JUDGMENT : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J This criminal appeal filed by the accused-appellants under Section 374(2) of Cr. P.C. is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 25.05.2015, passed by the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Katghora, District Korba (C.G.) in S.T. No.04/2014, whereby the appellants-accused have been convicted for offence under Section 302 r/w 34 of IPC and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment each with fine of Rs.1,000/- each and, in default of fine, additional imprisonment of 01 year each. 2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 14.11.2013 at about 03:00 PM at Village Botla, the accused-appellants shared a common intention to kill Samaru Singh (deceased) and, in furtherance thereof, assaulted Samaru Singh (deceased) by means of ‘lathi’, hand, fist and legs, due to which he suffered grievous injuries and died during the course of treatment in hospital and, thereby, committed the offence under Section 302 r/w 34 of IPC. 3. In the instant case, it is admitted and undisputed facts that : Amir Singh (PW-05) and Rai Singh (PW-01) are brothers of deceased- Samaru Singh and Ku. Fulkunwar is sister of deceased- Samaru Singh; all the accused persons/appellants and the deceased are resident of Village Botla; and appellant No.02-Asman Singh and appellant No.04- Meena Kumari are son and daughter of appellant No.03- Smt. Vedmati. 4. Fulkunwar is sister of deceased- Samaru Singh; all the accused persons/appellants and the deceased are resident of Village Botla; and appellant No.02-Asman Singh and appellant No.04- Meena Kumari are son and daughter of appellant No.03- Smt. Vedmati. 4. The further case of the prosecution, in nutshell, is that: on 14.11.2013, in the afternoon, deceased-Samaru Singh was going towards Mateen Pahad for the purpose of gazing cattle, and about 03:00 PM when he reached near his fields (farm) at Jhumarjhotki Nala, he saw accused-appellants were cutting paddy/harvesting crops from his fields; thereafter, deceased- Samaru Singh entered into the fields and asked accused-appellants not to cut paddy from his fields, but they refused and started abusing him by encircling deceased- Samaru Singh and, at that juncture, accused-appellant No.01- Dharm Singh armed with ‘lathi’ was standing there; Fulkunwar (PW-04), who is sister of deceased, also reached on the spot, as she came to cut paddy from the fields and Sukul Singh (PW-02), who was going towards market to purchase some stuff by that side, also reached on the spot, and they both saw accused-appellants disputing with deceased- Samaru Singh by encircling him, pursuant to which, they immediately informed the brothers of deceased- Samaru Singh, namely, Amir Singh (PW-05) and Rai Singh (PW- 01) and, thereafter, they all visited the place of incident; on the place of incident, appellant No.01- Dharm Singh assaulted deceased- Samaru Singh by means of ‘lathi’ and appellants No.02 to 04 assaulted deceased by means of hand, fist and legs, due to which deceased- Samaru Singh sustained injuries and fell down on floor in an unconscious state and, thereafter, he was taken to Podi-Uproda Hospital for treatment, where on 15.11.2013, at about 05:00 AM in the morning he died during the course of treatment. 5. Thereafter, on the basis of information given by Amir Singh (PW-05), marg intimation (Ex.P/05) was recorded and FIR (Ex.P/06) was also registered by the police against the accused-appellants. Inquest proceedings were conducted vide Ex.P/02. Nazari Naksha was prepared vide Ex.P/04. The dead-body of deceased- Samaru Singh was sent for postmortem examination and, in the postmortem examination report (Ex.P/03), conducted by Dr. Rakesh Agrawal (PW-07), it has been opined that the cause of death is due to cardio-respiratory arrest due to neurogenic and hypovolemic shock, as a result of injury- Intra Extracranial Hemorrhage and mode of death is homicidal in nature. The dead-body of deceased- Samaru Singh was sent for postmortem examination and, in the postmortem examination report (Ex.P/03), conducted by Dr. Rakesh Agrawal (PW-07), it has been opined that the cause of death is due to cardio-respiratory arrest due to neurogenic and hypovolemic shock, as a result of injury- Intra Extracranial Hemorrhage and mode of death is homicidal in nature. Thereafter, accused-appellants were arrested vide Ex.P/15 to 18. Memorandum statement of appellant No.01- Dharm Singh was recorded vide Ex.P/07 and, pursuant to which, seizure of a wooden stick was affected vide Ex.P/08. But said wooden stick was not subjected to FSL examination for the reasons best known to the prosecution or probably for the reasons that blood was not found on the said wooden stick. Thereafter, statement of witnesses were recorded and, after due investigation, the police filed charge-sheet against the accused-appellants for offence under Section 302 r/w 34 of IPC in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Katghora and, thereafter, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions. The accused-appellants abjured their guilt and entered into defence. 