JUDGMENT Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J. - The present second appeal arises out of a suit filed by the appellant for declaration of his tenancy right and other consequential reliefs. In the said suit, the respondent filed a counter-claim, apart from controverting the allegations made in the plaint in his written statement, thereby seeking eviction of the plaintiff/appellant from the suit premises on the ground that the appellant was a licensee, which relationship has since been terminated by the plaintiff. 2. Both the courts below, that is, the Trial Court and the First appellate Court, passed concurrent judgments and decrees, thereby dismissing the plaintiff's suit and allowing the counter-claim for eviction against the appellant. 3. The present second appeal has been heard on two substantial questions of law, as formulated by a Division Bench of this Court vide order dated October 14, 2015. The said substantial questions of law are as follows: 4. Whether both the learned courts below erred substantially in law in the matter of interpretation of the agreement of induction by not taking into consideration the basic principle that it is not open to the parties to contract out of the Rent act if the ingredients of the deal clearly indicate a tenancy rather than a licence? 5. Whether both the learned courts below erred substantially in law by not holding that it is not open to the owner of a premises to contend that he did not intend to create a tenancy when he was giving the exclusive possession for residential purpose to a person not related to him, with monthly rent and service charges and excluding the right to sublet in the written agreement between the parties? 6. The learned Senior advocate appearing for the plaintiff/appellant argues that the jural relationship existing between the parties is that of a landlord and tenant, not licensor and licensee. The defendant/respondent, it is contended, failed to establish that there was any relation between the parties to justify as to why residential rights were given to the plaintiff, a third person, to reside with the plaintiff's family. Under normal circumstances, unless any clear relationship is established between the parties, the onus is on the person seeking eviction to establish the reason why a stranger to the family would be permitted to reside at a premise with such stranger's family, thereby invading the privacy of the owner and his family. Under normal circumstances, unless any clear relationship is established between the parties, the onus is on the person seeking eviction to establish the reason why a stranger to the family would be permitted to reside at a premise with such stranger's family, thereby invading the privacy of the owner and his family. In the absence of any proof of such relationship or explanation being furnished by the defendant, it is argued that a presumption of tenancy arises. Such presumption was not rebutted by the defendant/respondent. 7. It is next contended by the appellant that even after the contractual relation between the parties expired, the respondent continued to accept rental charges from the appellant by describing the same as 'licence fees'. However, such nomenclature in the receipts cannot falsify the fact that the appellant was permitted to stay on with his family exclusively in the suit premises, which is a second indicator of tenancy. The exclusive possession, ipso facto, is sufficient to draw inference of such tenancy. 8. Thirdly, an amount of Rs.50,000/- accepted by the defendant/respondent as security deposit was never refunded by the defendant/respondent. The said fact, it is submitted, also creates a presumption of tenancy, as opposed to licence. 9. The learned Senior advocate appearing for the appellant further argues that mere nomenclature in the agreement executed between the parties as 'licensor' and 'licensee' and use of the expression 'licence fee', by themselves, are not sacrosanct to determine the jural relationship between the parties. In view of the clear conduct of the parties, and exclusive possession of the appellant with his family, the conduct of the parties was sufficient to establish tenancy. 10. The learned Senior advocate next argues that parties to an agreement cannot contract out of a statute. In the present case, since the parties, by their conduct, clearly expressed the intention to create a tenancy, which is protected by the Rent Control statute, that is, the West Bengal Premises Tenancy act, 1997, the mere language of the agreement cannot be a deciding factor in determining the relationship between the parties. 11. That apart, it is contended that the owner, that is, the defendant/respondent was obviously in a better position to bargain, in view of the plaintiff/appellant's immediate requirement of accommodation. 11. That apart, it is contended that the owner, that is, the defendant/respondent was obviously in a better position to bargain, in view of the plaintiff/appellant's immediate requirement of accommodation. Hence, the agreement was merely couched in the language of the landlord and not according to the reality as perceived from the conduct of the parties. Thus, the mere language of the agreement, it is argued, could not entitle the parties to wriggle out from the protection afforded by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy act, 1997. 