ORDER : Kunhikrishnan, J. The following points are referred to Full Bench as per the reference order dated 29.11.2018 by a Division Bench of this court : 1. Can a member elected to the Managing Committee of a Co-operative Society be unseated by resort to Rule 44(2)(c) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969 otherwise than by calling in question his election by a dispute under Section 69(2)(c) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act,1969? 2. Whether the Bench decision in Surendran Nair v. State of Kerala ( 2004 (1) KLT 407 ) on the question of disqualification under Rule 44(2)(c) of the Rules is correctly decided? 2. Brief facts of the case are like this: The appellant in the writ appeal was a member of the Managing Committee and also the elected President of Punukannur Service Co-operative Bank (‘the Bank’ for short). She was elected as a member of the Managing Committee on 02.07.2017. Much before she contested in the election, i.e., in the year 2013, the appellant availed a personal loan from the 3rd respondent Bank. Since there was a default in repaying the loan, the 3rd respondent Bank initiated recovery proceedings by filing A.R.C. No.42 of 2013 and an award was passed in favour of the Bank on 20.06.2017. Moreover, the appellant was also a surety for her sister who availed a loan from the 3rd respondent Bank and the same also resulted in another arbitration proceedings. Consequently, an award was passed against the appellant as surety on 20.06.2017 in A.R.C. No.41 of 2013 also. The Joint Registrar, as per Ext.P15 order produced in the writ petition, disqualified the appellant from being elected as a member of the Managing Committee of the Bank under Rule 44 (2)(c) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969 (hereinafter mentioned as ‘Rules’) and it was declared that she shall cease to be a member of the Managing Committee under Rule 44(3) of the Rules. The appellant challenged Ext.P15 before this Court by filing W.P.(C). No.36326 of 2018. The same was dismissed by the learned Single Judge. Challenging the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the present writ appeal is filed. The Division Bench, after hearing both sides, referred this matter to the Full Bench for the resolution of the points framed in the reference order dated 29.11.2018. 3. No.36326 of 2018. The same was dismissed by the learned Single Judge. Challenging the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the present writ appeal is filed. The Division Bench, after hearing both sides, referred this matter to the Full Bench for the resolution of the points framed in the reference order dated 29.11.2018. 3. The points referred by the Division Bench as per the reference order dated 29.11.2018 are already extracted above. But, for deciding the above issues, certain ancillary points are also to be considered. A reading of the first point referred by the Division Bench will show that the full bench has to decide the scope of the powers of the Registrar concerned under Rule 44(2) (c) of the Rules and that of the authority mentioned in section 69(2)(c) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act,1969 (hereinafter mentioned as ‘Act’). So, whether the disqualification as per Rule 44(2)(c) of the Rules and the dispute resolution under Section 69(2)(c) of the Act are separate powers and whether a separate cause of action is necessary to invoke those power are also to be decided. Whether the disqualification proceedings under Rule 44(2)(c) is deemed to be accrued only after the expiry of a period of one month from the date of receipt of a notice from the society by the member concerned demanding him to clear off the defaulted amount specified therein and he fails to remit or cause to remit the amount within the said period is also a point to be decided by the Full Bench. Yet another point to be decided is whether the notice issued to a defaulter long before the proceedings are initiated under Rule 44(3) can be treated as notice under the proviso to Rule 44(2)(c)? When disqualification proceedings are initiated to disqualify a person under Rule 44(2) (c), whether he should be a defaulter at the time when such proceedings are initiated is also to be decided. Therefore, we are framing the following points for resolution: 1. Can a member elected to the Managing Committee of a co-operative society be unseated by resort to Rule 44(2) (c) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969 otherwise than by calling in question his election by a dispute under Section 69(2)(c) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act,1969? 2. Therefore, we are framing the following points for resolution: 1. Can a member elected to the Managing Committee of a co-operative society be unseated by resort to Rule 44(2) (c) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969 otherwise than by calling in question his election by a dispute under Section 69(2)(c) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act,1969? 2. Whether the power of the Registrar under Rule 44(3) of the Rules to disqualify a person under Rule 44(2)(c) and the power under Section 69(2)(c) of the Act to the Cooperative Arbitration Court are distinct and whether the cause of action to invoke these powers are distinct and separate? 3. Whether the disqualification under Rule 44(2)(c) is deemed to be accrued only after the expiry of a period of one month from the date of receipt of a notice by the member concerned from the society demanding him to clear off the default amount specified therein and he failed to remit or caused to remit the amount within the said period? 4. Whether a notice issued to a defaulter before he is elected as a member of the Society can be treated as notice under the proviso to Rule 44(2)(c) to disqualify him? 5. Whether the person should be a defaulter at the time when the proceedings under Rule 44(3) are initiated? 6. Whether the Bench decision in Surendran Nair v. State of Kerala ( 2004 (1) KLT 407 ) on the question of disqualification under Rule 44 (2) (c) of the Rules has correctly laid down the law? 4. Heard Adv.Sri.P.C.Sasidharan, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned Government Pleader for the official respondents. We also heard the counsel appearing for the 4th respondent and the Amicus Curiae Adv. Arjun Raghavan appointed by the Division Bench before referring the matter to the Full Bench. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the disqualification under Rule 44(2)(c) is possible only after giving notice to the member concerned and even thereafter he failed to clear off the defaulted amount or cause to remit the amount within the specified period. The counsel also submitted that the proviso to Clause (c) of Rule 44(2) is subsequently added and a reading of the explanatory note will show the intention with which the proviso is inserted. The counsel also submitted that the proviso to Clause (c) of Rule 44(2) is subsequently added and a reading of the explanatory note will show the intention with which the proviso is inserted. Without a notice as contemplated in the proviso to Rule 44(2)(c), no disqualification proceedings can be initiated by the Registrar by invoking the power under Rule 44(3) is the submission of the counsel. The counsel for the petitioner also relied on the judgments of this court in Thankappan v. Deputy Registrar ( 1983 KLT 88 ), Madanamohanan Kartha v. Elamkulam Service Co-operative Bank ( 1983 KLT 640 ), Abdul Rasheed v. State of Kerala ( 1988 (1) KLT 190 ), Justus Daniel v. State ( 1992 (2) KLT 308 ), Kumaran v. Returning Officer ( 1998 (2) KLT 789 ), Rajasekharan Nair v. Returning Officer ( 2008 (4) KLT 994 ) and Thommen Itticheriyanthu v. State of Kerala (1978 KHC 214). Relying on the above judgments, the counsel for the petitioner submitted that the disqualification proceedings can be initiated only if at the time when the proceedings are initiated, the person occupies the character of a defaulter. 