JUDGMENT : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. The appellant herein has preferred this criminal appeal under Section 374(2) of the CrPC calling in question legality, validity and correctness of the impugned judgment of conviction recorded and sentence awarded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge by which the appellant has been convicted for offences under Sections 450, 302 & 397 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years and pay fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months; imprisonment for life and pay fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months; and rigorous imprisonment for seven years, respectively. 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that in the intervening night of 3rd & 4th September, 2011 at Village Boirdih, Indira Awas, Bhatapara, the appellant herein trespassed the house of his bua (father’s sister) Budhwantin Bai and caused her death and thereafter, robbed four gold ear rings and four silver bangles. The matter was reported on 4-9-2011 at 10.30 a.m. by Jailal Khare, S/o Rikhiram, on the basis of which an unnumbered nalishi was registered vide Ex.P-4 and unnumbered morgue intimation was also registered at the instance of Jailal Khare vide Ex.P-2. Thereafter, inquest was conducted vide Ex.P-12 in which both the ears of deceased Budhwantin Bai (dead) were found cut and blood was oozing out of it and injury near ear & mouth was also found, and ornaments were also found looted. Postmortem was advised to be conducted and dead body was sent for postmortem examination which was conducted by Dr. Anil Mahakalkar (PW-12). Bloodstained ladies muffler, bloodstained petticoat, bloodstained blade, bloodstained match stick and one kathri – bundle of clothes used in villages have been seized from the spot and exhibited as Ex.P-14 and sent for forensic examination. Thereafter, on 5-9- 2011, the accused was taken into custody and his memorandum statement was recorded vide Ex.P-13 pursuant to which gold ring and silver bangles were recovered vide Ex.P-14 from the place indicated by the accused in presence of two witnesses Mahesh Yadav (PW-6) & Sarju Prasad Lahre (PW-13) and same were identified by Smt. Keshar Bai (PW-1) and Ashok Khare (PW-5). Recovered articles were subjected to measurement by Champalal Soni (PW-9) and identification parade was conducted by the Executive Magistrate. Recovered articles were also subjected to forensic examination and the FSL report is Ex.P-24. 3. Recovered articles were subjected to measurement by Champalal Soni (PW-9) and identification parade was conducted by the Executive Magistrate. Recovered articles were also subjected to forensic examination and the FSL report is Ex.P-24. 3. Statements of the witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC. After usual investigation, the accused / appellant was charge-sheeted for offences under Sections 450, 302 & 397 of the IPC and charge-sheet was filed before the jurisdictional criminal court and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions from where the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Rajnandgaon received the case on transfer for hearing and disposal in accordance with law. 4. The accused / appellant abjured the guilt and entered into witness. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as many as thirteen witnesses and brought on record 28 exhibits. The defence has examined none, but brought on record the statement of Jailal Khare Ex.D-1. 5. The trial Court after appreciating oral and documentary evidence available on record, convicted and sentenced the appellant under Sections 450, 302 & 397 of the IPC in the manner mentioned in the opening paragraph of this judgment against which the instant appeal under Section 374(2) of the CrPC has been preferred. 6. Mr. Santosh Bharat, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, would submit that there is no evidence against the appellant for the aforesaid offences and memorandum & seizure witnesses namely, Mahesh Yadav (PW-6) & Sarju Prasad Lahre (PW-13), both, have been declared hostile and they have not supported the case of the prosecution, therefore, merely on the basis of recovery pursuant to the disclosure statement which has been proved, the appellant cannot be convicted and he is liable to be acquitted. Alternatively, he would further submit that even if the recovery pursuant to the memorandum statement is proved against the appellant, at the most, he can be convicted for the offence of theft under Section 379 of the IPC, but cannot be convicted for offences under Sections 302, 450 & 397 of the IPC, as such, the appeal deserves to be allowed partly. 