ORDER : 1. If an error emanate from non-adherence of the procedure (or the rule), the life of the litigation will become complex. While passing orders, lower judiciary should take a note that their application of judicious mind at the right time, in a right way, will ease the load on higher judiciary. The present case is a class example. PART - ‘A’ PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT:- (a) FACTUAL BACKGROUND:- This Civil Revision Petition is filed under Article - 227 of Constitution of India, to set aside the Order passed in C.F.R.No.2540 of 2021 dated 21-12-2021 and C.F.R.No.2490 of 2021 dated 03-01- 2022 by the learned District Judge, Adilabad. 2. Heard Sri Naresh Reddy Chinnolla, learned counsel for the petitioner. i) SUIT INSTITUTED:- 3. The petitioner herein had filed a suit for specific performance of contract of sale and for possession. The suit schedule property is land admeasuring Acs.02-16 guntas in Sy.No.114 (after mutation in the name of the defendant, it is separately identified as Sy.No.114/A, in Revenue records and after introduction of Dharani Portal by the Government of Telangana State, the suit land is again identified by separate survey number as Sy.No.114/A7), situated at Kadthal Revenue Village Shivar, Soan Mandal, Nirmal District. ii) PLAINT VALUED AT:- 4. It is mentioned in the plaint that the sale consideration of suit land to an extent of Acs.02-16 guntas and market value is Rs.3,24,00,000/- @ Rs.1,35,00,000/- per acre, as per the agreement of sale. Hence, the Court fee of Rs.3,26,426/- is paid under Section - 39 of the Telangana State Court Fee and Suit Valuation Act, 1956, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). In respect of prayer of perpetual injunction, the relief is valued at Rs.10,000/- and paid a Court fee of Rs.786/- which according to the plaintiff is sufficient under Section -26 (C) of the Act. Thus, a total Court Fee of Rs.3,27,212/-is paid. iii) OBJECTION RAISED BY THE OFFICE:- 5. The Office of the l e a r n e d District Judge, Adilabad, has returned thesaid plaint with the following objections:- “1. As per the Agreement the land available will be taken by the Plaintiff. 2. As per the details of Dharani the land existing is Ac. 3-06 gts., then state under which document the Plaintiff is claiming Ac.2-16 gts.,. As per the Agreement the land available will be taken by the Plaintiff. 2. As per the details of Dharani the land existing is Ac. 3-06 gts., then state under which document the Plaintiff is claiming Ac.2-16 gts.,. It is averred in the plaint that L.A.O. acquired same land for N.H. Therefore, at least the proceedings of L.A.O is to be file to ascertain the extent land actually acquired in the Sy.No.114, to know the original extent of land. Hence, the Court Fee paid is in sufficient andnot in accordance with Section 39 of Telangana State Court Fee and Suit Valuation Act, 1956. Hence, may be returned.” iv) THE EXPLANATION BY THE PETITIONER:- 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner resubmitted the plaint on 28.12.2021 with the following explanation: “This is suit is filed by the plaintiff for Specific Performance of Contract of Sale and possession against the Defendant basing on the Agreement of Sale dated 09-11- 2019 executed by Defendant in favour of Plaintiff. The Plaintiff paid the Court Fee on the market value of the land to an extent of Ac.2-16 gts., only in Sy.No.114, where as “Dharani” records show the extent of land is Ac.03- 06 gts., in Sy.No.114, which is the subject matter of the suit. It is to submit that in the Sale Agreement, it is noted that consideration of land is Rs.1,35,00,000/- per acre and the consideration amount will be paid only to the land available after its measuring. But the land was neither measured nor any document showing that the land at present available is Ac.2-16 gts., only. In the above said circumstances, the suit was returned to pay the Court Fee as per Section 39 (a) of Telangana State Court Fee and Suit Valuation Act, 1956, for the extent shown in “Dharani” records. But today, the case is resubmitted with a request to May be heard on bench”. v) IMPUGNED ORDER OF THE DISTRICT JUDGE:- 7. The Court below, by an order dated 03.01.2022 passed the following:- “Heard the petitioner. The earlier objection taken by the Office holds good. Hence retuned for compliance.” 8. Challenging the said order, the petitioner herein had filed the present Civil Revision Petition under Article - 227 of the Constitution of India. (b) COURT’S ANALYSIS:- i) JUDICIAL ORDER WITHOUT REASONS IS NULITY:- 9. The earlier objection taken by the Office holds good. Hence retuned for compliance.” 8. Challenging the said order, the petitioner herein had filed the present Civil Revision Petition under Article - 227 of the Constitution of India. (b) COURT’S ANALYSIS:- i) JUDICIAL ORDER WITHOUT REASONS IS NULITY:- 9. It is rather surprising and shocking to realize that a Judicial Officer at the level of District Judge could pass such an order based on the office objection. The learned District Judge passed a judicial order without assigning any reason of whatsoever and without looking into the provisions of law. A judicial order not supported by any reason is a nullity. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax Department Works Contract and Leasing, Kota v. Shukla & Brothers, [ (2010) 4 SCC 785 ] and the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Bolla V.K. Radha Krishna v. Viswanadha Venkata Subbaiah, [ 2002 (5) ALT 355 ] held that reasons are the soul of orders. ii) ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL ORDER DIFFERENCE:- 10. There is yet another infirmity. The learned Judge did not even refer to the facts requiring for adjudication. This Court is constrained to express its unhappiness for the manner in which the learned Judge disposed of the case. It is relevant to note, the Office of District Judiciary, right from the Junior Civil Judges to District Judges are returning plaints based on the office objections on flimsy grounds without even going through the factual aspects and the settled legal position. 11. It is misfortune that some of the Judges are also embark upon the objections raised by the Office. In the present case, shockingly, the learned District Judge had delegated her judicial function to the office of the District Court. 12. It is settled law that judicial function cannot be delegated to the office of the District Court. Numbering a suit is purely on administrative side. The objection taken by the office of the District Court on the aspect of Court fee requires application of judicial mind and by applying appropriate judicial standards. The said view was fortified by the Apex Court in P. Surendran v. State by Inspector of police, [ (2019) 9 SCC 154 ] wherein it was held that the power of the judicial function cannot be delegated to the Registry. The said view was fortified by the Apex Court in P. Surendran v. State by Inspector of police, [ (2019) 9 SCC 154 ] wherein it was held that the power of the judicial function cannot be delegated to the Registry. (c) RESOLUTION TO THE PRESENT CASE:- i) CHAPTER - IV OF THE ACT VII OF 1956:- 13. Chapter-IV deals with the computation of Court Fee. Sections - 20 to 47 of the Act deals with the fee in respect of various suits. Clarification is required, hence, in the present case this Court is dealing with legal position on payment of Court fee in some important suits. ii) SECTION 39 OF THE ACT VII OF 1956:- 14. First let us examine Section - 39 of the Act. Section 39:-In a suit for specific performance, with or without possession, fee shall be payable:- 1. In the case of a contract of sale, computed on the amount of the consideration. (b) xxxxxxxxx (c) xxxxxxxxxx (d) xxxxxxxxxx (e) xxxxxxxxxxx iii) INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 39:- 15. It is mentioned in the plaint that as per the agreement of sale, the extent is Acs.02-16 guntas and the sale consideration of suit land is valued at Rs.3,24,00,000/- @ Rs.1,35,00,000/- per acre. Hence, the Court fee of Rs.3,26,426/- paid is sufficient under Section- 39 of the Act. 16. The true interpretation of Sub-section (a) of Section - 39 of the Act VII of 1956:- a) According to the amount of the consideration. b) Such consideration is the consideration agreed in the contract for sale of which specific performance is claimed. c) In other words, the amount of Court fee that is to be paid in a suit for specific performance of contract based on the value of the contract. 17. The plaint must be in respect of which the performance was due to plaintiff from the defendant and in respect of which the plaintiff could claim specific performance and that the suit had to be valued only on the basis of the relief prayed for in the plaint and that the Court fee payable would be on the basis of that valuation. iv) RELEVANT PRECEDENTS:- 18. The above issue has been directly decided way back in 1961 by the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Kadiyala Kasi Viswanadham v. Raghuramayya, [Order in C.R.P. No.108 of 1961, decided on 02.02.1962]. iv) RELEVANT PRECEDENTS:- 18. The above issue has been directly decided way back in 1961 by the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Kadiyala Kasi Viswanadham v. Raghuramayya, [Order in C.R.P. No.108 of 1961, decided on 02.02.1962]. In that case, the question that fell to be determined was: “whether the plaintiff had to value the suit on the basis of the original agreement for sale, namely, Rs. 67,875 and pay Court-fee thereon; or, whether it was open to him to value the suit on the basis of the value of 3,500 square yards, which alone was the subject -67,875 and pay Court-fee thereon; or, whether it was open to him to value the suit on the basis of the value of 3,500 square yards, which alone was the subject-matter of the relief in the suit and in respect of which he had asked for specific performance, and pay Court fee on that valuation.” Therein, the learned Judge observed as follows:— “The language of section 39 (a)………… must be read as referring to the consideration of the contract of sale in respect of which performance is asked for. It obviously could not be read as implying that even if 1/100th portion of a performance is due under an agreement for sale, the remaining 99/100th having been already performed, the suit should be valued on the basis of the entire contract of sale and that Court-fee should be paid for such a valuation. I am clearly of opinion that this is not the interpretation of section 39 (a)" The learned Judge held that, in the circumstances, the plaint must be deemed to relate only to the 3,500 square yards of land in respect of which the performance was due to him from the defendant and in respect of which alone he could claim specific performance and that the suit had to be valued only on the basis of the relief prayed for in the plaint and that the Court-fee payable would be on the basis of that valuation.” 