12. By relying upon relevant clauses of the agreement between the parties, which was marked as Exhibit-1 (agreement dated November 1, 1998), it is argued by the appellant that the same contemplated eviction prior to the stipulated period of 11 months only in case of any breach of the agreement. Thus, the respondent did not have an unfettered right, as would be in the case of a licence, to evict the plaintiff at will. 13. Moreover, a specific clause in the agreement preventing the plaintiff from 'sub-letting' itself unerringly indicates that the property was let out, in the first place, to the appellant, thus, ruling out the proposition that a licence was created between the parties. 14. Certain other points taken in the Trial Court, however, are not pressed by the learned Senor advocate for the appellant. 15. However, by placing reliance on Clauses 2 and 17 of the agreement in particular, it is contended that the agreement conferred exclusive and residential possession, not mere right of user, on the appellant. Clauses 2 and 17 of the agreement, it is argued, clearly sought to avoid the consequences of a tenancy, which all the more proves that, in substance, the agreement between the parties was a tenancy agreement and not a licence agreement. 16. The learned Senior advocate for the petitioner, in support of his proposition, cites the judgment of Street Vs. Clauses 2 and 17 of the agreement, it is argued, clearly sought to avoid the consequences of a tenancy, which all the more proves that, in substance, the agreement between the parties was a tenancy agreement and not a licence agreement. 16. The learned Senior advocate for the petitioner, in support of his proposition, cites the judgment of Street Vs. Mountford, reported at [1985] 2 all ER 289, delivered by a five-Judge Bench of the House of Lords, where it was held that the test whether an occupancy of residential accommodation was a tenancy or a license was whether, on the true construction of the agreement, the occupier had been granted exclusive possession of the accommodation for a fixed or periodic term at a stated rent and unless special circumstances existed which negatived the presumption of a tenancy (for example, where from the outset there was no intention to create legal relations or where the possession was granted pursuant to a contract of employment) a tenancy arose whenever there was a grant of exclusive possession for a fixed period or term at a stated rent. It was further observed by House of Lords that the intention of the parties, as manifested in the agreement, that they only intended to create license and that they agreed not to be bound by the Rent acts, was irrelevant. 17. Learned Senior advocate next cites a.G. Securities Vs. Vaughan and others, reported at [1988] 3 all ER 1058. In the said judgment it was held, inter alia, that since it was the intention of the two appellants to occupy the flat as man and wife and since that intention was known to the respondent, the true nature of the arrangement was to create a joint tenancy and the purported retention by the respondent of the right to share the occupation of the small flat with the appellants or to introduce an indefinite number of third parties to do so was clearly a pretence to deprive them of the protection of the Rent acts. It followed that the agreements created a joint tenancy and not a license, it was further observed. 18. The learned Senior advocate next cites a Single Judge decision of the Bombay High Court rendered in Balvantsingji anand Vs. Bhagwantrao Deshmukh, reported at Air 1980 Bom. It followed that the agreements created a joint tenancy and not a license, it was further observed. 18. The learned Senior advocate next cites a Single Judge decision of the Bombay High Court rendered in Balvantsingji anand Vs. Bhagwantrao Deshmukh, reported at Air 1980 Bom. 333 , wherein the tests to determine whether the jural relationship was lease or license, in the context of Section 105 of the Transfer of Property act, 1882, were considered. Exclusive possession was held to be an important test. Under an agreement, the plaintiff-landlord reserving the right to enter and visit suit premises without interference would clearly indicate a lease, the Bombay High Court held. 19. The learned Senior advocate next cites Capt. B. V. D'Souza Vs. antonio Fausto Fernandes, reported at Air 1989 SC 1816 , where it was held that, for ascertaining whether a document creates a license or lease, the substance of the document must be preferred to the form and that it is not correct to say that exclusive possession of a party is irrelevant, but at the same time, it is not conclusive. The other tests were enumerated to be intention of the parties and whether the document creates any interest in the property or not which, according to the Supreme Court, are important considerations. 