JUDGMENT : By the Court: - Heard the parties through video conferencing. 2. This writ petition has been filed invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of Constitution of India with a prayer to issue appropriate writ(s)/direction(s) including writ of Certiorari for quashing/setting aside the order dated 25.04.2017 passed by the Hon’ble Lokayukta, Jharkhand in Complaint Case No.01/Lok(Grih) 03/2012, whereby and whereunder direction has been issued to the Additional Director General of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau (A.C.B.) for institution of FIR against the petitioner being without any jurisdiction and beyond the powers conferred upon the Lokayukta under the provisions of Jharkhand Lokayukta Act, 2001 and issuing further writ(s)/direction(s) including writ of Certiorari for quashing/setting aside the entire criminal proceeding including the FIR being Vigilance Case No.16 of 2017, corresponding to Anti-Corruption Bureau (A.C.B.) P.S. Case No.14 of 2017 registered for the offences punishable under Section 13 (2) read with Section 13 (1) (e) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 3. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the President of a political party made a written complaint before the Hon’ble Lokayukta, Jharkhand alleging therein that the petitioner who was working as Divisional Fire Officer as amassed huge property disproportionate to his known source of income. It is then submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that upon the direction of the Hon’ble Lokayukta, Jharkhand, a preliminary enquiry was instituted by the Anti-Corruption Bureau but the said order is not under challenge in this writ application. An enquiry report was submitted to the Lokayukta, Jharkhand on 24.04.2017 and vide order dated 25.04.2017, the Hon’ble Lokayukta, Jharkhand directed the Additional Director General of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau to lodge an F.I.R. and to carry out thorough investigation and after collection of evidence, to proceed in accordance with law and to submit the compliance report to the Office of the Hon’ble Lokayukta, Jharkhand within three months as the Hon’ble Lokayukta found that the petitioner has amassed a sum of Rs.53,11,509/- in excess of his known source of income, which is 66% of his known source of income. It is next submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order passed by the Hon’ble Lokayukta for institution of the F.I.R. against the petitioner is having adverse civil consequences upon the petitioner and vitally affects the civil rights of the petitioner and the order has been passed by the Hon’ble Lokayukta in violation of the principle of natural justice, hence is violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is next submitted that under the provisions of the Jharkhand Lokayukta Act, 2001, Hon’ble Lokayukta has not been conferred any jurisdiction to direct for institution of F.I.R. against any public servant either serving or retired and on the contrary, the only power vested under Section 12 of the said act is only to communicate in writing, his findings and recommendation along with relevant documents to the competent authority and it is for the competent authority to examine the report forwarded to it by the office of the Hon’ble Lokayukta, Jharkhand and to inform the Lokayukta thereafter about the action taken or proposed to be taken on the basis of the report to it by the office of the Hon’ble Lokayukta, Jharkhand and if the Hon’ble Lokayukta is not satisfied with the action taken or proposed to be taken against the public servant, the learned Lokayukta has been conferred with jurisdiction to make special report with respect to the case to the Government of Jharkhand. In this respect, the learned counsel for the petitioner draws the attention of this Court to Section 12 of the Jharkhand Lokayukta Act, 2001 which reads as under:- 12. Reports of Lokayukta – (1) If, after investigation of any action in respect of which a complaint involving a grievance has been or can be or could have been made, the Lokayukta is satisfied that such action has resulted in injustice or undue hardship to the complainant or any other person, the Lokayukta shall by a report in writing, recommend to the public servant and the competent authority concerned that such injustice or undue hardship shall be remedied or redressed in such manner and within such time as may be specified in the report. (2) The competent authority to whom a report is sent upon sub-section (1) shall, within one month of the expiry of the term specified in the report, intimate or cause to be intimated to the Lokayukta, the action taken for compliance with the report. (3) If after investigation of any action in respect of which a complaint involving and allegation has been or can be or could have been made, the Lokayukta is satisfied that such allegation can be substantiated either wholly or partly, he shall by a report in writing communicate his findings and recommendations along with the relevant documents, materials and other evidence to the competent authority. (4) The competent authority shall examine the report forwarded to it under sub-section (3) and intimate within three months of the date of receipt of the report, the Lokayukta, the action taken or proposed to be taken on the basis of the report. (5) If the Lokayukta is satisfied with the action taken or proposed to be taken on his recommendations or findings referred to in sub-sections (1) and (3), he shall close the case under information to the complainant, the public servant and the competent authority concerned; but where he is not so satisfied and if he considers that the case so deserves, he may make a special report upon the case to the Governor and also information the complainant concerned. (5A) Where in a report