JUDGMENT : VIPIN SANGHI, J. 1. The present Special Appeal is directed against the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (S/S) No. 608 of 2019, dated 04.12.2020. By the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition preferred by the respondent/writ petitioner. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the respondent was appointed in Indo Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) on 19.09.1986; he was dismissed from service vide order dated 04.06.1998. He challenged his dismissal by preferring Writ Petition (S/S) No. 338 of 2000 (Old No. 6731 of 1999) before the High Court of judicature at Allahabad. After creation of the High Court of Uttarakhand, the said petition was transferred to this Court. The Division Bench of this Court set aside the dismissal order vide judgment dated 04.08.2004 on the ground that the punishment of dismissal was disproportionate and shocking in nature. The Court proceeded to substitute the penalty imposed upon the respondent from dismissal to reduction in rank, i.e. from the rank of Head Constable to the rank of Constable. The said reduction in rank was to continue for two months from the date of production of the certified copy of the order, where after the respondent was to be reverted back to the higher rank of Head Constable. In compliance of the said judgment, the respondent was reinstated in service on 16.08.2004 on the post of Constable/G.D. However, he was reinstated in provisional pay of Rs. 3350/- per month equal to regular pay prevailing on 01.11.1997 under the pay scale of Rs. 2750-70-3800-75-4400. After completion of two months, i.e. on 15.10.2004, he was fixed in the provisional pay on the post of Head Constable/G.D. i.e. Rs. 3370/- per month equal to the regular pay as on 10.10.1997 under the pay scale of Rs. 3200-85-4900. 3. The respondent filed a clarification application No. 183 of 2012 in the disposed of Writ Petition (S/S) No. 338 of 2000. The clarification sought by the respondent was in relation to the salary payable to him from the date of his dismissal, to the date of reinstatement in service. The said application was disposed of by the Court on 03.04.2012 with the following observation: “A disciplinary proceeding resulted in passing of an order of dismissal of the petitioner. The clarification sought by the respondent was in relation to the salary payable to him from the date of his dismissal, to the date of reinstatement in service. The said application was disposed of by the Court on 03.04.2012 with the following observation: “A disciplinary proceeding resulted in passing of an order of dismissal of the petitioner. In a writ petition, the order of punishment was altered by providing that the writ petitioner shall be punished by reverting him from the post of head constable to the post of constable for two months, whereafter, the petitioner shall be given the rank of head constable. This order is so clear that there is no question of giving any clarification in relation thereto. While dealing with the matter and directing in the manner as above, the Division Bench allowed reinstatement, but did not give any direction in relation to the period the petitioner remained out of employment from the date of his dismissal and until the date of passing the order of the Division Bench and, accordingly, it must be, in Law, deemed that the Division Bench left the matter there. If such a situation is dealt with by the Rules governing the service conditions of the petitioner, it goes without saying that the matter has to be dealt with in terms of those Rules. However, the order, at the same time, in so many words directed reinstatement of the petitioner and, accordingly, the status of the petitioner is required to be ascertained on the basis thereof read with the relevant provisions of the Service Rules. We, accordingly, find no scope to give any clarification to the order as above.” (Emphasis supplied) 4. The petitioner was aggrieved by the nonpayment of salary for the period that he remained dismissed from service and also by the fixation of provisional salary, instead of regular salary, after his reinstatement. The learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition thereby directing the appellant to grant him regular salary, and to pay arrears of difference between the regular salary and the provisional salary. The learned Single Judge has also directed payment of salary to the petitioner for the period 04.06.1998 to 15.08.2004, during which period the petitioner did not render service. The learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition thereby directing the appellant to grant him regular salary, and to pay arrears of difference between the regular salary and the provisional salary. The learned Single Judge has also directed payment of salary to the petitioner for the period 04.06.1998 to 15.08.2004, during which period the petitioner did not render service. The stand of the appellant that he was not entitled to salary for the said period on the principle of “No Work No Pay” as he was not fully exonerated while being reinstated in service by this Court, was rejected. 