JUDGEMENT : Heard Mr. S. P. Roy, the learned counsel for the Petitioners. Mr. S. Bora, the learned counsel appears on behalf of the Respondent Nos. 1, 2 & 3 and Mr. R. Dubey, the learned counsel appears on behalf of the Respondent No. 4. 2. From a perusal of the writ petition, it appears that the Respondent No. 3 had vide an order dated 01/10/2019 rejected the application filed by the Petitioner No. 2 dated 28/8/2019 for issuance of trade license. A perusal of the said order reflects that the said rejection has been done on the basis that the Petitioners have not submitted the required documents for issuance of fresh trade license as per the Rules. 3. At this juncture, it may be relevant herein to mention that the issue pertaining to the issuance of trade license to the Petitioners also came up for consideration before this Court in W.P.(C) No. 5815/2019, whereby this Court disposed off the said writ petition observing that a landlord tenant dispute, if any, between the parties cannot be the subject matter of the writ petition and the said aspect of the matter can be decided in a proceedings pending before the appropriate forum. It was further observed that the Respondent/GMC Authorities cannot refuse to accept the application for issuance of trade license. It was directed that if the petitioners submit application seeking issuance of trade license, the same ought to be considered by the authorities in accordance with law and dispose off by issuing a reasoned order. 4. The petitioners herein, who were the petitioners also in the said proceedings were permitted to file an application within a week of the said order for issuance of trade license and the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were directed to deal with the same in accordance with law. It is on the basis of the said order passed by this Court that the petitioners have filed an application seeking issuance of trade license and vide the impugned order dated 01.10.2019, the said application was rejected on the ground of absence of required documents. It may not be out of place to mention herein that the Respondent No. 3 while passing the impugned order, did not indicate what are the required documents which the petitioners did not file. 5. Be that as it may, the Respondent Nos. It may not be out of place to mention herein that the Respondent No. 3 while passing the impugned order, did not indicate what are the required documents which the petitioners did not file. 5. Be that as it may, the Respondent Nos. 1, 2 & 3 have filed a joint affidavit amplifying the specific reason for which the petitioners’ application was rejected i.e. on the ground that required documents were not filed. It would be relevant to take note of Paragraph No. 13 of the said affidavit, wherein, it has been mentioned that as per the Notification dated 30.05.2017 issued by the Guwahati Development Department the following documents are required to be submitted with the application for trade license. They are- (i) I/D Proof (ii) Lease Deed/Rent Agreement/Legal Occupancy(any one) (iii) PAN/VAT/TIN/GSTN. It has been mentioned in the said affidavit in opposition that the petitioner No. 2 had failed to fulfill the requirement in terms with the Notification dated 30.05.2017 and it was under such circumstances that the impugned order was passed. 6. At this stage, it may also be relevant herein to take note of that there are various other grounds being taken in the affidavit in opposition supporting the impugned order passed. Taking into consideration the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill Vs. Election Commissioner of India, New Delhi reported in (1978) 1 SCC 405 and more particularly Paragraph No. 8, this Court is of the opinion that such reasons which have been assigned to support the impugned order cannot be taken into consideration by this Court. Paragraph 8 of the said judgment is quoted herein below :- “8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose, J. in Gordhandas Bhanji: “Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself.” Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older” 7. The said affidavit in opposition does not disclose which documents in respect to the Notification dated 30.05.2017 the petitioners did not submit. However, Mr. S. Bora, the learned counsel for the Respondent/GMC submits that the Lease Deed/Land Agreement/Legal Occupancy, either of any one, was not submitted which were required to be filed in view of the Notification dated 30.05.2017 for issuance of the trade license. 8. At this stage, it may be relevant herein to mention that admittedly there is a dispute between the Petitioner No.2 and the Respondent No. 4 for which the Respondent No. 4 had instituted a suit being Title Suit No. 101/2021, which is pending before the Court of the Civil Judge No. 3, Kamrup(Metro) at Guwahati. The copy of the said plaint has been enclosed to the affidavit in opposition filed by the Respondent No. 4. 