19. It is relevant to mention here that the above said judgment was followed by another single Judge of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Athili Appalaswamy v. State, [1963 (1) An.W.R. 118]. It is relevant to mention here that the above said judgment was followed by another single Judge of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Athili Appalaswamy v. State, [1963 (1) An.W.R. 118]. In the said judgment, the following two points arose for consideration:- “(1)Whether the appellant has to value the appeal at Rs.20,900 being the value of 4-18 acres decreed against him or at Rs.25,000 at which the plaint was originally valued on the basis of five acres? (2) Whether the appeal has to be valued regarding costs also?” It was held:- “Point No.1- This point has been directly decided by my learned brother, Sanjeeva Row Nayudu, J., in Kadiyala Kasi Viswanadham v. Raghuramayya (unreported judgment of this Court, dated 2nd February, 1962 in C.R.P. No.1084 of 1961). xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx I respectfully follow the above decision and hold that the Court-fee should be paid on the sum of Rs. 20,900 being the value of 4-18 acres decreed, as valued by the appellant himself and not on Rs. 25,000 at which the plaint was originally valued on the basis of value of five acres.” 20 (a). The said principle was further followed by another Single Judge of erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Kanakala Venkata Rao v. Konda Krishnam Raju, [ 1996 (1) ALD 1217 ]. The question for consideration was:- "2. Defendants 3 to 5 have entered into an agreement of sale with defendants 1 and 2 in respect of a total extent of Acres 43-58 cents for a consideration of Rs.4 lakhs by an agreement dated 3-1-89. Defendants 1 and 2 executed sale deeds for an extent of Ac. 30-54 cents. They failed to execute the sale deed in respect of remaining extent of Ac. 13- 04cents. The plaintiff filed suit for specific performance of agreement in respect of his share which comes to Ac. 3- 26cents out of Ac. 1304 cents. The plaintiff's suit is in respect of 1/4th share out of the remaining extent. The learned subordinate Judge held that there are no recitals in the agreement that the execution of sale deed would be as per shares. Therefore he directed to pay Court fee on the value of the remaining extent of Ac. 13-04 cents. 1304 cents. The plaintiff's suit is in respect of 1/4th share out of the remaining extent. The learned subordinate Judge held that there are no recitals in the agreement that the execution of sale deed would be as per shares. Therefore he directed to pay Court fee on the value of the remaining extent of Ac. 13-04 cents. Against this order the present revision is filed.” (b) After followingthe ratio laid down in the above referred judgments i.e., Athili Appalaswamy (Supra) and Hiranand Ramsook Firm v. Province of Madras, [ AIR 1954 AP 6 ], learned Judge in Kanakala Venkatrao (Supra) at paragraph Nos.4 and 5 held as follows:- 4. “I entirely agree with the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The plaintiff is seeking specific performance in respect of his share only. It is true that there are no recitals in the agreement that the execution of sale deed would be as per shares. When others did not cooperate the plaintiff can try to enforce the agreement in respect of his share only. Relying upon the ratio laid down in the above decisions, I am of the opinion that the plaintiff has to pay the Court-fee only on the value of Ac.3-26 cents in respect of which he seeks specific performance of contract. He need not pay the Court fee on the entire extent of Ac.13-04 cents. 5. In the result the revision petition is allowed……….” (d) COURT’S VERDICT:- 21. Coming to the case on hand, it is relevant to note that the agreement of sale dated 09.11.2019 was entered between the defendant and the plaintiff with regard to the land admeasuring Acs.03-32 guntas in Sy.No.114 of Kadthal Village, Sone Mandal, Nirmal District. The sale consideration agreed was Rs.1,35,00,000/- per acre and an amount of Rs.50,00,000/- was paid. The balance amount of sale consideration agreed to be paid within a period of six months, if the petitioner vendee fails to pay the balance sale consideration within six months period, the said agreement of sale is cancelled automatically. 22. The sale consideration agreed was Rs.1,35,00,000/- per acre and an amount of Rs.50,00,000/- was paid. The balance amount of sale consideration agreed to be paid within a period of six months, if the petitioner vendee fails to pay the balance sale consideration within six months period, the said agreement of sale is cancelled automatically. 22. The petitioner - plaintiff had filed the above suit for specific performance of the agreement of sale of the land admeasuring Acs.2.16 guntas only in the said survey number on the ground that after mutation in the name of the defendant, it is separately identified as Sy.No.114/A, situated at Kadthal Village in Revenue Records and after introduction of Dharani Portal by the Government of Telangana State, the suit land is again identified by separate survey number as Sy.No.114/A7 situated at Kadthal Revenue Village Shivar, Soan Mandal, Nirmal District. 23. Thus, the petitioner herein is claiming specific performance of the agreement of sale in respect of land admeasuring Acs.02-16 guntas out of the agreed land of Acs.03-32 guntas. In the plaint, it was mentioned that Land Acquisition Officer has also acquired the same for National Highway, therefore, the plaintiff sought for specific performance of agreement of sale in respect of land admeasuring Acs.2-16 guntas. 24. In view of the same, the question fell for consideration before this Court is “whether the petitioner - plaintiff has to pay the Court fee on the entire extent of land admeasuring Acs.03-32 guntas as agreed under agreement of sale dated 09.11.2019 or on Acs.02-16 guntas as claimed by the plaintiff. 25. However, the objection raised by the Court below with regard to availability of land as per Dharani portal is unsustainable. ‘Dharani’ is only a portal which the Government is relying upon. The Court has to consider the pleadings in the plaint and also contents of the agreement of sale. 26. In view of the said legal position, the petitioner has to pay only on the said extent of Acs.02-16 guntas, but not on the entire land mentioned in the agreement of sale dated 09.11.2019 i.e., Acs.03- 32 guntas. 27. As discussed supra, the objection raised by the Court below in C.F.R. No.2540 of 2021 dated 21.12.2021 and C.F.R. No.2490 of 2021 dated 03.01.2022, is unsustainable. The said orders are not reasoned orders and they were passed contrary to the settled principle of law. 27. As discussed supra, the objection raised by the Court below in C.F.R. No.2540 of 2021 dated 21.12.2021 and C.F.R. No.2490 of 2021 dated 03.01.2022, is unsustainable. The said orders are not reasoned orders and they were passed contrary to the settled principle of law. Therefore, viewed from any angle, the said orders and the objection raised by the office of the Court below are liable to be set aside. Accordingly the same is set aside. 28. In view of the above, the Court below is directed to number the suit on payment of Court fee on the land admeasuring Acs.02-16 guntas, as mentioned in the schedule annexed to the plaint. 29. Accordingly, this Civil Revision Petition is allowed with above directions. 30. The Registry is directed to return the originals of both C.F.R.No.2540 of 2021, dated 21.12.2021 and C.F.R. No.2490 of 2021, dated 03.02.2022 to the learned counsel for the petitioner under due acknowledgment. PART - ‘B’ MORE INSIGHTS ON ISSUE OF COURT FEE:- 31. Given the back drop of the present case, which reveals that lack of clarity about applicable Court fee in a suit for specific performance has resulted in an erroneous judicial order, followed by the present revision, I feel it appropriate to give more insights on the issue of Court fee not only under Section - 39 of the Act, but also under other important sections of the Act. COMPUTATION OF COURT FEE: i) SUITS FOR DECLARATION:- 32. Let us examine Section 24 of the VII of 1956:- Section - 24 of the Act deals with suits for declaration and Court fee to be paid. Section - 24 (a) (b) is relevant and the same is extracted: “Section 24: In a suit for a declaration with or without consequential relief, not falling under section 25:- a. Where the prayer is for a declaration and for possession of the property to which the declaration relates, fee shall be computed on the market value of the movable property or three fourths of the market value of the immovable property or on rupees three hundred, which ever is higher. b. Where the prayer is for a declaration and for consequential injunction and the relief sought is with reference to any immovable property, fee shall be computed on one-half of the market value of the property or on rupees three hundred, whichever is higher; c. Xxxxxxxxxx d. Xxxxxxxxxxxx” 33. b. Where the prayer is for a declaration and for consequential injunction and the relief sought is with reference to any immovable property, fee shall be computed on one-half of the market value of the property or on rupees three hundred, whichever is higher; c. Xxxxxxxxxx d. Xxxxxxxxxxxx” 33. Section - 24 (a) of the Act provides for suit for declaration and possession of the property to which the declaration speak-about. It stipulates that the Court fee shall be computed on the market value of the immovable property or Rs.300/-, whichever is higher. 34. In Asmal Khan v. Mohd. Abdul Ghani Sahib, [ 1965 (2) ALT 353 ], the question as to whether the Court fee was payable under Section - 27 of the Act, 1956 or Section - 24 (a) was applicable, fell for consideration before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. It was held that “if the suit was between the trustees or rival claimants to the Office of trustee, the provisions of Section 27 of the Act, would have been attracted.” On further examination, it was held that “since first defendant is only in possession of the property and the first plaintiff who is a Mutawallies, is not seeking relief as trustee, it cannot be said to be a suit between trustee, it can be said to be a suit between trustees or rival claimants to the office of the trustees. Mutawallies of Dargahs or Mosques cannot be held to be trustees and as such Section 27 of the Act has no application. The proper Court fee which should be paid is leviable under Section 24 (b) of the Act.” 35. Likewise, Section 24 (b) provides for suit for declaration and injunction as a consequential relief sought is with reference to any immovable property, fee shall be computed on one-half of the market value of the property or on Rs.300/-,whichever is higher. 36. In Dr. Likewise, Section 24 (b) provides for suit for declaration and injunction as a consequential relief sought is with reference to any immovable property, fee shall be computed on one-half of the market value of the property or on Rs.300/-,whichever is higher. 36. In Dr. V. Rajeshwar Rao v. N. Yadagiri Reddy, [ 2000 (5) ALD 102 ], the question which fell for consideration before the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh is:- “Consequent to the addition of prayers of possession and mandatory injunction in a suit for bare injunction, which of the reliefs partakes of the character of the main relief and whether it attracts any payment of additional Court Fee?” On examination of facts and provisions of the Act, it was held that : “Thus, the proviso contemplates that the plaint has to be valued on the main relief if the other reliefs are only ancillary to the main relief. Therefore, for applying the said provision, it has to be seen as to which of the reliefs constitute the main and ancillary. The expression "main relief takes in almost every relief for which the suit is solely laid for. However, the expression "ancillary relief has to be read in conjunction with the main relief i.e., it should be aiding or auxiliary to the main relief. An ancillary relief can in a given circumstance be the main relief but not vice versa. In a simpliciter suit for injunction, the relief of injunction comprises the main relief but when a relief which is of a substantial nature viz. ,possession or declaration is added to it, the relief of injunction which was hither to the main relief scales down to the position of a consequential relief. There are ample distinctive features in between main and ancillary reliefs. Apart from being essentially paramount and predominant, the main relief is a substantial in nature forging on substantive and vested rights. Possessory relief is the basis and any form of injunction- either mandatory or perpetual- springs from it. To see if a relief is subsidiary or main, the real test is to see whether one relief can be granted without the other. Here in this case in view of the very facts alleged, either of the reliefs of injunctions cannot be granted unless the petitioner seeks possession. Therefore, the possessory relief becomes dominant and constitutes as the main. To see if a relief is subsidiary or main, the real test is to see whether one relief can be granted without the other. Here in this case in view of the very facts alleged, either of the reliefs of injunctions cannot be granted unless the petitioner seeks possession. Therefore, the possessory relief becomes dominant and constitutes as the main. Simply because initially the suit is filed for injunction and the other reliefs of declaration or possession have been added in view of changed circumstances or warranting circumstances on the appearance of the defendant, the relief of injunction does not remain as the main relief making the other reliefs of declaration or possession ancillary thereto. In fact, in any given case, the reliefs of declaration and possession necessarily constitute the main reliefs and these reliefs would always go with the other incidental reliefs of injunction either perpetual or mandatory depending on the facts of each case. Subsequent addition of any such substantial relief would not make it ancillary to the relief already existing merely because such relief was the initial foundation for the suit. The petitioner-plaintiff having filed the suit initially for injunction and in view of the alleged subsequent acts of encroachment and construction, the reliefs of possession and mandatory injunction were added later on. These reliefs, even according to the plaintiff, are in fact based on the subsequent cause of action. In these circumstances, it has to be held that the relief of possession constitutes the main relief and any other reliefs of injunction either perpetual or mandatory fall behind the same and become ancillary to the same. Even if the suit is to be treated as a comprehensive one including the reliefs of injunction and possession, apart from basing upon different causes of action, it only calls for payment of the highest Court fee leviable on the reliefs as per Section 6 (2)of the Act viz., possessory relief. Accordingly, the lower Court is right in calling upon the plaintiff to pay the Court fee as per Section 24of the Act on the substantiation of the market value by necessary certificates as contemplated.” 37. Accordingly, the lower Court is right in calling upon the plaintiff to pay the Court fee as per Section 24of the Act on the substantiation of the market value by necessary certificates as contemplated.” 37. In view of the above discussion, it can be concluded that the Court fee to be paid in a suit for declaration and possession would be calculated on the market value of the movable property or three-fourths of the market value of the immovable property; whereas with respect to suit for declaration with consequential injunction, it should be calculated on half of the market value; with Rs.300/- being the lower limit. Also, the valuation had to be done based on the main relief sought for, but not the ancillary. ii) SUITS FOR INJUNCTION:- 38. Section 26 of the Act VII of 1956, deals with payment of court fee in Suits for injunction, which is as follows;- SECTION 26. SUITS FOR INJUNCTION:- (a) where the relief sought relates to any immovable property, and where the plaintiff’s title to the property is denied, fee shall be computed on one-half of the market value of the property or on rupees two hundred, whichever is higher; (b) xxxxxxxxxx (c) in any other case, whether the subject-matter of the suit has a market value or not, fee shall be computed on the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or at which such relief is valued by the Court, whichever is higher. 