7. Mr. 7. Mr. Soumya Rai, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the State / respondent, would support the impugned judgment and would submit that it is a case of circumstantial evidence and here, the appellant has caused the death of his aunt (father’s sister) on account of not having good relationship with her as she has promised Ashok Khare (PW-5) to give her property to him and executed a document Article ‘A’. He would further submit that Ashok Khare (PW-5) was looking after the deceased and relationship of the appellant & the deceased was not cordial which is apparent from the evidence of Smt. Keshar Bai (PW-1) (paragraphs 5 & 17) and that of Smt. Manglin Bai (PW-3), and the property has been given to Ashok Khare (PW-5), agreement has been filed and it has been brought on record as Art. A. He would also submit that the deceased had already told the appellant to vacate her house at Indira Awas which the appellant was occupying and on account of that, the appellant was having grudge upon the deceased and it is the appellant who caused the murder of deceased Budhwantin Bai. Learned State counsel would contend that pursuant to the memorandum statement Ex.P-13, gold ring and silver bangles have been seized vide Ex.P-14 and same were subjected to identification in presence of the Executive Magistrate which have been identified vide Ex.P-1 by Smt. Keshar Bai (PW-1) & Ashok Khare (PW-5) to be of the deceased. Furthermore, Mahesh Yadav (PW-6) & Sarju Prasad Lahre (PW-13) have clearly proved memorandum and seizure and the seized articles have been identified by Smt. Keshar Bai (PW-1) & Ashok Khare (PW-5). As such, it has clearly been established that it is the appellant who has not only unauthorisedly house trespassed the house of the deceased, but also committed her murder and thereafter, robbed gold & silver ornaments wore by the deceased, which have been recovered from the possession of the appellant pursuant to his memorandum statement, therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 9. The first question for consideration would be, whether the trial Court is justified in holding that the death of deceased Budhwantin Bai was homicidal in nature? 10. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 9. The first question for consideration would be, whether the trial Court is justified in holding that the death of deceased Budhwantin Bai was homicidal in nature? 10. The trial Court after relying upon the medical evidence of Dr. Anil Mahakalkar (PW-12) and further relying upon the postmortem report Ex.P-20A, came to the conclusion that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature and it occurred on account of fracture in cervical vertebra. The finding recorded by the trial Court that death of deceased Budhwantin Bai was homicidal in nature, is a finding of fact based on the evidence available on record, it is neither perverse nor contrary to the record and we hereby affirm the said finding. Motive of the offence: - 11. It is the case of the prosecution that the appellant being nephew of deceased Budhwantin Bai, wanted to grab her property, but the deceased had declared Ashok Khare (PW-5) as her successor and executed agreement Art. ‘A’ in his favour, therefore, the appellant has murdered Budhwantin Bai. It is not in dispute that the deceased was widow and issue-less, aged about 80 years, and the accused / appellant is nephew of the deceased and staying in Indira Awas, Bhatapara, owned by the deceased, and despite her asking the appellant to vacate Indira Awas owned by her, the appellant did not vacate and was continuing in the said premises. It has also been established by the prosecution that the relationship between the deceased and the appellant was not cordial which is apparent from the statement of Smt. Keshar Bai (PW-1) (paragraphs 5 & 17) and on that account, deceased Budhwantin Bai was residing separately and she was being looked after by Ashok Khare (PW-5). It has also been established by the prosecution that the relationship between the deceased and the appellant was not cordial which is apparent from the statement of Smt. Keshar Bai (PW-1) (paragraphs 5 & 17) and on that account, deceased Budhwantin Bai was residing separately and she was being looked after by Ashok Khare (PW-5). As such, it is clearly established from record that though the appellant is real nephew of the deceased being her brother’s son, but his relationship with deceased Budhwantin Bai was not cordial and despite that, he was staying in Indira Awas, Bhatapara, owned by her, adjoining to her house and did not vacate the same, and the appellant was having grudge with the deceased, as she has declared Ashok Khare (PW-5) as successor to her property after her death, and relationship being not cordial, the appellant has quarrelled with the deceased, as stated by Smt. Keshar Bai (PW-1). Therefore, motive of the offence is fully established by the prosecution. 12. The next circumstance pointed out by the prosecution is that the incident is of the intervening night of 3rd & 4th September, 2011 at Village Boirdih, Indira Awas, Bhatapara, and the matter was reported to the police on 4-9-2011 at 10.30 a.m. by Jailal Khare (PW-4) and thereafter, at his instance, unnumbered morgue intimation was registered vide Ex.P-2 and unnumbered dehati nalishi was also registered vide Ex.P-4 and thereafter, the wheels of investigation started running and immediately thereafter, inquest Ex.P-12 was conducted in which both the ears of the deceased were found cut and blood was oozing out of it and thereafter, postmortem was conducted by Dr. Anil Mahakalkar (PW-12) in which following seven injuries were found: 1- [kjksap ukd ds ckaW;h rjQ 1/2 x 1/2 ls-eh- dk Fkk tks dRFks jax dk FkkA 2- [kjksap ukd ds ckgj rjQ Fkk ftldk 1/2 x 1/2 ls-eh- dk Fkk] tks dRFkbZ jax dk FkkA 3- [kjksap ukd ds fljs ij] ftldk vkdkj 1/4 x 1/4 ls-eh- dk Fkk A 4- ckWa;s dku ds mij ,d dV ekdZ ftldk vkdkj 4 x 1/2 ls-eh- iwjh eksVkbZ rd FkkA ftldh lrg jsxqyj Fkh rFkk ogkaW ls tek gqvk jDr cg jgk FkkA 5- nkfguk dku dV ekdZ Fkk] ftldk vkdkj x 1 x 1 ls-eh- dku dh iwjh eksVkbZ rd Fkk] ftldh lrg jsxqyj Fkh