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2022 DIGILAW 343 (GAU)

National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. David Vanlalhruaia, F/o. Francis Lalkulhpuia (L)

2022-04-01

MARLI VANKUNG

body2022
JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. Johny L. Tochhawng, learned counsel for the appellant as well as Mr. L.H. Lianhrima, learned Senior counsel for the respondents. 2. This is an appeal against the Judgment & Award dated 17/07/18 wherein the Ld. Tribunal awarded the respondent No. 1-3/claimants an amount of Rs.5,00,000/- as compensation with interest @ 7% per annum from the date of filing the claim petition i.e. 4/4/2017 until realization of the whole amount. 3. Brief facts of the case is that on 26.06.2015 at 2:00 PM to 3:00 PM the deceased Francis Lalkulhpuia drove out a motor vehicle (Yamaha FZ-SFI) B/R No. MZ-01-K-9547 and met with an accident at Melriat village. As a result of which he was seriously injured and rushed to Civil Hospital, Aizawl where he was diagnosed to have seriously injured his head, however, due to none availability of bed, he was admitted to a private hospital at Aizawl Hospital & Research Centre, and succumbed to his injury on 2.7.2015. An FIR was submitted to Kulikawn P.S. by the wife of the deceased namely Zorinmawii D/o Lalrintluanga of Melriat on 17.7.2015 (i.e. 21 days after the incident) and a case was registered as GDE No. 10 at 1:00 PM on the same date. The Police report was then made on the same day the FIR was submitted i.e. on 17.7.2015. The Police report made by the O/C, Kulikawn Police Station stated that from the enquiry made no foul play was found in the incident and the incident was purely accidental. 4. Respondent Nos. 1-3/Claimants thereafter, on 4.4.2017 filed the claim petition before MACT, Aizawl under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 wherein they claimed compensation amounting to Rs. 9,49,423/-with interest against the above mentioned Appellant Insurance Co /O.P No.2.and the Respondent No. 4/owner of the vehicle (Yamaha FZ-SFI) B/R No. MZ-01-K-9547.That the deceased was a daily labourer at the time of his death and used to earn around Rs.3000/-per month and looked after the Respondent Nos. 1-3/Claimants. The said claim petition was registered as MACT Case No. 22/2017. 5. 1-3/Claimants. The said claim petition was registered as MACT Case No. 22/2017. 5. The Respondent No.4 /O.P No. 1 contested the case by filing Written Statement stating amongst others that he is the owner of the accident vehicle (Yamaha FZ-SFI) B/R No. MZ-01-K-9547.That the driver of the accident vehicle Francis Lalkulhpuia held a valid Driving Licence No. OLA:MZ-01200723717 as such as per the Motor Vehicle Rules, that he can drive the said vehicle. That the accident vehicle was validly insured with the O.P No. 2/Appellant Insurance Co. under policy No. 200504/31/14/6200002963 covering the date of the accident i.e. 26.6.2015. Thus, all the liability should be shifted to the O.P No. 2/Appellant i.e. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 6. The Appellant Insurance Co./ O.P No.2 contested the claim and denied that a vehicle (Yamaha FZ-SFI) B/R No. MZ-01-K-9547 slide and hit the wall on a roadside and one Francis Lalkulhpuia died purely due to accident and that the deceased Francis Lalkulhpuia was not having valid driving license to drive a two wheeler but was holding LMV-NT license only at the time of the accident. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties the Ld. Tribunal had framed the following issues : (i) Whether the present claim application is maintainable in the present form and style? (ii) Whether the claimant is entitled to compensation, and if so, who is liable to pay and to what extent? 7. The Respondent No. 1/Claimant examined only himself during the course of the trial and the Appellant Insurance Co/O.P 2 also examined one witness. After taking evidence the Ld. Tribunal had disposed the claim vide its Judgment & Award dated 17/07/18 wherein the Ld. Tribunal awarded the respondent No.1-3/claimants an amount of Rs.5,00,000/- as compensation with interest @ 7% per annum from the date of filing the claim petition i.e. 4/4/2017 until realization of the whole amount. 