JUDGMENT : SANDEEP N. BHATT, J. 1. The present First Appeal is filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and award dated 27.04.2010 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Aux.), Amreli, in Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 328 of 2005, by which, the claim petition of the claimant is partly allowed by the Tribunal, directing the opponents i.e. owner of rickshaw, owner of indica car and insurance company of indica car to pay the compensation of Rs. 1,15,460/- with 7.5% interest per annum, to the claimant, jointly and severally, whereas the insurance company of rickshaw has been exonerated. 2. Brief facts of the present case are that, on 20.06.2005 at about 16:30 hours, the claimant was travelling in rickshaw bearing Registration No. GJ-04-T-6329, along with other passengers, and was going from village: Derdi to village: Kariyana of Babra Taluka. When the said rickashw reached in between village: Galkotdi to Babra near by turning situated nearby water tank, at that time, one Indica car bearing Registration No. MH-12-0898 came from the opposite direction in rash and negligent manner and in excessive speed and dashed with the rickshaw. As a result, the claimant sustained serious bodily injuries. FIR came to be lodged against the driver of the Indica car being CR-I No. 59 of 2005 before the Babra Police Station. Since the claimant has received serious injuries and taken medical treatment for long time, the claimant has preferred a claim petition before the Tribunal. Notices were served to the opponents i.e. owner and insurance company of the rickshaw as well as owner and insurance company of the Indica car. The insurance company of the rickshaw and Indica car, both have filed the written statements before the Tribunal and have denied the contentions and negligence. Various evidence, oral as well as documentary, were led before the Tribunal. After hearing the submissions made by the learned advocates for the respective parties, the Tribunal has partly allowed the claim petition as noted above and held liable opponents No. 1, 3 and 4 for the compensation, jointly and severally. Opponent No. 2-insurance company of the rickshaw has been exonerated by the Tribunal. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said order, the present appeal is preferred by the claimant for enhancement of compensation. 3. Learned advocate Mr. Opponent No. 2-insurance company of the rickshaw has been exonerated by the Tribunal. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said order, the present appeal is preferred by the claimant for enhancement of compensation. 3. Learned advocate Mr. Hiren Modi for the appellant-claimant has submitted that the Tribunal has erred in apportioning the liability of 70% and 30% and directed the opponents to pay the amount accordingly as the claimant is a third party to the opponents, more particularly offending vehicles rickshaw and Indica car. He has submitted that while issuing direction in operative part of the impugned judgment, the Tribunal has considered that the rickshaw and Indica car have accepted the negligence of 70% and 30%, respectively and accordingly, the reference is made to pay the amount for the claim of Rs. 1,15,460/- by holding opponents No. 1, 3 and 4 liable, jointly and severally and in the same paragraph in later part, it was indicated that subject to negligence assessed on the part of the driver of the goods rickshaw as well as Indica car. He has submitted that this is a case of composite negligence and in view of the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Khenyei vs. New Indian Assurance Co. Ltd. (2015) 9 SCC 273 , the Tribunal cannot apportion the amount of compensation to be recovered from the particular opponents, the claimant can recover from all the tort-feasors and/or either one of them. Therefore, he has submitted that the Tribunal has committed an error that though the Tribunal has initially found that opponents No. 1, 3 and 4 are jointly and severally liable, but in the later part of its direction/observation, the Tribunal has created confusion by observing that subject to negligence 70%-30%. Therefore, he has submitted that the impugned judgment and award be quashed and set aside by clarifying that aspect. He has submitted on the aspect that the Tribunal has not properly considered the income of the claimant. He has submitted that the deposition of the claimant-Ramuben Chhotabhai Bharwad has been recorded at Exh.28. As per her deposition, at the time of occurrence of accident, she was aged about 50 years. Further, she has deposed that prior to the accident, she was healthy and her husband was having 15 bigha agriculture land and she was also doing agriculture work and she was earning Rs. 3,60,000/- per annum. As per her deposition, at the time of occurrence of accident, she was aged about 50 years. Further, she has deposed that prior to the accident, she was healthy and her husband was having 15 bigha agriculture land and she was also doing agriculture work and she was earning Rs. 3,60,000/- per annum. She has also deposed that due to occurrence of the vehicular accident, she has sustained fractured in right hand wrist portion as well as left humerus and iron plat has been inserted in her both the arms portion and therefore, she has submitted that she has spent Rs. 75,728/- towards medical treatment and as per the bills. She has also remained bed ridden for six months. Mr. Modi, learned advocate for the claimant has relied on the MLC certificate issued by the Community Health Centre, Babra at Exh.60 and MLC Certificate issued by the Government Hospital, Rajkot at Exh.58 as well as disability certificate at Exh.54, whereby the medical bills of Rs. 58,844/- are available on record, but actually, expenses of Rs. 75,728/- has been occurred for the same. Therefore, he has submitted that the Tribunal has erred in not considering that aspect. He has submitted that as per the claim petition, the income of the claimant should be assessed Rs. 1,800/- p.m. Therefore, even if we consider the present claimant as housewife, then also in view of the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kirti vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (2021) 2 SCC 166 , minimum wage should be considered for the income of the housewife and accordingly, he has submitted that the appropriate enhancement is required to be made in the impugned award by the Tribunal. 