rFkk tek gqvk jDr cg jgk FkkA 6- xys ds ihNs dh vksj lwtu Fkk ftldk vkdkj 3 x 2 ls-eh- Fkk rFkk jax dRFkbZ FkkA 7- ,d dqpyk gqvk ?kko ckaW;s rjQ iSjk;Vy cksu esa Fkk ftldk vkdkj 2 x 2 ls-eh- FkkA 13. A careful perusal of the aforesaid injuries would show that both the ears were found cut and blood was oozing out of it and the injuries have been proved by Dr. Anil Mahakalkar (PW-12) who opined that death has occurred on account of fracture in cervical vertebra and injuries No.4 & 5 on both the ears were caused by sharp edged weapon. The sharp edged weapon – blade (Art. C) was seized from the spot which was sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur, from where report Ex.P-24 was received according to which, blood was found on it, though origin and blood group could not be ascertained. Thereafter, the appellant was taken into custody on 5-9-2011 and his memorandum was recorded vide Ex.P-13 in presence of two witnesses Mahesh Yadav (PW-6) & Sarju Prasad Lahre (PW-13) and on the basis of his memorandum statement, four pieces of gold ear rings and four pieces of silver bangles were recovered from the pocket of the shirt kept hanging to a hook in his house, vide Ex.P-14. The said recovery pursuant to the memorandum statement of the appellant has been made in presence of Mahesh Yadav (PW-6) & Sarju Prasad Lahre (PW-13) which has duly been proved. The incident is of the intervening night of 3rd & 4th September, 2011 and memorandum statement was made on 5-9-2011 at 6.10 p.m.. 14. The said recovery pursuant to the memorandum statement of the appellant has been made in presence of Mahesh Yadav (PW-6) & Sarju Prasad Lahre (PW-13) which has duly been proved. The incident is of the intervening night of 3rd & 4th September, 2011 and memorandum statement was made on 5-9-2011 at 6.10 p.m.. 14. It is well settled law that under Section 27 of Evidence Act only so much of the information as distinctly relates to the facts really thereby discovered is admissible. The word ‘fact’ means some concrete or material fact to which the information directly relates. As held by Sir John Beaumont in the matter of Pulukuri Kotayya v. King-Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67 “… it is fallacious to treat the “fact discovered” within the section as equivalent to the object produced ; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact.” 15. Following the principle of law laid down in Pulukuri Kotayya (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Asar Mohammad and others v. State of U.P. AIR 2018 SC 5264 , with reference to the word “fact” employed in Section 27 of the Evidence Act, have held that the facts need not be self-probatory and the word “fact” as contemplated in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not limited to “actual physical material object”. It has been further held that the discovery of fact arises by reason of the fact that the information given by the accused exhibited the knowledge or the mental awareness of the informant as to its existence at a particular place and it includes a discovery of an object, the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to its existence. 16. In order to make Section 27 of the Evidence Act applicable, two conditions are prerequisite, namely (1) the information must be such as has caused discovery of the fact; and (2) the information must ‘relate distinctly’ to the fact discovered. 16. In order to make Section 27 of the Evidence Act applicable, two conditions are prerequisite, namely (1) the information must be such as has caused discovery of the fact; and (2) the information must ‘relate distinctly’ to the fact discovered. In the present case, the incident occurred in the intervening night of 3rd & 4th September, 2011 and on 5-9-2011 at 6.45 p.m., as pointed out by the appellant, pursuant to his memorandum statement, incriminating articles were recovered from his house kept in the pocket of shirt hanging to a hook duly concealed in a handkerchief. As such, recovery made from the appellant pursuant to the disclosure statement satisfies the requirement of Section 27 of the Evidence Act and that being so, the statement made by the appellant under Section 27 vide Ex.P- 13, is clearly admissible in evidence. 17. Now, the seized articles – four gold ear rings and four silver bangles, have been identified by Smt. Keshar Bai (PW-1) & Ashok Khare (PW-5). Ashok Khare (PW-5) is the person, who was at the relevant point of time, looking after the deceased and he used to visit her along with the food. Similarly, Smt. Keshar Bai (PW-1) was niece of deceased Budhwantin Bai. They have clearly stated in their statements before the Court that these are the ornaments of the deceased and have proved their signature in Ex.P-1. The test identification parade was conducted vide Ex.P-1 by R.P. Tiwari (PW-8), Nayab Tahsildar / Executive Magistrate in which the two witnesses – Smt. Keshar Bai (PW-1) & Ashok Khare (PW-5) have identified the ornaments recovered from the possession of the appellant to be the ornaments of deceased Budhwantin Bai. They have been subjected to cross-examination, but nothing has been elicited from them to hold that the identification proceeding was not conducted in accordance with law and the two witnesses named above have not identified the ornaments wore by the deceased. In our considered opinion, the seized ornaments have been identified though the ornaments