JUDGMENT Arindam Lodh, J. - This is an intra-court appeal filed by the appellants challenging the legality and validity of the judgment and order dated 21- 11-2019 passed by a learned Single Judge of this court in case No. WP(C) No.1192/2018, titled as Sri Subrata Debbarma v. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. & two Ors. whereby and whereunder the learned Single Judge interfered with the penalty imposed by the Disciplinary Authority on the writ petitioner (respondent herein). 2. We have heard Mr. S.K.Deb, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. A. L. Saha, learned counsel appearing for the appellants and Mr. P. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel assisted by Ms. A. Debbarma, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 3. The parties in the instant appeal are addressed here-in-below according to their original status in the writ petition. 4. The Oil and Natural Corporation Ltd. (ONGC for short) the respondents, initiated a disciplinary proceeding against the writ petitioner, Subrata Debbarma on the basis of following three articles of charges: 'Article-I a) Habitually irregular in attendance, b) Willfully and habitually absenting, c) Absenting himself from his place of work after signing the attendance register. Article-II Neglected his duty on various occasions, refused to perform his official assignment and thereby disobeyed the lawful orders of his superiors demonstrating insubordination. The petitioner was given warning/caution for such behavior. Article-III Exhibited threat intimidation and abused his superiors for asking him to perform his duty or to observe the official formality.' 5. On completion of the proceeding, the Disciplinary Authority had passed an order of removal of the petitioner from his service vide order dated 09.10.2018. The said order of penalty of removal was challenged by the petitioner by filing the writ petition before this court. Learned Single Judge upon hearing the parties had observed and held thus:- '17. While considering the inquiry report [part of Annexure-4 to the writ petition] this court did not find that the adequate materials were disclosed to the petitioner at the time of forming articles of charge 2 and 3 [as emphasized] even though some witnesses have come to prove the abusive conduct of the petitioner, but those conducts having not specified or not disclosed in the memorandum of charge enabling the petitioner to represent against it cannot be made basis of any disciplinary action. Those charges are vague, unspecified and instrumental to put the delinquent officer in quandary. Those charges are vague, unspecified and instrumental to put the delinquent officer in quandary. If the charge is formed in that manner those cannot be sustained on the ground of vagueness and incomprehensiveness. This court therefore by brushing aside the technical objection of maintainability for not filing the appeal, despite the specific rules accommodating the adequate provision for filing the appeal, would interfere the charges (2) and (3) in the memorandum dated 25.09.2017 [Annexure-B to the reply filed by the respondents]. Accordingly, the articles of charges (2) and (3) are set aside and quashed. But this court finds sufficient materials to hold the article of charge (1) on absenteeism or neglecting the duties well substantiated. But the penalty on that charge appears to be shockingly disproportionate. Hence, the order of penalty is interfered with and set aside. The disciplinary authority shall pass the fresh order of penalty after taking the proportionality vis-a-vis the mis-conduct in consideration. At the time of passing the order of penalty in terms of this direction the authority shall consider the long twenty five years of service as rendered by the petitioner. It is made abundantly clear that the disciplinary authority may impose any penalty lesser than the penalty of removal or dismissal. Such order shall invariably be based within a period of two months from the day of receipt of a copy of this order in accordance with the rules, subject to what has been observed as above. Having observed thus, the writ petition stands allowed to the extent as indicated above.' 6. In the course of hearing before this court, Mr. S. K. Deb, learned senior counsel has strongly argued that the learned Single Judge ought to have dismissed the writ petition on the ground of maintainability alone as in the long line of decisions, the Hon'ble Apex Court has categorically held that when there is provision for alternative remedy, the said provision has to be followed. After going through the ONGC Conduct Rules, we find that statute prescribes filing of appeal to the departmental appellate authority if a delinquent is aggrieved by an order passed by Disciplinary Authority. After going through the ONGC Conduct Rules, we find that statute prescribes filing of appeal to the departmental appellate authority if a delinquent is aggrieved by an order passed by Disciplinary Authority. Admitted fact is that the writ petitioner did not exhaust the statutory remedy available under the aforesaid Rules and instead of that he directly approached this court asking to interfere with the order of penalty imposed by the Disciplinary Authority in exercise of its prerogative jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 7. Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel has pressed into service some judgments passed by Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and including the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, passed in M/s. Radha Krishnan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors., reported in AIR 2021 SC 2114 and in State of Karnataka & Anr. v. Umesh reported in (2022) 6 SCC 563 . In Radha Krishnan (supra), the Apex Court while dealing with the question of maintainability of writ petition without exhausting the statutory remedy had, after taking into consideration of its earlier decisions, laid down the following principles: [SCC. p.2126, para 27] '27. The principles of law which emerge are that: (i) The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well; (ii) The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition. p.2126, para 27] '27. The principles of law which emerge are that: (i) The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well; (ii) The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved person; (iii) Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where (a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a legislation is challenged; (iv) An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law; (v) When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion; and (vi) In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be interfered with.' 8. In the case of Umesh (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has mainly dealt with the scope of judicial review in regard to the reappreciation of evidence by a writ court. 9. Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel has tried to persuade this court that learned Single Judge exceeded its jurisdiction in making a roving inquiry as regards the evidence led by the parties in the disciplinary proceeding. 10. On the other hand, Mr. 9. Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel has tried to persuade this court that learned Single Judge exceeded its jurisdiction in making a roving inquiry as regards the evidence led by the parties in the disciplinary proceeding. 10. On the other hand, Mr. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner submits that learned Single Judge has correctly held that the charges framed under Article-II and under Article-III are vague, unspecified which appear to be instrumental to put the delinquent officer in quandary for which those charges were rightly quashed by the learned Single Judge. Furthermore, learned Single Judge has rightly interfered with the penalty imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. Mr. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel has argued that since the order of penalty imposed by the Disciplinary Authority is illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction, the plea of maintainability of the writ petition raised by the respondents-ONGC is rightly rejected by learned Single Judge. 11. We have considered the above rival submissions advanced by learned counsels appearing for the parties. 12. Indubitably, the ONGC Conduct Rules prescribe specific provision for preferring appeal to the departmental Appellate Authority. Obviously, the writ petitioner has not exhausted this statutory procedure. According to learned Single Judge Articles of charges II and III appeared to be vague and in- comprehensive. As such, those were interfered with. However, the learned Single Judge has not specifically held that the petitioner is not guilty of committing the misconduct under Article of charge-I. It indicates that there are some materials to substantiate the charge under Article-I. Since the scope of re-appreciation of evidence by the court in a challenge against the finding of disciplinary authority is very limited, we find it appropriate to remit the entire matter to the departmental Appellate Authority. 13. Accordingly, the same stands remitted and the petitioner is directed to submit representation before the departmental Appellate Authority. The said Appellate Authority shall decide the representation made by the petitioner without being influenced by any of the observations made here-in-above by this court. 13. Accordingly, the same stands remitted and the petitioner is directed to submit representation before the departmental Appellate Authority. The said Appellate Authority shall decide the representation made by the petitioner without being influenced by any of the observations made here-in-above by this court. But the observation of the learned Single Judge that the penalty of removal of the petitioner from service passed by the Disciplinary Authority is quite disproportionate to the charge brought against him must be taken into consideration by the Appellate Authority particularly when the penalty of removal from service appears to be in contra to the relevant provision of ONGC (Conduct) Rules as the articles of charges do not relate to any financial irregularities. As such, the Appellate Authority should proceed in accordance with law keeping in mind the above observation made by this court. It is made clear that the Appellate Authority shall be at liberty to examine the findings of the Disciplinary Authority on all the charges. 14. As a sequel, the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge as aforestated, stands set aside and quashed. It is directed that the petitioner shall submit his representation within a period of two weeks from today and the Appellate Authority after receipt of the representation, shall dispose of the same with a reasoned order within a period of four weeks thereafter. 15. For the reasons aforesaid, the delay in preferring the statutory appeal before the Appellate Authority also stands condoned. The instant appeal, accordingly, stands disposed of. Pending application(s) if any, shall also stand disposed of.