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2022 DIGILAW 368 (ALL)

Govind Saran v. Shubhi Mishra

2022-03-14

J.J.MUNIR

body2022
JUDGMENT : 1. This is a tenant's revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 (for short “the Act of 1887”), questioning a decree for ejectment, besides recovery of arrears of rent and mesne profits. 2. S.C.C. Suit No.15 of 2012 was instituted on behalf of the plaintiff-landlady, Km. Shubhi Mishra, then a minor aged about 16 years through her father, Dr. Pramod Kumar Mishra, acting as her next friend. This suit was instituted before the District Judge of Pilibhit sitting as the Judge, Small Cause Court, against the defendant-tenant, Govind Saran, seeking the defendant's ejectment from a shop situate in Mohalla Desh Nagar, District Hospital Road, Pilibhit, details whereof are given at the foot of the plaint, giving rise to the suit. Besides ejectment, a decree for recovery of a sum of Rs.41,433/-as arrears of rent was also sought. A further decree for recovery of mesne profits in the sum of Rs.2000/-with effect from the date of determination of the tenancy until the date of the suit, worked out at the rate of Rs.250/-per day, besides Rs.1500/-as costs of the notice, was also claimed. Apart from the aforesaid items of the claim, a decree for recovery of mesne profits at the rate last mentioned was claimed for the period pendente lite and future. 3. The suit was instituted on behalf of the plaintiff-landlady (for short, 'the plaintiff') alleging that the shop in question, which shall hereinafter be referred to as the 'demised shop', was let out on her behalf by her father to the defendant-revisionist (for short, 'the defendant') in the year 2008 for a period of eleven months. The rate of rent was Rs.5500/- per month. The tenancy was month-to-month, commencing on the first day of each English calendar month. The provisions of The Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (for short “U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972”) did not govern the tenancy. The defendant committed default in payment of rent w.e.f. February, 2012 and continued to do so, extending false promises to pay. He avoided paying the due rent on one pretext or the other that he came up with. Despite repeat demands to pay his outstanding rent, the defendant did not comply. The defendant committed default in payment of rent w.e.f. February, 2012 and continued to do so, extending false promises to pay. He avoided paying the due rent on one pretext or the other that he came up with. Despite repeat demands to pay his outstanding rent, the defendant did not comply. In the circumstances, the plaintiff caused a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short, “the Act of 1882”) to be issued to the defendant on 13.08.2012, calling upon the defendant to pay the entire arrears of rent and determining the tenancy on expiry of a period of thirty days of the receipt of notice. The defendant was also called upon to vacate the demised shop and hand over possession thereof on the expiry of the notice period. The notice was dispatched at the correct residential address of the defendant as well as his business address by registered post. The notice was duly served upon the defendant personally on 16.08.2012. The defendant's tenancy stood determined w.e.f. 16.09.2012. Despite termination of his tenancy, the defendant did not vacate the demised shop or remit the arrears of rent. It was asserted that the defendant owed the plaintiff a sum of Rs.41,433/-in arrears of rent from 01.02.2012 till 16.09.2012. A sum of Rs.2000/-was claimed to be due towards mesne profits from 17.09.2012 till the date of institution of the suit, worked out at the rate of Rs.250/-per day, besides Rs.1500/-on account of fee and expenses of the notice served. 4. The suit was instituted on 24.09.2012 and a summons returnable on 24.11.2012 was issued to the defendant. 5. A written statement was filed on behalf of the defendant, admitting himself to be a tenant in the demised shop at the rate of Rs.5500/-per month. It was, however, pleaded that rent in the year 2007 was Rs.4500/-per month, but in deference to wishes of the plaintiff's father, the rent was enhanced to Rs.5500/-. It was claimed that until 30.06.2012, rent was paid to the plaintiff's father, who despite demand, did not issue any receipt. The plaintiff's father would ward off his obligations and never issued any receipt. The defendant on 05.08.2012, along with his son, went to the plaintiff's father in order to pay rent for the period 01.07.2012 to 31.07.2021 and demanded a receipt thereof. The plaintiff's father refused to issue a receipt. The plaintiff's father would ward off his obligations and never issued any receipt. The defendant on 05.08.2012, along with his son, went to the plaintiff's father in order to pay rent for the period 01.07.2012 to 31.07.2021 and demanded a receipt thereof. The plaintiff's father refused to issue a receipt. He asked the defendant to deposit rent by cheque in lieu of cash. The defendant and his son thereupon issued a cheque on 05.08.2012, favouring the plaintiff's father, signed by himself and his son and handed it over to the payee. The plaintiff's father thereupon instructed the defendant that in future, he should pay rent by cheque. In compliance with those instructions, the defendant handed over to the plaintiff's father Cheque No.779463 worth Rs.5500/-on 03.09.2012, Cheque No.779464 worth Rs.11,000/-, being the accumulated rent for two months on 18.11.2012, Cheque No.774650 worth Rs.11,000/-on 17.01.2013, which was in liquidation of his liability up to 31.12.2012. On 01.02.2013, when the defendant went over to the plaintiff's father to pay him rent for the month of January, 2013, he avoided receiving it and told the defendant that he would accept rent in some wholesome figure in future. 