can be treated to be the ornaments in common use, but these witnesses, particularly, Smt. Keshar Bai (PW-1), being niece of the deceased, has not committed any mistake in identifying the seized gold rings and silver bangles. In our considered opinion, the seized ornaments have been identified though the ornaments can be treated to be the ornaments in common use, but these witnesses, particularly, Smt. Keshar Bai (PW-1), being niece of the deceased, has not committed any mistake in identifying the seized gold rings and silver bangles. The Supreme Court in the matter of Earabhadrappa alias Krishnappa v. State of Karnataka, (1983) 2 SCC 330 as held that it is a matter of common knowledge that ladies have an uncanny sense of identifying their own belongings particularly articles of personal use in the family. As such, the submission on behalf of the appellant that memorandum and pursuant seizure have not been proved in accordance with law and further, the ornaments have not been identified in a duly constituted test identification proceeding, has no merit and deserves to be and is accordingly rejected. 18. Now, the next submission on behalf of the appellant is that even if the seized articles were owned by the deceased and were found in possession of the appellant, he can only be convicted for offence under Section 379 of the IPC, but cannot be convicted for offence under Section 302 of the IPC, whereas it is the case of the State / respondent that where murder and robbery are proved to have been integral parts of one and the same transaction and consequently, the presumption under Illustration (a) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act would be drawn that it is only the appellant who not only committed the murder of the deceased but also committed robbery of her gold and silver ornaments which form part of the same transaction, as the prosecution has led sufficient evidence to connect the appellant with the commission of the offence in question. 19. In order to consider the submission, it would be appropriate to notice Illustration (a) to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which states as under: - “114. Court may presume existence of certain facts. —The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. Court may presume existence of certain facts. —The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. Illustrations The Court may presume— (a) That a man who is in possession of stolen goods soon after the theft is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession;” 20. In order to draw an inference that fact in dispute has been established, there must exist, on record, some direct material facts or circumstances from which such inference could be drawn. Inference of proof of that fact could be drawn from given objective facts, direct or circumstantial (see R. Puthunainar Alhithan, etc. v. P.H. Pandian and others, AIR 1996 SC 1599 ). 21. Furthermore, the illustrations appended to the aforesaid section are not exhaustive but merely illustrate the principle underlying the main provision. The presumption to be drawn under that provision is one of fact and whether it should be drawn or not in a particular case must depend upon the facts of that case. 22. In the matter of Tulsiram Kanu v. The State, AIR 1954 SC 1 , while considering Illustration (a) appended to Section 114 of the Evidence Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the presumption permitted to be drawn under Section 114, illustration (a), Evidence Act, has to be read along with the important time-factor. If ornaments or things of the deceased are found in possession of a person soon after the murder, a presumption of guilt may be permitted. But if several months expire in the interval, the presumption may not be permitted to be drawn having regard to the circumstances of the case. Their Lordships observed in paragraph 7 as under : - “7. Apart from this confession, the judgment of the High Court is based on the identification of the gold ornaments. The Sessions Judge recognised that if the ornaments had been proved to have been the property of the deceased it would have been possible to infer that the accused was the person who committed the murder and robbed the murdered man. In our opinion, this reasoning, under the circumstances of the case, is unsound. The Sessions Judge recognised that if the ornaments had been proved to have been the property of the deceased it would have been possible to infer that the accused was the person who committed the murder and robbed the murdered man. In our opinion, this reasoning, under the circumstances of the case, is unsound. The alleged murder took place on 28-5-1949 and assuming that the ornaments were traced to the accused at the end of October 1949, no legitimate inference could be drawn about the appellant being the murderer of the deceased. The important factor which appear to have been overlooked is that five months had elapsed between the date of the alleged murder and the tracing of the ornaments. The presumption permitted to be drawn under S. 114, illu. (a), Evidence Act, has to be read along with the important time factor. If ornaments or things of the deceased are found in the possession of a person soon after the murder, a presumption of guilt may be permitted. But if several months expire in the interval, the presumption may not be permitted to be drawn having regard to the circumstances of the case. The criticism applied equally to the reasoning of the High Court for its conclusion. 