6. The prosecution in order to prove its case examined as many as 11 witnesses and exhibited 20 documents, whereas the accused-appellants in support of their defence examined 02 witnesses, namely, Bharat Singh (DW- 01) and Sukraj Singh (DW-02) and exhibited 01 document i.e. statement of Ku. Fulkunwar. 7. The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record proceeded to convict the appellants for offence under Section 302 r/w 34 of IPC and sentenced them as mentioned hereinabove, against which this appeal has been preferred by the appellants-accused questioning the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. 8. Mr. R.K. Jain and Mrs. The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record proceeded to convict the appellants for offence under Section 302 r/w 34 of IPC and sentenced them as mentioned hereinabove, against which this appeal has been preferred by the appellants-accused questioning the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. 8. Mr. R.K. Jain and Mrs. Kiran Jain, learned counsel appearing for the appellants contend twofold submissions as under: (i) that the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in invoking Section 34 of IPC as there was no prior meeting or concert of mind between the appellants No.02 to 04, namely, Asman Singh, Smt. Vedmati and Meena Kumari with the appellant No.01- Dharm Singh to commit murder of deceased- Samaru Singh, as they were only harvesting crops from their fields, which were sown by them and even they were not aware that appellant No.01- Dharm Singh was having a ‘lathi’ in his possession and further the prosecution has failed to lead any evidence which shows that the appellants No.02 to 04 have shared common intention to commit offence under Section 302 of IPC. Reliance is placed on decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Dukhmochan Pandey and others vs. State of Bihar, (1997) 8 SCC 405 and Balvir Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2019) 15 SCC 599 . Hence, the present appeal deserves to be allowed in full for appellants No.02 to 04 and they are liable to be acquitted/discharged from offence under Section 302 r/w 34 of IPC. (ii) that though the death of deceased- Samaru Singh is said to be homicidal in nature, but there was no premeditation or motive or intention on the part of the appellant No.01- Dharm Singh to cause death of the deceased and only on account of sudden quarrel and under heat of passion on a petty dispute of cutting paddy/harvesting of crops from the fields, the appellant No.01- Dharm Singh assaulted deceased by means of wooden stick, pursuant to which he sustained three injuries and died during the course of treatment in hospital on 15.11.2013, thus, the appellant No.01 had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Therefore, the case of the appellant No.01- Dharm Singh falls within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC, as his act is culpable homicide not amounting to murder and, as such, it is a fit case where the conviction of the appellant No.01- Dharm Singh can be converted/altered to an offence under Section 304 (Part-II) of IPC and, further, since the appellant No.01 is in jail since 16.11.2013 i.e. more than 08 years and 09 months, taking into consideration the period he has already undergone, the appellant No.01- Dharm Singh be released from jail forthwith. Hence, the present appeal deserves to be allowed in part for appellant No.01- Dharm Singh. 9. Per-contra, Mr. Sudeep Verma and Mr. Arjit Tiwari, learned State counsel supported the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence and submits that the prosecution has proved the offence beyond reasonable doubt by leading evidence of clinching nature. They submits that though deceased died during the course of treatment in the hospital, but fact remains that the appellant No.01 has caused grievous injury on his head by assaulting him be means of wooden stick and the appellants No.02 to 04 were present over the spot and they have also assaulted deceased by means of hand, fist and legs. The learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellants for offence under Sections 302 r/w 34 of IPC. Exception 04 to Section 300 of IPC is not attracted in this case and it is not a case where conviction of the appellant No.01- Dharm Singh under Section 302 r/w 34 of IPC requires to be altered to Section 304 Part-II of IPC, thus, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed. 10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 11. Looking to the twofold submissions made by learned counsel for the appellants, firstly with regard to appellants No.02 to 04 and secondly with regard to appellant No.01, we would like to consider each submissions one by one. 12. 