9. A perusal of the plaint in Title Suit No. 101/2021 shows that the suit has been filed inter alia for declaration that the defendant(the Petitioner No. 2 herein) is an illegal occupier over the Schedule A premises over which the said defendant has no right to possess the Schedule A premises and is liable to be evicted; for recovery of khas possession; for compensation @ Rs. 1500/-per day for illegal and unauthorized occupation of the Schedule A premises by the Defendant therein and for permanent injunction. 1500/-per day for illegal and unauthorized occupation of the Schedule A premises by the Defendant therein and for permanent injunction. A perusal of Paragraph No. 17 of the Plaint discloses that there is a statement made to the effect that the defendant (the Petitioner No. 2 herein) had forcefully kept possession of the Schedule A premises and is allegedly depositing rent in the Court as proprietor of M/S Sambhu Electricals without any authority from the plaintiff (the Respondent No. 4 herein). 10. Thus from a perusal of the plaint, it appears that while the plaintiff i.e. the Respondent No. 4 herein claims the Petitioner No. 2 to be an illegal occupier, but from Paragraph 17 of the said plaint, it shows that the Defendant (the petitioner No. 2) herein has been allegedly illegally depositing the rent purportedly in terms of Section 5(4) of the Assam Urban Area Rent Control Act, 1972. A dispute therefore arises between the Respondent No. 4 and the Petitioner No. 2 as to whether the petitioner No. 2 is a tenant within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Assam Urban Area Rent Control Act, 1972(for short ‘’the Act of 1972) which obviously has to be decided by the competent Court. For the sake of convenience, the said definition of tenant as defined in Section 2(f) of the Act of 1972 is quoted herein below :- “2(f). Tenant means person by whom or on whose behalf rent is payable for any house and includes every person who from time to time derives title under a tenant".. Now it would also be relevant to take note of that Section 5(1) of the Act of 1972 affords certain protection to the tenant as defined in Section 2(f) of the Act of 1972. Now it would also be relevant to take note of that Section 5(1) of the Act of 1972 affords certain protection to the tenant as defined in Section 2(f) of the Act of 1972. The said Section 5(1) of the Act of 1972 is quoted herein below :- “5) Bar against passing and execution of decree and orders for ejection---(1) No order or decree for the recovery of possession of any house shall be made or executed by any Court so long as the tenant pays rent to the fu extent a allowable under this Act and performs the conditions of the tenancy: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply in a suit or proceedings for eviction of the tenant from the house--- (a) where the tenant has done anything contrary to the provisions of clause (m), clause (o) or clause (p) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (Central Act of 1882) or to the spirit of the aforesaid clause in areas where the said Act does not apply; or (b) where the tenant has been guilty of conduct which is a nuisance or an annoyance to the occupiers of the adjoining or neighbouring houses; or (c) where the house is bonafide required by the landlord either for purposes of repairs or re-building, or for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the house is held, or where the landlord can show any other cause which may be deemed satisfactory by the Court; or (d) where the tenant sublets the house or any part thereof or otherwise transfers his interest in the house or any part thereof without permission in writing from the landlord; or (e) where the tenant has not paid the rent lawfully due from him in respect of the house within a fortnight of its falling due; or (f) where the tenant has built, acquired or been a o ed a suitable residence.” 11. The opening words of the said Section imposes a bar against passing and execution of decree and orders of ejection. The opening words of the said Section imposes a bar against passing and execution of decree and orders of ejection. It would also be seen from a perusal of the said Section that Clauses (a) to (f) of the proviso to Sub-Section (1) of Section 5 of the Act of 1972, stipulates the various conditions where the bar as stipulated in Sub-Section (1) of Section 5 of the Act of 1972, shall not apply. The question as to whether the bar would apply in the facts of each case has to be decided by the competent Court and till such decision is not taken, the tenant as defined in Section 2(f) of the Act is protected under the provisions of the Act of 1972. 12. In the present facts the question as to whether the Petitioner No.2 is a tenant within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Act of 1972 is pending disposal before the Civil Court in Title Suit No.101 of 2021. The Gauhati Municipal Corporation cannot decide as to whether the Petitioners are tenants under the provision of the Act of 1972. In the said backdrop, it would be relevant to take note of the provision of Section 180 of the Gauhati Municipal Corporation Act 1971. For the purpose of the instant dispute, Sub-Section (1) of Section 180 is relevant to take note of and the same is quoted herein below:_ “180. Licence to be taken out annually –(1) Every person who exercises or carries in the city, either by himself or by an agent or representative, any of the professions, trades or callings indicated in the Fourth Schedule, shall annually take out a licence before the first day of April in each year or within one month of his taking up the profession, trade or calling, as the case may be, and pay for the same, such fee as is mentioned in that behalf in the schedule.” 