23. Thereafter, in the matter of Wasim Khan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1956 SC 400 , the Supreme Court posed a question for consideration, whether the evidence in the case establishes that the appellant murdered and robbed Ram Dularey and their Lordships answered the question that recent and unexplained possession of stolen articles can well be taken to be presumptive evidence of the charge of murder as well as robbery. 24. Thereafter, in the matter of Alisher v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1974) 4 SCC 254 , it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that illustration (a) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act makes it plain that the time factor has a material bearing and the Court must keep it in view before it can draw the presumption in accordance with the illustration. It was further held that the presumption can be raised if a person is found to be in possession of stolen goods soon after the theft. It was further held that the presumption can be raised if a person is found to be in possession of stolen goods soon after the theft. If, however, a long period elapses between the date of the theft and the date on which a person is found to be in possession of the stolen articles, the Court would not be justified in drawing the presumption in accordance with illustration (a) to Section 114. It was also held that the question as to how much period should elapse after the theft in order to rule out the presumption under illustration (a) would depend on the nature of the stolen article and the facts of each case. 25. In the matter of Baiju alias Bharosa v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1978) 1 SCC 588 , the Supreme Court following the decisions in Wasim Khan (supra) and Alisher (supra) and while dealing with the presumption to be drawn under illustration (a) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act has held that it is a matter which depends on the evidence and circumstances of each case. Further, their Lordships pointed out the following factors in order to attract illustration (a) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act: - 1. The nature of the stolen article, 2. the manner of its acquisition by the accused, 3. the nature of the evidence about its identification, 4. the manner in which it was dealt with by the accused, 5. the place and circumstances of its recovery, 6. the length of the intervening period, and 7. the ability or otherwise of the accused to explain his possession, are factors which have to be taken into consideration in arriving at a decision. 26. Thereafter, in the matter of Gulab Chand v. State of M.P., (1995) 3 SCC 574 , following the decision of the Supreme Court in Tulsiram Kanu (supra), their Lordships have held that the presumption permitted to be drawn under Section 114, Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act has to be read along with the “important time factor” and if the ornaments in possession of the deceased are found in possession of a person soon after the murder, a presumption of guilt may be permitted, but if several months had expired in the interval, the presumption cannot be permitted to be drawn having regard to the circumstances of the case. 27. 27. Similarly, in the matter of George v. State of Kerala, (2002) 4 SCC 475 , relying upon the earlier decision in Baiju (supra), the Supreme Court while dealing with the phrase “soon after” employed in illustration (a) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act held as under: - “7. … The possession of the articles which had been duly identified by the witnesses as belonging to the deceased were found in his possession within less than 24 hours of the incident. It would lead to inference under Section 114(a) of the Evidence Act that the appellant has himself committed the robbery, an offence punishable under Section 392 IPC. According to the statement of PWs 10, 12 and 13 the deceased had been saying “take whatever you want, leave me alone”, which shows that he must have been under some apprehension or threat thereof.” 28. Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of the aforesaid principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court to invoke Illustration (a) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act, it is quite vivid that though the appellant was nephew (real) of deceased Budhwantin Bai, but relationship between both of them was not cordial and even the appellant was staying in Indira Awas, Bhatapara, owned by the deceased, which she had already asked him to vacate, but he did not vacate and continuing in the said Indira Awas owned by the deceased. Furthermore, deceased Budhwantin Bai had already declared Ashok Khare (PW-5) as her successor vide agreement Art. ‘A’ by which the appellant was not happy. Immediately after the incident happened in the intervening night of 3rd & 4th September, 2011 at Village Boirdih, Indira Awas, Bhatapara, it was reported by Jailal Khare on 4-9-2011 at 10.30 a.m. pursuant to which unnumbered nalishi was registered vide Ex.P-4, unnumbered morgue intimation was registered vide Ex.P-2, and inquest was conducted vide Ex.P-12 and thereafter, postmortem was conducted in which two ears of the deceased were found cut and blood was oozing out