20. In controverting such arguments, learned counsel for the respondent relies heavily on the language of the agreement-in-question. In the agreement dated November 1, 1998 between the parties, the same was described as an agreement of license and the parties were described respectively as licensor and licensee. That apart, it is pointed out, the agreement mentioned that the licensee had approached the owner/licensor for permission to use a portion of his property for temporary accommodation for a period of 11 months only. The owner had agreed to grant reserving for himself the care, control and services to the property on the basis of 'live and licence' only. Such fact was reiterated throughout the agreement, as was the description of the licensor and licensee. 21. The owner had agreed to grant reserving for himself the care, control and services to the property on the basis of 'live and licence' only. Such fact was reiterated throughout the agreement, as was the description of the licensor and licensee. 21. Clause 2 of the agreement, it is contended, stipulates that the said writing was never to be construed as any tenancy agreement or lease in any manner whatsoever, nor otherwise agreeing to any other right, or interest in the property or claim in favour of the user which is not at all the intention of the parties but on the contrary merely a temporary accommodation and a temporary agreement or arrangement simply to allow the said appellant to use the rear portion flat of the said property as a licensee for residential purpose only under the absolute control and supervision of the owner. Such right of user, coupled with the reiteration in the agreement itself, left no scope for ambiguity, it is argued, that the agreement was a licence agreement in form and substance. 22. Even the monthly payment made for such accommodation was described as 'licence fee'. 23. Clause 7 of the agreement, it is argued, provided for deposit of Rs. 50,000/- only as interest free security for the regular payments and observation and performance of the terms and conditions of the licence, kept with the licensor to be refunded without any interest, profits on revocation of licence and/or surrender and/or peaceful delivery of vacant khas possession of the property/flat, subject to such deduction as the owner-licensor shall be entitled to as against the use and occupation of the licensee. 24. In Clause 9 of the agreement, it is provided that the licensee shall deliver without any demand the vacant possession of the said property to the licensor on the expiry of the stipulated period or earlier or may surrender the said portion of the property with two months' prior notice in writing in advance to the licensor. 25. although Clause 11 restrained the licensee from sub-letting, under-letting, re-letting and/or from transferring or parting with the possession to any person, the same was merely for abundant caution. Such negative covenant, it is contended, cannot lead to the converse presumption that the licensee was actually a tenant. The expressions 'sub-letting', 'under-letting' and 're-letting' were used in a negative context. 25. although Clause 11 restrained the licensee from sub-letting, under-letting, re-letting and/or from transferring or parting with the possession to any person, the same was merely for abundant caution. Such negative covenant, it is contended, cannot lead to the converse presumption that the licensee was actually a tenant. The expressions 'sub-letting', 'under-letting' and 're-letting' were used in a negative context. In any event, even a licensee is not permitted to enter into such transactions. Such clause, as such, per se does not indicate the grant of a lease/tenancy. 26. The owner-licensor reserved the power to revoke the licence at his absolute discretion, as provided in Clause 14 of the agreement. 27. In Clause 16, the licensor was entitled to inspect the inside of the flat during the daytime with or without any prior notice. 28. It is contended that Clause 17 of the agreement further clinches, beyond reasonable doubt, the issue that the licensee shall never claim any tenancy, interest or any relationship of landlord and tenant, or lease for the suit property. 29. It is further argued by learned counsel for the respondent that in the plaint itself, the appellant admitted having a 'sweet relation' between the parties and the cordiality of such relation in view of the plaintiff allegedly calling the defendant as 'Dada', which is a term of respect and endearment in the Bengali vernacular. 30. Thus, it is argued that the appellant's arguments as to the necessity of any further explanation by the respondent as regards the reason for granting license becomes redundant. Learned counsel for the respondent cites, in support of his contentions, the following judgments: i. Santosh Hazari Vs. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. [ (2001) 3 SCC 179 ]; ii. New Bus-Stand Shop Owners association Vs. Corporation of Kozhimkode and another [ (2009) 10 SCC 455 ]; iii. Smt. Rajbir Kaur and another Vs. M/s S. Chokesiri and Co. [(1989) 1 SCC 16] 31. Upon hearing the arguments of the parties and perusing the materials on record, this court comes to the following decision: 32. In the present case, the plaintiff/appellant is admittedly an educated person. In his cross-examination as PW-1, the appellant admitted (on November 3, 2008) that his academic qualification is Bachelor of Sciences (B.Sc.). [(1989) 1 SCC 16] 31. Upon hearing the arguments of the parties and perusing the materials on record, this court comes to the following decision: 32. In the present case, the plaintiff/appellant is admittedly an educated person. In his cross-examination as PW-1, the appellant admitted (on November 3, 2008) that his academic qualification is Bachelor of Sciences (B.Sc.). He admittedly has a business or share-broking, dealing and stockist, which he had been carrying on for the last 23/24 years prior to the date of such deposition. Further, the plaintiff admittedly was, at the time of the deposition, attached to politics and was contesting as a candidate in the then Mla election for a particular political party. 