6. The learned Government Pleader, on the other hand, submitted that, if a notice is issued even before the election to the Committee, that notice also can be treated as notice under the proviso to Rule 44(2)(c). The Amicus Curiae submitted that a report is filed in which he narrated his stand about the issue referred to the Full Bench by the Division Bench. Point Nos.1 and 2 7. These two points are connected and therefore these points can be considered together. For deciding this question, it is necessary to deal with the jurisdiction under Section 69(2)(c) of the Act and Rule 44(2)(c) read with Rule 44(3) of the Rules. It will be beneficial to extract Section 69 of the Act first : 69. Point Nos.1 and 2 7. These two points are connected and therefore these points can be considered together. For deciding this question, it is necessary to deal with the jurisdiction under Section 69(2)(c) of the Act and Rule 44(2)(c) read with Rule 44(3) of the Rules. It will be beneficial to extract Section 69 of the Act first : 69. Disputes to be decided by Co-operative Arbitration Court and Registrar.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, if a dispute arises,- (a) among members, past members and persons claiming through members, past members and deceased members; or (b) between a member, past member or person claiming through a member, a past member or deceased member and the society, its committee or any officer, agent or employee of the society; or (c) between the society or its committee and any past committee, any officer, agent or employee or any past officer, past agent or past employee or the nominee, heirs or legal representatives of any deceased officer, deceased agent or deceased employee of the society; or (d) between the society and any other society; or (e) between a society and the members of a society affiliated to it ; or (f) between the society and a person, other than a member of the society, who has been granted a loan by the society or with whom the society has or had business transactions or any person claiming through such a person; or (g) between the society and a surety of a member, past member, deceased member or employee or a person, other than a member, who has been granted a loan by the society, whether such a surety is or is not a member of the society; or (h) between the society and a creditor of the society; such dispute shall be referred to the Co-operative Arbitration Court constituted under section 70A, in the case of non-monetary disputes and to the Registrar, in the case of monetary disputes and the Arbitration Court, or the Registrar, as the case may be, shall decide such dispute and no other court or other authority shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proceedings in respect of such dispute. (2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), the following shall also be deemed to be disputes, namely:- (a) a claim by the society for any debt or demand due to it from a member or the nominee, heirs or legal representatives of a deceased member, whether such debt or demand be admitted or not; (b) a claim by a surety against the principal debtor, where the society has recovered from the surety any amount in respect of any debt or demand due to it from the principal debtor, as a result of the default of the principal debtor, whether such debt or demand is admitted or not; (c) any dispute arising in connection with the election of the Board of management or any officer of the society; Explanation:- A dispute arising at any stage of an election commencing from the convening of the general body meeting for the election shall be deemed to be a dispute arising in connection with the election; (d) any dispute arising in connection with employment of officers and servants of the different classes of societies specified in sub-section (1) of section 80, including their promotion and inter se seniority. (3) No dispute arising in connection with the election of the Board of Management or an officer of the society shall be entertained by the Cooperative Arbitration Court unless it is referred to it within one month from the date of the election. (4) All monetary disputes mentioned in Schedule III to the Act shall be filed within the time limit specified in the said Schedule. (Emphasis supplied) 8. Section 69 deals with disputes to be decided by the Cooperative Arbitration Court and Registrar. If a dispute arises between the parties mentioned in Clauses (a) to (h) of Section 69(1) of the Act, and if such dispute relates to non-monetory disputes, it shall be referred to the Co-operative Arbitration Court constituted under Section 70A. But in the case of monetary disputes, it should be referred to the Registrar. The Section also states that the Arbitration Court, or the Registrar, as the case may be, shall decide such dispute, and no other court or other authority shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proceedings in respect of such dispute. But in the case of monetary disputes, it should be referred to the Registrar. The Section also states that the Arbitration Court, or the Registrar, as the case may be, shall decide such dispute, and no other court or other authority shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proceedings in respect of such dispute. Thus, it is clear that in the case of non-monetary dispute, the matter is to be referred to the Co-operative Arbitration Court and in the case of monetary dispute, it should be referred to the Registrar and only the Registrar and the Co-operative Arbitration Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proceedings in respect of such suits. Section 69(2) says that for the purpose of Section 69(1), the claims/disputes mentioned in Clauses (a) to (d) of Section 69(2) shall also be deemed to be a dispute. Section 69(2) (c) says about dispute arising in connection with the election of the Board of Management or any officer of the society. Section 69(3) says that no dispute arising in connection with the election of the Board of Management or an officer of the society shall be entertained by the Co-operative Arbitration Court unless it is referred to it within one month from the date of the election. Section 69(4) says that all monetary disputes mentioned in Schedule III to the Act shall be filed within the time limit specified in the said Schedule. From the above, it is clear that any dispute arising in connection with the election of the Board of Management or an officer of the society is to be decided by the authority mentioned in Section 69(1) of the Act. Explanation to Section 69(2)(c) says that a dispute arising at any stage of an election commencing from the convening of the general body meeting for the election shall be deemed to be a dispute arising in connection with the election. Therefore, whether a person is disqualified to be a member of a society is also a dispute arising in connection with the election of the Board of Management of a society and hence that question also can be redressed under Section 69 of the Act. Therefore, whether a person is disqualified to be a member of a society is also a dispute arising in connection with the election of the Board of Management of a society and hence that question also can be redressed under Section 69 of the Act. But, to invoke the dispute resolution under Section 69 of the Act in connection with the election of the Board of Management or an officer of the society by the Co-operative Arbitration Court, it is to be referred to the Arbitration Court within one month from the date of the election. 9. So the Co-operative Arbitration Court can entertain a dispute about the election of the board of management or officer of the society, only if that dispute is referred to the Arbitration Court within one month from the date of the election. In other words, the Co-operative Arbitration court is functus officio to entertain a dispute arising in connection with the election of the board of management or any officer of the society after one month from the date of the election. 