of it and the deceased was found dead on account of fracture in cervical vertebra. Immediately thereafter, the accused was taken into custody and his memorandum statement was recorded on 5-9-2011 at 6.10 p.m. vide Ex.P-13 pursuant to which four gold ear rings and four silver bangles owned by the deceased were recovered from the house of the accused concealed in a handkerchief kept in the pocket of shirt hanging to a wooden hook and as such, it was recovered within 36 hours of the incident. Thus, the ornaments of the deceased were found in possession of the appellant soon after the murder and therefore it satisfies the requirement of important time factor envisaged by the Supreme Court in Tulsiram Kanu (supra) to invoke Illustration (a) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act, as the ornaments were duly identified. Possession of the articles of the deceased has duly been identified by her niece namely, Smt. Keshar Bai (PW-1) and Ashok Khare (PW-5), as belonging to the deceased. This would meet the requirement of Illustration (a) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act and as such, murder and robbery are proved to be integral parts of one and the same transaction and therefore the presumption permitted under Section 114, Illustration (a), of the Evidence Act, would apply and it is held that the trial Court has rightly held that it is the appellant who not only committed the murder of the deceased but also robbed her gold and silver ornaments which form part of one and the same transaction for which the prosecution has led ample evidence to connect the appellant with the offence in question. 29. Now, it is contended by learned counsel for the appellant that vest, lungi and shirt of the appellant seized by the police have been marked as Articles B1, B2 and B3, respectively, but in the FSL report Ex.P-24, no blood stains were found on them. 30. True it is that none of the clothes of the appellant were found to be stained with blood, as they ought to have been if he had actually participated in causing the murder of the deceased, particularly having regard to nature of death of the deceased and injuries sustained by her. 30. True it is that none of the clothes of the appellant were found to be stained with blood, as they ought to have been if he had actually participated in causing the murder of the deceased, particularly having regard to nature of death of the deceased and injuries sustained by her. It is not in dispute that these clothes were recovered vide Ex.P-16 on 5-9-2011 at 7.15 p.m., whereas the offence is said to have been committed in the intervening night of 3rd & 4th September, 2011 and thus, the seizure of said clothes was made after three days of the incident and in the mean time, by passage of time, the appellant could have removed all the marks of bloodstains from his clothes. Therefore, merely because bloodstains were not found on the clothes seized from the appellant, cannot be a ground to hold that he is not involved in the offence of robbery and murder of deceased Budhwantin Bai. One more factor that needs consideration is that the appellant while answering question No.8 that ear rings and bangles of the deceased were found in his possession from his Indira Awas house, replied to be false, as such, the appellant has given false explanation under Section 313 of the CrPC as he has denied in question-answer form, though the stolen property was recovered from him. 31. The Supreme Court in Earabhadrappa alias Krishnappa (supra) in the like case it has been held that denial by the accused where the accused has no satisfactory explanation to offer for his possession of stolen articles, as in this case no satisfactory explanation has been offered, rather it has been denied, their Lordships held that false denial by itself is an incriminating circumstance (see para 13). 32. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the opinion that the prosecution has been able to prove the motive of the appellant to commit the offence on account of having an evil eye on the property of his bua, as his relationship with his bua i.e. the deceased was not cordial and the property has been given by his bua to Ashok Khare (PW-5) by agreement Article ‘A’. Furthermore, pursuant to the memorandum Ex.P-13, gold & silver articles have been seized vide Ex.P-14 which has proved by the witnesses to seizure and memorandum. Furthermore, pursuant to the memorandum Ex.P-13, gold & silver articles have been seized vide Ex.P-14 which has proved by the witnesses to seizure and memorandum. Moreover, gold & silver articles have been identified by Smt. Keshar Bai (PW-1) & Ashok Khare (PW-5) in the test identification parade conducted by R.P. Tiwari (PW-8), Nayab Tahsildar / Executive Magistrate to be belonging to deceased Budhwantin Bai. The appellant has failed to give explanation about the ornaments which were recovered within 36 hours from the date and time of incident and has given false explanation which itself is an incriminating circumstance. 33. In that view of the matter, the trial Court is absolutely justified in holding that it is the appellant who is the author of the crime and as such, the trial Court is justified in convicting the appellant under Sections 450, 302 & 397 of the IPC. 34. For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit in this appeal, it deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed.