JUDGMENT : PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI, J. 1. In the wake of instant surge in COVID - 19 cases and spread of its highly infectious Omicron variant, lawyers have been advised to refrain from coming to Courts. 2. This writ petition has been preferred claiming the following reliefs: "By an appropriate writ, order or direction, order dated 10.11.2017 (Annexure-6) passed by learned Trial Court in Civil Case No. 28 of 2017 (Execution) Smt. Nameta K. Bomb v. Udaipur Mahila Samridhi Urban Cooperative Bank Ltd. & Ors. may kindly quashed and set aside and the execution petition which has been filed by petitioner may kindly be executed as prayer in toto." 3. As the pleaded facts would reveal, the petitioner's services were terminated by the respondent-Bank vide order dated 04.04.2011, and after exhausting the available remedy and being unsuccessful in that pursuit, she has approached this Hon'ble Court claiming the aforementioned reliefs. 4. This Hon'ble Court directed the petitioner to approach the appropriate authority, whereafter the petitioner submitted her claim under Section 58 of the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Act, 2001 before the authority concerned, and in pursuance of the same, an Arbitrator was appointed, who in turn, passed an award/decree dated 04.09.2013, in favour of the petitioner. 5. The respondent-bank thereafter, filed an appeal against the aforementioned award/decree passed by the learned Arbitrator, and upon the said appeal being dismissed, the respondent-Bank preferred a writ petition before this Hon'ble Court, wherein interim relief was granted. The petitioner then filed an application seeking vacation of the said interim order, which was dismissed by the Hon'ble Single Bench of this Court. The petitioner thereafter preferred a special appeal before the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court, which was allowed and the order passed by the Hon'ble Single Bench, staying the operation of the award/decree of the learned Arbitrator was quashed, and the petitioner's application praying for vacation of interim stay was allowed. 6. The respondent-Bank then preferred an appeal through special leave before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, but the same was dismissed. 7. 6. The respondent-Bank then preferred an appeal through special leave before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, but the same was dismissed. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that after this long drawn out process of litigation, as it stands today, there is no stay operating as against the award/decree dated 04.09.2013 passed by the learned Arbitrator, and thus, the petitioner ought to be reinstated with all notional benefits and consequential benefits for the period she was deemed to be unfairly terminated from service by the respondent-Bank. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that since the respondent-Bank, despite the petitioner approaching them seeking her lawful reinstatement, the respondent-Bank did not reinstate her into service, and therefore, the petitioner filed an application before the learned trial court for execution of the aforementioned arbitral award/decree. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that the respondent-Bank then filed an application under Order 21 Rule 26 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, 'CPC') seeking stay of the execution proceedings, which was then rejected by the learned trial court, and thereafter, the respondent-Bank filed another application under Order 21 Rule 22 read with Section 151 CPC raising objections as to the maintainability of the execution petition, to which the learned trial court passed the execution decree, only to the extent of granting the petitioner two days pay for the dates 27.11.2010 and 30.11.2010. 10. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent-Bank submits that the award/decree as passed by the learned Arbitrator only stipulates that the petitioner is entitled to the aforementioned two days' salary, and that the same was already granted by the learned court below vide the impugned order dated 10.11.2017 passed in the execution proceedings. 11. Learned counsel for the respondent-Bank further submits that the award/decree makes no direction with regard to the reinstatement of the petitioner, and that to this extent, the award/decree is purely declaratory in nature; hence, this petition so preferred by the petitioner before this Court is not maintainable. 12. In support of the submissions so made by the respondent bank, reliance was placed on the following judgments: State of M.P. v. Magilal Sharma 1998 SCC (L & S) 599 wherein the Division Bench of the Hon'ble Madhya Pradesh High Court, at Paras. 6 and 8, observed the following: "6. 12. In support of the submissions so made by the respondent bank, reliance was placed on the following judgments: State of M.P. v. Magilal Sharma 1998 SCC (L & S) 599 wherein the Division Bench of the Hon'ble Madhya Pradesh High Court, at Paras. 