forwarded by the Lokayukta any recommendation imposing the penalty of removal from the office of a public servant, falling within sub-clause (iv) of clause (j) of section 2 of the Act, had been found, it shall be lawful for the Government without any further enquiry to take action on the basis of the said recommendation for the removal of such public servant from his office and for making him ineligible for being elected to any office, specified by the Government in this behalf not withstanding anything contained in any law for time being in force. (6) The Lokayukta shall present annually a consolidated report on the performance of his functions under this Act to the Governor. (7) On receipt of a special report under sub-section (5), or the annual report under sub-section (6), the Governor shall cause a copy thereof together with an explanatory memorandum to be laid before each House of the State Legislature. (6) The Lokayukta shall present annually a consolidated report on the performance of his functions under this Act to the Governor. (7) On receipt of a special report under sub-section (5), or the annual report under sub-section (6), the Governor shall cause a copy thereof together with an explanatory memorandum to be laid before each House of the State Legislature. (8) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 10, the Lokayukta may, at his discretion, make available from time to time, the substance of cases closed or otherwise disposed of by him which may appear to him to be of general public, academic or professional interest in such manner and to such persons as he may deem appropriate. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner, relying upon the order dated 23.04.2019, passed by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court, in the case of Ashok Kumar Das Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Another in W.P. (C) No. 3575 of 2017 submits that it has been observed in para-18, the Hon’ble coordinate Bench of this Court has directed the authority before whom the findings along with recommendation of the Hon’ble Lokayukta was sent to act strictly in pursuance to Section 12 of the Jharkhand Lokayukta Act, 2001 and vide subsequent order dated 16.08.2019 remitted the matter before the Hon’ble Lokayukta to proceed from the stage of the institution of the complaint by resorting to the provision as contained in Section 10(1) (a) and (b) of the Jharkhand Lokayukta Act, 2001 but it is fairly submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in that case, no F.I.R. was lodged consequent upon the order of the Hon’ble Lokayukta. The learned counsel for the petitioner next relied upon the Judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in the case of Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Ltd. and Ors. v. Ananta Saha and Ors., reported in (2011) 5 SCC 142 wherein in the facts of the case, where the learned Single Judge quashed the punishment order of dismissal from service as well as disciplinary proceeding of the respondent no.1 of that case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed in para-32 as under:- “32. It is a settled legal proposition that if initial action is not in consonance with law, subsequent proceedings would not sanctify the same. It is a settled legal proposition that if initial action is not in consonance with law, subsequent proceedings would not sanctify the same. In such a fact situation, the legal maxim sublato fundamento cadit opus is applicable, meaning thereby, in case a foundation is removed, the superstructure falls.” 5. It is next submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there were several irregularities in the preliminary enquiry report and the petitioner during the course of preliminary enquiry cooperated with the investigating officer and submitted the relevant documents but the enquiry officer ignored the documents and without considering the income of the wife of the petitioner and the two sons of the petitioner has fraudulently registered the First Information Report and the First Information Report is full of ambiguity and vagueness. It is next submitted that since the very institution of the F.I.R. against the petitioner is based upon the order passed by the Office of the Hon’ble Lokayukta; which is without jurisdiction; hence the subsequent to institution of the F.I.R. also becomes Void ab initio and is liable to be set aside by this Court. Hence, it is submitted that the F.I.R. be also quashed and set aside. 6. Mr. Suraj Verma, the learned Spl. P.P. on the other hand vehemently opposes the prayer for quashing of the F.I.R. and submits that the F.I.R. has not been registered on the basis of the order dated 25.04.2017, passed by the Hon’ble Lokayukta rather, as is evident from the F.I.R. itself, the copy of which has been annexed as annexure-1 which is kept at page nos. 33-41 of the brief, wherein it has been categorically mentioned that the preliminary enquiry was instituted as per the order of the Hon’ble Lokayukta and on the basis of the materials collected during the preliminary enquiry, it was found that the petitioner during the check period of 01.09.2006 to 31.12.2012 has amassed a total amount of Rs.45,71,194/-in excess of his known source of income which comes out to 56.78% of his known source of income and both the figures i.e. the amount of disproportionate assets in terms of rupees as well as percentage is different from the amount and percentage mentioned in the order dated 25.04.2017, passed by the Hon’ble Lokayukta. It is then submitted that no fault could be found with the F.I.R. in view of the order dated 25.04.2017 passed by the Hon’ble Lokayukta; as this F.I.R. is independent of the contents of the said order dated 25.04.2017 of the Hon’ble Lokayukta and certainly is not a consequential act of the order passed by the