11. Looking to the twofold submissions made by learned counsel for the appellants, firstly with regard to appellants No.02 to 04 and secondly with regard to appellant No.01, we would like to consider each submissions one by one. 12. Submissions-(i) regarding Appellants No.02 to 04: it has been vehemently contended by learned counsel for the appellants that the prosecution has failed to prove that Section 34 of IPC is attracted in the present case against the appellants No.02 to 04 beyond any reasonable doubt and the learned trail Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellants No.02 to 04 for offence under Section 302 of IPC with the aid to Section 34 of IPC, as there is no evidence available on record to show that the appellants No.02 to 04, namely, Asman Singh, Smt. Vedmati and Meena Kumari have shared common intention with the appellant No.01- Dharm Singh to cause death of deceased-Samaru Singh and they were only present over the spot, as they have assembled to cut paddy/harvest the crops which they have sown. Therefore, the prosecution was required to prove that there was prior meeting or concert of mind between the appellants and, in furtherance thereof, they all have gathered in the fields and formed an intention to cause death of deceased. 13. In order to consider the plea, it would be appropriate to quote Section 34 of IPC, which reads as under: “34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.— When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.” 14. The Supreme Court in the matter of Dukhmochan Pandey (supra) while considering the applicability of Section 34 of IPC held that in order to invoke Section 34 of IPC the evidence and the circumstances of the case must establish that a meeting of minds and a fusion of ideas had taken place amongst the different accused and in prosecution of it the overt acts of the accused persons flowed out and held in Para-08 of the judgment as under: “8. ….. ….. For an inference of common intention being drawn for the purposes of Section 34, the evidence and the circumstances of the case should establish, without any room for doubt, that a meeting of minds and a fusion of ideas had taken place amongst different accused and in prosecution of it the overt acts of the accused persons flowed out. As has been stated earlier the prosecution case itself is, they came to prevent the labourers from continuing the transplantation operation but at the spur of the moment on account of certain lalkara being given by some of the accused persons. Persons armed with weapons started assaulting the deceased. But from mere assault even not on vital parts of the body which ultimately resulted in causing some minor injuries, it may not be sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt that they also shared a common intention of causing murder of deceased Ahmed Shah. In this view of the matter, the conviction of appellants Uttam Pandey, Janak Das, Sanjam Pandey, Upendra Narain Pandey, Jaogeshwar Mandal and Kapileshwar Mandal under Section 302/34 IPC for causing murder of deceased Ahmed Shah cannot be sustained and the same is set aside…..” 15. Similarly, in the case of Balvir Singh (supra) the Supreme Court in Paras-33, 34 & 38 as under : “33. To invoke Section 34 IPC, it must be established that the criminal act was done by more than one person in furtherance of common intention of all. It must, therefore, be proved that : (i) there was common intention on the part of several persons to commit a particular crime, and (ii) the crime was actually committed by them in furtherance of that common intention. The essence of liability under Section 34 IPC is simultaneous conscious mind of persons participating in the criminal action to bring about a particular result. Minds regarding sharing of common intention gets satisfied when an overt act is established qua each of the accused. Common intention implies pre-arranged plan and acting in concert pursuant to the prearranged plan. Criminal act mentioned in Section 34 IPC is the result of the concerted action of more than one person and if the said result was reached in furtherance of common intention, each person is liable for the offence as if he has committed the offence by himself. 34. Criminal act mentioned in Section 34 IPC is the result of the concerted action of more than one person and if the said result was reached in furtherance of common intention, each person is liable for the offence as if he has committed the offence by himself. 