6 and 8, observed the following: "6. A declaratory decree merely declares the right of the decree - holder vis a vis the judgment debtor and does not in terms direct the judgment debtor to do or refrain from doing any particular act or thing. Since in the present case decree does not direct reinstatement or payment of arrears of salary the executing court could not issue any process for the purpose as that would be going outside or beyond the decree... 8. In Prakash Chand v. S.S. Grewal the petitioner had a decree in his favour declaring his dismissal from service to be illegal, void and of no effect. The Punjab Government did not reinstate him nor paid him the arrears of salary. He, therefore, filed a writ petition for taking contempt of court proceedings against certain officials of the State Government. The Court held as under: "A declaratory decree, in my opinion, cannot be executed as it only declares the rights of the decree-holder qua the judgment-debtor and does not, in terms, direct the judgment-debtor to do or refrain from doing any particular act or thing. Since there is no command issued to the judgment-debtor to obey, the civil process cannot be issued for the compliance of that mandate or command. The decree-holder is free to seek his legal remedies by way of suit or otherwise on the basis of the declaration given in his favour." State of Punjab and others v. Krishnan Dayal Sharma AIR 1990 SC 2177 wherein the Division Bench of the Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court, at Para. 3, observed thus: "There is no dispute between the parties that the decree which was put to execution did not contain any order or direction for the payment of any interest or the amount which was payable to the decree holder consequent to the declaration made by the Court decreeing the respondent's suit. There is no further dispute that no relief for interest has been claimed by the respondent in the suit nor any such claim was discussed or awarded by the Court decreeing the suit... There is no further dispute that no relief for interest has been claimed by the respondent in the suit nor any such claim was discussed or awarded by the Court decreeing the suit... the Execution Court is bound by the terms of the decree, it cannot add or alter the decree on its notion of fairness or justice. The right of the decree holder to obtain relief is determined in accordance with the terms of the decree..." Lingaraj Paikaray and others v. Raghunath Chhotray and others, AIR 1983 Orissa 146 wherein the Hon'ble Orissa High Court observed thus: "4. It is well settled that a declaratory decree is incapable of execution and a separate suit has to be filed on the basis of the declaration made in the decree. 5. A declaratory decree is one which merely declares the rights of the parties but does not direct any act to be performed. It embodies no definite order which can be enforced by execution. Though it declares certain rights out of which certain reliefs are to emerge, the decree itself does not provide for those reliefs vide (1966) Cut LT 1049, Dambaru Pradhan v. Kausalya. 6. In the present case, the decree merely declares the rights of the parties and does not require either party to do or not to do anything. It does not contain any direction to the plaintiffs to pay any amount to the defendant. There is also no direction that the defendant would recover the amount from the plaintiffs by execution. The learned counsel appearing for the defendant- opposite party placed reliance on the following words in the decree.:- "...... the defendant has no other right against the plaintiffs or the partnership firm or its assets except to receive the amount standing in the books of the firm in his name and the value of his share in the goodwill assessed at Rs. 5,000/- and contended that there is an enforceable decree in favour of the defendant. I am unable to accede to this contention, As already stated, the decree merely declares that the defendant has no other right except to receive the amount of Rs. 1,04,542.78 paise standing in his name In the books of the firm and the sum of Rs. 5,000/- as the value of his share in the good will of the business. An executing Court can only execute a definite order. 1,04,542.78 paise standing in his name In the books of the firm and the sum of Rs. 5,000/- as the value of his share in the good will of the business. An executing Court can only execute a definite order. In the instant case, the decree does not contain any definite order which can be enforced by execution. So the defendant could not recover the amount by execution. The right to receive the amount declared by the decree could only be enforced in a regular suit brought for the purpose. 8. In the instant case, there was no order of the Court for payment of the amount which could be enforced by execution. There is nothing in the decree which empowers the defendant to recover the amounts through the Court by execution. The decree in its nature is declaratory and, not executory. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the defendant has misconceived his remedy and his application for execution was not maintainable. 9. In view of my above findings, it is not necessary to consider the other points urged on behalf of the petitioners. 