8. Aggrieved by the impugned Judgment & Award dated 17.07.2018 passed in MACT Case No. 22/2017, the Appellant/Opposite party No. 2 prefer to file this appeal on the following grounds ; (i) that from a plain reading of the Police Report it is clear that the Police Report was made on the same date when the FIR was lodge to the Police Station. Further, the FIR was submitted only after a span of 21 days from the date the accident occur, as such the evidentiary value of the Police Report upon which the Ld. Tribunal based upon its judgment is shaken and unreliable, as such the impugned Judgment & Award dated 17.07.2018 is liable to be set aside and quashed. (ii) that the Ld. Tribunal had erred in law and in fact as it has failed to appreciate the evidence adduced by the appellant in respect of the driving license of the deceased, which was not a valid license to drive the motorcycle but only a LMV-NT (Light Motor Vehicle-Non Transport). As such the insured owner of the motor vehicle had breached the contract of insurance by allowing unqualified driver to drive the vehicle, therefore the appellant is set free from its liability to indemnify the insured owner, as such the impugned Judgment & Award dated 17.07.2018 is liable to be set aside and quashed. (iii) that the Ld. Tribunal had erred in accepting the offending driver to be the third party and awarded compensation of Rs.5,00,000/-. The deceased driver who borrowed the accident vehicle from the actual owner i.e. the respondent No. 4 stepped into the shoe of the owner, and therefore he is not a third party. Furthermore, the deceased driver who, on his own volition drove the vehicle is within the ambit of gratuitous driver and therefore he is not a third party, and as such the impugned Judgment & Award dated 17.07.2018 is liable to be set aside and quashed. (iv) that the Ld. Tribunal erred in law in appreciating the claim petition which was liable to be dismissed for non-joinder and mis-joinder of necessary party. Jacinta Zorinmawii, who was the wife of the deceased and mother of the respondent No. 2 and 3/Claimants was not impleaded as a party in the claim petition. In fact, it is the wife of the deceased who had lodged an FIR to the Kulikawn Police Station. 9. The learned counsel has relied on the Apex court decisions in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Bibek Barhoi & Ors., 2018 (4) GLT 527, Ningamma and Another Vs. United India Insurance Company Limited., (2009) 13 SCC 710 , New India Assurance Co. Ltd Vs. P.C Lalfakawmi & 4 others, MAC.APP 26/2019. 10. 9. The learned counsel has relied on the Apex court decisions in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Bibek Barhoi & Ors., 2018 (4) GLT 527, Ningamma and Another Vs. United India Insurance Company Limited., (2009) 13 SCC 710 , New India Assurance Co. Ltd Vs. P.C Lalfakawmi & 4 others, MAC.APP 26/2019. 10. The learned senior counsel for the respondent on the other hand submits that the delay in submitting the FIR was due to the fact that the deceased was immediately hospitalized after the accident due to the serious injury sustained and ultimately succumbed to his injury, filing an FIR was not possible during this stressful period. On receiving the FIR, inquiry was immediately done and police report was submitted on the same day wherein it was held that the accident was purely accidental. That as the vehicle was validly insured at the time of the accident the insurance company are liable to indemnify the claimants/respondents. 11. With regards to the driving licence of the deceased, which is for LMV-NT vehicles, the learned senior counsel for the claimant/respondents submits that when deceased drove the vehicle (Yamaha FZ-SFI) B/R No. MZ-01-K-9547 the owner of the vehicle was not expected the check the validity of the driving licence of the deceased. 12. The learned senior counsel further submits that, on the point whether the deceased had stepped into the shoes of the owner of the vehicle, this point was never raised before the learned tribunal. Moreover the Insurance Co. has not established that the deceased had stepped into the shoes of the owner of the motor vehicle and thus the Appellant Insurance Co. is liable to indemnify the claimant since the accident vehicle is validly insured. That the claimant No.1 is the father of the deceased and claimant no.2& 3 are the minor children of the deceased and that they were all dependant on the deceased. The learned sr. counsel has placed reliance on National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Sinitha & Others, (2009) 13 SCC 710 , Pepsu Road Transport Corporation Vs. National Insurance Company (2013) 10 SCC 217 , Ram Chandra Singh Vs. Rajaram and Others, 2018 (4) T.A.C. 28 (S.C.). 13. Having heard both the parties, it is not a disputed fact that the accident vehicle(Yamaha FZ-SFI) B/R No. MZ-01-K-9547 was validly insured at the time of the incident. National Insurance Company (2013) 10 SCC 217 , Ram Chandra Singh Vs. Rajaram and Others, 2018 (4) T.A.C. 28 (S.C.). 