39. Clause (a) of Section 26 postulates the following three conditions, which are to be satisfied before the plaint could be registered:- a) the first is that the suit should be one for an injunction in relation to immovable property, restraining the defendant from disturbing the plaintiff’s possession or enjoyment; b) the second condition is that, the defendant is seeking to disturb the plaintiff’s possession is on foot of a denial of the plaintiff’s title; c) the third condition is that, the Court can at the stage of registering the plaint, determine the fee payable on the plaint by arriving at the market value, of the property in dispute as on the date of presentation of the plaint and by computing the fee in accordance with the averments made in the plaint and the material annexed therewith. 40. 40. Before dissecting the above section, it would be useful to draw the attention to a few authoritative rulings that cropped up for consideration before this Institution. 41. In My Palace Mutually Aided Housing Society v. State of A.P., [ 2003 (5) ALD 720 ], the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh had dealt with a case wherein the plaintiff sought for an Injunction, when the defendant is not only interfering with plaintiffs possession of the property but also denying the plaintiffs title. The Court had ruled that the Court fee has to be paid under section 26(a) of Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act 1956. While dealing with the matter the court held in Paragraph No.9 as follows: “In the instant case, as can be seen from the avermentsmade in the plaint and the other material annexed thereto, it is obvious that the plaintiff’s title to the property has been denied. It is specifically averred in the plaint that respondent No. 4 issued a memo dated 24.04.2003 stating inter alia that the land covered by Sy. No.57 of Shamshiguda Village was a gairan land, and has been proposed to be assigned to third parties. This memo had been issued when the petitioner approached respondent No. 4 seeking mutation of the land in dispute in his name in the revenue records as per the provisions of A.P. Rights in Land and Pattedar Pass Book Act, 1971. It is obvious that not only the request of the petitioner to effect the mutation in revenue records has not been considered, nay the very title of the plaintiff to the property in question has been denied asserting that the property is a gairan land. These facts squarely attract Clause (a) of Section 26 of the CF & SV Act.” 42. On a plain reading of the above excerpted provision, particularly Clause (a) thereof, indicate that, if the relief sought for in the plaint relates to any immovable property, and if the plaintiff’s title to the same is denied, the Court fee shall be computed on one half of the market value of the property in dispute. Clause (c) is a residuary provision, and it applies to all other cases, which are not covered by Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 26 of the CF & SV Act, 1956. 43. Clause (c) is a residuary provision, and it applies to all other cases, which are not covered by Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 26 of the CF & SV Act, 1956. 43. While interpreting the above section the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh, in Krishna Pratapa Rao vs. M. Pochaiah, [ 1983 (1) ALT 147 ], had dealt with a case where injunction from fleeing trees standing in a Patta land was sought for and the court has categorically held that the calculation of Court Fee has to be under section 26(c) upon the relief sought i.e., the value of the trees in this case; and not under section 26(a) for the Andhra Pradesh Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act. The Court held in paragraph Nos.4 & 5 as follows: “In view of this authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court and in view of the evidence placed on record, Gulanohwa trees are only timber fit for being used as building material, therefore, I have no hesitation to hold that the subject-matter of the case is timber. The definition of “immoveable property” excludes standing timber, therefore, it is not an immovable property. If it is not an immovable property, then Section 26 (a) of the Andhra Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, has no application to the facts of this case”. “A Division Bench of this Court in APS Electricity Board vs. K. R. Reddy& [AIR 1977 A.P. Page 200] has exhaustively considered the scope of the provisions of Section 26 (c) of the Court-Fens Act and held that the advantage which the plaintiffs seen to gain or the loss which they seek to avoid, must be decided with reference to the allegations in the plaint. I have already said the plaintiffs (petitioners,) by virtue of an injunction that is sought for, are entitled to get advantage of retention of the trees standing on their patta lands. If that be the advantage, then they have to value the trees standing on their patta lands and determine the valuation of the suit and pay court fee thereon under section 26 (c) of the Act.” 44. It is the settled legal position that, the relief of injunction under Section 26 (c) of the Act has to be valued on the basis of advantage sought to be derived or the loss to be averted by the plaintiff. It is the settled legal position that, the relief of injunction under Section 26 (c) of the Act has to be valued on the basis of advantage sought to be derived or the loss to be averted by the plaintiff. For better understanding, it is useful to refer some more important decisions rendered by erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh, on the issue of section 26 (c) of the Act. In Viraj Constructions v. P. Pandu, [ 1998 (6) ALT 262 = 1998 (6) ALD 563 ], while referring to the