6. It is the defendant's case that he received envelopes from Mr. B.S. Ashok, Advocate by registered post and speed post, but upon opening the envelopes, each of them were found to carry blank papers with nothing scripted on it. The next day, the defendant went to the city in connection with some personal work and upon his return, sent a letter dated 14.09.2012 by registered post to Mr. B.S. Ashok, Advocate, informing him that he had received an envelope from the learned Advocate carrying blank papers. The defendant also requested the addressee to let him know the purpose of it all, and not to misuse the same. 7. The defendant claims to have come to know about the suit upon publication of summons in the newspaper. Prior to publication, he had no knowledge about the pending suit. It is asserted that from 01.01.2013 to 31.03.2013, rent has been deposited in Court through tenders for the purpose. Any kind of default was denied and it is the defendant’s further case that provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 apply to the demised shop. Service of notice under Section 106 of the Act of 1882 was denied. It is asserted that from 01.01.2013 to 31.03.2013, rent has been deposited in Court through tenders for the purpose. Any kind of default was denied and it is the defendant’s further case that provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 apply to the demised shop. Service of notice under Section 106 of the Act of 1882 was denied. The notice filed along with the plaint is said to be bogus, which was not served upon the defendant at all. It did not terminate his tenancy and, therefore, no decree of eviction etc. could be passed on its basis. 8. After exchange of pleadings, the Trial Court framed the following issues (Translated into English from Hindi): “(1) Whether the plaintiff and the defendant bear the relationship of landlord and tenant relating to the shop in dispute? (2) Whether the suit is not barred by the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972? (3) Whether the notice dated 13.08.2012 served upon the plaintiff is illegal and void? (4) Whether the defendant has committed default in the payment of settled rent? If yes, its effect? (5) To what relief is the plaintiff entitled?” 9. The plaintiff, in support of her case, filed documentary evidence that includes a copy of the notice dated 13.08.2012, AD Card, the postal receipt, the statement of account of the plaintiff's father duly certified. For her oral evidence, an affidavit sworn by Pramod Kumar Mishra, the plaintiff's father was filed under Order XVII Rule 4 CPC. He testified himself as PW-1 and was cross-examined. 10. The defendant filed documentary evidence, being challans dated 02.09.2013, 29.03.2013 and 04.08.2013; still more dated 29.03.2013, 04.05.2013 and 01.06.2013. Besides, photostat copies of four cheques were also filed. The detail of documentary evidence finds its enumeration in the summary thereof set out in the judgment of the Trial Court, which need not be scripted for every detail of it. The defendant examined himself as a witness in support of his case and filed his affidavit. He testified in the witness-box as DW-1, where he was cross-examined. 11. Issue No.1 was decided on admission, holding the relationship of landlord and tenant well established between parties. The defendant examined himself as a witness in support of his case and filed his affidavit. He testified in the witness-box as DW-1, where he was cross-examined. 11. Issue No.1 was decided on admission, holding the relationship of landlord and tenant well established between parties. About Issue No.2, the Trial Court held that since the monthly rent was Rs.5500/-, a figure that is not in dispute, which exceeds Rs.2000/-per month, the building is exempt from the operation of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 by virtue of Section 2(g) thereof. Returning its finding on Issue No.3, it was held by the Trial Court that the notice to quit was valid and effectively determined the defendant's tenancy. As regards Issue No.4, it was held that the defendant committed default in the payment of monthly rent, rendering him liable to eviction. So far as Issue No.5 goes, it was opined that deposit of a sum of Rs.33,000/-towards rent, that was remitted by cheques, issued by the defendant, was well established. Also, money that was deposited by tenders in Court was also opined to be established. The said sum of money was directed to be adjusted against the plaintiff's claim for arrears of rent and mesne profits. The suit was decreed for eviction as well as arrears of rent and mesne profits, after adjusting the sum of money towards rent and mesne profits that was remitted through cheque or deposit by tender in Court. Also, w.e.f. 17.09.2012 till delivery of possession, the tenant was ordered to pay mesne profits at the rate of Rs.250/-per day. 12. This revision was entertained on 13.03.2014 and notice pending admission was issued. By an interim stay order, the defendant's eviction was stayed, subject to deposit of the entire decretal amount within a period of one month from the date of the stay order. Subsequently, after appearance of parties, the revision was admitted to hearing vide order dated 21.07.2014 and the lower court records were summoned. 