ORDER : The civil suit for recovery of an amount of Rs.47,500/- alongwith interest was instituted by the respondent against the appellant. Learned Trial Court decreed the suit on 31.05.2005 for an amount of Rs.40,000/- alongwith interest @ 6% per annum from the date of accrual i.e. 1.4.2000 till its realization. The judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court was affirmed by the learned First Appellate Court on 5.9.2008. Having lost in both the learned Courts below, the defendant has preferred the instant appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2(i). The case put-forth by the respondent-plaintiff was that an agreement Ext. PW1/A was entered into between the parties on 14.06.1999. This agreement was in respect of running the business of Cafe ‘Mrigni’ at Gopalpur for a period of 12 months from 31.3.1999 to 31.3.2000. In terms of this agreement, plaintiff had paid a sum of Rs.1 lac to the defendant as costs of crockery, furniture, kitchen equipments etc. lying in the premises. A sum of Rs.40,000/- was paid by the plaintiff to the defendant as security for the use of latter’s beer bar licence upto 31.3.2000. It was submitted that plaintiff had used the beer bar licence of the defendant till 31.3.2000. He ran the beer bar in accordance with law and was not challaned for any kind of violation. He had not disobeyed any instructions of the beer bar licence, therefore, was entitled to the refund of security amount of Rs.40,000/- alongwith interest from 1.4.2000 onwards. The defendant had failed to refund the security amount of Rs.40,000/- to the plaintiff despite repeated requests, hence, suit for recovery was instituted. 2(ii). In his written statement, the defendant admitted execution of the agreement dated 14.06.1999 concerning the running of Cafe ‘Mrigni’ from 31.3.1999 to 31.3.2000. The defendant also admitted receipt of Rs. 1 lac from the plaintiff towards costs of crockery, furniture and kitchen equipments etc. Defendant also admitted having been paid Rs.40,000/- by the plaintiff as security for the use of beer bar licence upto 31.3.2000. The defence taken was that the plaintiff was not entitled to refund of the security amount of Rs.40,000/-. Defendant contended that the plaintiff had contravened the terms and conditions of the agreement Ex.PW1/A after 31.3.2000. The defendant had to deposit licence renewal fee of Rs.12,500/- to the Excise and Taxation Department for the period 2000-2001. The defence taken was that the plaintiff was not entitled to refund of the security amount of Rs.40,000/-. Defendant contended that the plaintiff had contravened the terms and conditions of the agreement Ex.PW1/A after 31.3.2000. The defendant had to deposit licence renewal fee of Rs.12,500/- to the Excise and Taxation Department for the period 2000-2001. This amount paid by the defendant was liable to be set-off against the security amount. The defendant further averred that the plaintiff had used the licence beyond 31.3.2000. There was an oral agreement between him and the plaintiff whereunder the plaintiff had agreed to share the profit earned by him by using the beer bar licence, which was got renewed by the defendant beyond 31.3.2000. The plaintiff had agreed to pay the defendant a sum of Rs.15,000/- on this account but the amount was not paid by him. Defendant’s case was that in addition to Rs.12,500/- deposited by him to the Department as renewal fee of the beer bar for the year 2000-2001, plaintiff was also liable to pay an amount of Rs.15,000/- towards share of profits earned by him by using renewed beer bar licence. The defendant also claimed that the plaintiff had not paid the rent for use and utilization of Cafe amounting to Rs.39,600/- for the period from June 1999 to March 2000. The defendant thus in all claimed an amount of Rs.67,000/- from the plaintiff and after adjusting plaintiff’s security amount of Rs.40,000/- , put forth his claim of balance amount of Rs.27,000/- 2(iii). Learned trial Court, on consideration of the entire material before it, decreed the suit for an amount of Rs.40,000/- alongwith interest @ 6% per annum vide judgment and decree dated 31.05.2005. This judgment and decree has been affirmed in appeal by the learned First Appellate Court on 5.9.2008. 3. This appeal was admitted on 2.3.2009 on the following substantial question of law:- “3. Whether the Ld. Appellate Court erred in dismissing the application keeping in view the averments made in the application as well as the receipt dated 25.03.2000 and letter No.1156/G dated 29.8.2000 issued by Divisional Forest Officer, being devoid of any merit?” 4. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that both the learned Courts below erred on facts in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff. Plaintiff was liable to pay an amount of Rs.67,000/- to the defendant. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that both the learned Courts below erred on facts in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff. Plaintiff was liable to pay an amount of Rs.67,000/- to the defendant. This amount of Rs.67,000/- included Rs.12,500/- deposited by the appellant/defendant as licence renewal fee, Rs.15,000/- towards share of the defendant in the profits earned by the plaintiff by using renewed beer bar licence beyond 31.3.2000 and Rs.39,600/- towards rent for use and utilization of the Cafe of the period in question. Learned counsel also invited the attention to the fact that an application was moved by the defendant under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC before the First Appellate Court for leading additional evidence. By means of this application, defendant had sought permission to place on record letter dated 29.08.2000 issued to him by the Divisional Forest Officer Palampur and receipt for an amount of Rs.12,500/- towards renewal of beer bar licence for the year 2000-2001. Learned counsel submitted that learned First Appellate Court erred in dismissing the application. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the defendant had proved on record that he was entitled to set off of Rs.67,000/-, against the claim of Rs.40,000/- set out by the plaintiff, therefore, the suit filed by the plaintiff for recovery of amount could not have been decreed. Learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff defended the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below. 5. As observed above, this appeal was admitted only on the ground whether the application moved by the plaintiff under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC was considered in accordance with law or not. Learned appellate Court while dismissing the appeal moved by the appellant/defendant has observed that the defendant had not given any reason as to why he could not produce the documents sought to be produced by him by means of aforesaid application. It is not disputed for the appellant/defendant that the documents in question were in possession of the appellant/defendant. Despite this he did not produce the same in support of his evidence. No explanation was offered by the defendant as to why the documents could not be produced during trial. Under the circumstances, learned Appellate Court was justified in dismissing the application moved by the appellant/defendant under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. Despite this he did not produce the same in support of his evidence. No explanation was offered by the defendant as to why the documents could not be produced during trial. Under the circumstances, learned Appellate Court was justified in dismissing the application moved by the appellant/defendant under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. The case of the respondent/plaintiff was that neither he misused the beer bar licence of the appellant/defendant nor he had violated the agreement arrived at between them. Defendant-appellant has not disputed that an amount of Rs.40,000/- was deposited with him by the plaintiff as security for beer bar licence upto 31.03.2000. On coming to end of the period, the security amount was liable to be refunded. It is not the case of the defendant that during the period in question, the plaintiff/respondent disobeyed any instructions on the beer bar licence or violated the provisions thereof. The defendant/appellant could not demonstrate that he was entitled to an amount of Rs.67,000/- from the plaintiff/respondent or in other words, after adjusting the security amount of Rs.40,000/- due to the plaintiff, plaintiff was liable to pay him the balance amount of Rs.27,000/-. It is well settled that the concurrent findings of fact are not to be interfered with in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC unless the same are shown to be perverse. The principals for entertaining the second regular appeal under the provisions of Section 100 of CPC are well settled. In this regard, it would be beneficial to notice hereinafter in 2020 (10) Scale 168 , titled Nazir Mohamed Vs Kamala and Ors., wherein following principles were culled out relating to Section 100 of CPC:- “37. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus : (i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact, but the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document, involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue. (iii) A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the Court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered 5 AIR 1963 SC 302 on a material question, violates the settled position of law. (iv) The general rule is, that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. A decision based on no evidence, does not refer only to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.” Taking note of the well settled law on the exercise of jurisdiction in second appeal under Section 100 CPC, and the points being raised herein, it can safely be concluded that no question of law much less substantial one arises for adjudication. There is no infirmity in the concurrent judgments & decrees passed by learned Court below. Hence, the instant appeal being devoid of merit, is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, also stand disposed of.