principle laid down in Jabbar v. State of A.P., [1969 An.W.R. 411], it was held in Para 4, which is as follows: “It is the settled position that the relief of injunction under Section 26(c) of the Act has to be valued on the basis of the advantage sought to be derived or the loss to be averted by the plaintiff. Sec: Jabbar v. State of A.P., 1969 (1) An.WR 411, and A.P.S. Elec. Board v. K.R. Reddy. In K. Ramamurthy v. E.O., Panchayat Raj, it is held that in a suit for injunction, the value of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction and Court-fee are one and the same and that in a suit for mere injunction, the proper method for valuing the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction is to value the suit for the purpose of Court fee first and to treat that value for the purpose of jurisdiction but not vice versa. It is further held that in a suit for injunction the notional value given by the plaintiff at his option for the relief sought is the criterion, which is subject to revision by the Court.” 45. Considering the same, it was held that, in suits for injunction, the notional value given by the plaintiff at his option for the relief sought is the criterion, which is subject to revision by the Court. 46. It further held that, in a suit for mere injunction the market value of the suit land as such is not the criterion for valuing the relief, as the relief has to be valued on the basis of the advantage which is sought to be derived or the loss which is sought to be averted. 47. 46. It further held that, in a suit for mere injunction the market value of the suit land as such is not the criterion for valuing the relief, as the relief has to be valued on the basis of the advantage which is sought to be derived or the loss which is sought to be averted. 47. Above discussion concludes that, the court fee in a suit for injunction had to be calculated based on the value of the relief sought, but not on the market value of the property. iii) DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP FIRM:- 48. Section - 33 of the Act deals with suits for dissolution of partnership. Section - 33 (1), which is relevant of the Act, is extracted hereunder:- “Section 33 (1). In a suit for dissolution of partnership and accounts or for accounts of dissolved partnership, fee shall be computed on the value of the plaintiff’s share in the partnership as estimated by the plaintiff. (1) xxxxxxxxxx (2) xxxxxxxxxx (3) xxxxxxxxxx” Clause (1) provides that the Court fee should be paid on the value estimated by the party in his plaint, in respect of his share but not on the total value of the property 49. It is relevant to note that the issue of “what is the Court fee that has to be paid for suit for dissolution of partnership” fell for consideration before the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Y. Audisesha Reddy v. Dasaradha Rami Reddy, [ 1960 ALT 1087 ]. On examination of the facts, the Court held as follows:- “Under section 33 (1), the plaintiff is entitled to estimate the value of his share in the partnership. 'Such an estimate may be right or wrong and may be excessive or inadequate. But the statute enables him to pay Court-fee on the value as estimated by him. The old provision by which such suits were governed was section 7, clause (iv), sub-clause (f) of the Madras. Court-fees Act, where under in a suit of: accounts the plaintiff could state the amount at which he valued the relief sought and pay Court-fee thereon. In applying this provision, it was always held that the plaintiff was at liberty to value the relief at any amount, however unreasonable. Court-fees Act, where under in a suit of: accounts the plaintiff could state the amount at which he valued the relief sought and pay Court-fee thereon. In applying this provision, it was always held that the plaintiff was at liberty to value the relief at any amount, however unreasonable. It seems to me that the same reasoning applies to the construction of the language in section 33 of the Andhra Court-fees Act: Just as formerly the plaintiff in such a suit was entitled to state the amount, he is not entitled to give his own estimate. It is not open to the Court to consider whether that estimate is bona fide or motet fide, just as it was not open to the Court to consider whether the statement of the value under section 7 (iv) (f) at which relief was sought, was not bona fide. The petition is allowed and the plaint will be received and registered. The petitioner is entitled to his costs of this petition.” 50. The above discussion indicates that the Court Fee in a suit for dissolution of partnership has to be calculated solely upon the plaintiff’s estimate of his share in the partnership; irrespective of whether the calculation is bona fide or otherwise. iv) CANCELLATION OF DECREES:- 51. Likewise Section - 37 of the Act deals with cancellation of Decrees etc., and collection of Court Fee. “37. Suits for cancellation of decrees;- (1) In a suit for cancellation of a decree for money or other property having a money value, or other document which purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest in money, movable or immovable property, fee shall be computed on the value of the subject-matter of the suit, and such value shall be deemed to be a) If the whole decree or other document is sought to be cancelled, the amount or value of the property for which the decree was passed or other document was executed; b) if a part of the decree or other document is sought to be cancelled, such part of the amount or of the value of the property. (2) If the decree or other document is such that the liability under it cannot be split up and the relief claimed relates only to a particular item of property belonging to the plaintiff or to the plaintiffs share in any such property, fee shall be computed on the value of such property or share or on the amount of the decree, whichever is less. Explanation:-A suit to set aside an Award shall be deemed to be a suit for cancellation of a decree within the meaning of this section.” 