13. Heard learned Counsel for the defendant and Mr. Pradeep Kumar, Senior Advocate, assisted by Ms. Babita Upadhyay, learned Counsel for the plaintiff. 14. The only point, that has been pressed in support of this revision by the learned Counsel for the defendant, is about validity of the notice to quit dated 13.08.2012, that was subject matter of Issue No.3 before the Trial Judge. Pradeep Kumar, Senior Advocate, assisted by Ms. Babita Upadhyay, learned Counsel for the plaintiff. 14. The only point, that has been pressed in support of this revision by the learned Counsel for the defendant, is about validity of the notice to quit dated 13.08.2012, that was subject matter of Issue No.3 before the Trial Judge. The learned Counsel for the defendant has assailed the notice on three counts, to wit, the fact that the notice was never served and in its stead, a registered cover carrying blank papers was sent to the defendant on behalf of the plaintiff; secondly, the language of the notice does not effect a determination of the tenancy or work as a notice to quit within the meaning of Section 106 of the Act of 1882, as applicable to the State of Uttar Pradesh; and thirdly, the defendant having deposited rent beyond the month of December, 2012 through tender in Court at the hearing of the suit, including accrued interest and full costs, is entitled to be relieved of his liability against forfeiture under Section 114 of the Act of 1882. In short, on the last score, it is submitted that a notice to quit under Section 106 of the Act of 1882 would not entitle the plaintiff to evict the defendant, once he has complied with the provisions of Section 114 last mentioned. 15. Mr. Pradeep Kumar, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the plaintiff, on the other hand, has refuted these submissions and urged that a valid notice to quit was served, that effectively determines the tenancy, which is for a residential purpose. He submits that the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 does not apply, and, therefore, all that is required is a notice to quit under Section 106 of the Act of 1882 without reference to any case of forfeiture on account of default, or a violation of the other terms of the lease. 16. This Court has keenly considered the submissions advanced on behalf of both sides and perused the record. 17. So far as the first part of the challenge to the notice determining the defendant's tenancy is concerned, it proceeds on a purely factual premise that the notice to quit dated 13.08.2012 is a non-existent document, where a registered cover was served upon the defendant carrying blank sheets with no contents scripted. 17. So far as the first part of the challenge to the notice determining the defendant's tenancy is concerned, it proceeds on a purely factual premise that the notice to quit dated 13.08.2012 is a non-existent document, where a registered cover was served upon the defendant carrying blank sheets with no contents scripted. This document, sent by registered post on behalf of the plaintiff by her Counsel, purporting to be a notice under Section 106 of the Act of 1882, is a non-existent document, which would not work to determine the defendant's tenancy. The learned Trial Judge has examined the matter in considerable detail and has opined that the defendant does not dispute the fact that the registered cover, purporting to carry the notice to quit, was served upon him, but says that it carried blank papers. The learned Trial Judge has opined that in the face of this plea, the minimum evidential burden which the defendant had to shoulder was to produce the registered cover that he received in original along with the blank sheets, that he says were placed there. He has neither filed the registered cover that he received admittedly nor the blank sheets, which he claims to bear the contents thereof. In the face of an allegation of this kind sans evidence led by the defendant, the Trial Judge has refused to accept the defendant's case about service of blank sheets in a registered cover that the defendant duly received. It appears to be part of the reasoning that no prompt action was taken upon receipt of the aforesaid registered cover, which the defendant alleged carried blank papers, and a reply was given by the defendant to the plaintiff's Counsel on 14.09.2012, though the notice was served on 16.08.2012. Apparently, the long lapse of time has been inferred to generate an afterthought with the defendant on the foot of sound reasoning that a person, served with blank papers from a person who is an Advocate through registered cover, would promptly react. 18. The case that the addressee left station shortly after receiving the notice, causing the delay, has not been accepted by the Trial Judge. There is nothing perverse about the reasoning that the Trial Judge has adopted to disbelieve the defendant's case on this score. 18. The case that the addressee left station shortly after receiving the notice, causing the delay, has not been accepted by the Trial Judge. There is nothing perverse about the reasoning that the Trial Judge has adopted to disbelieve the defendant's case on this score. The finding on this part of the issue, that the defendant assails, is a pure finding of fact regarding which the Trial Court has recorded a reasonable opinion on the evidence available. There is absolutely no reason for this Court to take a different view in exercise of our revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Act of 1887. 