13. A perusal of the Sub-Section (1) of Section 180 would show that every person who exercises or carries in the city either by himself or by any agent or representative any of the professions, trade or calling indicated in the Fourth Schedule shall annually take out a license before the first day of April in each year or within one month of his taking up the profession, trade or calling as the case may be and pay for the same such fee as is mentioned in that behalf in the Fourth Schedule. The said Section 180 is the provision under which the Gauhati Municipal Corporation grants the trade licenses. It would also be relevant herein to take note of that Section 180 is found in Chapter XVII with the heading “Tax on professions, trades or callings”. Therefore the issuance of Trade License to a person who exercises or carries on any professions, trade or callings in the Guwahati City is for the purpose of collection of revenue in terms with the Fourth Schedule. As already noted hereinabove, GMC Authorities are empowered to decide a dispute between the landlord and the tenant or a dispute as to whether a person is a tenant within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Act of 1972. Clause (2) of the notification dated 30.05.2017 has to be therefore understood in the said perspective. In other words, the requirement of Lease Deed/Rent Agreement/Legal Occupancy has to be understood in the context of Section 180 of the GMC Act, 1971. Though the terms Lease Deed/Rent Agreement does not required any elaboration but the document to prove legal occupancy has to mean a document on the basis of which the person applying for the trade license can show that he has a right to continue in occupancy of the premises from where he is carrying on any profession, trade or calling. A tenant in case of a dispute with the landlord against whom an eviction proceedings is pending may not be in a position to produce before the authority a lease deed or a rent agreement however in view of the protection which has been granted to him under the Act of 1972, he can very well show before the authority under the GMC Act of 1971 that he is a tenant of the premises from where he is carrying on his profession, trade or calling. For doing so, the said person may show documents such as pendency of litigations wherein his claim of tenancy is in question or even show documents of payment of rent to the landlord or even before the Court as is mandated under Section 5(4) of the Act of 1972. This Court is of the opinion that such document shall be sufficient compliance to the term “Legal Occupancy Certificate” within the meaning of Clause (2) of the notification dated 30.05.2017. If any other interpretation is given, it would result in the GMC authorities usurping the jurisdiction of competent Court under the Act of 1972 inasmuch as if any other meaning is given then it may lead to a situation where a landlord may instead of filing a suit for eviction and bypassing the protection afforded under the Act of 1972, compel the tenant to vacate the tenanted premises for not having a trade license for want of a Lease Deed/Rent Agreement/Legal Occupancy Certificate. 14. Coming to the instant case, there is no dispute that there is a suit pending between the Respondent No.4 and the Petitioner No.2, wherein the question as to whether the Petitioner No.2 is a tenant, is pending adjudication. It is also an admitted fact as could be seen from paragraph No.17 of the Plaint that the Respondent No.4 had duly admitted that the Petitioner No.2 have illegally and unauthorisedly had been depositing rent in terms with Section 5(4) of the Act of 1972. These facts are enough to show that the petitioners have legal occupancy insofar issuance of trade License is concerned and the collection of revenue in terms with Section 180 of the GMC Act of 1971. 15. Accordingly, this Court interferes with the order dated 01.10.2019 and directs the GMC authorities to consider the case of issuance of the Trade License to the petitioners on the basis of the observations made hereinabove within a period of 15 days from the date of on which a certified copy of this order is served upon the Respondent No.3. 16. The above observations so made in the instant order is in relation to the entitlement of the petitioners for issuance of trade license vis-à-vis Section 180 of the GMC Act of 1971. 16. The above observations so made in the instant order is in relation to the entitlement of the petitioners for issuance of trade license vis-à-vis Section 180 of the GMC Act of 1971. The issuance of Trade License by the GMC authorities or the observations made hereinabove as regards the petitioners’ entitlement to the Trade License shall not affect or prejudice the parties in the civil suit pending i.e. Title Suit No.101 of 2021 before the Civil Court.