4. Per Contra, learned advocate Mr. Majmudar for the respondent No. 2-insurance company has submitted that since the insurance company is exonerated, he has no objection if any enhancement is given or any direction which is sought in view of the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Khenyei (supra). 5. Learned advocate Ms. Panchal for learned advocate Ms. Aditi Raol for the respondent No. 4 has submitted that the Tribunal has rightly assessed the aspect of negligence and has rightly apportioned the negligence. She has further submitted that the Tribunal has rightly assessed the income of the injured claimant to the tune of Rs. 5. Learned advocate Ms. Panchal for learned advocate Ms. Aditi Raol for the respondent No. 4 has submitted that the Tribunal has rightly assessed the aspect of negligence and has rightly apportioned the negligence. She has further submitted that the Tribunal has rightly assessed the income of the injured claimant to the tune of Rs. 1,800/- p.m. in absence of any documentary evidence available on record in support of the claim that she was earning Rs. 3,000/- per month at the time of accident. She has also submitted that looking to the disability, the Tribunal has assessed the amount of compensation as per the documentary evidence available on record and also as per the settled position of law and therefore, she has prayed that no interference is required in the impugned judgment by this Court. 6.1 I have heard learned advocates for the respective parties. I have considered the impugned judgment and award passed by the Tribunal. I have perused the record and proceedings of the Tribunal. In view of the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Khenyei (supra), it is an admitted position that in the case of composite negligence, where more than one persons/vehicles are involved and held negligent, the Tribunal should be awarded compensation by holding all the respondents/opponents liable jointly and severally and the claimant can recover from any one or all of them. Relevant paragraphs 3, 5, 6, 15, 21 and 22 of the said decision are as under: “3. It is a case of composite negligence where injuries have been caused to the claimants by combined wrongful act of joint tort feasors. In a case of accident caused by negligence of joint tort feasors, all the persons who aid or counsel or direct or join in committal of a wrongful act, are liable. In such case, the liability is always joint and several. The extent of negligence of joint tort feasors in such a case is immaterial for satisfaction of the claim of the plaintiff/claimant and need not be determined by the court. However, in case all the joint tort feasors are before the court, it may determine the extent of their liability for the purpose of adjusting inter-se equities between them at appropriate stage. The liability of each and every joint tort feasor vis-a-vis to plaintiff/claimant cannot be bifurcated as it is joint and several liability. However, in case all the joint tort feasors are before the court, it may determine the extent of their liability for the purpose of adjusting inter-se equities between them at appropriate stage. The liability of each and every joint tort feasor vis-a-vis to plaintiff/claimant cannot be bifurcated as it is joint and several liability. In the case of composite negligence, apportionment of compensation between tort feasors for making payment to the plaintiff is not permissible as the plaintiff/claimant has the right to recover the entire amount from the easiest targets/solvent defendant. 5. In Law of Torts by Winfield and Jolowicz, 17th Edn. 2006, the author has referred to Performance Cars Ltd. vs. Abraham, 1962 (1) QB 33, Baker vs. Willoughby, 1970 AC 467 , Rogers on Unification of Tort Law: Multiple Tortfeasors; G.N.E.R. vs. Hart, (2003) EWHC 2450 (QB), Mortgage Express Ltd. vs. Bowerman and Partners, 1996 (2) All E.R. 836 etc. and observed thus: “WHERE two or more people by their independent breaches of duty to the claimant cause him to suffer distinct injuries, no special rules are required, for each tort feasor is liable for the damage which he caused and only for that damage. Where, however, two or more breaches of duty by different persons cause the claimant to suffer a single, indivisible injury the position is more complicated. The law in such a case is that the claimant is entitled to sue all or any of them for the full amount of his loss, and each is said to be jointly and severally liable for it. If the claimant sues defendant A but not B and C, it is open to A to seek “contribution” from B and C in respect of their relative responsibility but this is a matter among A, B and C and does not affect the claimant. This means that special rules are necessary to deal with the possibilities of successive actions in respect of that loss and of claims for contribution or indemnity by one tort feasor against the others. It may be greatly to the claimant's advantage to show that he has suffered the same, indivisible harm at the hands of a number of defendants for he thereby avoids the risk, inherent in cases where there are different