19. The language of the notice dated 13.08.2012 under Section 106 of the Act of 1882, served upon the defendant on behalf of the plaintiff, in the material part, reads: “4- That you have committed a default in the payment of rent and my client now does not want you to continue as her tenant. Your tenancy shall be terminated immediately after the expiry of the period of 30 days of the receipt of this notice. You are already called upon to pay all the arrears of rent within month from the receipt of this notice. 5- That you are hereby called upon to pay the entire arrears of rent as aforesaid and hand over the possession of the shop after the expiry of the period of this notice to my client failing which my client shall be compelled to file a suit in a competent court of law for ejectmen and arrears of rent and in that event you will be further liable for the damages @ Rs.250/- per day and costs of the suit Which Pleas NOTE.” 20. Learned Counsel for the defendants submits that this does not qualify as a valid notice to quit and for the purpose, has placed reliance upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Abdul Jalil v. Haji Abdul Jalil, AIR 1974 All 402 . In the said decision, their Lordships of the Division Bench have classified notices into seven categories, marked by Alphabets A to G, enumerated in Paragraph No.10 of the report and dealt with in Paragraphs Nos.11 to 20. In the specified categories, enumerated in Abdul Jalil (supra), notices worded like those in Categories D and G alone have been held invalid, while all others were held valid. In the specified categories, enumerated in Abdul Jalil (supra), notices worded like those in Categories D and G alone have been held invalid, while all others were held valid. The effective words of a notice in Categories D and G read: “D. Your tenancy is terminated with effect from today and you are required to vacate the premises on the expiry of thirty days from the date of service of this notice on you. G. You are required to vacate the premises on the expiry of thirty days from the date of receipt of this notice.” 21. Notice in Category D was held invalid because it effects a termination of the tenancy inpresenti and allows the tenant to stay in the premises for thirty days before vacating the same reducing him to the status of “a licencee or a tenant on sufferance which is in contravention of the law”, to employ the words of their Lordships. Likewise, in Category G, the notice was held invalid, because it simply carries a demand for possession without purporting to determine the tenancy expressly or by necessary implication. It has been opined that in the absence of a clear and explicit intimation to the tenant that if he continues in the premises beyond the specified period, he will become a trespasser, the notice to quit would not work to determine the tenancy. This follows a old Full Bench decision of this Court in Atkinson v. Bradley, (1885) ILR 7 All 899 (FB). 22. A perusal of the notice to quit involved here would show that it does not effect a termination of tenancy in presenti, permitting the tenant to stay in the demised shop for thirty days as a matter of grace or on licence or at sufferance. Clearly, the notice says in Paragraph No.4 that “tenancy shall be terminated immediately after the expiry of the period of 30 days of the receipt of this notice”. This notice, for the worst, would fall in Category E enumerated in Abdul Jalil, and more specifically, in Category C, both of which have been held to be notices bringing about a valid determination of tenancy. This notice, for the worst, would fall in Category E enumerated in Abdul Jalil, and more specifically, in Category C, both of which have been held to be notices bringing about a valid determination of tenancy. Quite apart, though nothing has been brought to the notice of this Court during the course of hearing, that the principles in Abdul Jalil regarding the validity of various categories of notices, have been overruled by a Larger Bench, or by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the perspective of the law regarding the validity of a notice has fairly changed to lean in favour of the view that what matters is the intention of the landlord to determine the lease, where Section 106 of the Act of 1882 governs the rights of parties. It is not so much about the words employed as it is about the intent. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of this Court in B.R. Trading Company and another v. Dharam Raj Sahu and others, 2007 SCC OnLine All 885. 