JUDGMENT : Arup Kumar Goswami, J. 1. Heard Mr. Varun Sharma and Mr. Krishna Tandon, learned counsel, appearing for the appellants. Also heard Mr. Vikram Sharma, learned Deputy Government Advocate, appearing for the respondents No. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 as well as Mr. Sumesh Bajaj, learned counsel for the respondent No. 4. 2. This writ appeal is presented by the writ petitioners against an order dated 08.04.2016 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPC No. 696/2016 whereby the writ petition was dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. 3. This writ appeal was earlier dismissed by a judgment dated 28.09.2016. This Court, while dismissing the appeal, at paragraph 4 of the judgment, had observed as follows: “4. We have perused the record of the writ petition and in the writ petition there is not a single averment that the possession of the land has not been taken. In the writ petition, there is no averment much less any proof of the fact that this land has been taken over. Therefore, we have no reason to discard clear cut finding given by the Learned Single Judge that the land has been used for development of Naya Raipur. Therefore, we find no merit in the appeal, which is accordingly dismissed.” 4. Against the aforesaid judgment, the appellants had preferred a Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 36272/2016 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court which was registered as Civil Appeal No. 3778/2018. 5. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment dated 13.04.2018 observed that in column No. 3 (particulars of the cause/order against which the petition is made) of the writ petition, paragraph 4 of the application dated 29.02.2016 for grant of interim relief and paras 1.1, 1.20, 2.2, 2.4 and 2.7 of the writ appeal, the writ petitioners had made specific averments that they are in possession of the land in dispute and accordingly, holding that the aforesaid statements had escaped the attention of the Division Bench, set aside the order dated 28.09.2016 passed in the writ appeal and remanded the case for fresh disposal in accordance with law. At paragraph 15 of the judgment dated 13.04.2018, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows: “15. We, however, leave all the questions including the maintainability of the writ petition on any other grounds open for its decision. At paragraph 15 of the judgment dated 13.04.2018, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows: “15. We, however, leave all the questions including the maintainability of the writ petition on any other grounds open for its decision. Indeed, it is for the Division Bench to decide the issues, while deciding the writ appeal, uninfluenced by any of our observations made in this judgment.” 6. The case of the writ petitioners, as projected in the writ petition, is that they are agriculturists and are land owners in village Parsada, Tehsil Arang. On a request made by Naya Raipur Development Authority, Raipur, (for short, NRDA), the Land Acquisition Officer/Sub-Divisional Officer, Arang, registered a case on 16.03.2011 for compulsory acquisition of total 9.62 hectares of land in 23 Khasras of village Parsada for construction of a sports village (Khel Gram). 7. Though not stated in the writ petition, in the writ appeal, it is stated that while the petitioner No. 1 holds land measuring 0.65 hectares in Khasra No. 356, petitioner No. 2 holds land measuring 0.37 hectare in Khasra No. 370, 1.88 hectares in Khasra No. 407, and 0.20 hectares in Khasra No. 419, totaling 2.45 hectares. 8. In the writ petition, the following prayers were made: “(i) That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire records pertaining to the Land Acquisition Case No. 18A/82 year 2010-2011, in village Parsada, PH No. 21, Tahsil Aarang, District Raipur. (ii) That, this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to quash the entire land Acquisition proceedings in Land Acquisition Case No. 18A/82 year 2010-2011 in village Parsada, PH No. 21, Tahsil Arang, District Raipur. (iii) That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the award dated 4/7/2012 passed under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in Land Acquisition Case No. 18A/82 year 2010-2011, in village Parsada, PH No. 21, Tahsil Arang, District Raipur. (iv) That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the land record of village Kotni. (v) That, this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to pass any other relief that this Hon’ble Court may please deem fit and proper.” 9. The learned Single Judge, relied upon the judgments in (i) Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. (v) That, this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to pass any other relief that this Hon’ble Court may please deem fit and proper.” 9. The learned Single Judge, relied upon the judgments in (i) Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd., reported in (1996) 11 SCC 501 , State of Rajasthan v. D.R.Laxmi & Others, reported in JT 1996 (9) SC 327, Municipal Council Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, reported in (2000) 2 SCC 48 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that once the award is passed and possession of the land is taken, the Court ought not to exercise its power to quash the award; (ii) State of Karnataka v. Sangappa Dayappa Biradar, reported in (2005) 4 SCC 264 , wherein it was observed that once the award is accepted, no legal right survives for claiming a reference to the Civil Court; (iii) Swaika Properties Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2008) 4 SCC 696, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that any writ petition filed after passing of the award which has become final, deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches; (iv) Royal Orchid Hotels Limited v. G. Jayarama Reddy, reported in (2011) 10 SCC 608 , wherein it was observed that the High Court may not enquire into belated and stale claim and deny relief to a litigant if he is found guilty of delay and laches as a person who is not vigilant and does not seek intervention of the Court within reasonable time from the date of accrual of cause of action or alleged violation of the constitutional, legal or other right, is not entitled to relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as well as on the ground that in the intervening period, rights of third parties may have crystallized; and the decision in (v) Sulochana Chandrakant Galande v. Pune Municipal Transport, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 467 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court had observed that once the land is acquired, it vests in the State free from all encumbrances and once the land vests in the State, the person whose land is acquired becomes a persona non grata and he has a right to get compensation only for the same and that the person interested cannot claim the right of restoration of land on any ground, whatsoever. 10. 10. Taking note of the fact that the writ petition was filed almost after four years of passing of the award, and opining that much developments had taken place after the possession had been taken over, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches. 11. It is submitted by Mr. Varun Sharma, learned counsel for the appellants that when the NRDA had prepared the Naya Capital City Raipur Development Plan in the year 2003, village Kotni was included in the said plan but subsequently, with the change of the Government, the plan was changed in the year 2008 excluding village Kotni. It is further submitted that as required under the provisions of Section 50 and 56 of the Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973, for short, Adhiniyam of 1973, no proposal was put forward by the NRDA to the land owners indicating its intention to acquire the land by mutual consent or agreement and straightway acquisition proceedings were initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, the Act of 1894), and therefore, the acquisition proceedings initiated by the State Government is bad in law. It is also submitted that invocation of urgency clause under Section 17 of the Act of 1894, in the instant case, was not justified. Further contention of Mr. Sharma is that the Sub Divisional Officer, Arang/Abhanpur was not appointed as the Land Acquisition Officer by the appropriate Government to perform the duties and functions of the Collector. He reiterates the submission that possession of the land has not been taken over from the petitioners. 12. Mr. Sharma places reliance on the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Banda Development Authority, Banda v. Motilal Agrawal & Others, reported in (2011) 5 SCC 394 and Patasi Devi v. State of Haryana & Others, reported in (2012) 9 SCC 503 . 13. As no counter-affidavit was filed in the writ petition, after the remand from the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the respondent No. 4 has filed a reply to which rejoinder has also been filed by the writ petitioners. 14. Mr. Sumesh Bajaj, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 4 submits that the possession of the land in dispute was duly taken in the year 2012 itself and in this connection, he has drawn attention to Annexure A/4 of the writ appeal. 14. Mr. Sumesh Bajaj, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 4 submits that the possession of the land in dispute was duly taken in the year 2012 itself and in this connection, he has drawn attention to Annexure A/4 of the writ appeal. It is submitted that the land in question which was acquired is in the vicinity of the International Cricket Stadium and therefore, the same was required for development of Khel Gram. Opportunity was granted to the land owners to sell their lands to respondent No. 4 with mutual consent and in response to the publication made in this regard, about 6,500 land owners had sold their plots of land to the respondent No. 4 by mutual consent. He contends that provisions of Section 50 and 56 of the Adhiniyam of 1973 are not at all attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case and that the Sub- Divisional Officer (Revenue)/Deputy Collector is duly delegated with the powers of Collector in the State of Chhattisgarh. It is submitted that the land acquisition proceedings were initiated and concluded in accordance with law and there is no illegality in the entire proceedings. It is submitted that the writ appeal is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches as dismissed by the learned Single Judge as there is no explanation whatsoever as to why the writ petition came to be filed after a period of four years from the date of passing of the award. It is further submitted by him that there is also no averment, either in the writ petition or in the writ appeal, that the writ petitioners had not received or accepted the compensation amount. It is submitted that the documents filed by the writ petitioners are self-serving documents and do not establish their possession. Even otherwise, for gross delay and creation of third party rights, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. Mr. Bajaj places reliance on a Constitution Bench decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal & Others etc. reported in AIR 2020 SC 1496 , specifically drawing attention of the Court to the observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in respect of issue No. 4, relating to mode of taking possession under the Act of 1894 from paragraphs 244 to 277. 15. In reply, Mr. reported in AIR 2020 SC 1496 , specifically drawing attention of the Court to the observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in respect of issue No. 4, relating to mode of taking possession under the Act of 1894 from paragraphs 244 to 277. 