13. Having heard both the parties, it is not a disputed fact that the accident vehicle(Yamaha FZ-SFI) B/R No. MZ-01-K-9547 was validly insured at the time of the incident. The Apex court in Ravi vs. Badrinarayan & Ors reported in AIR 2011 SC 1226 held that “It is well-settled that delay in lodging FIR cannot be a ground to doubt the claimant's case. Knowing the Indian conditions as they are, we cannot expect a common man to first rush to the Police Station immediately after an accident. Human nature and family responsibilities occupy the mind of kith and kin to such an extent that they give more importance to get the victim treated rather than to rush to the Police Station. Under such circumstances, they are not expected to act mechanically with promptitude in lodging the FIR with the Police. Delay in lodging the FIR thus, cannot be the ground to deny justice to the victim.” 14. In the instant case I find that the explanation given for delay in filing the FIR that the victim in the accident was seriously injured and had to be looked after while he was hospitalized till he succumbed to his injuries, is plausible enough given the facts and circumstances of the case, I also find that there is no reason to discredit the evidentiary value of the Police Report simply because it was done promptly within a day. 15. On the point raised regarding the driving licence of the deceased, it is admitted by the respondents that the driving licence is only for a LMV-NT (Light Motor Vehicle-Non Transport). 16. In Ram Chandra Singh Vs. Rajaram and Others (supra) where the Apex Court held : “11. Suffice it to observe that it is well established that if the owner was aware of the fact that the licence was fake and still permitted the driver to drive the vehicle, then the insurer would stand absolved. However, the mere fact that the driving licence is fake, per se, would not absolve the insurer. Indubitably, the High Court noted that the counsel for the appellant did not dispute that the driving licence was found to be fake, but that concession by itself was not sufficient to absolve the insurer. 17. However, the mere fact that the driving licence is fake, per se, would not absolve the insurer. Indubitably, the High Court noted that the counsel for the appellant did not dispute that the driving licence was found to be fake, but that concession by itself was not sufficient to absolve the insurer. 17. Swaran Singh’s case (supra) was subsequently considered by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in National Insurance Company Limited vs. Laxmi Narain Dhut. It was explained that : “Mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time are not in themselves defences available to the insurer against either the insured or the third parties. To avoid its liability towards the insured the insurer has to prove that the insured was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the condition of the policy regarding use of vehicles by duly licensed driver or one who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant time…” 8. ....... The owner cannot be expected to go beyond that, to the extent of verifying the genuineness of the driving licence with the licensing authority before hiring the services of the driver. However, the situation would be different if at the time of insurance of the vehicle or thereafter the insurance company requires the owner of the vehicle to have the licence duly verified from the licensing authority or if the attention of the owner of the vehicle is otherwise invited to the allegation that the licence issued to the driver employed by him is a fake one and yet the owner does not take appropriate action for verification of the matter regarding the genuineness of the licence from the licensing authority. That is what is explained in Swaran Singh’s case (supra). If despite such information with the owner that the licence possessed by his driver is fake, no action is taken by the insured for appropriate verification, then the insured will be at fault and, in such circumstances, the insurance company is not liable for the compensation.” 