23. This Court, while examining the precise words to be employed in order to qualify as a valid notice under Section 106 of the Act of 1882, remarked that there is no prescribed form or language which alone would qualify for a valid notice under Section 106 of the Act of 1882. It was held that the notice, as aforesaid has to be liberally construed and read as a whole in order to find out the intention of the landlord or the lessor. The Court expressed this opinion after a survey of high authority, including decisions of the Supreme Court and the comments of Sir D.F. Mulla in his Commentary on the Act of 1882, 4th Edition. In B.R. Trading Company, it has been held: “19. There is no prescribed form or language in which a notice under section 106 of the Act has to be given. In such circumstances, the notice has to be liberally construed and has to be read as a whole. All that is necessary is that the notice should express clearly the intention to terminate the tenancy. The language of the notice is immaterial and in such a case the word ‘terminate’ may not be used at all. 20. In such circumstances, the notice has to be liberally construed and has to be read as a whole. All that is necessary is that the notice should express clearly the intention to terminate the tenancy. The language of the notice is immaterial and in such a case the word ‘terminate’ may not be used at all. 20. This is what was observed by this Court in Tikka Ram (supra): “The short answer to this argument is that the plaint does contain this averment. In para. 4, the respondent alleged that he had served a notice on the appellant that the tenancy was no longer acceptable to him and had further demanded (in the notice) that the appellant should vacate the premises on the expiry of 30 days from the service of notice. Mr. Chaturvedi contended that this was not enough, and the notice should have expressly stated that the tenancy was being terminated. I cannot agree. No particular words have been prescribed under section 106 of the Act of 1882 as amended by the U.P. Legislature, which merely provides that “a lease………. shall be terminable on the part of either lessor or lessee by one month's notice.” Section 111 (h) of the same Act provides that “a lease of immovable property determines….(h) on the expiry of a notice to determine the lease, or to quit or of intention to quit, the property leased, duly given by one party to another.” D.F. Mulla in his commentary on the Act of 1882, 4th edition, has observed, “………….the notice to quit must indicate in substance and with reasonable clarity an intention on the part of the person giving it to determine the existing tenancy at a certain time.” (p. 619). The same author has observed, a liberal construction is therefore put on a notice to quit in order that it should not be defeated by inaccuracies either in the description of the premises or the name of the tenant, or the date of expiry of notice. The author's observation is based on authorities cited in the footnote on this page. Thus the crucial test is (1) whether the language of the notice indicates a clear intention to terminate the tenancy, and (2) whether the date of determination of the tenancy is certain. Applying these principles and tests to the notice in the present case, I think it is a valid notice of termination. Thus the crucial test is (1) whether the language of the notice indicates a clear intention to terminate the tenancy, and (2) whether the date of determination of the tenancy is certain. Applying these principles and tests to the notice in the present case, I think it is a valid notice of termination. If a landlord writes to the tenant, “I am no longer willing to continue this tenancy, you are therefore given notice that you should vacate the premises on the expiry of one month which is the time limit prescribed by law failing which I shall file a suit for your ejectment,” this indicates a clear intention to terminate the tenancy on the expiry of the period of one month.” (emphasis supplied) 21. The Supreme Court in Mangilal v. Sugan Chand Rathi (deceased) [ AIR 1965 SC 101 .], while commenting on the language used in the notice sent under section 106 of the Act observed: “On April 11, 1959 the plaintiffs served a notice on the defendant bringing to his notice the fact of his being in arrears of rent for 12 months and requiring him to remit to them Rs. 1,020/-within one month from the date of service of notice and stating that on his failure to do so, a suit for ejectment would be filed against him. In addition to this the notice called upon the defendant to vacate the premises by April, 30, 1959 upon two grounds. …….The requirement of section 106 of the Act of 1882 is that a lease from month to month can be terminated only after giving fifteen days' notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy either by the landlord to the tenant or by the tenant to the landlord. Such a notice is essential for bringing to an end the relationship of landlord and tenant. Unless the relationship is validly terminated the landlord does not get the right to obtain possession of the premises by evicting the tenant. Such a notice is essential for bringing to an end the relationship of landlord and tenant. Unless the relationship is validly terminated the landlord does not get the right to obtain possession of the premises by evicting the tenant. ………Now, the learned Additional Solicitor General states that the notice of April, 1959 may be a good notice for the purposes of section 4 (a) of the Accommodation Act but it is not a good notice for the purposes of section 106 of the Act of 1882 for two reasons; in the first place it does not purport to determine the tenancy and in the second place the notice falls short of the period of 15 days specified in section 106 of the Act of 1882. The High Court has, however, treated this as a composite notice under section 4 (a) of the Accommodation Act and section 106 of the Act of 1882 and in our opinion rightly. It has to be observed that the plaintiffs, after requiring the defendant to pay the rental arrears due up to the end of March, 1959 within one month from the date of service of the notice, proceeded to say “failing which suit for