15. In reply, Mr. Varun Sharma submits that as the possession of the lands of the petitioners had not been taken physically and the same is shown to have been taken over by only drawing a ‘Panchnama’, it has to be understood that the petitioners are in lawful possession of the land in question. 16. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the materials on record. 17. It is seen that a letter dated 01.09.2012 was issued by the Chief Executive Officer, NRDA to the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue)/Land Acquisition Officer, Aarang/Abhanpur with reference to delivery of possession of the plots of land. Pursuant to the said letter, the actual possession of the plots of land were handed over to the prescribed officer of the NRDA on the spot on 24.12.2012 which is evident from the “Possession Certificate” filed as Annexure A/4. Although, the materials on record do not indicate as to when the State had taken possession of the acquired land, materials on record demonstrate that the State had handed over the possession of the acquired plots of land including the plots of the petitioners to the NRDA on 24.12.20212. 18. In Patasi Devi (supra), noticing that no evidence was produced by the official respondents before the High Court to show that possession of the appellant's land and the house constructed over it had been taken by the competent authority between 09.12.2009, i.e., the date on which the award was passed and 20.01.2010, i.e., the date on which the writ petition was filed, it was observed that the High Court was not justified in holding that the writ petition of the appellant was not maintainable because the same was filed after the passing of the award. 19. In Patasi Devi (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court had relied upon the earlier judgment in the case of Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana, reported in (2012) 1 SCC 792 . 19. In Patasi Devi (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court had relied upon the earlier judgment in the case of Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana, reported in (2012) 1 SCC 792 . In Raghbir Singh Sehrawat (supra), the High Court had non-suited the writ petitioner on the ground that possession of the acquired land had been taken by officers concerned and the same would be deemed to have vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances. As the respondents had not produced any other evidence to show that actual possession of the land, on which crop was standing, had been taken after giving notice to the appellant or that he was present at the site when the possession of the acquired land was delivered to the Senior Manager of Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation (HSIIDC) and in view of the fact that crop was standing on the land, the Hon’ble Supreme Court opined that the exercise undertaken by the respondents showing delivery of possession cannot but be treated as farce and inconsequential. 20. In Indore Development Authority (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court overruled the decisions rendered in Velaxan Kumar v Union of India, reported in (2015) 4 SCC 325 and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narmada Bachao Andolan & Others, reported in (2011) 7 SCC 639 , with regard to the mode of taking possession and it was categorically held that drawing of Panchnama of taking possession is the mode of taking possession in land acquisition cases, and thereafter, the land vests in the State and any re-entry or retaining the possession is unlawful and does not inure for conferring benefits under section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. 21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Indore Development Authority (supra), took note of the judgment rendered in Banda Development Authority (supra). It was observed as under: “261. In Banda Development Authority (2011 AIR SCW 2835, Para 34) (supra), this Court held that preparing a Panchnama is sufficient to take possession. This Court has laid down thus: "37. The principles which can be culled out from the above noted judgments are: (i) No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to what act would constitute taking of possession of the acquired land. This Court has laid down thus: "37. The principles which can be culled out from the above noted judgments are: (i) No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to what act would constitute taking of possession of the acquired land. (ii) If the acquired land is vacant, the act of the State authority concerned to go to the spot and prepare a panchnama will ordinarily be treated as sufficient to constitute taking of possession. (iii) If crop is standing on the acquired land or building/ structure exists, mere going on the spot by the authority concerned will, by itself, be not sufficient for taking possession. Ordinarily, in such cases, the authority concerned will have to give notice to the occupier of the building/structure or the person who has cultivated the land and take possession in the presence of independent witnesses and get their signatures on the panchnama. Of course, refusal of the owner of the land or building/structure may not lead to an inference that the possession of the acquired land has not been taken. (iv) If the acquisition is of a large tract of land, it may not be possible for the acquiring/designated authority to take physical possession of each and every parcel of the land and it will be sufficient that symbolic possession is taken by preparing appropriate document in the presence of independent witnesses and getting their signatures on such document. (v) If beneficiary of the acquisition is an agency/ instrumentality of the State and 80% of the total compensation is deposited in terms of Section 17(3-A) and substantial portion of the acquired land has been utilised in furtherance of the particular public purpose, then the court may reasonably presume that possession of the acquired land has been taken." 