10. In the result, the Civil Revision is allowed and the order of the executing Court is set aside. Execution Case No. 9 of 1979 be dismissed as not maintainable. Parties to bear their own costs incurred in this Court." Parkash Chand v. Shri S.S. Grewal I.A.S. Chief Secretary to Government Punjab and others. 1974 (1) SLR 647 (P&H), wherein the Hon'ble Special Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, observed thus: "3. The contempt petition came up for hearing before Sandhawalia, J., and the learned Judge was of the opinion that a number of significant and far-reaching questions arose in the petition for which there was no binding precedent. He, therefore, directed that a larger Bench may be constituted to hear the petition. The questions posed by the learned Judge were as under:-- (1) Does a declaratory decree granted in favour of a public servant declaring his dismissal to be illegal, void and unconstitutional, entitle him to claim reinstatement to his original post? (2) Would such a public servant be entitled to the payment of his past and future emoluments by virtue of the decree alone? (2) Would such a public servant be entitled to the payment of his past and future emoluments by virtue of the decree alone? (3) Is such a decree in executable by civil process and if so, can resort be had to contempt proceedings against the officials of the State for refusing to give effect to such a decree? (4) Would the fact that an appeal has been preferred by the State against such a decree make any difference, where no stay has been prayed for, or if prayed, has been declined by the appellate Court? The petition was then placed for hearing before a Division Bench consisting of Gurdev Singh and Gurnam Singh, JJ. Gurdev Singh, J., wrote the main order in which it is mentioned that the controversy before the Bench centred round the following questions:-- (1) Whether a decree of a Civil Court declaring the dismissal of a person like the petitioner as illegal and ultra vires and treating him to be still in service can be construed as enjoining upon the Government to reinstate the decree-holder and grant him all the privileges of his post, including the arrears of his salary, etc.? (2) Whether refusal or failure of the Government to take any action to reinstate such a person and grant him the privileges of that post amounts to contempt? (3) In case question No. 2 is answered in the affirmative, whether the State officials concerned can take shelter behind the legal advice tendered to them? After referring to various judgments, it was observed by Gurdev Singh, J.-- "Whether there has been disobedience of an order or decree of this Court in the case before us, depends upon the question whether the declaratory decree obtained by the petitioner, implies any direction to the State or to its servants to do something to reinstate the petitioner and give him all benefits and privileges, which he was enjoying at the time he was dismissed from service. As there is no clear authority on this matter and on some other questions that arise in this case, I am of the opinion that the matter be settled by a larger Bench. As there is no clear authority on this matter and on some other questions that arise in this case, I am of the opinion that the matter be settled by a larger Bench. I would, accordingly, refer the following questions to a Full Bench for its opinion:-- (1) Whether a decree of a Civil Court declaring the order of dismissal of a public servant as void and illegal and treating him to be still in service can be construed as enjoining upon the Government to reinstate the decree-holder and grant him all benefits and privileges, including his past and future emoluments? (2) Whether such a decree is executable by a civil process? (3) Whether the refusal or failure of the Government or its servants concerned to take any action to reinstate such a decree-holder and grant him all the benefits and privileges of his service, amounts to contempt of Court? (4) If question No. 3 is found in the affirmative, whether the State or its officials concerned can take shelter behind the legal advice tendered to them or the fact that an appeal against the decree is pending, though no order staying the operation of the decree had been obtained. My learned brother Gurnam Singh, J., also agreed that the case be referred to a Full Bench for he decision of the questions formulated by Gurdev Singh, J., and that is how this petition has come up for hearing before us. 8. 