ejectment will be filed”. These recitals clearly indicate the intention of the landlord to terminate the tenancy of the defendant under the relevant provisions of both the Acts.” (emphasis supplied) 22. This Court in Suraj Prasad v. Smt. Kusumlata Sinha [AIR 1973 Alld. 198.], also while considering the requirements of the notice under section 106 of the Act observed: “The third objection to the validity of the notice was that it did not meet the requirement of section 106 of the Act of 1882 as amended by U.P. Civil Law 1954 as it was not a thirty daysnotice of termination of tenancy. In fact at one stage the learned Counsel strenuously argued that the tenancy has not at all been terminated and there is nothing in the notice terminating the tenancy but merely calling upon the tenant to vacate the premises leased would not amount to terminating the tenancy. The learned Counsel referred to an old Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Bardley v. Atkinson [(1885) ILR 7 All 899 (FB).]. The learned Counsel referred to an old Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Bardley v. Atkinson [(1885) ILR 7 All 899 (FB).]. Much water has flown down the bridge since the Full Bench decided that case and I need not encumber this judgment by referring to the numerous cases in which the Full Bench decision in (1885) ILR 7 All. 899 (FB) has been considered and explained. A notice calling upon the tenant to vacate the leased premises would always amount to a notice terminating the tenancy. Under clause (h) of section 111 of the Act of 1882 a lease of immovable property determines on the expiration of a notice to determine the lease or to quit, or of intention to quit, the property leased, duly given by one party to the other. Whether the lessor has given a notice expressing an intention that the lease will stand terminated or he by the notice calls upon the lessee to quit, that is, to leave, the legal consequence of both would be that the lease would stand determined. The provisions of section 106 of the Act of 1882 lay down the manner in which such a notice is to be served and fixes the time before which it has to be given. In Ram Chandra v. Lala Duli Chand [ AIR 1958 All 729 .], a notice calling upon the tenant to vacate the premises let out has been held to be a notice which successfully determines the tenancy.” (emphasis supplied) 23. In Sita Ram v. Moti Lal [ AIR 1976 All. 70 .], similar observations were made by this Court: “Coming to the second contention, the notice sent by the plaintiff terminating the tenancy of the defendant is contained in paper No. Ext. 1. In this notice, the plaintiff claimed Rs. 920/-after adjusting Rs. 111/-sent by the defendant by money order and Rs. 54/-paid by the defendant towards taxes, at the rate of Rs. 15/-per mensum, and in the end, the plaintiff asked the defendant to vacate the premises in dispute on the expiry of 30 days from the receipt of the notice and give its possession to the plaintiff. 920/-after adjusting Rs. 111/-sent by the defendant by money order and Rs. 54/-paid by the defendant towards taxes, at the rate of Rs. 15/-per mensum, and in the end, the plaintiff asked the defendant to vacate the premises in dispute on the expiry of 30 days from the receipt of the notice and give its possession to the plaintiff. The plaintiff added that on the expiry of that period, the plaintiff would take legal action for the recovery of the balance and possession of the house in a proper Court and the defendant would be held responsible for the expenses. In this notice, the plaintiff has expressed in unambiguous and unequivocal terms that the defendant should vacate the house and give its possession to the plaintiff on the expiry of thirty days after the receipt of the notice. In the present case, as I have noted above, there is a clear indication in the notice of ejectment that in default by the defendant, the plaintiff would take legal proceedings regarding the ejectment of the defendant in a proper law Court. ………………The notice of ejectment served by the plaintiff on the defendant was perfectly valid and the contention advanced by the appellant to the contrary must be rejected.” (emphasis supplied) 24. The observations made by Supreme Court in Bhagabandas Agarwalla v. Bhagwandas Kanu [ AIR 1977 SC 1120 : 1977 (3) ALR 40 (Sum) (SC).], are also relevant: “The only question which arises for determination in this appeal is whether the notice to quit given by the appellant to the respondents was invalid as not being in conformity with the requirements of section 106 of the Act of 1882. The notice to quit, so far as material, was in the following terms: “You are hereby informed by this notice that you will vacate the said house for our possession within the month of October, 1962 otherwise you will be treated as trespassers from 1st November in respect of the said house.” ………………………………….. Now, it is settled law that a notice to quit must be construed not with a desire to find faults in it, which would render it defective, but it must be construed ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Now, it is settled law that a notice to quit must be construed not with a desire to find faults in it, which would render it defective, but it must be construed ut res magis valeat quam pereat. “The validity of a notice to quit” as pointed out by Lord Justice Lindley, L.J. in Side-botham v. Holland [(1895) 1 QB 378.], “ought not to turn on the splitting of a straw”. It must not be read in a hyper critical manner, nor must its interpretation be affected by pedagogic pendantism or over refined subtlety, but it must be construed in a common sense way. See Harihar Banerji v. Ramsashi Roy [45 Ind App 222 : AIR 1918 PC 102 .]