22. The Issue No. 4 as framed in Indore Development Authority (supra), reads as follows: “In re: Issue No. 4 : mode of taking possession under the Act of 1894” 23. It will be appropriate to quote paragraphs 244, 247, 253, 256, 271, 272, 276 and 277 in the context of the above issue. They read as under: “244. Section 16 of the Act of 1894 provided that possession of land may be taken by the State Government after passing of an award and thereupon land vest free from all encumbrances in the State Government. They read as under: “244. Section 16 of the Act of 1894 provided that possession of land may be taken by the State Government after passing of an award and thereupon land vest free from all encumbrances in the State Government. Similar are the provisions made in the case of urgency in Section 17(1). The word “possession” has been used in the Act of 1894, whereas in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, the expression “physical possession” is used. It is submitted that drawing of panchnama is not enough when the actual physical possession remained with the land owner and Section 24(2) requires actual physical possession to be taken, not the possession in any other form. When the State has acquired the land and award has been passed, land vests in the State Government free from all encumbrances. The act of vesting of the land in the State is with possession, any person retaining the possession, thereafter, has to be treated as a trespasser and has no right to possess the land which vests in the State free from all encumbrances. xxx xxx xxx 247. The concept of possession is complex one. It comprises the right to possess and to exclude others, essential is animus possidendi. Possession depends upon the character of the thing which is possessed. If the land is not capable of any use, mere non-user of it does not lead to the inference that the owner is not in possession. The established principle is that the possession follows title. Possession comprises of the control over the property. The element of possession is the physical control or the power over the object and intention or will to exercise the power. Corpus and animus are both necessary and have to co-exist. Possession of the acquired land is taken under the Act of 1894 under Section 16 or 17 as the case may be. The government has a right to acquire the property for public purpose. The stage under Section 16 comes for taking possession after issuance of notification under Section 4(1) and stage of Section 9(1). Under section 16, vesting is after passing of the award on taking possession and under section 17 before passing of the award. xxx xxx xxx 253. Under section 16 of the Act of 1894, vesting of title in the Government, in the land took place immediately upon taking possession. Under section 16, vesting is after passing of the award on taking possession and under section 17 before passing of the award. xxx xxx xxx 253. Under section 16 of the Act of 1894, vesting of title in the Government, in the land took place immediately upon taking possession. Under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act of 1894, the acquired land became the property of the State without any condition or limitation either as to title or possession. Absolute title thus vested in the State. xxx xxx xxx 256. Thus, it is apparent that vesting is with possession and the statute has provided under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act of 1894 that once possession is taken, absolute vesting occurred. It is an indefeasible right and vesting is with possession thereafter. The vesting specified under section 16, takes place after various steps, such as, notification under section 4, declaration under section 6, notice under section 9, award under section 11 and then possession. The statutory provision of vesting of property absolutely free from all encumbrances has to be accorded full effect. Not only the possession vests in the State but all other encumbrances are also removed forthwith. The title of the landholder ceases and the state becomes the absolute owner and in possession of the property. Thereafter there is no control of the landowner over the property. He cannot have any animus to take the property and to control it. Even if he has retained the possession or otherwise trespassed upon it after possession has been taken by the State, he is a trespasser and such possession of trespasser enures for his benefit and on behalf of the owner. xxx xxx xxx 271. In the decision in Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana, the observation made was that it is not possible to take the possession of entire land in a day on which the award was declared, cannot be accepted as laying down the law correctly and same is contrary to a large number of precedents. The decision in Narmada Bachao Andolan v. State of M.P, is confined to particular facts of the case. The Commissioner was appointed to find out possession on the spot. DVDs and CDs were seen to hold that the landowners were in possession. The District Judge, Indore, recorded the statements of the tenure-holder. The decision in Narmada Bachao Andolan v. State of M.P, is confined to particular facts of the case. The Commissioner was appointed to find out possession on the spot. DVDs and CDs were seen to hold that the landowners were in possession. The District Judge, Indore, recorded the statements of the tenure-holder. We do not approve the method of determining the possession by appointment of Commissioner or by DVDs and CDs as an acceptable mode of proving taking of possession. The drawing of Panchnama contemporaneously is sufficient and it is not open to a court Commissioner to determine the factum of possession within the purview of Order XXVII, Rule 9 CPC. Whether possession has been taken, or not, is not a matter that a court appointed Commissioner cannot opine. However, drawing of Panchnama by itself is enough and is a proof of the fact that possession has been taken. 272. It was submitted on behalf of land owners that under Section 24 the expression used is not possession but physical possession. In our opinion, under the Act of 1894 when possession is taken after award is passed under section 16 or under section 17 before the passing of the award, land absolutely vests in the State on drawing of Panchnama of taking possession, which is the mode of taking possession. Thereafter, any re-entry in possession or retaining the possession is wholly illegal and trespasser’s possession insures for the benefit of the owner and even in the case of open land, possession is deemed to be that of the owner. When the land is vacant and is lying open, it is presumed to be that of the owner by this Court as held in Kashi Bai v. Sudha Rani Ghose { AIR 1958 SC 434 }. Mere re-entry on Government land once it is acquired and vests absolutely in the State (under the Act of 1894) does not confer, any right to it and Section 24(2) does not have the effect of divesting the land once it vests in the State. xxx xxx xxx 276. We have seen the blatant misuse of the provisions of section 24(2). Acquisitions that were completed several decades before even to say 50-60 years ago, or even as far back as 90 years ago were questioned; cases filed were dismissed. References were sought claiming higher compensation and higher compensation had been ordered. xxx xxx xxx 276. We have seen the blatant misuse of the provisions of section 24(2). Acquisitions that were completed several decades before even to say 50-60 years ago, or even as far back as 90 years ago were questioned; cases filed were dismissed. References were sought claiming higher compensation and higher compensation had been ordered. Now, there is a fresh bout of litigation started by erstwhile owners even after having received the compensation in many cases by submitting that possession has not been taken and taking of possession by drawing a Panchnama was illegal and they are in physical possession. As such, there is lapse of proceedings. 277. The court is alive to the fact that there are large number of cases where, after acquisition land has been handed over to various corporations, local authorities, acquiring bodies, etc. After depositing compensation (for the acquisition) those bodies and authorities have been handed possession of lands. They, in turn, after development of such acquired lands have handed over properties; third party interests have intervened and now declaration is sought under the cover of section 24(2) to invalidate all such actions. As held by us, section 24 does not intend to cover such cases at all and such gross misuse of the provisions of law must stop. Title once vested, cannot be obliterated, without an express legal provision; in any case, even if the landowners' argument that after possession too, in case of non- payment of compensation, the acquisition would lapse, were for arguments' sake, be accepted, these third party owners would be deprived of their lands, lawfully acquired by them, without compensation of any sort. Thus, we have no hesitation to overrule the decisions in Velaxan Kumar ( AIR 2015 SC 1462 ) (supra) and Narmada Bachao Andolan ( AIR 2011 SC 1989 ) (supra), with regard to mode of taking possession. We hold that drawing of Panchnama of taking possession is the mode of taking possession in land acquisition cases, thereupon land vests in the State and any re-entry or retaining the possession thereafter is unlawful and does not inure for conferring benefits under section 24(2) of the Act of 2013.” 24. A perusal of the above goes to show that possession of the land may be taken by the State Government after passing of an award and thereupon land vests free from all encumbrances in the State Government. A perusal of the above goes to show that possession of the land may be taken by the State Government after passing of an award and thereupon land vests free from all encumbrances in the State Government. Similar are the provisions made in the case of urgency in Section 17(1) of the Act of 1894. Vesting is with possession and the statute has provided under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act of 1894 that once possession is taken, absolute vesting occurs. It is an indefeasible right and vesting is with possession thereafter. Not only the possession vests in the State but all other encumbrances are also removed forthwith. The title of the landholder ceases and the State becomes the absolute owner and in possession of the property. Even if the earlier land-owner has retained the possession or otherwise trespassed upon it after possession has been taken by the State, he is a trespasser. It was categorically held at paragraph 277 that drawing of Panchmana of taking possession is the mode of taking possession in land acquisition cases, thereupon land vests in the State and any re-entry or retaining the possession thereafter is unlawful. 25. Admittedly, the writ petition was filed after more than four years of passing of the award and taking of possession by the NRDA. In view of the decision in Indore Development Authority (supra), the assertion of possession by the appellants in the facts and circumstances of the case becomes irrelevant. The appellants are conspicuously silent with regard to the aspect as to whether they have accepted or not accepted the compensation amount. As held by the learned Single Judge, there was a gross delay and laches on the part of the appellants in approaching the Court and therefore, we are of the opinion that no interference is called for with regard to the order of the learned Single Judge. 26. In view of the above determination, no occasion arises for this Court to dwell upon the contentions advanced questioning the validity of the acquisition proceedings. 27. Resultantly, the writ appeal is dismissed. No cost.