8. A declaratory decree, in my opinion, cannot be executed as it only declares the rights of the decree-holder qua the judgment debtor and does not, in terms, direct the judgment-debtor to do or to refrain from doing any particular act or thing. Since there is no command issued to the judgment-debtor to obey, the civil process cannot be issued of the compliance of that mandate or command. The decree-holder is free to seek his legal remedies by way of suit or otherwise on the basis of the declaration given in his favour. Question 2 is answered accordingly. Dharamveer & Others v. Mr. Ashok Sampatram, Principal Secretary & Anr., 2015 (5) WLC (Raj.) 183 wherein the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court, observed thus: "7. The decree-holder is free to seek his legal remedies by way of suit or otherwise on the basis of the declaration given in his favour. Question 2 is answered accordingly. Dharamveer & Others v. Mr. Ashok Sampatram, Principal Secretary & Anr., 2015 (5) WLC (Raj.) 183 wherein the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court, observed thus: "7. Learned Single Judge in the judgment, which was upheld by the Division Bench held that once the private respondents were granted the benefit of selection grade in the year 1989, taking into consideration their eligibility for promotion on the post of Assistant Agriculture officer, the said benefit could not be withdrawn or taken away on the basis of amendment made in 1981 in respect of Rules. 8. We do not find that any such direction was given, which may entitle the petitioners to be given the selection grade after the judgment despite the change in eligibility conditions. The directions issued by the learned Single Judge, were confined to the withdrawal of the benefit, and not for grant of any benefits in future. The respondents were required to take any positive steps for granting any benefits to the petitioner, and thus we are of the view that no case is made out to issue notice in the contempt petition." 13. Learned counsel for the respondent-Bank thereafter, submits that the award/decree was passed by the learned Arbitrator on 04.09.2013, and the petitioner, through the course of the litigation has merely sought its execution, and the award/decree itself was not challenged by her, and thereby through non-challenge and passage of time of about 9 years, the award/decree itself has attained finality. Learned counsel also submits that the learned trial court vide its order dated 10.11.2017 directed for the execution of the arbitral award/decree, wherein the learned Arbitrator made a clear direction for the payment of the petitioner's salary for two days i.e. 27.11.2010 and 30.11.2010. 14. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the record of the case, alongwith the judgments cited above. 15. This Court observes that under Section 36 sub-section (1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1996') the arbitral award/decree shall be enforced under the CPC, as if it were a decree of the Court. 15. This Court observes that under Section 36 sub-section (1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1996') the arbitral award/decree shall be enforced under the CPC, as if it were a decree of the Court. Needless to say, the award/decree in question in the present case is a domestic award governed by Part 1 of the Act of 1996, as clearly laid down in Section 2 sub-section (2). Section 36 of the Act of 1996 reads as follows: "36. Enforcement. (1) Where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under section 34 has expired, then, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), such award shall be enforced in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in the same manner as if it were a decree of the Court. (2)... (3)... 16. This Court further observes that the arbitral award/decree in question may be safely assumed to be final and valid, under Section 35 of the Act of 1996, as no application to set aside the award under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 was made by the respondent. Therefore, the validity of the award and subsequently, the validity of the execution is not in question. 17. This Court also observes that based on the primary argument raised by the learned counsel for the respondent, the question that arises for consideration is whether an arbitral award may be treated in part as a declaratory decree and in part as an executable decree, and the learned counsel has subsequently relied on a multitude of case laws to submit that a decree may only be executed only to its executable portion, and not executable with respect to the declaratory portion. 18. This Court also observes the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Parkash Chand Khurana and Ors. v. Harnam Singh and Ors., (1973) 2 SCC 484 , wherein at Para. 19. it was observed as under: "... The tenor of the award shows that the arbitrator did not intend merely to declare the rights to the parties..." 20. This Court further observes the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Madras High Court in Manavikrama Raja v. Thattamangalath and Ors., wherein at Para. 12, it was observed thus: "... 19. it was observed as under: "... The tenor of the award shows that the arbitrator did not intend merely to declare the rights to the parties..." 20. This Court further observes the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Madras High Court in Manavikrama Raja v. Thattamangalath and Ors., wherein at Para. 12, it was observed thus: "... of two possible constructions, the Court will not accept the one which leads to plain injustice and makes its own decree an instrument of depriving parties, whose case had not been heard and decided, of valuable and cherished rights which no one had any intention to destroy. That would be the effect of adopting the appellant's construction of this decree." 