. The notice to quit in the present case must be judged for its validity in the light of this well recognised principle of interpretation.” (emphasis supplied) 25. In Budh Sen v. Smt. Rahiman [1979 (5) ALR 299 : AIR 1978 Alld. 549.], the language used in the notice sent under section 106 of the Act was very much similar to the language used in the notice sent in the present case. This Court observed that the tenancy was terminated on the expiry of thirty days and the relevant observations are as follows: “In the notice the appellant has already expressed an intention that he did not wish the respondent to continue in possession of the premises after the expiry of the period of one month. It is true that in notice in question it has not been stated that the tenancy of the defendant-respondent was being terminated. However, if an intention to terminate the tenancy can be clearly discerned by construing the words used in the notice as a whole, the mere fact that the expression that tenancy was being terminated is not used, would not render the notice invalid. The language which has been used in the notice given by the appellant to the respondent, does unmistakably evidenced an intention on the part of the plaintiff- appellant not to continue the tenancy of the respondent. The notice would validly terminate the tenancy of the respondent.” (emphasis supplied) 26. The language which has been used in the notice given by the appellant to the respondent, does unmistakably evidenced an intention on the part of the plaintiff- appellant not to continue the tenancy of the respondent. The notice would validly terminate the tenancy of the respondent.” (emphasis supplied) 26. In Pyare Lal v. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Allahabad [1980 ALJ 643.], this Court again observed: “As I have mentioned above, the notice under consideration clearly requires the tenant to vacate and deliver up possession to the lessor within thirty days of the notice, failing which, it states, the lessor would be constrained to file a suit for the ejectment of the petitioner. Such a notice is similar to the notice contemplated under illustration F mentioned in the case of Abdul Jalil [1974 ALJ 381.]. It accords with requirements of section 106 of the T.P. Act as regards the period. It will hence validly determine the tenancy on the expiry of the period of the notice under section 111 (h).” 27. In Smt. Sushila Devi v. Mahohar Lal [1985 (11) ALR 213.], the notice sent under section 106 of the Act read as follows: “……In default of payment of rent during the period aforesaid after occupation of the shop for a period of full 30 days you vacate the shop and put it in possession of plaintiff;……… on expiry of the said period your status would be that of a trespasser only and you will be liable to ejectment and damages for use and occupation at the rate of Rs. 10 per day…………..” 28. This Court observed that the aforesaid notice terminated the tenancy in accordance with the provisions of section 106 of the Act. 29. The aforesaid decisions clearly holds that the crucial test is to find out from the notice whether the language used expresses a clear intention of terminating the tenancy after the expiry of thirty days and in such a case, the absence of the word ‘terminate’ in the notice is not conclusive. 29. The aforesaid decisions clearly holds that the crucial test is to find out from the notice whether the language used expresses a clear intention of terminating the tenancy after the expiry of thirty days and in such a case, the absence of the word ‘terminate’ in the notice is not conclusive. The decisions also hold that if the landlord clearly expresses, in the notice, an intention that he does not desire the tenant to continue in possession of the premises after the expiry of one month and asks the tenant to handover the vacant possession of the property after the expiry of the aforesaid period failing which he would file a suit for ejectment then in that case it would be a notice which determines the tenancy after 30 days even though it may not be mentioned in the said notice that “the tenancy shall be terminated on the expiry of the period of one month”. 30. In the present case, as pointed out above, the notice clearly mentions that it was not acceptable to the landlord to permit the tenant to continue in occupation of the premises and that he was required to handover the vacant possession immediately after the expiry of 30 days from the date of receipt of the said notice sent to him under section 106 of the Act and that in the event he failed to handover the possession on the expiry of the said period, the landlord would file a suit for ejectment.” 24. In view of what the law is about a valid notice under Section 106 of the Act of 1882 and what this Court has remarked above about the notice here, this Court finds that the notice to quit effectively determines the defendant's tenancy, and there is absolutely no flaw in its language that may vitiate the said notice. The notice to quit well effectuates its statutory purpose. 25. The third limb of challenge to the validity of the notice is founded on the principle that the defendant having tendered in Court at the hearing of the suit, all arrears of rent together with interest thereon and full costs of the suit, the defendant is entitled to be relieved of his liability from eviction under Section 114 of the Act of 1882. 