10. But suppose a member of a committee becomes disqualified or ceased to be a member of the society or is subsequently seen to be disqualified, a separate remedy is provided under Rule 44 of the Rules. It will be better to extract Rule 44 of the Rules. “44. 10. But suppose a member of a committee becomes disqualified or ceased to be a member of the society or is subsequently seen to be disqualified, a separate remedy is provided under Rule 44 of the Rules. It will be better to extract Rule 44 of the Rules. “44. Disqualification of membership of committee.- (1) No member of the society shall be eligible for being elected, or appointed as a member of the committee of the society under S.28 if he: (a) is disqualified under S.28; or (b) is a near relative of a paid employee of the society; or Provided that this clause shall not be applicable to the banks and apex Institutions included in the schedule appended to the Act under sub-section (3A) of Section 80 of the Act (c) (i) is in default to the society or to any other society in respect of any loan or loans taken by him or loan in which he had stood surety, for such period, as is prescribed in the bye-laws of the society concerned or in any case for a period exceeding three months or is a defaulter to the society or to any other society; or (ii) has been sentenced for any offence other than an offence of a political character or an offence not involving moral delinquency such sentence not having been reversed or offence pardoned and a period of three years has not elapsed from the date of expiration of the sentence; or (d) is interested directly or indirectly in any contract made with the society or in any sale or purchase made by the society privately or in any auction or in any transaction of the society other than investment and borrowing involving financial interest, if the contract or transaction is subsisting or if the contract, sale, purchase or transaction be not completed; or (e) is employed otherwise than in an honorary capacity as legal adviser or as legal practitioner on behalf of the society or against the society which is a member of the former society; or (f) is a paid employee of the society or of any other society ; Provided that the Registrar may by general or special order exempt any society or any person from the operation of this clause for such period to be specified by him in the order of exemption; or Provided further that this clause shall not apply in the case of an Employee's Co-operative Society. (g) is of unsound mind, or a leper; or is a minor or a nominal, or an associate member; Provided that the disqualification of leprosy shall not apply to the members of Committees of Societies formed for the rehabilitation of lepers; or (h) is an applicant to be adjudicated a bankrupt or an insolvent or an uncertified bankrupt or an undischarged insolvent; or (i) is carrying the same business as is being carried on by the society; or (j) is disqualified under any other provisions in the bye- laws of the society; or (k) was a member of the Committee which has been superseded and a period of one year has not elapsed from the date of supersession; or (l) has been surcharged under Section 68, (2) A member of the committee shall cease to hold his office as such, if he- (a) becomes disqualified under sub-rule (1) provided that where a member ceases to hold his office as such by reason of having been sentenced for any offence, he shall be restored to office for such portion of the period for which he was elected or appointed as may remain unexpired at the date of such restoration, if and when the sentence is annulled on appeal or revision and any person elected or appointed in the vacancy in the interim period shall on such restoration vacate office; Provided further that the disqualification under sub-clause (i) of clause (c) of sub rule (1) shall be deemed to be accrued only after expiry of a period of one month from the date of receipt by the member concerned of a notice from the society demanding him to clear off the defaulted amount specified therein and he fails to remit or cause to remit the amount within the said period; or (b) cease to be a member of the society; or Provided that this clause shall not apply to a person nominated by the Government or any other authority specified in this behalf by the Government under sub-section (1) of S.31 of the Act or by Government or Registrar under subsection (1) of S.28 of the Act or by Government under Sub-section (3) of Section 28 (A) of the Act (c) is subsequently seen to be disqualified under sub-rule (1) on the date of election itself. Provided that the disqualification under sub-clause (i) of clause (c) of sub-rule (1) shall be deemed to be accrued only after the expiry of a period of one month from the date of receipt by the member concerned of a notice from the society demanding him to clear off the defaulted amount specified therein and he fails to remit or cause to remit the amount within the said period. (3) If any person is or becomes disqualified to be a member of the committee, the Registrar may on his own motion or on a representation made to him by any member of the society or by its Financing Bank by an order in writing declare that he shall cease to be a member of the committee of the society concerned from the date of such disqualification. Before passing an order, the Registrar shall give such person an opportunity to state his objections, if any, against the proposed action and if the person wishes to be heard he shall be given an opportunity to be heard.” (Emphasis supplied) 11. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 44 of the Rules deals mainly with the election or appointment of members who are subject to pre-existing disqualifications. Sub-clauses (a) to (l) of Rule 44(1) deal with the ineligibility of a member from being elected or appointed as a member of the committee of the society under Section 28 of the Act. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 44 deals with a situation of a member of the committee who ceased to hold his office in certain situations mentioned in Clause (a) to (c) of that Rule. Rule 44(2) (a) begins with the words “becomes disqualified under Sub-Rule (1)”. This itself shows that it is a situation when a member becomes disqualified after the election. The literal meaning of “becomes” as per the Chambers 20th Century dictionary is “to come to be”, “to arrive”, “begin to be” etc. Therefore, Rule 44(2) (a) deals with a situation where a member of the committee ceases to hold his office when he becomes disqualified under Sub- Rule (1) of Rule 44. The literal meaning of “becomes” as per the Chambers 20th Century dictionary is “to come to be”, “to arrive”, “begin to be” etc. Therefore, Rule 44(2) (a) deals with a situation where a member of the committee ceases to hold his office when he becomes disqualified under Sub- Rule (1) of Rule 44. In such situation, as per Rule 44(3), the Registrar may on his own motion or on a representation made to him by any member of the society or by its Financing Bank by an order in writing declare that he shall cease to be a member of the committee of the society concerned from the date of such disqualification. Similarly, Sub-clause (b) of Rule 44 (2) deals with a situation when a member of the committee shall cease to hold his office as such if he ceases to be a member of the society. In such a situation also, as per Rule 44(3), Registrar has got the power to disqualify him. In addition to this, as per Rule 44(2)(c), if a member of the committee is subsequently seen to be disqualified under Sub-rule (1) of Rule 44 on the date of election itself, as per Rule 44(3), Registrar has