JUDGMENT : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. Six writ petitions were heard together and decided by a common order dated 7th July 2017. 2. The writ petitioners who are respondent(s) before us in the respective Letters Patent Appeal faced departmental inquiry which was conducted on the basis of a complaint made by Mahesh Kumar to Deputy Inspector General of Police, Hazaribagh. They suffered an order of punishment of dismissal from service by the disciplinary authority and their appeals/memorials were rejected, against which they approached the writ Court. 3. In the order dated 7th July 2017 passed in W.P.(S) No.582 of 2014 and analogous cases, the writ Court recorded stand of the parties in detail but interfered with the order of punishment of dismissal from service only on the ground of parity in punishment. 4. The writ Court has held as under: “18. After hearing learned counsel for the respective parties and on perusal of the relevant records, the impugned order of punishment of dismissal from services of the petitioners in different writ applications warrant interference, due to the reasons stated hereinbelow: (I) The petitioners having rendered considerable length of service have been inflicted with the order of punishment of dismissal from services, basing on the findings of the enquiry officer. The genesis of the case pertain to lodging of false F.I.R by the petitioners, which was enquired into by the departmental authorities and subsequently in the departmental proceeding the enquiry officer found the petitioners to be prima facie guilty of the charges, though no conclusive findings have been given by the enquiry officer. (II) One of the ground on which this Court is inclined to interfere in the impugned order of punishment that two of the officials one Inspector Radhey Shyam Das and Constable Nand Bihari Singh, those who have been roped in the same set of allegations, have been let off with lesser punishment, whereas petitioners have been subjected to major punishment of dismissal from services. It would be apposite to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in (2013) 3 SCC 73 (Rajendra Yadav vs. State of M.P) wherein at paragraph-9, it has been held as under: “9. The doctrine of equality applied to all who are equally placed; even among persons who are found guilty. It would be apposite to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in (2013) 3 SCC 73 (Rajendra Yadav vs. State of M.P) wherein at paragraph-9, it has been held as under: “9. The doctrine of equality applied to all who are equally placed; even among persons who are found guilty. The persons who have been found guilty can also claim equality of treatment, if they can establish discrimination while imposing punishment when all of them are involved in the same incident. Parity among co-delinquents has also to be maintained when punishment is being imposed. Punishment should not be disproportionate while comparing the involvement of co-delinquents who are parties to the same transaction or incident. The disciplinary authority cannot impose punishment which is disproportionate i.e. lesser punishment for serious offences and stringent punishment for lesser offences.” (III) Here, It would also be apposite to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in (2013) 12 SCC 372 (Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank vs. Rajendra Singh) wherein at paragraph-17, it has been held as under: “17. If there is a complete parity in the two sets of cases, imposing different penalties would not be appropriate as inflicting of any/higher penalty in one case would be discriminatory and would amount to infraction of the doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. That is the ratio of Rajendra Yadav case, already taken note above. On the other hand, if there is some difference, different penalty can be meted out and what should be the quantum is to be left to the appellate authority. However, such a penalty should be commensurate with the gravity of misconduct and cannot be shockingly disproportionate. As per the ratio of Obettee (P) Ltd. case even if the nature of misconduct committed by the two sets of employees is same, the conduct of one set of employees accepting the guilt and pleading for lenient view would justify lesser punishment to them than the other employees who remained adopted the mode of denial, with the result that charges stood proved ultimately in a full-fledged enquiry conducted against them. In that event, higher penalty can be imposed upon such delinquent employees. In that event, higher penalty can be imposed upon such delinquent employees. It would follow that choosing to take a chance to contest the charges such employees thereafter cannot fall back and say that the penalty in their cases cannot be more than the penalty which is imposed upon those employees who accepted the charges at the outset by tendering unconditional apology.” 19. In view of the aforesaid reasons, the impugned orders of punishment of dismissal passed in the aforesaid writ applications, vide Annexures-5 (in W.P.(S) No. 582 of 2014), Annexures-10 and 13 (in W.P.(S) No. 3740 of 2013), Annexures1, 5 and 7 (in W.P.(S) No. 1816 of 2014), Annexures-7 and 8 (in W.P.