26. 26. This Court does not intend to go into the details of how much the arrears of rent were and if the deposit claimed to be made at the hearing of the suit under Section 114 of the Act last mentioned is sufficient to relieve the defendant of his liability from eviction. The moot point is whether in a suit instituted on the basis of a notice simplicitor to terminate a tenancy under Section 106 of the Act of 1882, the provisions of Section 114 providing for relief against the eviction, upon deposit of certain outstandings, would be available to the defendant. This question has engaged attention of this Court in B.R. Trading Company (supra) and in another decision in Vinod Kumar and others v. Arya Samaj Mandir, 2016 SCC OnLine All 2938. The principle is that if the notice to quit comes by on account of forfeiture of the lease for violating an express condition thereof, which provides for a right to the lessor to re-enter, a notice under Section 111(g) of the Act of 1882 may issue, and if that be the case, a suit based on a notice forfeiting the lease may attract the provisions of Section 114 of the Act of 1882, providing a locuspoententiaeto the tenant against forfeiture. It has been opined in Vinod Kumar that in a case where there is no written lease and the tenancy is governed by oral compact, the provisions relating to forfeiture would not come into play. The question of forfeiture generally arises if there is a written lease carrying terms that entitle the lessor to re-enter, if violated by the tenant and the lease is for a specific duration or perpetual in nature. The entire gamut of provisions of Sections 111, 112, 113 and 114 of the Act of 1882 would not apply in the case of a tenancy that is month-to-month, which can be terminated by a notice simplicitorunder Section 106 of the Act of 1882, without the question of forfeiture at all figuring. 27. Nothing has been brought to the notice of the Court here to show that there was a lease for a specified period in writing, carrying a term about forfeiture and re-entery. 27. Nothing has been brought to the notice of the Court here to show that there was a lease for a specified period in writing, carrying a term about forfeiture and re-entery. There is also nothing to show that for the violation of such a term, any kind of a forfeiture clause was invoked, though the plaintiff's case is that the tenancy commenced sometime in the year 2008 for a period of eleven months; but, there is no written deed of lease on record to evidence its terms. The defendant, more or less, is ad idem on this point and says that the the tenancy commenced in the year 2007 at the rate of Rs.4500/-per month, that was later on enhanced to Rs.5500/-. There is no document to show on record, even that initial deed of lease for eleven months to indicate what the terms were. Assuming it was there, the subsequent acceptance of rent on behalf of the plaintiff by her father, after eleven months, would convert the tenancy into one from month to month by operation of law. The tenancy is about a shop, which could be validly terminated any time by a thirty days' notice without assignment of any reason. This position is evident from the provisions of Section 106 of the Act of 1882, as amended in U.P. by U.P. Act No. 24 of 1954. The tenant's case that U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 governs the demised shop has been negatived by the Trial Judge for very valid reasons, the admitted rent being well above a figure of Rs.2000/-. Thus, the tenancy, in the opinion of this Court, has been validly terminated by a simple notice to quit under Section 106 of the Act of 1882. 28. The case urged by the plaintiff about default in payment of rent is absolutely irrelevant, because a landlord is not required to prove default, where in a tenancy not regulated by the provisions of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972, he/ she decides to determine it by a notice simplicitor under Section 106 of the Act of 1882. This Court must remark that the allegations about default, somewhat in the context of relief of eviction, have confounded matters for a while before the Trial Court. The question of default need not be examined at all, so far as relief of eviction is concerned. This Court must remark that the allegations about default, somewhat in the context of relief of eviction, have confounded matters for a while before the Trial Court. The question of default need not be examined at all, so far as relief of eviction is concerned. That question is relevant for the purpose of quantifying of arrears of rent due and/ or mesne profits post determination of the tenancy, until delivery of possession. 29. No other point was pressed. 30. In the result, this revision fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. The interim stay order dated 13.03.2014 is hereby vacated. 31. The defendants is granted six months' time to vacate the demised shop, subject to the condition that he deposits within a month the entire arrears of rent and mesne profits, besides all other sums of money due under the impugned decree with the Trial Court and also furnishes an undertaking that he will handover peaceful possession of the demised shop to the plaintiff on expiry of six months of date. In the event of default, the decree will become executable forthwith.