injuries, of finding that one defendant is insolvent (or uninsured) and being unable to execute judgment against him. It may be greatly to the claimant's advantage to show that he has suffered the same, indivisible harm at the hands of a number of defendants for he thereby avoids the risk, inherent in cases where there are different injuries, of finding that one defendant is insolvent (or uninsured) and being unable to execute judgment against him. Even where all participants are solvent, a system which enabled the claimant to sue each one only for a proportionate part of the damage would require him to launch multiple proceedings, some of which might involve complex issues of liability, causation and proof. As the law now stands, the claimant may simply launch proceedings against the “easiest target.” The same picture is not, of course, so attractive from the point of view of the solvent defendant, who may end up carrying full responsibility for a loss in the causing of which he played only a partial, even secondary role. Thus a solicitor may be liable in full for failing to point out to his client that there is reason to believe that a valuation on which the client proposes to lend is suspect, the valuer being insolvent; and an auditor will be likely to carry sole responsibility for negligent failure to discover fraud during a company audit. A sustained campaign against the rule of joint and several liability has been mounted in this country by certain professional bodies, who have argued instead for a regime of “proportionate liability” whereby, as against the claimant, and not merely among defendants as a group, each defendant would bear only his share of the liability. While it has not been suggested here that such a change should be extended to personal injury claims, this has occurred in some American jurisdictions, whether by statute or by judicial decision. However, an investigation of the issue by the Law Commission on behalf of the Dept. of Trade and Industry in 1996 led to the conclusion that the present law was preferable to the various forms of proportionate liability.” 6. Pollock in Law of Torts, 15th Edn. has discussed the concept of composite negligence. The relevant portion at page 361 is extracted below: “Another kind of question arises where a person is injured without any fault of his own, but by the combined effects of the negligence of two persons of whom the one is not responsible for the other. Pollock in Law of Torts, 15th Edn. has discussed the concept of composite negligence. The relevant portion at page 361 is extracted below: “Another kind of question arises where a person is injured without any fault of his own, but by the combined effects of the negligence of two persons of whom the one is not responsible for the other. It has been supposed that A could avail himself, as against Z who has been injured without any want of due care on his own part, of the so-called contributory negligence of a third person B. It is true you were injured by my negligence, but it would not have happened if B had not been negligent also, therefore, you can not sue me, or at all events not apart from B. Recent authority is decidedly against allowing such a defence and in one particular class of cases it has been emphatically disallowed. It must, however, be open to A to answer to Z: You were not injured by my negligence at all, but only and wholly by B's. It seems to be a question of fact rather than of law (as, within the usual limits of a jury's discretion, the question of proximate cause is in all ordinary cases) what respective degrees of connection, in kind and degree, between the damage suffered by Z and the independent negligent conduct of A and B will make it proper to say that Z was injured by the negligence of A alone, or of B alone, or of both A and B,. But if this last conclusion be arrived at, it is now quite clear that Z can sue both A and B. At Page 362 Author has observed as: “The strict analysis of the proximate or immediate cause of the event: the inquiry who could last have prevented the mischief by the exercise of due care, is relevant only where the defendant says that the plaintiff suffered by his own negligence. Where negligent acts of two or more independent persons have between them caused damage to a third, the sufferer is not driven to apply any such analysis to find out whom he can sue. He is entitled, of course, within the limits set by the general rules as to remoteness of damage, to sue all or any of the negligent persons. He is entitled, of course, within the limits set by the general rules as to remoteness of damage, to sue all or any of the negligent persons. It is no concern of his whether there is any duty of contribution or indemnity as between those persons, though in any case he can not recover in the whole more than his whole damage.” 15. There is a difference between contributory and composite negligence. In the case of contributory negligence, a person who has himself contributed to the extent cannot claim compensation for the injuries sustained by him in the accident to the extent of his own negligence; whereas in the case of composite negligence, a person who has suffered has not contributed to the accident but the outcome of combination of negligence of two or more other persons. This Court in T.O. Anthony vs. Karvarnan and Others, 2008 (3) SCC 748 : AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 1646, has held that in case of contributory negligence, injured need not establish the extent of responsibility of each wrong doer separately, nor is it necessary for the court to determine the extent of liability of each wrong doer separately. It is only in the case of contributory negligence that the injured himself has contributed by his negligence in