and Ors. ( AIR 1992 SC 1213 ); B.R. Kapur v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr. ( AIR 2001 SC 3435 ); The Mor Modern Co-operative Transport Society Ltd. v. Financial Commissioner and Secretary to Govt., Haryana and Anr. ( AIR 2002 SC 2513 ); Arun Singh v. State of Bihar and Ors. ( AIR 2006 SC 1413 ); Hari Bansh Lal v. Sahodar Prasad Mahto and Ors. ( AIR 2010 SC 3515 ); and Central Electricity Supply Utility of Odisha v. Dhobei Sahoo and Ors. (2014) 1 SCC 161 ).” (vii) In Premkumar T.R. v. Mahatma Gandhi University and Ors. reported in ILR 2018 (1) Kerala 993, this Court held as under: “27. Well established is the legal proposition that a writ of quo warranto lies when the appointment is made contrary to the statutory provisions. True, the University and Dr. Sebastian, too, have questioned Premkumar's locus standi to file the writ petition. Dr. Sebastian has, in fact, alleged that Premkumar was fielded by persons unhappy with his appointment as the Vice Chancellor. But this objection to the suitor's standing in a writ of quo warranto cannot detain us for long. Legion are the judicial precedents. 28. If we examine this prerogative writ--quo warranto--from the judicial perspective of England, the place of its origin, the writ's primary object is to shield the sovereignty of the Crown from invasion, and to prevent abuse of public office, by a usurper or intruder. So every subject is deemed to be interested and may institute quo warranto proceedings.[Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn.) Vol. 1, paras 179-80, as quoted in V.G. Ramachandran's Law of Writs, EBC (2006), p. 1355] 29. In India, too, any person may challenge the validity of an appointment to a public office, whether or not that person's fundamental or other legal right has been infringed. But the Court must be satisfied that the person so applying is bona fide, and there is a necessity in public interest to declare judicially that there is a usurpation of public office. But the Court must be satisfied that the person so applying is bona fide, and there is a necessity in public interest to declare judicially that there is a usurpation of public office. [Id., 1355] Indisputably, a writ of quo warranto questioning a usurper's occupying public office, according to the Supreme Court, can be maintained even by a busybody (N. Kannadasan v. Ajoy Khose [ (2009) 7 SCC 1 : 2009 (8) SCALE 351 ]). 30. A citizen can claim a writ of quo warranto, for he stands in the position of a relater. He need not have any special or personal interest. The real test is to see whether the person holding the office is authorised to hold the same under law. Delay and laches, according to the Supreme Court in Rajesh Awasthi v. Nand Lal Jaiswal [ AIR 2013 SC 78 : (2013) 1 SCC 501 ], constitute no impediment for the Court to deal with the lis on merits. 31. In Central Electricity Supply Utility of Odisha v. Dhobei Sahoo [ 2013 (13) SCALE 477 : AIR 2014 SC 246 ], the Supreme Court has pointed out that the concept of locus standi, which strictly applies to service jurisprudence, should have no entry, for such allowance is likely to exceed the limits of Quo Warranto. The basic purpose of a Writ of Quo Warranto, it was pointed out, is to confer jurisdiction on the Constitutional Courts to see that the public office is not held by a usurper, a person with no legal authority.” (viii) In Bharati Reddy v. The State of Karnataka and Ors. reported in (2018) 6 SCC 162 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as as under: “26. In K. Venkatachalam v. A. Swamickan ( AIR 1999 SC 1723 ) : (1999) 4 SCC 526 , the challenge was to the election of the Appellant to the Legislative Assembly in Tamil Nadu by way of a writ Under Article 226 of the Constitution filed by the contesting candidate (Respondent therein) for a declaration that the Appellant was not qualified to be a Member of Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, since he was not enrolled as an elector in the electoral roll in the concerned constituency for the general elections in question. The Court analysed the factual matrix which pointed out that, admittedly, the incumbent was not an elector of the concerned constituency and that he blatantly and fraudulently impersonated himself as another elector in the constituency. Accepting that indisputable position, the Court proceeded to conclude that the Appellant was not eligible to contest elections from the concerned constituency, not being a voter in that constituency. It thus held that the Appellant therein lacked the basic qualification under Clause (c) of Article 173 of the Constitution of India read with Section 5 of the 1951 Act, which was quintessential to be elected from the constituency. On such a finding, the Court entertained the writ petition Under Article 226 and declared the Appellant to be occupying the public office without legal authority and issued a writ of quo warranto. In other words, the matter was decided on the basis of indisputable and established facts. This judgment will be of no avail to the writ Petitioners in the present case, so long as the Income and Caste Certificate issued to the Appellant is in force. 27. In Kurapati Maria Das v. Ambedkar Seva Samajan (2009) 7 SCC 387 , the Court distinguished the decision in K. Venkatachalam (supra) being on the facts of that case and reversed the judgment of the High Court under challenge, whereby a writ of quo warranto was issued against the Appellant therein. The reason for doing so may have some bearing on the matter in issue as in that case, there was dispute about the caste status of the Appellant. The Court opined that the issue regarding the caste status can be decided only by the Competent Authority under the relevant enactment and not by the High Court. The Court accepted the contention of the Appellant that continuance of the post of Chairperson depended directly on his election, firstly, as a ward member and secondly as the Chairperson, which election was available only to the person belonging to the Scheduled Caste. The Court accepted the contention of the Appellant that continuance of the post of Chairperson depended directly on his election, firstly, as a ward member and secondly as the Chairperson, which election was available only to the person belonging to the Scheduled Caste. In paragraph 32 of the reported decision, the Court while accepting the contention of the Appellant noted that the question of caste and his election are so inextricably connected that they cannot be separated and therefore, when the writ Petitioners challenged the continuation of the Appellant on the ground of his not belonging to a particular caste what they actually challenged was the validity of the election of Appellant though, apparently, the petition was for a writ of quo warranto.” 44. The issue with respect to maintainability of Public Interest Litigation in service matters, was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W.B., reported in (2004) 3 SCC 349 , and held as under: “5. It is necessary to take note of the meaning of the expression “public interest litigation”. In Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, Vol. 4 (4th Edn.), “public interest” is defined thus: “Public interest.— (1) A matter of public or general interest ‘does not mean that which is interesting as gratifying curiosity or a love of information or amusement; but that in which a class of the community have a pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected’.” 6. In Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Edn.), “public interest” is defined as follows: “Public interest.— Something in which the public, the community at large, has some pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected. It does not mean anything so narrow as mere curiosity, or as the interests of the particular localities, which may be affected by the matters in question. Interest shared by citizens generally in affairs of local, State or national Government.” 7. In Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary and Others [ (1992) 4 SCC 305 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the scope of public interest litigation. In para 53 of the said judgment, after considering what is public interest, the Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down as follows: “The expression ‘litigation’ means a legal action including all proceedings therein initiated in a court of law with the purpose of enforcing a right or seeking a remedy. In para 53 of the said judgment, after considering what is public interest, the Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down as follows: “The expression ‘litigation’ means a legal action including all proceedings therein initiated in a court of law with the purpose of enforcing a right or seeking a remedy. Therefore, lexically the expression ‘PIL’ means a legal action initiated in a court of law for the enforcement of public interest or general interest in which the public or a class of the community have pecuniary interest or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected.” 8. In para 62 of the said judgment, it was pointed out as follows: “Be that as it may, it is needless to emphasis that the requirement of locus standi of a party to a litigation is mandatory; because the legal capacity of the party to any litigation whether in private or public action in relation to any specific remedy sought for has to be primarily ascertained at the threshold.” 9. In para 98 of the said judgment, it has further been pointed out as follows: “While this Court has laid down a chain of notable decisions with all emphasis at their command about the importance and significance of this newly developed doctrine of PIL, it has also hastened to sound a red alert and a note of severe warning that courts should not allow its process to be abused by a mere busybody or a meddlesome interloper or wayfarer or officious intervener without any interest or concern except for personal gain or private profit or other oblique consideration.” 10. In subsequent paras of the said judgment, it was observed as follows: “It is thus clear that only a person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of PIL will alone have a locus standi and can approach the court to wipe out the tears of the poor and needy, suffering from violation of their fundamental rights, but not a person for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration. Similarly a vexatious petition under the colour of PIL brought before the court for vindicating any personal grievance, deserves rejection at the threshold.” 11. Similarly a vexatious petition under the colour of PIL brought before the court for vindicating any personal grievance, deserves rejection at the threshold.” 11. It is depressing to note that on account of such trumpery proceedings initiated before the courts, innumerable days are wasted, which time otherwise could have been spent for the disposal of cases of the genuine litigants. Though we spare no efforts in fostering and developing the laudable concept of PIL and extending our long arm of sympathy to the poor, the ignorant, the oppressed and the needy whose fundamental rights are infringed and violated and whose grievances go unnoticed, unrepresented and unheard; yet we cannot avoid but express our opinion that while genuine litigants with legitimate grievances relating to civil matters involving properties worth hundreds of millions of rupees and substantial rights and criminal cases in which persons sentenced to death facing the gallows under untold agony and persons sentenced to life imprisonment and kept in incarceration for long years, persons suffering from undue delay in service matters — government or private, persons awaiting the disposal of tax cases wherein huge amounts of public revenue or unauthorized collection of tax amounts are locked up, detenus expecting their release from the detention orders etc. etc. are all standing in a long serpentine queue for years with the fond hope of getting into the courts and having their grievances redressed, the busybodies, meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers or officious interveners having absolutely no real public interest except for personal gain or private profit either of themselves or as a proxy of others or for any other extraneous motivation or for glare of publicity, break the queue muffling their faces by wearing the mask of public interest litigation and get into the courts by filing vexatious and frivolous petitions of luxury litigants who have nothing to lose but trying to gain for nothing and thus criminally waste the valuable time of the courts and as a result of which the queue standing outside the doors of the courts never moves, which piquant situation creates frustration in the minds of the genuine litigants. 12. Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity-seeking is not lurking. 12. Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity-seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as an effective weapon in the armoury of law for delivering social justice to the citizens. The attractive brand name of public interest litigation should not be allowed to be used for suspicious products of mischief. It should be aimed at redressal of genuine public wrong or public injury and not publicity-oriented or founded on personal vendetta. As indicated above, courts must be careful to see that a body of persons or members of the public, who approaches the court is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private motive or political motivation or other oblique consideration. The court must not allow its process to be abused for oblique considerations by masked phantoms who monitor at times from behind. Some persons with vested interest indulge in the pastime of meddling with judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives and try to bargain for a good deal as well to enrich themselves. Often they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity. The petitions of such busybodies deserve to be thrown out by rejection at the threshold, and in appropriate cases with exemplary costs. 13. The Council for Public Interest Law set up by the Ford Foundation in USA defined “public interest litigation” in its Report of Public Interest Law, USA, 1976 as follows: “Public interest law is the name that has recently been given to efforts which provide legal representation to previously unrepresented groups and interests. Such efforts have been undertaken in the recognition that ordinary marketplace for legal services fails to provide such services to significant segments of the population and to significant interests. Such groups and interests include the proper environmentalists, consumers, racial and ethnic minorities and others.” 14. The court has to be satisfied about: (a) the credentials of the applicant; (b) the prima facie correctness or nature of information given by him; and (c) the information being not vague and indefinite. The information should show gravity and seriousness involved. Such groups and interests include the proper environmentalists, consumers, racial and ethnic minorities and others.” 14. The court has to be satisfied about: (a) the credentials of the applicant; (b) the prima facie correctness or nature of information given by him; and (c) the information being not vague and indefinite. The information should show gravity and seriousness involved. Court has to strike a balance between two conflicting interests: (i) nobody should be allowed to indulge in wild and reckless allegations besmirching the character of others; and (ii) avoidance of public mischief and to avoid mischievous petitions seeking to assail, for oblique motives, justifiable executive actions. In such case, however, the court cannot afford to be liberal. It has to be extremely careful to see that under the guise of redressing a public grievance, it does not encroach upon the sphere reserved by the Constitution to the executive and the legislature. The court has to act ruthlessly while dealing with imposters and busybodies or meddlesome interlopers impersonating as public-spirited holy men. They masquerade as crusaders of justice. They pretend to act in the name of pro bono publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect. 15. Courts must do justice by promotion of good faith, and prevent law from crafty invasions. Courts must maintain the social balance by interfering where necessary for the sake of justice and refuse to interfere where it is against the social interest and public good. (See State of Maharashtra v. Prabhu [ (1994) 2 SCC 481 ] and A.P. State Financial Corpn. v. Gar Re-Rolling Mills [ (1994) 2 SCC 647 - AIR 1994 SC 2151 ]. No litigant has a right to unlimited draught on the court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes. Easy access to justice should not be misused as a licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions. [See Buddhi Kota Subbarao (Dr) v. K. Parasaran [ (1996) 5 SCC 530 ]. Today people rush to courts to file cases in profusion under this attractive name of public interest. Easy access to justice should not be misused as a licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions. [See Buddhi Kota Subbarao (Dr) v. K. Parasaran [ (1996) 5 SCC 530 ]. Today people rush to courts to file cases in profusion under this attractive name of public interest. Self-styled saviors who have no face or ground in the midst of public at large, of late, try to use such litigations to keep themselves busy and their names in circulation, despite having really become defunct in actual public life and try to smear and smirch the solemnity of court proceedings. They must really inspire confidence in courts and among the public, failing which such litigation should be axed with a heavy hand and dire consequences. 16. As noted supra, a time has come to weed out the petitions, which though titled as public interest litigations are in essence something else. It is shocking to note that courts are flooded with a large number of so-called public interest litigations, whereas only a minuscule percentage can legitimately be called as public interest litigations. Though the parameters of public interest litigation have been indicated by this Court in a large number of cases, yet unmindful of the real intentions and objectives, courts at times are entertaining such petitions and wasting valuable judicial time which, as noted above, could be otherwise utilized for disposal of genuine cases. Though in Duryodhan Sahu (Dr) v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra [ (1998) 7 SCC 273 ], this Court held that in service matters PILs should not be entertained, the inflow of the so-called PILs involving service matters continues unabated in the courts and strangely are entertained. The least the High Courts could do is to throw them out on the basis of the said decision. This tendency is being slowly permitted to percolate for setting in motion criminal law jurisdiction, often unjustifiably just for gaining publicity and giving adverse publicity to their opponents. The other interesting aspect is that in the PILs, official documents are being annexed without even indicating as to how the petitioner came to possess them. In one case, it was noticed that an interesting answer was given as to its possession. It was stated that a packet was lying on the road and when out of curiosity the petitioner opened it, he found copies of the official documents. In one case, it was noticed that an interesting answer was given as to its possession. It was stated that a packet was lying on the road and when out of curiosity the petitioner opened it, he found copies of the official documents. Apart from the sinister manner, if any, of getting such copies, the real brain or force behind such cases would get exposed to find out whether it was a bona fide venture. Whenever such frivolous pleas are taken to explain possession, the court should do well not only to dismiss the petitions but also to impose exemplary costs, as it prima facie gives impression about oblique motives involved, and in most cases shows proxy litigation. Where the petitioner has not even a remote link with the issues involved, it becomes imperative for the court to lift the veil and uncover the real purpose of the petition and the real person behind it. It would be desirable for the courts to filter out the frivolous petitions and dismiss them with costs as aforestated so that the message goes in the right direction that petitions filed with oblique motive do not have the approval of the courts.” 45. In S. P. Gupta and Others v. Union of India, reported in [1981 Suppl. SCC 87], the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the court must be careful to see that a member of the public, who approaches the Court with a public interest litigation, is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private profit or political motivation or other oblique consideration and that the court must not allow its process to be abused by politicians and others to delay legitimate administrative action or to gain a political objective. 46. In Indian Consumers Welfare Council v. Union of India and another, reported in 2005 (3) L.W. 522 , the above said Council, filed a public interest writ petition, challenging a notification, issued by the 2nd respondent therein, by which, applications were invited, from degree holders, with degree in education, and consequently, prayed for a direction to the respondent therein, to appoint only those teachers, who were trained in teaching primary sections, for handling classes from 1st to 7th standards, to the post of Secondary Grade Teachers. Following the decision in Gurpal Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in 2005 J.T. [5] SC 389, a Hon'ble Division Bench of Madras High Court held as under: “This is a public interest litigation in respect of a service matter. It has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court that no public interest litigation lies in service matters, the last decision being Gurpal Singh v. State of Punjab, (2005 J.T. [5] SC 389). Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed.” 47. In B. Srinivasa Reddy v. Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage Board Employees' Association and Others reported in (2006) 11 SCC 731 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of quo warranto. After conducting a deep seated survey of the earlier judgments, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: “51. It is settled law by a catena of decisions that the court cannot sit in judgment over the wisdom of the Government in the choice of the person to be appointed so long as the person chosen possesses the prescribed qualification and is otherwise eligible for appointment. This Court in R.K. Jain v. Union of India [ (1993) 4 SCC 119 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1128 : (1993) 25 ATC 464] was pleased to hold that the evaluation of the comparative merits of the candidates would not be gone into a public interest litigation and only in a proceeding initiated by an aggrieved person, may it be open to be considered. It was also held that in service jurisprudence it is settled law that it is for the aggrieved person, that is, the non-appointee to assail the legality or correctness of the action and that a third party has no locus standi to canvass the legality or correctness of the action. Further, it was declared that public law declarations would only be made at the behest of a public-spirited person coming before the court as a petitioner. Further, it was declared that public law declarations would only be made at the behest of a public-spirited person coming before the court as a petitioner. Having regard to the fact that neither Respondents 1 and 2 were or could have been candidates for the post of Managing Director of the Board and the High Court could not have gone beyond the limits of quo warranto so very well delineated by a catena of decisions of this Court and applied the test which could not have been applied even in a certiorari proceedings brought before the Court by an aggrieved party who was a candidate for the post. 52. The judgment impugned in this appeal not only exceeds the limit of quo warranto but has not properly appreciated the fact that the writ petition filed by the Employees' Union and the President of the Union, Halakatte was absolutely lacking in bona fides. In the instant case, the motive of the second respondent Halakatte is very clear and the Court might in its discretion decline to grant a quo warranto. 53. This Court in A.N. Shashtri v. State of Punjab [1988 Supp SCC 127] held that the writ of quo warranto should be refused where it is an outcome of malice or ill will. The High Court failed to appreciate that on 18-1-2003 the appellant filed a criminal complaint against the second respondent Halakatte, that cognizance was taken by the criminal court in CC No. 4152 of 2003 by the Jurisdictional Magistrate on 24-2-2003, process was issued to the second respondent who was enlarged on bail on 12-6-2003 and the trial is in progress. That apart, the second respondent has made successive complaints to the Lokayukta against the appellant which were all held to be baseless and false. That apart, the second respondent has made successive complaints to the Lokayukta against the appellant which were all held to be baseless and false. This factual background which was not disputed coupled with the fact that the second respondent Halakatte initiated the writ petition as President of the 1st respondent Union, which had ceased to be a registered trade union as early as on 2-11-1992 suppressing the material fact of its registration having been cancelled, making allegations against the appellant which were no more than the contents of the complaints filed by him before the authorities which had been found to be false after thorough investigation by the Karnataka Lokayukta, would unmistakably establish that the writ petition initiated by Respondents 1 and 2 lacked in bona fides and it was the outcome of the malice and ill will the 2nd respondent nurses against the appellant. Having regard to this aspect of the matter, the High Court ought to have dismissed the writ petition on that ground alone and at any event should have refused to issue a quo warranto, which is purely discretionary. It is no doubt true that the strict rules of locus standi are relaxed to an extent in a quo warranto proceedings. Nonetheless an imposter coming before the Court invoking public law remedy at the hands of a constitutional court suppressing material facts has to be dealt with firmly. 54. This Court in B. Singh (Dr.) v. Union of India [ (2004) 3 SCC 363 ] held that only a person who comes to the Court with bona fides and public interest can have locus. Coming down heavily on busybodies, meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers or officious interveners having absolutely no public interest except for personal gain or private profit either of themselves or as a proxy of others or for any other extraneous motivation or for glare of publicity, this Court at para 14 of the Report held as under: (SCC p. 373, para 14) “14. The court has to be satisfied about: (a) the credentials of the applicant; (b) the prima facie correctness or nature of information given by him; and (c) the information being not vague and indefinite. The information should show gravity and seriousness involved. The court has to be satisfied about: (a) the credentials of the applicant; (b) the prima facie correctness or nature of information given by him; and (c) the information being not vague and indefinite. The information should show gravity and seriousness involved. Court has to strike a balance between two conflicting interests: (i) nobody should be allowed to indulge in wild and reckless allegations besmirching the character of others; and (ii) avoidance of public mischief and to avoid mischievous petitions seeking to assail, for oblique motives, justifiable executive actions. In such case, however, the court cannot afford to be liberal. It has to be extremely careful to see that under the guise of redressing a public grievance, it does not encroach upon the sphere reserved by the Constitution to the executive and the legislature. The court has to act ruthlessly while dealing with imposters and busybodies or meddlesome interlopers impersonating as public-spirited holy men. They masquerade as crusaders of justice. They pretend to act in the name of pro bono publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect.” 70. In the instant case, there is no violation of statutory provision and, therefore, in our view, a writ of quo warranto does not lie. If there be any doubt, it has to be resolved in favour of upholding the appointment. 71. In Statesman (P) Ltd. v. H.R. Deb [ AIR 1968 SC 1495 ] Hidyatullah, C.J., speaking for the Constitution Bench indicated: (SCR p. 621 F) “The High Court in a quo warranto proceeding should be slow to pronounce upon the matter unless there is a clear infringement of the law.” 72. In the circumstances which we have narrated above in paragraphs supra, it is indeed difficult to hold that the appellant did not have the requisite qualification. 73. The above ruling was followed in A.N. Shashtri v. State of Punjab [1988 Supp SCC 127]. We are of the view that in the facts of this case, the reasonable conclusion to reach should have been that the writ petitioners had failed to establish that the appellant did not possess requisite qualification and the appeals are, therefore, allowed and the judgment of the High Court has to be set aside and the writ petition has to be dismissed. 78. The High Court, in the instant case, was not exercising certiorari jurisdiction. 78. The High Court, in the instant case, was not exercising certiorari jurisdiction. Certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only at the instance of a person who is qualified to the post and who is a candidate for the post. This Court in Umakant Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar [ (1973) 1 SCC 485 ] held that the appointment cannot be challenged by one who himself is not qualified to be appointed. In Kumari Chitra Ghosh v. Union of India [ (1969) 2 SCC 228 ] a Constitution Bench of this Court held as under: (SCC p. 234, para 12) “12. The other question which was canvassed before the High Court and which has been pressed before us relates to the merits of the nominations made to the reserved seats. It seems to us that the appellants do not have any right to challenge the nominations made by the Central Government. They do not compete for the reserved seats and have no locus standi in the matter of nomination to such seats. The assumption that if nominations to reserved seats are not in accordance with the rules all such seats as have not been properly filled up would be thrown open to the general pool is wholly unfounded.” 84. In our opinion, the finding of legal mala fides is unsustainable being based on a misunderstanding of the law and facts. When a competent and experienced officer of an outstanding merit is appointed to a higher post on contract basis after his superannuation from service in the larger public interest, it does not suffer from legal malice at all. The decision of the then Chief Minister, Shri S.M. Krishna, recorded in the file, is also extracted by the High Court at p. 69 of SLP paper-book, Vol. II. In the context of the note put up by the Secretary of the Department, it is again extracted at pp. 67 and 68 which clearly bring out the fact that the appointment was made in the interest of the Board and the State at a time when nobody else other than the appellant could have served the interests of the State better. The High Court failed to appreciate the element of urgency involved in making the appointment because of impending negotiations with World Bank scheduled for 9-2-2004. The High Court failed to appreciate the element of urgency involved in making the appointment because of impending negotiations with World Bank scheduled for 9-2-2004. The writ petition, in our opinion, was motivated as Respondent No.1 had lodged a false complaint to the Lokayukta against the appellant which was found to be baseless by the Lokayukta (Annexure P-9). A petition praying for a writ of quo warranto being in the nature of public interest litigation, it is not maintainable at the instance of a person who is not unbiased. The second respondent is the President of the first respondent Union. He has chosen this forum to settle personal scores against his erstwhile superior officer after his retirement. The proceeding, in our view, is not meant to settle personal scores by an employee of the department. The High Court, in our view, ought to have dismissed the writ petition filed by Respondent No.1 at the threshold. 48. In Neetu v. State of Punjab, reported in (2007) 10 SCC 614 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: “The scope of entertaining a petition styled as a public interest litigation, locus standi of the petitioner particularly in matters involving service of an employee has been examined by this court in various cases. Referring to the decisions in Dr. Duryodhan Sahu and others v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra and others, reported in 1998 (7) SCC 273 and Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W.B. reported in ( 2004 (3) SCC 349 ), cited supra, the Apex Court held that PIL in service matters has been held as not maintainable.” 49. In Hari Bansh Lal v. Sahodar Prasad Mahto and others, reported in (2010) 9 SCC 655 , claiming himself as Vidyut Shramik Leader, a writ petition was filed before the High Court, challenging the appointment of Mr. Hari Bansh Lal, as the Chairman of Jharkhand State Electricity Board. The High Court declared that his appointment was not only arbitrary, but also, contemptuous, and ultimately, quashed the appointment order, which gave rise to an appeal. Addressing the issue, as to whether a public interest writ petition, is maintainable in service matters, following the earlier decisions in Dr. Hari Bansh Lal, as the Chairman of Jharkhand State Electricity Board. The High Court declared that his appointment was not only arbitrary, but also, contemptuous, and ultimately, quashed the appointment order, which gave rise to an appeal. Addressing the issue, as to whether a public interest writ petition, is maintainable in service matters, following the earlier decisions in Dr. Duryodhan Sahu and others v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra and others, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 273 and Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W.B reported in [ (2004) 3 SCC 349 ] and other decisions, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: “PIL in service matters: (11) About maintainability of the Public Interest Litigation in service matters except for a writ of quo warranto, there are a series of decisions of this Court laying down the principles to be followed. It is not seriously contended that the matter in issue is not a service matter. In fact, such objection was not raised and agitated before the High Court. Even otherwise, in view of the fact that the appellant herein was initially appointed and served in the State Electricity Board as a Member in terms of Section 5(4) and from among the Members of the Board, considering the qualifications specified in sub-section (4), the State Government, after getting a report from the vigilance department, appointed him as Chairman of the Board, it is impermissible to claim that the issue cannot be agitated under service jurisprudence. (12) We have already pointed out that the person who approached the High Court by way of a Public Interest Litigation is not a competitor or eligible to be considered as a Member or Chairman of the Board but according to him, he is a Vidyut Shramik Leader. Either before the High Court or in this Court, he has not placed any material or highlighted on what way he is suitable and eligible for that post. .............. The same principles have been reiterated in the subsequent decisions, namely, Dr. B. Singh v. Union of India and Others, (2004) 3 SCC 363 , Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2005) 1 SCC 590 and Gurpal Singh v. State of Punjab and Others, (2005) 5 SCC 136 . (15) The above principles make it clear that except for a writ of quo warranto, Public Interest Litigation is not maintainable in service matters.” 50. (15) The above principles make it clear that except for a writ of quo warranto, Public Interest Litigation is not maintainable in service matters.” 50. Apart from the decisions extracted above, the In Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dr. B. Singh (Dr.) v. Union of India, [ (2004) 3 SCC 363 ], B. Srinivasa Reddy v. Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage Board Employees Association and others [ (2006) 11 SCC 731 ], Seema Dharmdhere, Secretary, Maharashtra Public Service Commission v. State of Maharashtra, [ (2008) 2 SCC 290 ], and Vishal Ashok Thorat and Ors. v. Rajesh Shrirambapu Fate and Ors., ( AIR 2019 SC 3616 ), reiterated the said proposition of law that PIL in service matters is not maintainable. 51. Going through the above decisions, it is clear that maintainability of a Public Interest Litigation in service matters is very well settled and if a public interest litigant is able to establish a case for issuance a writ of quo warranto, no doubt, writ court is vested with ample powers to do so. But, here is a case where the discussion would make it clear that none of the contentions advanced by the petitioner have factual or legal basis, in order to come to the conclusion that respondents 3 and 4 are usurpers in the post of Assistant Geologist or Geologist. On the other hand, it is clear that the appointment of said respondents as Assistant Geologists in the Geology Department was made in accordance with law and having been satisfied that they have the required qualification as per the Kerala Geology Service Rules, 1981. Further, it was after successful completion of their probation, the respondents 3 and 4 were appointed as Geologist, in terms of the provisions of Exhibit-P1 Special Rules. 52. In view of the discussions made above, we have no hesitation to hold that petitioner has not made out a case of public interest, in the matter of appointment of respondents 3 and 4, as Geologist, and in our view, the requirements under law have been followed by the said respondents as regards the extension of their probation period. It is for the Government to take a decision in the applications submitted by respondents 3 and 4, taking into account the legal and factual circumstances, as per Exhibit-P1 Special Rules, 2009 and the provisions of Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958. It is for the Government to take a decision in the applications submitted by respondents 3 and 4, taking into account the legal and factual circumstances, as per Exhibit-P1 Special Rules, 2009 and the provisions of Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958. Since the petitioner has not made out a case for interference, we are of the view that the primary reliefs sought for by the petitioner cannot be granted. 53. We are also of the view that the other relief, to quash the orders issued by respondents 3 and 4, while functioning as Geologists, as nonest in law, sought for by the petitioner, consequent to the main relief of writ of quo warranto, also cannot be granted, since we are not granting the primary reliefs sought for by the petitioner. In the result, this Writ Petition fails and accordingly, it is dismissed.