got the power to disqualify him. Therefore, it is clear from Rule 44(2) of the Rules that the Registrar has got the power to declare that a member of a committee is disqualified if a situation like clauses (a) to (c) of Rule 44(2) arises. From a reading of Rule 44(3), it is clear that the Registrar has got absolute power to declare that if any person is or becomes disqualified to be a member of the committee, he can either initiate suo motu power or on a representation made to him by any member of the society or by its Financing Bank. The declaration by the Registrar under Rule 44(3) should be in writing and the Registrar shall give such person an opportunity to state his objections if any against the proposed action, and if the person wishes to be heard, he shall be given an opportunity to be heard. No limitation period is prescribed to invoke the powers under Rule 44(3) of the Rules by the Registrar just like the restrictions in Sec.69(3) of the Act. No limitation period is prescribed to invoke the powers under Rule 44(3) of the Rules by the Registrar just like the restrictions in Sec.69(3) of the Act. Therefore, a reading of Rule 44(3) of the Rules itself, would make it clear that the Registrar has got independent power to decide about the disqualification, if any mentioned in clauses (a) to (c) in Rule 44(2). The powers of the Registrar under Rule 44(3) is an independent power in addition to the dispute resolution under Section 69(2)(c) of the Act. Section 69(2) proceedings are to be initiated within one month from the date of the election. But for initiating proceedings under Rule 44(3) by the Registrar, there is no time limit, but it is restricted to the consideration of disqualification mentioned in clauses (a) to (c) of Rule 44(2) of the Rules. Therefore, the powers under Section 69(2)(c) of the Act and the powers of the Registrar under Rule 44(3) of the Rules are separate and distinct. Therefore, the first point referred by the Division Bench in the reference order is to be decided in that manner and we have to hold that a member elected to the Managing Committee of a co-operative society can be unseated by invoking the powers under Rule 44(2)(c) of the Rules by the Registrar and moreover the authority under Section 69(2)(c) also can decide the disqualification dispute, if the same is referred to that authority within one month. 12. Similarly, the point No.2 framed by us is also to be decided to the effect that the powers under Rule 44(3) of the Rules by the Registrar and the powers under Section 69(2)(c) to the Arbitration Court are distinct and the cause of action to initiate those proceedings are also separate. Point No.3 13. This question deals about the cause of action to initiate proceedings under Rule 44(2)(c) of the Rules. The proviso to Rule 44(2)(c) was added subsequently by SRO 1125/89 published in Kerala Gazette No.26 dated 27.6.1989. Point No.3 13. This question deals about the cause of action to initiate proceedings under Rule 44(2)(c) of the Rules. The proviso to Rule 44(2)(c) was added subsequently by SRO 1125/89 published in Kerala Gazette No.26 dated 27.6.1989. The proviso to Rule 44(2) (c) says that the disqualification under sub-clause (i) of clause (c) of sub-rule (1) shall be deemed to be accrued only after the expiry of a period of one month from the date of receipt by the member concerned of a notice from the society demanding him to clear off the defaulted amount specified therein and he fails to remit or cause to remit the amount within the said period. The importance of the proviso to a rule/section is explained by this Court and the Apex Court in several decisions. In Union of India and Others v. VKC Footsteps India Pvt.Ltd (2021 KHC 6452) the apex court observed that the normal function of a proviso is to except something out of the enactment or to qualify something enacted therein which but for the proviso would be within the purview of the enactment. The proviso to clause (c) of Rule 44(2) clearly says about the time when the cause of action accrued for initiating disqualification proceedings under Rule 44(3) of the Rules. The explanatory note to the notification (SRO No. 1125/89) by which the proviso to Rule 44(2)(c) was added will show the intention to add such a proviso. It will be beneficial to extract the explanatory note to the SRO No.1125/89 published in Kerala Gazette No. 26 dated 27.6.1989 by which the proviso to Rule 44(2)(c) was added. The explanatory note is extracted hereunder. It will be beneficial to extract the explanatory note to the SRO No.1125/89 published in Kerala Gazette No. 26 dated 27.6.1989 by which the proviso to Rule 44(2)(c) was added. The explanatory note is extracted hereunder. "Explanatory Note (This does not form part of the notification, but is intended to indicate its general purport.) Clauses (a) and (c) of sub-rule (2) of rule 44 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969, provide that the member of the committee of a society shall cease to hold his office if he becomes disqualified or is subsequently seen to be disqualified under sub-rule (1), As per sub-clause (i) of clause (c) of sub rule (i) of rule 44, no member of the society shall be eligible for being elected, or appointed as a member of the committee of the society under section 28 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 if he is in default to the society or to any other society in respect. of any loan or loans taken by him or loan in which he has stood surety for such period as is prescribed in the bye laws of the society concerned or in any case for a period exceeding three months or is a defaulter to the society or to any other society. It has been represented that several members of the committees of Co-operative Societies are being disqualified, under sub-rule (2) of rule 44 read with sub-rule (1)(c)(i) of the rules even before they are made known about their default and without giving reasonable opportunity to pay off the defaulted amount. This leads to large scale disqualification of the members of the Committees causing administrative difficulties for the societies and depriving them of the valuable services of the committee members. It is considered by Government that it is only natural justice to give a reasonable opportunity and time to the committee member to clear off the defaulted amount by serving a notice from the concerned society, showing the amount at default and demanding him to clear off or cause to clear off the default within one month from the date of receipt of notice. The amendment is intended to achieve the above purpose.” 14. The amendment is intended to achieve the above purpose.” 14. From the explanatory note to the notification it is clear that the insertion of the proviso intends to avoid a situation where several members were disqualified under sub rule 2 of Rule 44 without knowing about the default and without giving reasonable opportunity to pay off the defaulted amount. Therefore the rule making authority decided to add the proviso by which the cause of action to initiate proceedings under Rule 44(3) will accrue only after the expiry of a period of one month from the date of receipt by the member concerned of a notice from the Society demanding him to clear off the defaulted amount satisfied therein and even thereafter he fails to remit or cause to remit the amount within the said period. Therefore one more opportunity is given to a member before invoking the powers under Rule 44(3) by the Registrar to disqualify him/her in a situation narrated in Clause (c) of Rule 44(2) of the Rules. In other words, the Registrar will have jurisdiction to entertain the question of disqualification under Rule 44(2)(c) only after the expiry of a period of one month from the date of receipt by the member concerned of a notice from the Society demanding him to clear off the defaulted amount specified therein and if he fails to