the accident. Extent of his negligence is required to be determined as damages recoverable by him in respect of the injuries have to be reduced in proportion to his contributory negligence. The relevant portion is extracted hereunder: “6. ‘Composite negligence’ refers to the negligence on the part of two or more persons. Where a person is injured as a result of negligence on the part of two or more wrong doers, it is said that the person was injured on account of the composite negligence of those wrong-doers. In such a case, each wrong doer, is jointly and severally liable to the injured for payment of the entire damages and the injured person has the choice of proceeding against all or any of them. In such a case, the injured need not establish the extent of responsibility of each wrong-doer separately, nor is it necessary for the court to determine the extent of liability of each wrong-doer separately. In such a case, the injured need not establish the extent of responsibility of each wrong-doer separately, nor is it necessary for the court to determine the extent of liability of each wrong-doer separately. On the other hand where a person suffers injury, partly due to the negligence on the part of another person or persons, and partly as a result of his own negligence, then the negligence of the part of the injured which contributed to the accident is referred to as his contributory negligence. Where the injured is guilty of some negligence, his claim for damages is not defeated merely by reason of the negligence on his part but the damages recoverable by him in respect of the injuries stands reduced in proportion to his contributory negligence. 7. Therefore, when two vehicles are involved in an accident, and one of the drivers claims compensation from the other driver alleging negligence, and the other driver denies negligence or claims that the injured claimant himself was negligent, then it becomes necessary to consider whether the injured claimant was negligent and if so, whether he was solely or partly responsible for the accident and the extent of his responsibility, that is his contributory negligence. Therefore where the injured is himself partly liable, the principle of ‘composite negligence’ will not apply nor can there be an automatic inference that the negligence was 50:50 as has been assumed in this case. The Tribunal ought to have examined the extent of contributory negligence of the appellant and thereby avoided confusion between composite negligence and contributory negligence. The High Court has failed to correct the said error.” The decision in T.O. Anthony vs. Karvarnan and Others, AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 1646, has been relied upon in Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and Others vs. K. Hemlatha and Others. 21. The same analogy can be applied to the instant cases as the liability of the joint tort feasor is joint and several. In the instant case, there is determination of inter se liability of composite negligence to the extent of negligence of 2/3rd and 1/3rd of respective drivers. Thus, the vehicle - trailor-truck which was not insured with the insurer, was negligent to the extent of 2/3rd. In the instant case, there is determination of inter se liability of composite negligence to the extent of negligence of 2/3rd and 1/3rd of respective drivers. Thus, the vehicle - trailor-truck which was not insured with the insurer, was negligent to the extent of 2/3rd. It would be open to the insurer being insurer of the bus after making payment to claimant to recover from the owner of the trailor-truck the amount to the aforesaid extent in the execution proceedings. Had there been no determination of the inter se liability for want of evidence or other joint tort feasor had not been impleaded, it was not open to settle such a dispute and to recover the amount in execution proceedings but the remedy would be to file another suit or appropriate proceedings in accordance with law. 22. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is as follows: 22.1 In the case of composite negligence, plaintiff/ claimant is entitled to sue both or any one of the joint tort feasors and to recover the entire compensation as liability of joint tort feasors is joint and several. 22.2 In the case of composite negligence, apportionment of compensation between two tort feasors vis-a-vis the plaintiff/claimant is not permissible. He can recover at his option whole damages from any of them. 22.3 In case all the joint tort feasors have been impleaded and evidence is sufficient, it is open to the court/tribunal to determine inter se extent of composite negligence of the drivers. However, determination of the extent of negligence between the joint tort feasors is only for the purpose of their inter se liability so that one may recover the sum from the other after making whole of payment to the plaintiff/claimant to the extent it has satisfied the liability of the other. In case both of them have been impleaded and the apportionment/ extent of their negligence has been determined by the court/tribunal, in main case one joint tort feasor can recover the amount from the other in the execution proceedings. 22.4 It would not be appropriate for the court/tribunal to determine the extent of composite negligence of the drivers of two vehicles in the absence of impleadment of other joint tort feasors. 