34. Observing that the inference of common intention is to be drawn from the conduct of the accused, in Ramesh Singh alias Phooti v. State of A.P. (2004) 11 SCC 305 , the Supreme Court held as under:- “12. ……. As a general principle in a case of criminal liability it is the primary responsibility of the person who actually commits the offence and only that person who has committed the crime can be held guilty. By introducing Section 34 in the Penal Code the legislature laid down the principle of joint liability in doing a criminal act. The essence of that liability is to be found in the existence of a common intention connecting the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. Thus, if the act is the result of a common intention then every person who did the criminal act with that common intention would be responsible for the offence committed irrespective of the share which he had in its perpetration. Section 34 IPC embodies the principle of joint liability in doing the criminal act based on a common intention. Common intention essentially being a state of mind it is very difficult to procure direct evidence to prove such intention. Therefore, in most cases it has to be inferred from the act like, the conduct of the accused or other relevant circumstances of the case. The inference can be gathered from the manner in which the accused arrived at the scene and mounted the attack, the determination and concert with which the attack was made, and from the nature of injury caused by one or some of them. The contributory acts of the persons who are not responsible for the injury can further be inferred from the subsequent conduct after the attack. In this regard even an illegal omission on the part of such accused can indicate the sharing of common intention. The contributory acts of the persons who are not responsible for the injury can further be inferred from the subsequent conduct after the attack. In this regard even an illegal omission on the part of such accused can indicate the sharing of common intention. In other words, the totality of circumstances must be taken into consideration in arriving at the conclusion whether the accused had the common intention to commit an offence of which they could be convicted. (See Noor Mohammad Mohd. Yusuf Momin v. State of Maharashtra (1970) 1 SCC 696 )” The decision in Ramesh Singh was referred to in Balu @ Bala Subaramaniam and another v. State (UT of Pondicherry) (2016) 15 SCC 471 . **** ***** ***** ***** 38. ….. If accused Nos.2 and 3 have shared the common intention, they would also have attacked the deceased; but they were only alleged to have caught hold of the deceased. The prosecution did not bring in evidence that there was prior meeting of minds and that accused Nos.2 and 3 were having knowledge that their brother accused Harnam Singh was armed with katta. The evidence adduced by the prosecution is not convincing to hold that accused Nos.2 and 3 also shared the common intention with the accused Harnam Singh and other accused Bharat in committing the murder of Mohan. Conviction of accused Nos. 2 and 3 under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC is, therefore, liable to be set aside.” 16. Further, the Supreme Court in its recent judgment rendered in the case of Jasdeep Singh @ Jassu vs. State of Punjab, (2022) 2 SCC 544 while reviewing its earlier judgments on the entire point, considered the essence and scope of Section 34 of IPC and held in Para-26 & 27 as under: “26. There may be cases where all acts, in general, would not come under the purview of Section 34 IPC, but only those done in furtherance of the common intention having adequate connectivity. When we speak of intention it has to be one of criminality with adequacy of knowledge of any existing fact necessary for the proposed offence. Such an intention is meant to assist, encourage, promote and facilitate the commission of a crime with the requisite knowledge as aforesaid. 27. The existence of common intention is obviously the duty of the prosecution to prove. Such an intention is meant to assist, encourage, promote and facilitate the commission of a crime with the requisite knowledge as aforesaid. 27. The existence of common intention is obviously the duty of the prosecution to prove. However, a court has to analyse and assess the evidence before implicating a person under Section 34 IPC. A mere common intention per se may not attract Section 34 IPC, sans an action in furtherance. There may also be cases where a person despite being an active participant in forming a common intention to commit a crime, may actually withdraw from it later. Of course, this is also one of the facts for the consideration of the court. Further, the fact that all accused charged with an offence read with Section 34 IPC are present at the commission of the crime, without dissuading themselves or others might well be a relevant circumstance, provided a prior common intention is duly proved. Once again, this is an aspect which is required to be looked into by the court on the evidence placed before it. It may not be required on the part of the defence to specifically raise such a plea in a case where adequate evidence is available before the court.” 17. Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of the aforesaid principles of law laid down by their Lordships of Supreme Court qua the applicability of Section 34 of IPC, it is quite vivid and appropriate to notice that the land in which instant dispute arose belongs to Government, in which the appellants have claimed to sown crops and, on the date of incident, the appellants were harvesting the crops on the said land. Amri Singh (PW-05), who is brother of the deceased, in Para-13 of his statement before the Court has clearly stated that in the year 2013 firstly they (deceased and his family) have sown the crops in the aforesaid land and thereafter the accused-appellants have sown the crops. Similarly, Fulkunwar (PW-04), who is sister of the deceased, has also stated in her statement before the Court that in that particular year i.e. 2013 the accused-appellants have sown the crops on the aforesaid land. Similarly, Fulkunwar (PW-04), who is sister of the deceased, has also stated in her statement before the Court that in that particular year i.e. 2013 the accused-appellants have sown the crops on the aforesaid land. Tribhuwan Singh (PW-03), who is a villager and independent witness in the instant case has also stated in his statement before the Court that on the date of offence the accused-appellants were harvesting the crops and when deceased- Samaru Singh reached over the spot while grazing his cattle, he saw accused-appellants harvesting the crops and, at that juncture, a dispute ensued between the appellants and the deceased followed by sudden quarrel and, thereafter, Rai Singh (PW-1), Fulkunwar (PW-04) and Amri Singh (PW-05) also reached over there and, in that course of dispute, the appellant No.01 assaulted deceased- Samaru Singh by means of ‘lathi’ and appellants No.02 to 04 assaulted the deceased by means of hand and fist. Further, in the PM report (Ex.P/03) also only one abrasion on right buttock, one contusion on right arm and swelling over parietal region of head was found, which is said to have been caused by hard and blunt object, which is duly proved by Dr. Rakesh Agrawal (PW-07), who has conducted the postmortem of dead-body of deceased, as in his statement before the Court he has stated that the aforesaid injuries should have been caused by hard and blunt object. Moreover, in the statements of Rai Singh (PW-1), Fulkunwar (PW-04) and Amri Singh (PW-05) it has came out that it was the appellant No.01- Dharm Singh who has assaulted deceased by ‘lathi’ (wooden stick) and appellant No.02 to 04 have assaulted deceased- Samaru Singh by hand, fist and legs. Thus, there is no grievous injury on the body of the deceased, which is said to have been caused by the appellants No.02 to 04. 18. Apart from this, in order to invoke Section 34 of IPC the prosecution has failed to show that the appellants No.02 to 04 were aware of the fact that the appellant No.01 was having a ‘lathi’ and they shared common intention with the appellant No.01 to commit murder of the deceased. 18. Apart from this, in order to invoke Section 34 of IPC the prosecution has failed to show that the appellants No.02 to 04 were aware of the fact that the appellant No.01 was having a ‘lathi’ and they shared common intention with the appellant No.01 to commit murder of the deceased. Except a stereotype statement of PW-01 to PW-05 that the appellants No.02 to 04 assaulted deceased by hand, fist and legs, there is no other evidence available on record to indicate that the appellants No.02 to 04 caused any grievous injury to the deceased-Samaru Singh, due to which he died. As such, the entire evidence available on record including the medical evidence would show that the prosecution has failed to prove that there was any prior meeting or concert of mind of the appellants No.02 to 04 with the appellant No.01 to caused death of deceased- Samaru Singh and, particularly, when it has come out by way of evidence that the appellants No.02 to 04 were present over the spot/fields for the purpose of harvesting the crops which they have sown and not for any other purpose and, incidentally, deceased- Samaru Singh saw their presence over the fields and asked them not to cut paddy/harvest crops from the fields, on which a dispute ensued followed by sudden quarrel and, in furtherance thereof, appellant No.01 assaulted deceased- Samaru Singh by means of ‘lathi’, due to which he suffered injury and died on the next date in hospital. In that view of the matter, the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellants No.02 to 04 for offence under Section 302 of IPC with the aid of Section 34 of IPC and their conviction is liable to be set aside. 