remit or cause to remit the defaulted amount in the meanwhile. Therefore point No.3 is to be answered to the effect that the disqualification under Rule 44(2) (c) is deemed to be accrued only after the expiry of a period of one month from the date of receipt of a notice by the member concerned from the Society demanding him to clear off the defaulted amount specified therein and he failed to remit or caused to remit the amount within the said period. Point Nos. 4 & 5 15. These points are connected and therefore considered together. The fourth point framed is whether the notice issued by the Society to a defaulter before he is elected as a member can be treated as a notice as per the proviso to Rule 44(2)(c). This is one of the points raised by the Government Pleader. We are not in a position to accept this contention. The fourth point framed is whether the notice issued by the Society to a defaulter before he is elected as a member can be treated as a notice as per the proviso to Rule 44(2)(c). This is one of the points raised by the Government Pleader. We are not in a position to accept this contention. A reading of the proviso to Rule 44(2)(c) clearly says that the disqualification under sub clause (i) of clause (c) of Sub Rule (1) shall be deemed to be accrued only after the expiry of a period of one month from the date of receipt of the member concerned of a notice from the Society demanding him to clear off the defaulted amount specified therein and he fails to remit or cause to remit the amount within the said period. So the cause of action accrued to initiate proceedings under Rule 44(3) will arise only if there is a notice as contemplated under Rule 44(2)(c). The Explanatory Note to the notification by which the proviso to Rule 44(2)(c) was added also strengthens this view. A person who received a notice of default before his election to the society and he continued to be in default is also entitled to notice before he is disqualified under Rule 44(3) read with Rule 44(2)(c). Therefore it is to be concluded that, before initiating a proceeding under Rule 44(3) read with Rule 44(2)(c) of the Rules by the Registrar concerned, a notice as provided in the proviso to Rule 44(2)(c) is mandatory and if there is no such notice, the disqualification if any, passed by the Registrar invoking the powers under Rule 44(3) is unsustainable. 16. The 5th point to be decided is whether the person should be in default or a defaulter at the time when the proceedings under Rule 44(3) are initiated? A reading of the proviso to Rule 44(2)(c) will show that only if the disqualification continues, the powers under Rule 44(3) can be initiated to disqualify a person under Rule 44(2)(c). 16. The 5th point to be decided is whether the person should be in default or a defaulter at the time when the proceedings under Rule 44(3) are initiated? A reading of the proviso to Rule 44(2)(c) will show that only if the disqualification continues, the powers under Rule 44(3) can be initiated to disqualify a person under Rule 44(2)(c). If a person contested and elected as a member in an election when he is not qualified to be elected as per Rule 44(1)(c) and suppose he did not notice the same at that time and subsequently when he came to know about the same, and he cleared the dues, there is no question of invoking the powers under Rule 44(3) of the Rules because in such situation a notice as provided in the proviso to Rule 44(2)(c) is redundant. The disqualification proceedings to disqualify a member under Rule 44(3) read with Rule 44(2)(c) will accrue only after a notice as provided in the proviso to Rule 44(2)(c) of the Rules. But in such a situation, the power of the authority concerned under Section 69 of the Act will stand for a period of one month from the date of the election. Therefore, if a person is disqualified on the date of election and if he continues as a disqualified person, which is noticed by none and further if a notice is issued as provided in the proviso to Rule 44(2)(c) but even then he fails to remit the amount due or cause to remit the amount within the period prescribed in the notice, only then the Registrar will have jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Rule 44(3). Therefore to disqualify a member under Rule 44(2)(c) on the ground that the member is subsequently seen to be disqualified under sub rule (1) of Rule 44, it is necessary that as on the date of the proceedings under Rule 44(3), he is disqualified for the reason mentioned in Rule 44(1)(c). Thereafter when the notice as provided in the proviso to Rule 44(2)(c) is issued and even then he refuses to clear off the amount due, then only the application under Rule 44(3) can be entertained by the Registrar. In other situations, the party aggrieved can approach the authority mentioned in Section 69(2) of the Act to redress their grievance. Thereafter when the notice as provided in the proviso to Rule 44(2)(c) is issued and even then he refuses to clear off the amount due, then only the application under Rule 44(3) can be entertained by the Registrar. In other situations, the party aggrieved can approach the authority mentioned in Section 69(2) of the Act to redress their grievance. In Section 69(2) proceedings, the aggrieved party can explain or prove before the Co-operative Arbitration Court that the member is disqualified as on the date of the election. But the dispute resolution under Section 69(2)(c) is possible only if the matter is referred to the Arbitration Court within one month from the date of the election. Therefore, if a person is disqualified as on the date of election it can be proved by resorting to the settlement of the dispute as per Section 69(2)(c) if the dispute is referred within one month from the date of the election. Subsequently, if no dispute reference is made as per Section 69 of the Act about the disqualification matter within one month from the date of the election, the second remedy is only under Rule 44(3) of the Rules. But the cause of action to invoke Rule 44(3) is applicable only if the person continued to be disqualified and even after getting the notice provided in the proviso to Rule 44(2)(c) of the Rules. Therefore the disqualification should continue as on the date on which the notice was issued as per the proviso to Rule 44(2)(c) for invoking the powers under Rule 44(3). Suppose a member clears off the dues after he becomes a member of the Society, no disqualification proceedings under Rule 44(3) of the Rules is maintainable. But of course, if the matter is referred under Section 69(2), the same can be decided by the Arbitration Court in accordance with law. 17. Moreover this position is considered by the Division Bench of this Court in Thommen Itticheriyanthu's case (supra). It is a short judgment and it will be beneficial to extract the judgment as such: “The writ petitioner in O.P No. 70 of 1978 has brought this appeal against the judgment of our learned brother Namboodiripad, J. dismissing that writ petition and declining to interfere with the order Ext. P4 passed by the State Government which was under challenge in the original petition. By the impugned order Ext. P4 passed by the State Government which was under challenge in the original petition. By the impugned order Ext. P4 the Government set aside the order Ext. P4 passed by the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Kottayam declaring that respondents Nos. 4 to 6 herein had ceased to be members of the committee on the ground that they had become disqualified to continue to hold the office of membership of the Board of Directors of the said cooperative society. The learned single Judge found that although the reason stated by the Government in the impugned order Ext. P4 setting aside the proceedings of the Deputy Registrar evidenced by Ext. P1 were not wholly sound, the conclusion reached by the Government that the order of the