52. It is relevant to note that the issue, “what is the Court fee that has to be paid for suit for declaration and cancellation of an instrument by executants and also non-executants, fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Suhrid Singh @ Sardool Singh v.Randhir Singh, (2010) 12 SCC 112 . On consideration of provisions of Act and on examination of the facts of the said case, the Apex Court held as follows:- “The sum and substance of the Judgment is as follows: If` ‘A’, the executant of the deed, seeks cancellation of the deed, he has to pay ad-valorem Court fee on the consideration stated in the sale deed. If ‘B’, who is a non-executant, is in possession and sues for a declaration that the deed is null or void and does not bind him or his share, he has to merely pay a fixed Court fee of Rs.19.50 under Article17(iii)of Second Schedule of the Act. But if ‘B’, a non-executant, is not in possession, and he seeks not only a declaration that the sale deed is invalid, but also the consequential relief of possession, he has to pay an ad-valorem Court fee as provided under Section 7 (iv)(c)of the Act.” 53. The above discussion concludes that a non-executant, who is in possession of the property, seeking just the cancellation of the decree, would pay a fixed Court Fee while an executant seeking cancellation or non-executant seeking possession along with cancellation will pay ad-valorem Court fee. PART - ‘C’ WITH REGARD TO COMMERCIAL COURTS:- 54. The Commercial Courts are getting busy due to the increase in value of transactions over a period of time, so I would like to touch up on the payment of Court fee to be paid in cases filed before the Commercial Courts. PART - ‘C’ WITH REGARD TO COMMERCIAL COURTS:- 54. The Commercial Courts are getting busy due to the increase in value of transactions over a period of time, so I would like to touch up on the payment of Court fee to be paid in cases filed before the Commercial Courts. The Commercial Courts Act, 2015 was enacted to establish procedural frame work distinct from the regular civil procedure with an objective of time bound adjudication and speedy disposal of commercial disputes. The distinction is only in the procedure, but not in the Court fee. High Court of Delhi in Mrs. Soni Dave v. M/s. Trans Asian Industries, [ AIR 2016 (Del.) 186 ] has dealt in detail about the valuation and Court fee under Commercial Courts Act and held that:- “25. In my view Section 12 of the Commercial Courts Act providing for determination of specified value as defined in Section 2 (i) thereof is not intended to provide for a new mode of determining the valuation of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction and Court fees. It would be incongruous to hold that while for the purpose of payment of Court fees the deemed fiction provided in the Court Fees Act for determining the value of the property is to apply but not for determining the specified value under the Commercial Courts Act. 26. In my opinion Section 12 of the Commercial Courts Act has to be read harmoniously with the Court Fees Act and the Suits Valuation Act and reading so, the specified value of a suit where the relief sought relates to immovable property or to a right thereunder has to be according to the market value of the immovable property only in such suits where the suit as per the Court Fees Act and / or the Suits Valuation Act has to be valued on the market value of the property and not where as per the Court Fees Act and the Suits Valuation Act the valuation of a suit even if for the relief of recovery of immovable property or a right therein is required to be anything other than market value as is the casein a suit by a landlord for recovery of possession of immovable property from a tenant.” 55. Only the disputes with value beyond a certain threshold are adjudicated by Commercial Courts; and naturally the absolute amount of Court fee are also on the higher side. There are several instances of cases being filed before the Commercial Courts, with deficit Court fee and the parties to such cases have to file a separate application for condonation of delay in paying deficit Court fee. Such applications being increased load in the Judiciary, hence, the Advocates and Courts have to be vigilant in calculating the correct Court fee before presenting the plaint. PART - ‘D’ CONCLUSION:- 56. The above instances are only illustrative and not exhaustive. There may be many more situations where the Court fee has to be calculated under the provisions of the Court Fee Act, which are not discussed above. The parties and the lower Judiciary will have to carefully scrutinize the pleadings mentioned in the plaint to arrive at a correct conclusion for payment of Court fee aspect. The conclusion has to be in accordance with the settled legal principles discussed above and also in various other judgments rendered by the Constitutional Courts, which are holding the field. RESULT: 57. The present Civil Revision Petition is allowed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the revision shall stand closed.