19. Submissions-(ii) regarding Appellant No.01: it has been argued by learned counsel for the appellants that the case of the appellant No.01- Dharm Singh falls within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC, as his act is culpable homicide not amounting to murder and, as such, it is a fit case where the conviction of the appellant No.01- Dharm Singh can be converted/altered to an offence under Section 304 (Part-II) of IPC. 20. 20. In order to decide the plea, we have to first decide whether the death of the deceased-Samaru Singh is homicidal in nature, which the learned trial Court has recorded in affirmative by taking into consideration the oral and documentary evidence available on record and particularly considering the postmortem report (Ex.P/03), wherein it has been opined that the cause of death of deceased- Samaru Singh is due to cardio-respiratory arrest due to neurogenic and hypovolemic shock, as a result of injury- Intra Extracranial Hemorrhage and mode of death is homicidal in nature, and the statement of Dr. Rakesh Agrawal (PW-07), who has conducted the postmortem of the dead-body of the deceased. Accordingly, taking into consideration the postmortem report (Ex.P/03) and the statements of Dr. Rakesh Agrawal (PW- 07), we are of the considered opinion that the learned trial Court is absolutely justified in holding that the death of deceased- Samaru Singh is homicidal in nature, as the same is correct finding of fact based on evidence and same is neither perverse nor contrary to the record. Accordingly, we hereby affirmed the said finding. 21. Now the next question would be whether appellant No.01- Dharm Singh is the author of the crime ? 22. As in above Paras-17 & 18, while considering the plea with regard to appellants No.02 to 04, we have considered the fact that it was the appellant No.01- Dharm Singh who on sudden quarrel and under heat of passion on a petty dispute of harvesting the crops has assaulted deceased- Samaru Singh by means of wooden stick, due to which he sustained injuries and died during the course of treatment, which is duly proved by the eye-witnesses in the instant case and, further, pursuant to memorandum statement of appellant No.01 (Ex.P/07) only, a wooden stick (lathi) has been seized vide Ex.P/08. Accordingly, we hereby affirm the finding recorded by the learned trial Court that the appellant No.01- Dharm Singh is the author of the crime in question. 23. Accordingly, we hereby affirm the finding recorded by the learned trial Court that the appellant No.01- Dharm Singh is the author of the crime in question. 23. The aforesaid findings brings us to the next question for consideration, which is, whether the trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant No.01- Dharm Singh for offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC or his case is covered with Exception 4 of Section 300 of IPC vis-a-vis culpable homicide not amounting to murder and, thus, his conviction can be converted to Section 304 Part II of IPC, as contended by learned counsel for the appellants? 24. The Supreme Court in the matter of Sukhbir Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002) 3 SCC 327 has observed as under:- “21. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that in the absence of the existence of common object Sukhbir Singh is proved to have committed the offence of culpable homicide without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and did not act in a cruel or unusual manner and his case is covered by Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC which is punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC. The finding of the courts below holding the aforesaid appellant guilty of offence of murder punishable under Section 302 IPC is set aside and he is held guilty for the commission of offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.5000. In default of payment of fine, he shall undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year.” 25. The Supreme Court in the matter of Gurmukh Singh v. State of Haryana, (2009) 15 SCC 635 has laid down certain factors which are to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused with reference to Section 302 or Section 304 Part II of IPC, which state as under :- “23. These are some factors which are required to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused. These factors are only illustrative in character and not exhaustive. Each case has to be seen fro its special perspective. These are some factors which are required to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused. These factors are only illustrative in character and not exhaustive. Each case has to be seen fro its special perspective. The relevant factors are as under : (a) Motive or previous enmity; (b) Whether the incident had taken place on the spur of the moment; (c) The intention/knowledge of the accused while