22.4 It would not be appropriate for the court/tribunal to determine the extent of composite negligence of the drivers of two vehicles in the absence of impleadment of other joint tort feasors. In such a case, impleaded joint tort feasor should be left, in case he so desires, to sue the other joint tort feasor in independent proceedings after passing of the decree or award.” From the above, it is clear that in the present case, the claimant is admittedly a third party and it is a case of composite negligence and therefore, the Tribunal has committed an error in the operative part of the order by mentioning that ‘subject to negligence assessed on the part of the driver of the goods rickshaw as well as indica car’ and assessed the ratio to the extent 70%-30% respectively. That will remain certainly for the inter-se liability of payment amongst that tort-feasors, but the claimant can certainly recover from any of the tort-feasors. Therefore, that direction is required to be modified by setting aside that part of the observation regarding ‘subject to negligence’ and by further directing to the respondents No. 1, 3 and 4 are jointly and severally liable to pay the amount of compensation to the appellant therein. However, it is always open for such tort-feasors to recover such amount as per share of negligence from other tort-feasors. 6.2 Now, the amount of compensation, if we consider the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kirti (supra), where the Hon’ble Apex Court has categorically considered that even in the case of housewife, monthly income is to be considered by considering the value of service rendered by home-maker. For that, the Tribunal has also considered the minimum wages for calculating the income and therefore, I found that in the present case, the Tribunal has erred in considering monthly income of only Rs. 1,800/- which should be atleast Rs. 3,000/- per month and the disability considered by the Tribunal is 22% therefore, Rs. 660/- would be the loss of monthly income which annually would be Rs. 7,920/- and applying 9 multiplier looking to the age of the claimant, it would be Rs. 71,280/- towards future loss of income, which should be awarded by the Tribunal. Further, the medical expenses which is awarded by the Tribunal Rs. 660/- would be the loss of monthly income which annually would be Rs. 7,920/- and applying 9 multiplier looking to the age of the claimant, it would be Rs. 71,280/- towards future loss of income, which should be awarded by the Tribunal. Further, the medical expenses which is awarded by the Tribunal Rs. 58,844/- which is awarded as per the bills and therefore, I found it just and proper. Looking to the injuries and medical treatment taken by the claimant at the relevant point of time, under the head of actual loss of income for two months, Rs. 6,000/- should be awarded. Further, under the head of pain, shock and suffering, Rs. 10,000/- is awarded by the Tribunal, which is on lower side and it should be Rs. 25,000/- looking to the hospitalization of longer period. Further, under the head of special diet, attendance and transportation charges, the Tribunal has awarded Rs. 5,000/- which should be Rs. 10,000/-. Accordingly, total compensation which is required to be awarded would be Rs. 1,71,080/- to the claimant, which would meet the ends of justice. The Tribunal has already awarded Rs. 1,15,460/- to the claimant, therefore additionally Rs. 55,620/- is required to be awarded more to the claimant. The said additional of Rs. 55,620/- is required to be paid by the respondents No. 1, 3 and 4, jointly and severally, with 7.5% interest per annum from the date of claim petition. 6.3 Considering the above, I hold that total amount of Rs. 171,080/- is required to be paid jointly and severally. Accordingly, Rs. 55,620/- with 7.5% p.a. interest from the date of application is required to be deposited by the opponent No. 4 before the Tribunal and it would be open for respondent No. 4 to recover the proportionate amount, as decided by the Tribunal, from respondents No. 1 and 3, in accordance with law, which will meet the ends of justice. Accordingly, the present appeal is required to be allowed to the above extent. 7. For the reasons recorded above, the following order is passed. 7.1 The present appeal is partly allowed to the aforesaid extent. 7.2 The impugned judgment and award dated 27.04.2010 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Aux.), Amreli, in Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 328 of 2005 is hereby modified to the extent that the claimant is entitled to get the total amount of compensation Rs. 7.1 The present appeal is partly allowed to the aforesaid extent. 7.2 The impugned judgment and award dated 27.04.2010 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Aux.), Amreli, in Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 328 of 2005 is hereby modified to the extent that the claimant is entitled to get the total amount of compensation Rs. 1,71,080/- with 7.5% per annum interest from the date of claim petition till its realization, from the respondents No. 1, 3 and 4, jointly and severally. 7.3 It is clarified that the Tribunal has already awarded the amount of compensation of Rs. 1,15,460/- by the impugned judgment and award. Therefore, the claimant is entitled to get the additional amount of compensation Rs. 55,620/- from the opponents No. 1, 3 and 4, jointly and severally. 7.4 Since it is a composite negligence, the respondent No. 4 is directed to deposit the additional amount of compensation Rs. 55,620/- with 7.5% p.a. interest from the date of claim petition till its realization and/or the deficit amount from the impugned award, if any, before the Tribunal within a period of six weeks from today. 7.5 It would be open to the respondent No. 4 to recover the proportionate amount from the respondents No. 1 and 3, in accordance with law. 7.6 On depositing the awarded amount, the Tribunal is directed to disburse the entire amount in favour of the claimant, by account payee cheque, after proper verification and after following due procedure. 7.7 Record and proceedings be sent back to the concerned Tribunal, forthwith.