5. The submission of learned counsel for the appellants is that the respondent not having served for the aforesaid period between 04.06.1998 to 15.08.2004, he was not entitled to receive any salary, as his reinstatement by the Court was not on account of his guilt being washed away. It was on account of the fact that the Court found the punishment imposed upon the respondent to be disproportionate. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has supported the impugned judgment. He submits that the Division Bench while disposing of the clarification application on 03.04.2012, had directed the appellant to examine the position in accordance with the rules governing the service conditions of the respondent, and under the service conditions, as observed by the learned Single Judge, there is no rule incorporating the principle of “No Work No Pay”. Thus, the respondent was entitled to salary for the period that he remained out of service, i.e. 04.06.1998 to 15.08.2004. 7. We have heard learned counsels and considered their submissions. We have also perused the impugned order and the record. 8. So far as the fixation of provisional salary of the respondent, upon his reinstatement in terms of the order of the Court is concerned, there was no basis for the appellant to fix the provisional salary of the respondent. He was a regular employee. His dismissal had been set aside when he was directed to be reinstated with reduction in rank. Therefore, from 04.06.1998, when he was dismissed, he stood reinstated, though in the post of Constable/G.D. He continued to remain in that post till 15.10.2004. He was a regular employee. His dismissal had been set aside when he was directed to be reinstated with reduction in rank. Therefore, from 04.06.1998, when he was dismissed, he stood reinstated, though in the post of Constable/G.D. He continued to remain in that post till 15.10.2004. Thereafter, he regained his status as Head Constable/G.D. We are, therefore, of the view that so far as the grant of provisional salary to the respondent is concerned, the same was not justified, and the learned Single Judge was correct in directing the grant of regular salary to the petitioner, and payment of the arrears of difference between the regular salary and provisional salary. 9. However, we are of the view, that the direction issued by the learned Single Judge directing that the respondent should be paid salary for the period when he did not serve between 04.06.1998 to 15.08.2004, was not justified. As noticed above, while allowing the writ petition preferred by the respondent, being Writ Petition (S/S) No. 338 of 2000, the Court did not give a clean slate to the respondent. His guilt was not effaced. The Court did not find the conduct of the respondent - on the basis of which he was dismissed from service, to be blemishless. It is only the quantum of punishment imposed upon the respondent that was found to be disproportionate, and, therefore, the same was substituted from dismissal to reduction in rank. 10. The respondent, admittedly, did not render service between 04.06.1998 to 15.08.2004. He did not serve during the said period on account of his own misconduct. That being the position, the principle of “No Work No Pay” was correctly applied by the appellant to deny salary to the respondent for the said period. To grant salary to the respondent for the period that he had not worked, for which he was responsible, would amount to granting premium on misconduct, which cannot be permitted. The clarification issued by the Division Bench, as extracted hereinabove, nowhere states that the judgment rendered in Writ Petition (S/S) No. 338 of 2000, directed payment of arrears of salary for the period that the respondent did not render service. The clarification issued by the Division Bench, as extracted hereinabove, nowhere states that the judgment rendered in Writ Petition (S/S) No. 338 of 2000, directed payment of arrears of salary for the period that the respondent did not render service. In fact, the clarificatory order observes that the Division Bench did not give any direction in relation to the period the petitioner remained out of employment from the date of his dismissal and until the date of passing the order by the Division Bench. The observation made by the learned Single Judge that under the service rules there is no rule providing for “No Work No Pay” is, even otherwise, not correct. In service jurisprudence, dias non is a well known concept, i.e. that the period for which the employee does not work may be treated as not counted for any purpose, including for the purpose of payment of salary. 11. For the aforesaid reasons, we set aside the impugned judgment in so far as it directs payment of salary to the respondent for the period 04.06.1998 to 15.08.2004. 12. The Appeal stands allowed to the aforesaid extent.