JUDGMENT : The petitioner has approached this Court with a prayer for quashing of Memo No.4/Ma.Sa./Ra. Aarop/423/2021/2278, Ranchi dated 03.12.2021 (Annexure-4), whereby and whereunder in purported exercise of powers under Rule 9 (1) (ka) & (ga) of Jharkhand Government Servant’s (Classification Control & Appeal) Rules, 2016, the petitioner has been put under suspension in contemplation of departmental enquiry and further has been directed to report at South Chhotanagpur Divisional Commissioner, Ranchi. 2. The case of the petitioner lies in a narrow compass. The petitioner joined the services in the State of Jharkhand as Child Development Officer in the year, 2000 and she was posted at various districts in the State of Jharkhand during the service career and lastly she was posted as District Social Welfare Officer, Ranchi w.e.f. 28.01.2021. She remained to discharge her duties to the full satisfaction of her superiors and with utmost sincerity. It is specific case of the petitioner that while she was posted in Ranchi, she was put under suspension on 03.12.2021 in contemplation of the Departmental Proceeding. Aggrieved by the said order of suspension dated 03.12.2021, the present writ petition has been filed. 3. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner confines his prayer to the extent that order of suspension be declared bad in law on the ground that even the currency of the suspension order should not exceed three months without issuance of show cause notice or any charge-sheet though the same has been done in the instant case but no reasons have been assigned for extension of currency of suspension beyond three months. Learned counsel places heavy reliance on the reported judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary, reported in (2015) 7 SCC 291 . He further submits that petitioner a lady is suffering from great hardship due to the order of suspension and extension of currency of suspension order without assigning any reasons. 4. Per contra, counter-affidavit has been filed. 5. Mr. Mukesh Kumar Sinha, learned counsel for the respondent-State vehemently opposes the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that on the direction of this Hon’ble Court he has already filed supplementary counter-affidavit and stated that after putting the petitioner under suspension, the Department through Resolution No. 135 dated 20.01.2022 initiated the departmental proceeding against the petitioner and the memo of charges has also been served to the petitioner. He further submits that he is conscious of the law that reasons were to be assigned for extension of currency of the suspension, but in the supplementary counter-affidavit, the same has not been mentioned and submits that if further time is granted to him, he will file an additional counter-affidavit. 6. Be that as it may, having gone through the rival submissions of the parties on 14.03.2022, this Court after hearing the parties orally directed the respondents to file a specific reply to the issues “as to whether departmental proceeding against the petitioner has been initiated or not and if initiated then what is the stage of the proceeding and whether before expiry of three months period from the date of suspension i.e. 03.12.2021, memo of charge has been served to the petitioner or not and if not then whether the department through fresh order by assigning reasons continued the suspension of the petitioner or not” 7. Though the reply has been filed by way of supplementary counter-affidavit, but very cleverly the reasons have not been assigned for extension of currency of suspension order. It is settled principles of law that for putting an employee under suspension in contemplation of the departmental proceeding, even a show cause notice is not required, but for extension of currency of suspension, the charge-sheet must be served as well as reasons have to be assigned. The issue fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary Vs. Union of India, reported in (2015) 7 SCC 291 , wherein at para 11, 12, 13, 14 & 21 it has been held thus:- 11. Suspension, specially preceding the formulation of charges, is essentially transitory or temporary in nature, and must perforce be of short duration. If it is for an indeterminate period or if its renewal is not based on sound reasoning contemporaneously available on the record, this would render it punitive in nature. Departmental/disciplinary proceedings invariably commence with delay, are plagued with procrastination prior and post the drawing up of the memorandum of charges, and eventually culminate after even longer delay. 12. Protracted periods of suspension, repeated renewal thereof, have regrettably become the norm and not the exception that they ought to be. Departmental/disciplinary proceedings invariably commence with delay, are plagued with procrastination prior and post the drawing up of the memorandum of charges, and eventually culminate after even longer delay. 12. Protracted periods of suspension, repeated renewal thereof, have regrettably become the norm and not the exception that they ought to be. The suspended person suffering the ignominy of insinuations, the scorn of society and the derision of his department, has to endure this excruciation even before he is formally charged with some misdemeanour, indiscretion or offence. His torment is his knowledge that if and when charged, it will inexorably take an inordinate time for the inquisition or inquiry to come to its culmination, that is, to determine his innocence or iniquity. Much too often this has now become an accompaniment to retirement. Indubitably, the sophist will nimbly counter that our Constitution does not explicitly guarantee either the right to a speedy trial even to the incarcerated, or assume the presumption of innocence to the accused. But we must remember that both these factors are legal ground norms, are inextricable tenets of Common Law Jurisprudence, antedating even the Magna Carta of 1215, which assures that — “We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right.” In similar vein the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. 13. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 assures that: “12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” 14. More recently, the European Convention on Human Rights in Article 6(1) promises that: “6. (1) in the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time….” and in its second sub-article that: “6. (2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.” 21. (1) in the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time….” and in its second sub-article that: “6. (2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.” 21. We, therefore, direct that the currency of a suspension order should not extend beyond three months if within this period the memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is not served on the delinquent officer/employee; if the memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is served, a reasoned order must be passed for the extension of the suspension. As in the case in hand, the Government is free to transfer the person concerned to any department in any of its offices within or outside the State so as to sever any local or personal contact that he may have and which he may misuse for obstructing the investigation against him. The Government may also prohibit him from contacting any person, or handling records and documents till the stage of his having to prepare his defence. We think this will adequately safeguard the universally recognised principle of human dignity and the right to a speedy trial and shall also preserve the interest of the Government in the prosecution. We recognise that the previous Constitution Benches have been reluctant to quash proceedings on the grounds of delay, and to set time-limits to their duration. However, the imposition of a limit on the period of suspension has not been discussed in prior case law, and would not be contrary to the interests of justice. Furthermore, the direction of the Central Vigilance Commission that pending a criminal investigation, departmental proceedings are to be held in abeyance stands superseded in view of the stand adopted by us. 8. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of State of Orissa Vs. Bimal Kumar Mohanty, reported in (1994) 4 SCC 126 , wherein it has been held thus: 13. 8. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of State of Orissa Vs. Bimal Kumar Mohanty, reported in (1994) 4 SCC 126 , wherein it has been held thus: 13. It is thus settled law that normally when an appointing authority or the disciplinary authority seeks to suspend an employee, pending inquiry or contemplated inquiry or pending investigation into grave charges of misconduct or defalcation of funds or serious acts of omission and commission, the order of suspension would be passed after taking into consideration the gravity of the misconduct sought to be inquired into or investigated and the nature of the evidence placed before the appointing authority and on application of the mind by disciplinary authority. Appointing authority or disciplinary authority should consider the above aspects and decide whether it is expedient to keep an employee under suspension pending aforesaid action. It would not be as an administrative routine or an automatic order to suspend an employee. It should be on consideration of the gravity of the alleged misconduct or the nature of the allegations imputed to the delinquent employee. The Court or the Tribunal must consider each case on its own facts and no general law could be laid down in that behalf. Suspension is not a punishment but is only one of forbidding or disabling an employee to discharge the duties of office or post held by him. In other words it is to refrain him to avail further opportunity to perpetrate the alleged misconduct or to remove the impression among the members of service that dereliction of duty would pay fruits and the offending employee could get away even pending inquiry without any impediment or to prevent an opportunity to the delinquent officer to scuttle the inquiry or investigation or to win over the witnesses or the delinquent having had the opportunity in office to impede the progress of the investigation or inquiry etc. But as stated earlier, each case must be considered depending on the nature of the allegations, gravity of the situation and the indelible impact it creates on the service for the continuance of the delinquent employee in service pending inquiry or contemplated inquiry or investigation. It would be another thing if the action is actuated by mala fides, arbitrary or for ulterior purpose. The suspension must be a step in aid to the ultimate result of the investigation or inquiry. It would be another thing if the action is actuated by mala fides, arbitrary or for ulterior purpose. The suspension must be a step in aid to the ultimate result of the investigation or inquiry. The authority also should keep in mind public interest of the impact of the delinquent's continuance in office while facing departmental inquiry or trial of a criminal charge. 9. In view of the legal propositions and the ratio laid down in the aforesaid cases (supra), it is crystal clear that the currency of a suspension order should not extend beyond three months if within this period the memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is not served on the delinquent officer/employee; if the memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is served, a reasoned order must be passed for the extension of the suspension. In the instant case, the memo of charges has already been served, but the reasons have not been assigned for extension of currency of suspension, this shows the callous approach of the respondent-State. 10. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid rules, guidelines and judicial pronouncement, the impugned order of suspension is not tenable in the eyes of law and as such, impugned order dated 03.12.2021 (Annexure-4) is hereby quashed and set aside. 11. As a result of quashment of the impugned order, the respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner at her original place of posting. Needless to say that petitioner is entitled for subsistence allowance, in accordance with law and if the same has not been paid to her, the same may be paid to her, within a period of three weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 12. Since the suspension is under contemplation of the departmental enquiry, the petitioner is also directed to participate and co-operate in the enquiry and the respondents shall conclude the enquiry, within a period of three months from the receipt of a copy of this order. 13. Resultantly, writ petition stands allowed.