inflicting the blow or injury; (d) Whether the death ensued instantaneously or the victim died after several days; (e) The gravity, dimension and nature of injury; (f) The age and general health condition of the accused; (g) Whether the injury was caused without premeditation in a sudden fight; (h) The nature and size of weapon used for inflicting the injury and the force with which the blow was inflicted; (I) The criminal background and adverse history of the accused; (j) Whether the injury inflicted was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death but the death was because of shock; (k) Number of other criminal cases pending against the accused; (l) Incident occurred within the family members or close relations; (m) The conduct and behaviour of the accused after the incident. Whether the accused had taken the injured/the deceased to the hospital immediately to ensure that he/she gets proper medical treatment ? These are some of the factors which can be taken into consideration while granting an appropriate sentence to the accused. 24. The list of circumstances enumerated above is only illustrative and not exhaustive. In our considered view, proper and appropriate sentence to the accused is the bounded obligation and duty of the court. The endeavour of the court must be to ensure that the accused receives appropriate sentence, in other words, sentence should be according to the gravity of the offence. These are some of the relevant factors which are required to be kept in view while convicting and sentencing the accused.” 26. Likewise, in the matter of State v. Sanjeev Nanda, (2012) 8 SCC 450 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that once knowledge that it is likely to cause death is established but without any intention to cause death, then jail sentence may be for a term which may extend to 10 years or with fine or with both. It has further been held that to make out an offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC, the prosecution has to prove the death of the person in question and such death was caused by the act of the accused and that he knew that such act of his is likely to cause death. 27. Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun v. State of Chhattisgarh (2017) 3 SCC 247 has elaborately dealt with the issue and observed in paragraphs 20 and 21, which reads as under :- “20. To invoke this Exception 4, the requirements that are to be fulfilled have been laid down by this Court in Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh [ (1989) 2 SCC 217 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 348], it has been explained as under :(SCC p. 220, para 7) “7. To invoke this exception four requirements must be satisfied, namely, (i) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done in a heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor its I relevant who offered the provocation or started the assault. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this exception provided he has not acted cruelly.” 21. Further in Arumugam v. State [ (2008) 15 SCC 590 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], in support of the proposition of law that under what circumstances Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC can be invoked if death is caused, it has been explained as under : (SCC p. 596, para 9) “9. …. 18. Further in Arumugam v. State [ (2008) 15 SCC 590 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], in support of the proposition of law that under what circumstances Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC can be invoked if death is caused, it has been explained as under : (SCC p. 596, para 9) “9. …. 18. The help of exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the “fight” occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in the Penal Code, 1860. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two or more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression “undue advantage” as used in the provisions means “unfair advantage”. 28. In the matter of Arjun (supra), the Supreme Court has held that if there is intent and knowledge, the same would be case of Section 304 Part-I of IPC and if it is only a case of knowledge and not the intention to cause murder and bodily injury, then same would be a case of Section 304 Part-II IPC. 29. In the matter of Arjun (supra), the Supreme Court has held that if there is intent and knowledge, the same would be case of Section 304 Part-I of IPC and if it is only a case of knowledge and not the intention to cause murder and bodily injury, then same would be a case of Section 304 Part-II IPC. 29. Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Rambir vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2019) 6 SCC 122 has laid down four ingredients which should be tested for bring a case within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC, which reads as under: “16. A plain reading of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC shows that the following four ingredients are required: (i) There must be a sudden fight; (ii) There was no premeditation; (iii) The act was committed in a heat of passion; and (iv) The offender had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.” 30. Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of above principles of law laid down by their Lordships of Supreme Court, it is quite vivid that there was no premeditation on the part of the appellant to cause death of the deceased, but only on account of petty dispute of cutting of paddy/harvesting of crops, the appellant No.01- Dharm Singh suddenly started quarreling with the deceased, ensued a dispute and, in furtherance thereof, assaulted the deceased by means of wooden stick, pursuant to which deceased- Samaru Singh sustained grievous injuries and died in the hospital during the course of treatment on next day, as such, there was no premeditation on the part of the appellant to cause death of the deceased- Samaru Singh and only because of a petty dispute, out of sudden anger, in heat of passion, the appellant assaulted deceased- Samaru Singh and caused his death. Further, in the statements of Tribhuwan Singh (PW-03), Fulkunwar (PW-04) and Amir Singh (PW-05) it has been brought on record that on the date of incident the appellants were harvesting crops which they have sown, but when deceased- Samaru Singh reached over the spot while gazing his cattle, he asked them not to cut paddy/harvest crops from fields, on which they refused and, thereafter, a dispute ensued between them and, in furtherance thereof, the appellant No.01 in order to protect his property (i.e. crops which he and his family has sown) has assaulted the deceased- Samaru Singh by means of wooden stick, which was in his possession, as a result of which, deceased sustained injuries and fell down on floor in unconscious state and thereafter died on the next day in hospital during the course of treatment, thus, it is clear that the appellant No.01- Dharm Singh has not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. However, looking to the injuries sustained by deceased- Samaru Singh, as recorded by Dr. Rakesh Agrawal (PW-07), which have been caused on his head/brain, the appellant No.01 must have had the knowledge that such injuries inflicted by him on the body of the deceased would likely to cause his death, as such, his case would fall within the purview of Exception 4 of Section 300 of IPC, as the act of the appellant No.01- Dharm Singh completely satisfies the four necessary ingredients of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC i.e. (i) there must be a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was committed in a heat of passion and (iv) the appellant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner and, therefore, the conviction of the appellant No.01 under Section 302 of IPC can be altered/converted to Section 304 (Part-II) of IPC. 31. In view of the aforesaid discussions, this Court came to the following conclusions: (i) the conviction of the appellants No.0 2 to 04, namely, Ashman Singh, Smt. Vedmati and Meena Kumari for offence punishable under Section 302 r/w 34 of IPC as well as the sentence of life imprisonment awarded to them by the learned trial Court is hereby set aside. They are acquitted/discharged from the aforesaid offence. They are acquitted/discharged from the aforesaid offence. Since the appellants No.02 to 04 are already on bail, they need not to surrender before the trial Court, but their bail bonds shall remain in operation for a period of 06 months in view of provisions contained in Section 437-A of Cr.PC.; & (ii) the conviction of the appellant No.01- Dharm Singh for offence punishable under Section 302 r/w 34 of IPC as well as the sentence of life imprisonment awarded to him by the learned trial Court is hereby set aside. Considering that there was no premeditation on the part of the appellant to cause death of the deceased but the injuries caused by him were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the appellant No.01- Dharm Singh is convicted for offence punishable under Section 304 Part-II of IPC. Since the appellant No.01- Dharm Singh is in jail since 16.11.2013 i.e. more than 08 years and 09 months, taking into consideration the period he has already undergone, we award him sentence already undergone by him, but the fine sentence imposed by the learned trial Court shall remain intact. Accordingly, the appellant No.01- Dharm Singh be released from jail forthwith, if not required in any other offence. 32. This criminal appeal, to the extent indicated herein-above, is fully allowed so far it relates to appellant No.02 to 04 and party allowed so far it relates to appellant No.01.