18. In United India Insurance Company... vs. Lehru and Ors. (2003) SCC 569 the Apex Court held that : “Section 3 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 prohibits driving of a motor vehicle in any public unless the driver has an effective driving licence. In United India Insurance Company... vs. Lehru and Ors. (2003) SCC 569 the Apex Court held that : “Section 3 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 prohibits driving of a motor vehicle in any public unless the driver has an effective driving licence. Further Section 180 of the Motor Vehicles Act makes an owner or person in charge of a motor vehicle punishable with imprisonment or fine if he causes or permits a person without a licence to drive the vehicle. It is clear that the punishment under Section 180 can only be imposed if the owner or person in charge of vehicle "causes or permits" driving by a person not duly licensed. Thus there can be no punishment if a person without a licence drives without permission of the owner. Section 149(2)(ii) merely recognises this condition. It therefore only absolves the Insurance Company where there is a breach by the insured. When an owner is hiring a driver he will therefore have to check whether the driver has a driving licence. If the driver produces a driving licence which on the face of it looks genuine, the owner is not expected to find out whether the licence has in fact been issued by a competent authority or not. The owner would then take the test of the driver. If he finds that the driver is competent to drive the vehicle, he will hire the driver. We find it rather strange that Insurance Companies expect owners to make enquiries with RTO's, which are spread all over the country, whether the driving licence shown to them is valid or not. Thus where the owner has satisfied himself that the driver has a licence and is driving competently there would be no breach of Section 149(2)(a)(ii). The Insurance Company would not then be absolved of liability. If it ultimately turns out that the licence was fake the Insurance Company would continue to remain liable unless they prove that the owner/insured was aware or had noticed that the licence was fake and still permitted that person to drive. More importantly even in such a case the Insurance Company would remain liable to the innocent third party, but it may be able to recover from the insured. This is the law which has been laid down in Skandia's Sohan Lal Passi's and Kaml’s case. More importantly even in such a case the Insurance Company would remain liable to the innocent third party, but it may be able to recover from the insured. This is the law which has been laid down in Skandia's Sohan Lal Passi's and Kaml’s case. We are in full agreement with the views expressed therein and see no reason to take a different view.” 19. In view of the above discussions matter I find that the appellant insurance Company cannot be exonerated from indemnifying the claimants since the owner of the vehicle is not expected to be aware of the nature of driving licence possessed by the deceased. 20. This court also finds that the issue whether the deceased driver who drove the accident vehicle (Motor bike) stepped into the shoe of the owner was not raised before the learned tribunal. I find that no evidence was taken or made out during the cross examination of the witness to establish the relationship between the deceased and the owner of the vehicle/respondent no.4. 21. The Apex Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Sinitha & Others, held that “Since the relationship between the Shijo and the owner has not been established, nor the capacity in which he was riding the vehicle has been brought out, it is not possible for us to conclude, that Shijo while National Insurance Co. Ltd vs. Sinitha & Ors. on 23 November, 2011 riding the motorcycle on the fateful day, was an agent, employee or representative of the owner. It was open to the petitioner to defeat the claim for compensation raised by the respondents by establishing, that the rider Shijo represented the owner, and as such, was not a third party, in terms of the judgment rendered by this Court in Oriental Insurance Company Limited case (supra). The petitioner failed to discharge the said onus. In view of the above, it is not possible for us to accede to the second contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 20. For the reasons recorded herein above, we find no merit in the instant Special Leave Petition.” 22. Regarding non-joinder or mis-joinder of parties, this should have been raised before the learned Tribunal. I also find that there is no miscarriage of justice if the father and the children of the deceased, being dependants of the deceased are the claimants. 23. For the reasons recorded herein above, we find no merit in the instant Special Leave Petition.” 22. Regarding non-joinder or mis-joinder of parties, this should have been raised before the learned Tribunal. I also find that there is no miscarriage of justice if the father and the children of the deceased, being dependants of the deceased are the claimants. 23. In light of the above reasoning, I find that the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant Insurance Co., unsustainable and MAC Appeal 17 of 2018 is dismissed and accordingly stands disposed.