33. Moreover, the language used in the relevant agreement dated November 1, 1998 (Exhibit-1) was unambiguous and clear. Since both the parties relied on the said agreement in both the courts below, one has to consider the various facets of the same for a proper appraisal of the nature of the agreement. 34. all along, the agreement has been described as an 'agreement for licence' and the parties thereto were described as 'licensor' and 'licensee' respectively. 35. It was reiterated in several places of the agreement that the agreement was for permission to use a portion of the property of the respondent for temporary accommodation on the basis of 'live and license' (in all probability, meaning 'leave and license'). 36. In Clause 2 of the agreement, it is mentioned in unequivocal terms that the said writing was never to be construed as any tenancy agreement or lease in any manner whatsoever, nor otherwise agreeing to any other right or interest in the property or claim in favour of the user, which was not at all the intention of the parties. It was further stated in Clause 2 that, on the contrary, it was merely a temporary accommodation and a temporary agreement or arrangement simply to allow the appellant to use the rear portion flat of the property as a licensee for residential purpose only under the absolute control and supervision of the owner (the respondent) for which purpose the owner shall retain the front portion and staircase of the ground floor for his own family. The accommodation charges payable by the appellant is referred to as 'licence fee' or 'charge for temporary use per month'. In Clause 14 of the agreement. The accommodation charges payable by the appellant is referred to as 'licence fee' or 'charge for temporary use per month'. In Clause 14 of the agreement. It was expressly agreed and admitted by and between the parties that in default of any payment, the owner-licensor shall be entitled to and shall always have the power to revoke the licence granted at his absolute discretion and recover, reoccupy the said portion or part of the property without subjecting himself to any liability or criminal offence. 37. Clause 16 gives the licensor the entitlement to inspect the inside of the said flat during the daytime 'with or without any prior notice'. 38. Clause 17 of the agreement is rather self-explanatory. It stipulates that the licensee shall never claim any tenancy, interest or any relationship of landlord and tenant, or lease for the said portion of the property and shall not 'hold over' the same on the expiry of the fixed period stipulated therein. 39. Clause 18 confers the power on the respondent to determine the jural relationship without any notice in writing to the appellant. 40. In view of such specific clauses and the tenor of the language used in the said agreement, there cannot be found any ambiguity to justify deviation from the Literal Rule of construction of documents in the instant case. 41. The appellant is admittedly an educated person (graduate) and has been successfully running a business for more than two decades at the time of adducing evidence in the suit and, as such, cannot be said to have signed the agreement with closed eyes. 42. The agreement, in unambiguous terms, reserves for the respondent the care, control, maintenance and service to the property on the basis of leave and license. 43. as regards the argument advanced by the appellant that there was no explanation offered by the respondent for granting the licence in favour of the appellant, who is a stranger to the respondent's family, such argument is defeated by the averments made by the plaintiff/appellant in the plaint as well as his evidence as PW-1. 44. In paragraph no.2 of the plaint as well as paragraph no.3 of the examination-in-chief of PW-1, the appellant categorically admitted that there was a good relation by and between the plaintiff and the respondent at the time of taking the licence. 44. In paragraph no.2 of the plaint as well as paragraph no.3 of the examination-in-chief of PW-1, the appellant categorically admitted that there was a good relation by and between the plaintiff and the respondent at the time of taking the licence. In paragraph no.4 as well as in his cross-examination dated November 3, 2008, the appellant admitted to have called the respondent 'Dada', which is a well-known term of endearment in the Bengali vernacular, which is the mother-tongue of both the parties. The appellant also admitted to having a sweet relation with the respondent in paragraph no.4 of the plaint as well as paragraph no.4 of his evidence-in-chief. 45. Thus, there could not exist an iota of doubt as to why the plaintiff was inducted by the defendant/respondent despite the plaintiff/appellant being a stranger to the family of the respondent. 