(S) No. 6605 of 2014), Annexures-10 and 11 (in W.P.(S) No. 1820 of 2015) and vide Annexures-13 and 14 (in W.P.(S) No. 2062 of 2015) are hereby quashed and set aside and the matter is remitted to the respondents to consider the case of the petitioners afresh, on the quantum of punishment and pass appropriate orders within a period of three months from the date of receipt/communication of a copy of the order. 20. With the aforesaid direction, the writ applications stand allowed.” 5. All these Letters Patent Appeals were posted together on 27th February 2019 and by an order of even date the delay in filing the appeals except L.P.A No. 146 of 2018 was condoned and the appeals were admitted. As a consequence of the order dated 27th February 2019, the contempt cases filed by the respondent(s) alleging willful disobedience of the writ Court's order dated 7th July 2017 were disposed of on 25th April 2019. 6. Two-fold submissions have been made by Mr. Sachin Kumar, the learned Additional Advocate-General-II to question legality of the impugned order dated 7th July 2017 viz. (i) plea of parity in punishment as discussed by the writ Court is not available to the respondent(s) and (ii) writ Court should not exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interfere with the order of punishment in the matters like the present one in which serious allegations pertaining to integrity, devotion to duty etc. are levelled against members of the disciplined force. 7. are levelled against members of the disciplined force. 7. Briefly stated, Barhi (Padma) PS Case No. 158 of 2007 was registered under section 414/34 of the Indian Penal Code and section 33 of the Indian Forest Act against Lallu Kumar, Pintu Sao and Chandan Thakur who were intercepted by the police party around NH-33 with cache of illegal coal. The place of occurrence was within Padma O.P and the delinquent officials were posted there in different capacity. 8. W.P.(S) No. 6605 of 2014 was filed by Shattrughan Prasad Singh who was a Police Driver 602; W.P.(S) No. 582 of 2014 was filed by Md. Samshed Khan (since deceased) who was posted as Hawaldar; W.P.(S) No. 3740 of 2013 was filed by Ajay Kumar Chaurasia who was the officer-in-charge of Padma O.P; W.P.(S) No. 1816 of 2014 was filed by Rupesh Kumar and W.P.(S) No. 1820 of 2015 was filed by Kaushal Kumar Singh who were posted as Constable, and; Harish Chandra Pal Bhagat who came before the writ Court in W.P.(S) No. 2062 of 2015 was Sub-Inspector of Police posted there. 9. A complaint was made to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Hazaribagh by Mahesh Kumar alleging that a false criminal case was lodged against his brother, namely, Lallu Kumar and his employees, namely, Chandan Thakur and Pintu Sao who had started from Patna on a Marshal Jeep bearing no. JH13A-1456 with brass and silverware utensils weighing 360 Kg. (approximately) and valued at Rs. One Lac. Around 04:30 AM on 2nd August 2007, he was informed by his brother over his mobile phone bearing no. 9835851123 that he was kidnapped by some persons for ransom and thereafter he received several calls from unknown persons the details of which were provided by him in his complaint dated 17th September 2007. On the basis of the aforesaid complaint made by Mahesh Kumar, an inquiry was conducted in the matter and after finding prima facie truth in the allegations made in the complaint dated 17th September 2007 a show-cause notice was issued to the respondent(s) alongwith one Radhey Shyam Das who was posted in Hazat at Pelawal O.P where Lallu Kumar, Pintu Sao and Chandan Thakur were kept in detention. Sadar PS Case No. 693 of 2008 was lodged against the respondent(s) under sections 342/386/379/469/471/120(B)/34 of the Indian Penal Code by the CID in which charge-sheet has been filed against the respondent(s) on 18th June 2012. 10. In the departmental proceeding separate charge-memos were issued to the respondent(s). The gist of allegations is, however, the same. Before us six Letters Patent Appeals are filed by the State of Jharkhand and we would take out facts from L.P.A No. 216 of 2018 which is corresponding to W.P.(S) No. 6605 of 2014. 11. In the charge-memo dated 11th October 2007 which was issued against Shattrughan Prasad Singh it is stated that on the basis of a complaint made by Mahesh Kumar and the report published in the daily newspaper Hindustan on 27th September 2007 an inquiry was conducted by Shree Naushaad Alam, the then D.S.P(HQ)1, Hazaribagh who submitted a report stating that the police kept Lallu Kumar and his two employees in illegal confinement for three days and when the talk of illegal demand for payment of money failed they were handed over to Padma O.P and a criminal case was registered against them. We would indicate that all the delinquent government employees were issued charge-memo which contained allegation of their involvement in false implication of the aforesaid three persons in Barhi (Padma) PS Case No. 158 of 2007. 12. The inquiry against Shattrughan Prasad Singh, Md. Samshed Khan, Ajay Kumar Chaurasia, Rupesh Kumar, Harish Chandra Pal Bhagat, Kaushal Kumar Singh concluded with the inquiry report dated 23rd April 2010, 18th May 2009, 15th April 2010, 6th June 2012, 12th July 2009 and 15th April 2010 respectively in which the inquiring officer has tendered an opinion that the delinquent government employees prima facie appear to be guilty. 