Deputy Registrar could not be allowed to stand was right in as much as there was no material produced before the Deputy Registrar to substantiate the contention urged by the writ petitioner, who had figured as the applicant before the Deputy Registrar, that respondents Nos. 4 to 6 had incurred a disqualification under R.44 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the learned single Judge. Even according to the averments contained in the original petition and the facts stated in Ext. P1 none amongst respondents Nos. 4 to 6 owned any amounts to the 3rd respondent Cooperative Society or to any other society registered under the Act as on the date on which the proceedings for disqualifying them are initiated. Action under R. 44(1)(c) would be justified only if the member concerned “is in default” to the society or to any other society in respect of a loan or loans taken by him or loan in which he has stood surety, for such period, as is prescribed in the byelaws or in any case for a period exceeding three months or “is a defaulter to the society or to any other society”. In employing the present tense by using the word ‘is’ the rule-making authority has clearly indicated its intention that the disqualification will be attracted only if at the time when the proceedings under the rule are initiated the person actually occupies the character of a defaulter. In employing the present tense by using the word ‘is’ the rule-making authority has clearly indicated its intention that the disqualification will be attracted only if at the time when the proceedings under the rule are initiated the person actually occupies the character of a defaulter. The mere fact that at some time in the past a member might have been in default to the society or to any other society in respect of any loan etc. will not afford a valid ground for taking action under R.44 unless it is further shown that the state of such default actually continued to exist as on the date when the proceedings under the rule are initiated. In this case, as pointed out by the learned single Judge no materials were placed either before the Deputy Registrar or even before this court to show that the respondents, who were admittedly only sureties, were concurrently liable for payment of the instalments along with their principal debtors and that their liability did not arise only on intimation being given to them by the society about the commission of default by the principal debtors. There was, therefore, nothing in the record to make out that the respondents had been in default to the society in respect of the instalments due under the kuri bonds in question. We, therefore, agree, with respect, with the view taken by the learned single Judge that the order Ext. P1 passed by the Deputy Registrar could not be sustained in law. 2. The judgment under appeal is accordingly confirmed and this writ appeal is dismissed with costs.” (Emphasis supplied) 18. In Thommen Itticheriyanthu's case (supra), the Division Bench of this Court found that by employing the present tense, that is by using the word ‘is’ by the rule-making authority has indicated its intention that the disqualification will be attracted only if at the time when the proceedings under the rule are initiated against the person actually occupies the character of a defaulter. The Division Bench also observed that the mere fact that at some time in the past a member might have been in default to the society or to any other society in respect of any loan etc. The Division Bench also observed that the mere fact that at some time in the past a member might have been in default to the society or to any other society in respect of any loan etc. will not afford a valid ground for taking action under Rule 44 unless it is further shown that the state of such default continued to exist as on the date when the proceedings under the rule were initiated. We agree with the above view of the Division Bench of this Court. Rule 44(2)(c) says that a member of the Committee shall cease to hold his office as such if he is subsequently seen to be disqualified under Sub Rule (1) on the date of election itself. The word 'is' in Clause (c) of Rule 44(2) will also strengthen our view as observed by the Division Bench in Thommen Itticheriyanthu's case (supra) that the disqualification will be attracted only if, at the time when the proceedings under the Rule are initiated, the person actually occupies the character of a defaulter. Moreover, after the insertion of the proviso to Rule 44(2)(c), the position is very clear, otherwise, the proviso to Rule 44(2)(c) will be redundant. 19. Another Division Bench of this court in Madanamohanan Kartha's case (supra) further held that the disqualification in Rule 44(1)(c)(i) and (2) have to be understood as not disqualification that arose prior to the election but disqualification that arose subsequently. 20. In Abdul Rasheed's case (supra), yet another Division Bench considered the Madanamohanan Kartha's case (supra) and Thommen Itticheriyanthu's case (supra) and reiterated the same principles. The importance of the proviso to Rule 44(2) (c) was considered by a Single judge in Justus Daniel' case (supra). It will be beneficial to extract paragraph 6 of the Justus Daniel' case (supra). “6. Notice Ext. P1 does not state anywhere that any notice envisaged by the aforesaid proviso had been served on petitioners 2 to 5 and that they had defaulted in remitting the amounts within a period of one month thereafter. It was incumbent on the second respondent to have recited the issue of such a notice, if really such notice had been issued, as that constitutes the foundation for the proceedings under Rule 44(2) read with Rule 44(1)(c)(i). It was incumbent on the second respondent to have recited the issue of such a notice, if really such notice had been issued, as that constitutes the foundation for the proceedings under Rule 44(2) read with Rule 44(1)(c)(i). A person cannot be a defaulter unless and until such a notice is served and he fails to make such payment within a period of one month thereafter. Ext. P1 is silent about any such notices as far as petitioners 2 to 5 are concerned, while it recites such notice expressly with regard to the first petitioner. In the absence of any such mention in Ext. P1 this court has to proceed on the basis that these petitioners had not been issued any notice by the respective societies of the nature envisaged by the proviso to Rule 44(2). Petitioners have made a specific point about it in their reply. The second respondent has chosen to slur over the same. He did not render any finding that any such notice had been served on them. In the original petition the petitioners have specifically raised the point of non-service of such notice on petitioners 2 to 5. The counter affidavit is significantly silent about the service of such notice on petitioners 2 to 5. Therefore it has to be held that no notice in the nature provided under the proviso to Rule 44(2) was served on petitioners 2 to 5. In that event they cannot be held defaulters under Rule 44(1)(c)(i) for the purpose of Rule 44(2) as they became defaulters only on their failure to remit the amounts within a period of one month after receipt of the notice from the society calling upon them to make payment of the amounts in default. The disqualification of petitioners 2 to 5 by the proceedings Ext.P11 is therefore illegal." 