21. This Court on the basis of the above-mentioned judgments and upon a thorough perusal of the arbitral award in question dated 04.09.2013, observes that the intent of the arbitrator was to regularise the services of the petitioner during the period of termination, after setting aside the termination order so passed by the respondent-Bank, as follows: 22. Furthermore, from a perusal of the award/decree dated 04.09.2013, it is apparent that the explicit demand for the salary for the aforementioned two days was made by the petitioner before the learned Arbitrator, only because she was not physically present in the office premises of the respondent-Bank, and in fact was present before the inquiry officer. It is, therefore, evident that the said demand was made over and above her rightful demand for notional and consequential benefits for the period during which she was unfairly terminated, and that is the reason, it has been explicitly included in the arbitral award. 23. This Court, in view of the praefatus observations, does not find any value in the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent-Bank, that the arbitral award in question dated 04.09.2013, is severable into certain portions being declaratory and certain portions being executable. 24. This Court also observes from the record of the present case that although the award/decree, dated 04.09.2013, passed by the learned Arbitrator only grants the petitioner the salary for two days i.e. 27.11.2010 and 30.11.2010, but it sets aside the order of termination of the petitioner from the service, in clear and unequivocal terms. 25. 24. This Court also observes from the record of the present case that although the award/decree, dated 04.09.2013, passed by the learned Arbitrator only grants the petitioner the salary for two days i.e. 27.11.2010 and 30.11.2010, but it sets aside the order of termination of the petitioner from the service, in clear and unequivocal terms. 25. This Court further observes that while the learned counsel for the respondent-Bank vehemently argued that the petitioner's right is limited to execution of the award/decree of the learned Arbitrator, only to the extent of grant of salary for the aforementioned two days, and that the rest of the award/decree is merely declaratory in nature, and therefore, the same cannot be sought to be executed by the petitioner, does not hold good in the opinion of this Court, as the language of the award is not merely declaratory. 26. This Court further observes that the arbitral award/decree itself clearly states that the aforementioned termination order was set aside, a logical and reasonable consequence of which would be that the petitioner must be reinstated into service with all the notional and consequential benefits for the period during which she was deemed to be unfairly terminated from service of the respondent-Bank, as is evident from the tenor of the arbitral award in question. 27. This Court further observes that however, this was not given effect to, and that the petitioner had to subsequently seek the execution of the award, and while the learned trial court granted limited relief, the same was done by adopting a hyper-technical approach, only to the extent of grant of salary for the two days i.e. 27.11.2010 and 30.11.2010, which is prima facie unjust and arbitrary, especially given that the award/decree explicitly states that the order of termination of the petitioner from service was set aside. 28. This Court also takes into consideration the fact that the respondent sought a challenge to the arbitral award, which at a subsequent stage was withdrawn, as accepted by the learned counsel for the respondent-Bank. Thus, the arbitral award acquired finality qua the parties. 29. This Court therefore finds substantial and sustainable directions in the form of the aforementioned award/decree dated 04.09.2013 passed by the learned Arbitrator. 30. Thus, the arbitral award acquired finality qua the parties. 29. This Court therefore finds substantial and sustainable directions in the form of the aforementioned award/decree dated 04.09.2013 passed by the learned Arbitrator. 30. In the opinion of this Court, if the petitioner is deprived of her lawful fruits, which is the consequential relief of the litigation, even after litigating before multiple forums and having an order in her favour, which has attained finality, it shall be travesty of justice if the required relief does not reach her. 31. In light of the above-mentioned observations, the present petition is allowed, and while setting aside the order dated 10.11.2017 passed by the learned trial court in Civil Case No. 28/2017 (Execution) (Smt. Nameta K. Bomb v. Udaipur Mahila Samridhi Urban Cooperative Bank Ltd. & Ors.), this Court directs the respondent-Bank to reinstate the petitioner forthwith and grant her all the notional benefits from the date of her termination till the date of this judgment; however, all the future benefits from the date of judgment shall be given actually. The compliance of this judgment shall be made within a period of three months from today. All pending applications also stand disposed of.