13. A second show-cause notice dated 15th September 2011 was issued to Shattrughan Prasad Singh to which he responded by reply dated 6th October 2011. The Superintendent of Police, Hazaribagh who is the disciplinary authority passed the order of dismissal from service on 23rd October 2011 which was affirmed by the appellate authority by an order dated 26th March 2012. 14. Mr. J. S. Singh, assisted by Mr. Anjani Kumar, and Mr. Rahul Kumar, assisted by Ms. The Superintendent of Police, Hazaribagh who is the disciplinary authority passed the order of dismissal from service on 23rd October 2011 which was affirmed by the appellate authority by an order dated 26th March 2012. 14. Mr. J. S. Singh, assisted by Mr. Anjani Kumar, and Mr. Rahul Kumar, assisted by Ms. Apoorva Singh, the learned counsels who appear for the respondent(s) take us through the submissions made before the writ Court to press hard upon the Court that no finding was recorded by the writ Court in respect of the other grounds urged on behalf of the respondent(s). It is further submitted that may be a factual error has crept in paragraph no. 18(II) of the order dated 7th July 2017 wherein the plea of parity has been discussed but for that reason alone this Court would not interfere with the order of remand by the writ Court on the question of quantum of punishment. Mr. Rahul Kumar, the learned counsel submits that in one of the cases it was brought to the knowledge of the appellate authority that lesser punishment has been awarded to the co-delinquent. 15. The parity in the punishment is applied to the delinquents who faced similar charges in the departmental proceeding and against whom similar evidence was laid by the department. A natural corollary to this would be that a little difference in the role played by a delinquent government employee may be a determinative factor and, therefore, warranting a different treatment at the hands of the departmental authority. In “Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Rajendra Singh” (2013) 12 SCC 372 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that if there is a complete parity in the two sets of cases, imposing different penalties would not be appropriate as inflicting of higher penalty in one case would be discriminatory and would amount to infraction of the doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 16. As we have indicated in the beginning, Radhey Shyam Das was posted in Hazat at Pelawal O.P where Lallu Kumar, Pintu Sao and Chandan Thakur were kept in custody which was later on found illegal and that seems to be the reason why he was awarded lesser punishment. 17. Mr. 16. As we have indicated in the beginning, Radhey Shyam Das was posted in Hazat at Pelawal O.P where Lallu Kumar, Pintu Sao and Chandan Thakur were kept in custody which was later on found illegal and that seems to be the reason why he was awarded lesser punishment. 17. Mr. Sachin Kumar, the learned Additional Advocate-General-II submits that for raising a plea of parity on punishment the delinquent government employee is required to produce all relevant materials starting from charge-memo before the appellate authority at the first instance to establish by comparison that on similar set of allegations and evidence different treatment was meted out to both the delinquent government employees. We have examined the writ Court's records which are attached with the respective Letters Patent Appeal(s) and find that no material was produced before the writ Court to establish differential treatment by the disciplinary authority to the delinquent government employees. 18. Mr. Sachin Kumar, the learned Additional Advocate-General would refer to the judgment in “State of Karnataka & Anr. v. N. Gangaraj” (2020) 3 SCC 423 to submit that the writ Court in exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not interfere with the findings of the disciplinary authority unless it is found that such findings are perverse or the case against the delinquent government employee is based on no evidence. 19. In “State of Karnataka” the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “14. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondent relies upon the judgment reported as Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan Tewari, wherein this Court held that if the disciplinary authority records a finding that is not supported by any evidence whatsoever or a finding which is unreasonably arrived at, the writ court could interfere with the finding of the disciplinary proceedings. We do not find that even on touchstone of that test, the Tribunal or the High Court could interfere with the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority. It is not the case of no evidence or that the findings are perverse. The finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct has been interfered with only on the ground that there are discrepancies in the evidence of the Department. The discrepancies in the evidence will not make it a case of no evidence. It is not the case of no evidence or that the findings are perverse. The finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct has been interfered with only on the ground that there are discrepancies in the evidence of the Department. The discrepancies in the evidence will not make it a case of no evidence. The inquiry officer has appreciated the evidence and returned a finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct. 15. The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the enquiry officer and had passed an order of punishment. An appeal before the State Government was also dismissed. Once the evidence has been accepted by the departmental authority, in exercise of power of judicial review, the Tribunal or the High Court could not interfere with the findings of facts recorded by reappreciating evidence as if the courts are the appellate authority. We may notice that the said judgment has not noticed the larger Bench judgments in S. Sree Rama Rao and B.C. Chaturvedi as mentioned above. Therefore, the orders passed by the Tribunal and the High Court suffer from patent illegality and thus cannot be sustained in law.” 20. The powers of the writ Court under Article 226 of the constitution of India of judicial review of the decision of the departmental authority are very limited. It is not akin to the appellate powers and is confined only to the extent of decision making process. The writ Court shall issue a writ of certiorari if it is established that the order of punishment is passed in breach of the rules of natural justice or contrary to the conduct rules. From the records, we would observe that the delinquent government employees did not raise a grievance as regards violation of the principles of natural justice except taking a plea in the second show-cause reply that statement of the witnesses was recorded behind their back. We find that a similar plea was urged before the writ Court on behalf of the respondent(s) which has been answered by the State of Jharkhand as under: “17. ….. It has further been submitted that petitioners were issued notices to appear before the enquiry officer and give reply to the show cause and also to cross examine the witnesses and also a wireless message were sent to the petitioners. ….. It has further been submitted that petitioners were issued notices to appear before the enquiry officer and give reply to the show cause and also to cross examine the witnesses and also a wireless message were sent to the petitioners. The witnesses namely Anant Kumar Singh, T.A. Mallik and Gazi Safdr Hyat deposed on 25.10.2008 but the petitioners did not cross examine them. Again notices were sent on 15.01.2009 to appear before the enquiry officer and cross examine the witnesses. Witnesses namely Lallu Kumar @ Amit Kumar, Mahesh Kumar and Pintu Sao deposed on 25.01.2009 but the petitioners did not cross examine them. It has further been submitted that the order of dismissal has been converted into withdrawal of two increments in the case of Radhey Shyam Das and Nand Bihari Singh by the appellate authority. ....” 21. In “Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan” AIR 1964 SC 477 explaining the powers of judicial review of the writ Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “7. …… A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. …...” 22. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. …...” 22. On a perusal of the materials on record, we are of the opinion that the allegations against the respondent(s) are very serious; the charges against the respondent(s) are found proved albeit prima facie and on the basis of the materials on record the disciplinary authority formed an opinion to inflict punishment of dismissal from service which order in our opinion was not open to challenge before the writ Court. As we have already discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the plea of parity raised by the respondent(s) before the writ Court was not sustainable and merely on the basis of some judgments the writ Court could not have set-aside the order of punishment and remanded the matter to the disciplinary authority for a decision afresh on the quantum of punishment. 23. For the aforesaid reasons, order dated 7th July 2017 passed in W.P.(S) No. 582 of 2014 and batch matters is set-aside. The order of punishment of Shattrughan Prasad Singh dated 23rd October 2011 as upheld by the order dated 26th March 2012, the order of punishment of Md. Samshed Khan dated 27th January 2012 as upheld by the order dated 24th November 2012, the order of punishment of Ajay Kumar Chaurasia dated 27th January 2012 as upheld by the order dated 31st January 2013, the order of punishment of Rupesh Kumar dated 12th September 2012 as upheld by the order dated 3rd July 2013, the order of punishment of Harish Chandra Pal Bhagat dated 27th January 2012 as upheld by the order dated 22nd November 2012 and the order of punishment of Kaushal Kumar Singh dated 17th October 2011 as upheld by the order dated 26th March 2012 are restored to take effect from the inception. 24. Accordingly, L.P.A No.216 of 2018, L.P.A No.146 of 2018, L.P.A No.188 of 2018, L.P.A No.218 of 2018, L.P.A No.241 of 2018 and L.P.A No.245 of 2018 are allowed. 25. I.A Nos. 2597 of 2018 and 7364 of 2021 in L.P.A No. 146 of 2018 stand disposed of.