21. From the above discussion also it is clear that to invoke the powers to disqualify a person under Rule 44(3) read with Rule 44(2)(c) by the Registrar, the person should be a defaulter at the time when the proceedings under Rule 44(3) are initiated. In other words, the disqualification should continue till a notice is issued as provided under the proviso to Rule 44(2)(c) for taking action under Rule 44(3) of the Rules. In other words, the disqualification should continue till a notice is issued as provided under the proviso to Rule 44(2)(c) for taking action under Rule 44(3) of the Rules. Point No.6 In Surendran’s case (supra), the facts are like this: The appellant in this case and two others borrowed loan from the District Co-operative Bank, Thiruvananthapuram. The loan was availed on 25.05.1990. When there was default in repaying the loan notices were issued on 31.03.1992, 29.05.1992 and 22.01.1993. The notice issued on 29.05.1992 was received by the appellant on 03.02.1993. Even after the expiry of one month from that date of receipt of notice, the loan was not repaid. Consequently, the Bank filed an Arbitration case against the appellant and the same was pending at that time. In such situation, the appellant took part in the election held on 31.08.2000 and became a member of the Board of Directors of Trivandraum Co-operative Milk Products Union and later the appellant was elected as the Chairman of the above Union. Subsequently, the appellant was disqualified holding that the appellant was in default on the date of election. The Division Bench considered this point in detail. It will be better to extract the relevant paragraphs in the judgment in Surendran’s case (supra). “11. As already stated, it is admitted that the Bank had filed A.R.C. 22 of 1996 and the same is still pending. The materials on record show that the appellant and two others as partners of a firm had borrowed amounts from the District Co-operative Bank and that they did not repay the amount within the time allowed by the Bank and that the said default continued for more than three months. Ultimately on 22.1.1993 the Bank issued a notice demanding the appellant to repay the loan amount. The said notice was received by the appellant on 3.2.1993, but he did not pay the amount even after the lapse of one month and till the election was held on 31.8.2000. The appellant has not produced any evidence to show that he had paid the amount demanded by the Bank within one month from 3.2.1993 or any subsequent date. So, the materials on record show that all the ingredients of Rule 44(1)(c)(i) read with Rule 44(2)(c) and the Proviso are satisfied in this case. The appellant has not produced any evidence to show that he had paid the amount demanded by the Bank within one month from 3.2.1993 or any subsequent date. So, the materials on record show that all the ingredients of Rule 44(1)(c)(i) read with Rule 44(2)(c) and the Proviso are satisfied in this case. Hence the finding of the statutory authorities that the appellant's case came within the mischief of Rule 44(1)(c)(i) read with Rule 44(2)(c) and the proviso is correct.” (emphasis supplied) 22. From the above facts, it is clear that the Division Bench accepted the notice issued to the defaulter before his election as a member as a notice under proviso to Rule 44 (2) (c) of the Rules. We already decided that a separate notice is necessary before initiating proceedings under Rule 44(3) of the Rules. Therefore, the finding in Surendran’s Case (supra) that proviso to Rule 44(2)(c) is satisfied because there was a notice issued to the defaulter in that case prior to the election and the defaulter refused to clear off the dues is not good law. In the light of the above discussion, the reference is answered like this : 1. A member elected to the Managing Committee of a Co-operative Society can be unseated by resorting to Rule 44(2)(c) of the Rules even without invoking the powers under Section 69(2)(c) of the Act. 2. The power of the Registrar under Rule 44(3) of the Rules and the power of the Co-operative Arbitration Court under Section 69(2)(c) are distinct and the cause of action for initiating those powers are also distinct and separate. 3. The disqualification proceedings under Rule 44(3) to declare a member as disqualified under Rule 44(2)(c) is deemed to be accrued only after the expiry of a period of one month from the date of receipt by the member concerned of a notice from the Society demanding him to clear off the defaulted amount specified therein and he failed to remit the amount within the said period. 4. To invoke the powers under Rule 44(3), a separate notice as per proviso to Rule 44(2)(c) to the defaulter is necessary, and notice issued to the defaulter before he is elected as a member or long before the proceedings initiated under Rule 44(3) is not sufficient. 5. 4. To invoke the powers under Rule 44(3), a separate notice as per proviso to Rule 44(2)(c) to the defaulter is necessary, and notice issued to the defaulter before he is elected as a member or long before the proceedings initiated under Rule 44(3) is not sufficient. 5. To invoke the powers under Rule 44(3), the disqualification of the member should continue till the notice as provided in the proviso to Rule 44(2)(c) is issued and in addition to that, the member should refuse to clear off the dues within the specified time even after the receipt of such notice. In other words, the member should be a defaulter at the time when the proceedings under Rule 44(3) are initiated. 6. The findings in Surendran’s Case (supra) to the effect that the notice issued to the defaulter before he is elected as a member of the society can be treated as notice under the proviso to Rule 44(2)(c) is not the correct law and a fresh notice under the proviso to Rule 44(2)(c) is necessary for initiating a proceeding under Rule 44(3) of the Rules. P.B.Suresh Kumar, J. (For himself and on behalf of C.S.Sudha, J.) (Dissenting) We have gone through the order authored by Brother Justice P.V.Kunjikrishnan and we are in respectful agreement with the conclusions on points 1 to 4 and 6 dealt with therein. 2. Point 5 dealt with in the order is whether, in order to initiate proceedings for declaration of disqualification in terms of Rule 44(3) on the ground that a person is subsequently seen to be disqualified under sub-clause (i) of clause (c) of Rule 44(1) on the date of election itself, should the person be a defaulter as on the date of initiation of the proceedings. The point has been answered in the affirmative. Having regard to the provisions in Rule 44, we are of the view that in order to initiate such a proceedings, the person concerned need not be a defaulter as on the date of initiation of the proceedings, for the following reasons. 3. Rule 44(1) is a provision dealing with disqualification for being elected or appointed as a member of the committee of the society, whereas Rule 44(2) deals with disqualification for holding the office of the member of the committee of the society. 3. Rule 44(1) is a provision dealing with disqualification for being elected or appointed as a member of the committee of the society, whereas Rule 44(2) deals with disqualification for holding the office of the member of the committee of the society. While Rule 44(1) provides that no member of the society shall be eligible for being elected or appointed as a member of the committee if he suffers from any of the disqualifications mentioned therein, Rule 44(2) provides that a member of the committee shall cease to hold his office as such if he incurs any of the disqualifications mentioned in Rule 44(1) after the election or if he is subsequently seen to be disqualified under Rule 44(1) on the date of election itself. Going by the plain meaning of the words used in Rule 44(2), prior to the amendment to the said provision in terms of SRO No.1125 of 1989 with effect from 27.06.1989, if a member of a committee of the society incurs after the election any of the disqualifications mentioned in Rule 44(1) or if he is subsequently seen to be disqualified under Rule 44(1) on the date of election itself, he ceases to hold his office by operation of the provision itself. Rule 44(3) deals with the procedure for giving effect to the provision in Rule 44(2). Rule 44(3) empowers the Registrar to make a declaration, whenever a case of disqualification of a member of the committee is brought to his notice, that the member concerned is ceased to be a member of the committee of the society with effect from the date of disqualification. Rule 44(3) however clarifies that before passing an order as provided for therein, the Registrar shall give such person an opportunity to state his objections, if any, against the proposed action and if the person wishes to be heard, he shall also be given an opportunity to be heard. It could be seen, therefore, that the date of initiation of proceedings for declaration of cessation of membership is the date on which notice is given to the person concerned in terms of Rule 44(3) to state his objections, if any, against the proposed action. 4. Let us now consider the effect of the amendment introduced to Rule 44(2) with effect from 27.06.1989. 4. Let us now consider the effect of the amendment introduced to Rule 44(2) with effect from 27.06.1989. In terms of the said amendment, two provisos were added to Rule 44(2), one to Rule 44(2)(a) and the other to Rule 44(2)(c). The provisos which are similarly worded clarify that the disqualification under Rule 44(1)(c) shall be deemed to be accrued only after the expiry of a period of one month from the date of receipt by the member concerned of a notice from the society demanding him to clear off the defaulted amount specified therein and that too, only if he fails to remit or cause to remit the amount within the said period. The provisos therefore give to the member concerned an opportunity to do away with his disqualification under Rule 44(1)(c) by postponing its effect through a deeming provision for a period of one month from the date of receipt by the member concerned of a notice from the society demanding him to clear off the defaulted amount specified therein and permitting the member to clear off the defaulted amount within the time specified in the notice. In other words, if only the member concerned to whom notice in terms of the proviso is issued, fails to remit or causes to remit the said amount before the expiry of the period specified therein, the disqualification would continue beyond the said period. Needless to say, if the member fails to remit or cause to remit the said amount before the expiry of the period specified therein, he would forfeit the benefit of the deeming provision and the disqualification would stand revived on the expiry of the period specified in the notice issued in terms of the proviso. If the disqualification revives on the expiry of one month from the date of receipt of the notice, proceedings under Rule 44(3) can be initiated at any time thereafter, notwithstanding whether he remits the defaulted amount at any time subsequent to the expiry of the period of one month from the date of receipt of the notice specified in the provisos. In other words, the person concerned need not continue to be a defaulter on the date of initiation of proceedings under Rule 44(3). In other words, the person concerned need not continue to be a defaulter on the date of initiation of proceedings under Rule 44(3). If it is held that a member of the committee should be a defaulter as on the date of initiation of proceedings under Rule 44(3), the requirement in the provisos that the defaulted amount shall be remitted within one month from the date of receipt by the member concerned of the notice referred to therein, would be meaningless, for such an interpretation would imply that one need not have to make the payment of the defaulted amount within the time stipulated in the notice provided for in the provisos. 5. It is seen that placing reliance on the expression “is in default” used in Rule 44(1)(c), a Division Bench of this Court in Thommen Itticheriyanthu v. State of Kerala, 1978 KHC 214, has held that disqualification should exist when the action is initiated under Rule 44(3) and the said decision has been followed by another Division Bench in Abdul Rasheed v. State of Kerala, 1988 (1) KLT 190 . Although it is discernible from the decisions referred to above that the cases dealt with therein are cases arising from proceedings initiated to disqualify members of the committees of societies from continuing in their respective offices, it is not discernible from the decisions as to whether the cases dealt with therein fall under Rule 44(2)(a) or Rule 44(2)(c). In either case, we are of the view that reference to the disqualification under Rule 44(1)(c) in those cases can only be for the application of the legal fiction provided under Rule 44(2), in terms of which the member of the committee would cease to hold his office as such. In other words, the expression “is in default” used in Rule 44(1)(c) cannot have any bearing on the proceedings provided for under Rule 44(3) for declaration of the disqualification of the member concerned with effect from the date of disqualification. As regards a case falling under Rule 44(2)(a), the expression “is in default” refers to the date on which the member concerned became disqualified, and as regards a case falling under Rule 44(2)(c), the expression “is in default” refers to the date on which the member concerned is elected. As regards a case falling under Rule 44(2)(a), the expression “is in default” refers to the date on which the member concerned became disqualified, and as regards a case falling under Rule 44(2)(c), the expression “is in default” refers to the date on which the member concerned is elected. In the said view of the matter, we are also of the view that Thommen Itticheriyanthu and Abdul Rasheed have not laid down the law correctly, in as much as it was held in those cases that default should exist when action is initiated under Rule 44(3). Order of the Court 1. A member elected to the Managing Committee of a Cooperative Society can be unseated by resorting to Rule 44(2)(c) of the Rules even without invoking the powers under Section 69(2)(c) of the Act. 2. The power of the Registrar under Rule 44(3) of the Rules and the power of the Co-operative Arbitration Court under Section 69(2)(c) are distinct and the cause of action for initiating those powers are also distinct and separate. 3.The disqualification proceedings under Rule 44(3) to declare a member as disqualified under Rule 44(2)(c) is deemed to be accrued only after the expiry of a period of one month from the date of receipt by the member concerned of a notice from the Society demanding him to clear off the defaulted amount specified therein and he failed to remit the amount within the said period. 4.To invoke the powers under Rule 44(3), a separate notice as per proviso to Rule 44(2)(c) to the defaulter is necessary, and notice issued to the defaulter before he is elected as a member or long before the proceedings initiated under Rule 44(3) is not sufficient. 5.In order to initiate proceedings for declaration of disqualification in terms of Rule 44(3) on the ground that a person is subsequently seen to be disqualified under subclause (i) of clause (c) of Rule 44(1) on the date of election itself, the person concerned need not be a defaulter as on the date of initiation of the proceedings and the decision of the Division Benches in Thommen Itticheriyanthu v. State of Kerala, 1978 KHC 214 and Abdul Rasheed v. State of Kerala, 1988 (1) KLT 190 have not laid down the law correctly, in as much as it was held therein that default should exist when action is initiated under Rule 44(3). 6.The findings in Surendran’s Case (supra) to the effect that the notice issued to the defaulter before he is elected as a member of the society can be treated as notice under the proviso to Rule 44(2)(c) is not the correct law and a fresh notice under the proviso to Rule 44(2)(c) is necessary for initiating a proceeding under Rule 44(3) of the Rules. Registry is directed to post this writ appeal for final hearing as per roster.

Jalaja Gopan v. Joint Registrar of Co-Operative Societies (General)