46. The determinants of a jural relationship (lease or licence) have undergone a transformation both in the English Law as well as in trend of judgments of Indian Courts, including the Supreme Court. As per the prevalent legal position, as reflected from the cited reports, the intention of the parties, to be derived from the document-in-question and the conduct of the parties, is an important ingredient in such determination. Exclusive control and possession in respect of the property are two other important criteria highlighted by the Supreme Court in several cases. 47. The test applied in Street Vs. Mountford (supra) by the House of Lords also highlighted the intention of the parties, as manifested in the agreement, as an important consideration in such context. 48. In the present agreement, the parties unambiguously agreed that the control and power and the right to entering the property at any time were reserved with the defendant/respondent. 49. In a.G. Securities (supra), the House of Lords laid stress on the concept of 'man and wife', which might have been germane in 1988 in the English societal context, but does not retain the same 'sanctity' in modern Indian society, inasmuch as the concept of joint family, which was the previous cardinal Indian concept of the primary family unit, has undergone a sea change and has been metamorphosed into solitary and unitary families. A man and wife might very well, in the present Indian context, signify a nuclear family, as opposed to a joint family. A man and wife might very well, in the present Indian context, signify a nuclear family, as opposed to a joint family. In the modern context of working couples, inducting spouses as licensees is not an alien concept. 50. The notion of privacy of a joint family has lost its significance in the modern Indian society in the sense that induction of a family per se does not signify that the notion of privacy of the owner's family is disrupted. That apart, the plaintiff has merely stated in his pleadings that he and his family were inducted in the suit premises, without disclosing any detail of the composition of such family. 51. Combined together, the aforesaid factors are utterly insufficient to clinch the plaint case of tenancy, as opposed to the defence case of licence. 52. as far as the intention of the parties is concerned, both the parties are educated people and the relevant agreement is in unequivocal and clear English, which discloses that it is a licence agreement and cannot be construed in any manner as a lease/tenancy. Thus, the 'conduct' of the parties pales into insignificance. 53. Even if the conduct of the parties is considered in the context of the evidence on record, there is nothing significant to indicate clearly that the jural relationship between the parties was not a licence but a tenancy. 54. a negative clause restraining sub-letting, under-letting, etc., by itself, cannot be deemed to be an indicator of a lease, since not only a lessee but also a licensor or trespasser is not entitled to sub-let, under-let the property in their occupation. 55. Even taking the best case of the defence, the agreement, in some places, lays stress on the fact that the relationship between the parties could be terminated only on expiry of the period of 11 months. However, such provision is diluted by the power to revoke the licence in the absolute discretion of the respondent, as stipulated in Clause 14 of the agreement. Although default in payment was a precursor of such revocation, the unfettered and absolute discretion conferred on the owner belies the case of tenancy. 56. Furthermore, Clause 16 of the agreement entitles the respondent to inspect the inside of the flat during the daytime with or without any prior notice and, additionally, in emergency cases. Although default in payment was a precursor of such revocation, the unfettered and absolute discretion conferred on the owner belies the case of tenancy. 56. Furthermore, Clause 16 of the agreement entitles the respondent to inspect the inside of the flat during the daytime with or without any prior notice and, additionally, in emergency cases. Such clause is a clear indicator of the control and power regarding the premises being retained with the owner. In Clause 18, although, the licensor was entitled to revoke the licence within 11 months 'only' on failure to pay regularly the licence fee, taxes or for any breach of terms and conditions or statutory rules or authoritative order, such term 'only' is a stray expression used in an isolated manner against the stream and tenor of the rest of the entire agreement, as evident on a composite reading of the same. 57. In any event, apart from using the expressions 'live', 'licence', 'licensor', 'licensee' and 'licence fee' in several parts of the agreement, Clause 2 of the same, in no uncertain terms, clarifies that the agreement shall never be construed as any tenancy agreement or lease in any manner whatsoever and/or create any other right or interest in the property or claim in favour of the 'user'; which was not at all the intention of the parties but, on the contrary, merely a temporary accommodation and a temporary agreement or an arrangement to allow the appellant user of the property as a licensee was granted. 58. Such nomenclature and use of the expressions as indicated above do not leave any iota of doubt as regards the jural relationship between the parties being that of leave and licence, as opposed to lease/tenancy. 59. Even in the Bombay High Court judgment, exclusive possession was indicated as a determinant of the relationship between the parties. In Capt. B. V. D'Souza (supra) the Supreme Court compared the terms of the documents set out in the judgments in associated Hotels of India Ltd. Vs. R. N. Kapoor [ Air 1959 SC 1262 ] and Sohan Lal Naraindas Vs. Laxmidas Raghunath Gadit [ (1971) 3 SCR 319 ] with the language used in the deeds of the said reported case and it was held that the document would defeat the object of the Rent acts. 60. R. N. Kapoor [ Air 1959 SC 1262 ] and Sohan Lal Naraindas Vs. Laxmidas Raghunath Gadit [ (1971) 3 SCR 319 ] with the language used in the deeds of the said reported case and it was held that the document would defeat the object of the Rent acts. 60. In the present case, however, the genesis of the jural relationship was admittedly the agreement between the parties. The licence agreement dated November 1, 1998 is similar in terms with those dated November 1, 1997, the prior agreement, and that dated September 10, 1981, which might or might not have been acted upon by the parties. There was, thus, no pre-existing jural relationship between the parties, which could be contracted out of. 61. Each of the several receipts produced and exhibited in the suit go on to indicate in clear terms that the amount being paid was as 'licence fees', not 'rent'. The said receipts were admittedly signed by both the appellant and the respondent, which further negates the plaint case of the appellant feigning ignorance as regards the relationship not being a tenancy but a licence. 62. Read in the context of the judgments cited by the respondent that is, New Bus-Stand (supra) and Smt. Rajbir Kaur (supra), the tests of a lease are not satisfied in the present case; both the intention of the parties and the control retained by the respondent clearly indicate a licence having been executed between the parties. 63. The dictum of Santosh Hazari (supra), also cited by the respondent, is squarely applicable to the present case. 'Substantially', it was elaborated in the judgment, means 'having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable' in the context of second appeals. 64. Even if we look into the questions formulated at the admission of the present second appeal, we find that both the said questions have to be answered in favour of the respondent and against the appellant. The ingredients of the 'deal' clearly indicate a licence and not a tenancy. The concept of 'contracting out' is not attracted at all, since there was no prior lease/tenancy between the parties which was replaced or substituted by the contract-in-question. All the contracts prevalent between the parties, which were the genesis of the jural relationship between the two, form the genesis of the said relationship. The concept of 'contracting out' is not attracted at all, since there was no prior lease/tenancy between the parties which was replaced or substituted by the contract-in-question. All the contracts prevalent between the parties, which were the genesis of the jural relationship between the two, form the genesis of the said relationship. Since such agreements are, contemporaneous and simultaneous with the creation of the jural relationship between the parties, there was no scope for the parties to 'contract out' of any pre-existing relationship. 65. as far as the second substantial question is concerned, as formulated previously and quoted at the outset of the present judgment, there is nothing to show that the courts below erred substantially in law, in the absence of exclusive possession and control of the appellant being established in the present case, sufficient to disturb or unsettle the concurrent findings of fact of both the courts below. 66. It is well-settled that the concurrent findings of the courts below are generally not interfered with in second appeal, merely because another possible view can be arrived at on the basis of the materials-on-record, thereby replacing the logic of the courts below. In the absence of any perversity whatsoever in the judgments of both the courts below, there is no reason why the same should be set aside at the second appellate stage. Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure clearly indicates substantial questions of law to be a prerequisite of interference in second appeal. In the present case, no error was committed by either of the courts below, sufficient to attain the level of a 'substantial question of law'. 67. In the above premises, there is no scope of interfering with the judgments and decrees of the courts below. 68. accordingly, S.a.T. No.378 of 2015 and S.a.T. No. 379 of 2015 are dismissed on contest, thereby affirming the decisions of the courts below, consequentially dismissing the appellant's suit for declaration and injunction and allowing the counter-claim of the respondent for eviction and ancillary reliefs. 69. all the connected applications are disposed of accordingly. 70. However, in the facts of the case, no costs are awarded against either of the parties. 71. Let decrees be drawn up accordingly in both the appeals.