Hon’ble Lokayukta. It is further submitted by Mr. Suraj Verma, the learned Spl. P.P. that the contention of the petitioner that the income of the wife and two sons of the petitioner has not been taken into consideration during the preliminary enquiry certainly cannot be treated as gospel truth and the same is not a valid ground for quashing the F.I.R. as the investigation of the case is going on and the petitioner is at liberty to approach the investigating officer with all the documents and if optional investigation of the case the contention of the petitioner is found to be true, the investigating officer will submit a final form and will not send up the petitioner for facing the trial but on that ground, the F.I.R. can not be quashed. It is next submitted by Suraj Verma, learned Spl. P.P. that since the case of Chairman-cum-Managing Director Coal India Ltd. and Ors. V. Ananta Saha and Ors. (supra) is passed in a service matter, the ratio of the same is not applicable in a criminal proceeding. Hence, it is submitted that this writ petition being without any merit be dismissed. 7. Mr. Rajesh Kumar, the learned counsel for the respondent no.2 submits that the complaint of the President of a political party was received by the Office of the Hon’ble Lokayukta on 02.04.2012 and thereafter the matter was referred to Anti-Corruption Bureau which was known as Vigilance Bureau at that relevant point of time for conducting preliminary enquiry from 08.05.2012 and the head of the Vigilance Bureau deputed his competent officer to make the preliminary enquiry and the Hon’ble Lokayukta being satisfied with the report submitted after the preliminary enquiry recommended the case before the competent authority as contemplated under Section 2(c) of the Jharkhand Lokayukta Act, 2001 as the matter relates to corruption punishable under the penal provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. It is next submitted that the Government of Jharkhand, Cabinet Secretariat and Vigilance Department took a resolution on 07.08.2015 whereby, it has been resolved at serial no.22, that criminal cases instituted under the Prevention of Corruption Act, by the Anti-Corruption Bureau as well as cases referred by the State Government/Hon’ble Court/Hon’ble Lokayukta shall be registered as P.E./Case for investigation and the F.I.R. has to be instituted as per the resolution by taking due permission from the Vigilance Commissioner with respect to Class-II and equivalent posts; which is the competent authority and the Hon’ble Lokayukta has only recommended the case without giving any finding at the stage, so far as to cause no prejudice to the petitioner. It is next submitted that the Hon’ble Lokayukta is not the adjudicatory authority and no finding has been given at this stage by Hon’ble Lokayukta on the basis of materials collected by the Vigilance/Anti-Corruption Bureau during preliminary enquiry rather an order has been passed to institute the F.I.R. It is then submitted that the order passed by the Lokayukta is only a recommendation under the Jharkhand Lokayukta Act, 2001 to investigate the matter as is being done under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. by the criminal court for other criminal offences. 8. 8. Having heard the submissions made at the Bar and after going through the materials in the record, so far as the first prayer of the petitioner regarding quashing of the order dated 25.04.2017, passed by the Hon’ble Lokayukta in Complaint Case No.01/Lok(Grih) 03/2012 is concerned, as the respondent no.2 being the Secretary of the Office of the Lokayukta has clarified that the same is only a recommendation and not an order for institution of the F.I.R. and the Hon’ble Lokayukta has not given any finding to affect the petitioner, it is ordered that the said order dated 25.04.2017 be treated as a recommendation and not an order for institution of the F.I.R. and the said order be treated being not the finding of the Lokayukta nor the same would be prejudicial to the petitioner in any forum and the respondent no.2 is directed to ensure that in future, the orders of the Hon’ble Lokayukta will be properly worded so as not to give any impression to be an order or direction for institution of the F.I.R. and such orders be properly worded to indicate categorically to be the recommendation in consonance with the provisions of the Lokayukta Act. Accordingly the impugned order dated 25.04.2017 is modified to the aforesaid extent instead of being quashed. 9. Accordingly the impugned order dated 25.04.2017 is modified to the aforesaid extent instead of being quashed. 9. So far as the prayer for quashing/setting aside the entire criminal proceeding including the FIR being Vigilance Case No.16 of 2017, corresponding to Anti-Corruption Bureau (A.C.B.) P.S. Case No.14 of 2017 is concerned, it is crystal clear from the records that the Hon’ble Lokayukta has referred the application of the President of a political party for conducting preliminary enquiry on 08.05.2012 as is evident from the counter affidavit filed by the respondent number 2 in this writ application; which order is not under challenge in this writ application and the perusal of the record further reveals that the F.I.R. of this case vide Vigilance Case No. 16 of 2017, corresponding to Anti-Corruption Bureau (A.C.B.) P.S. Case No.14 of 2017 has not been registered in terms of the order of the Hon’ble Lokayukta rather the same has been registered on the basis of the finding of the preliminary enquiry and the figures of the disproportionate assets in terms of rupees and in percentage terms as mentioned in the First Information Report are also different from the figures mentioned in the order of the Hon’ble Lokayukta dated 25.04.2017 as though in the said order of the Hon’ble Lokayukta, it has been mentioned that the disproportionate assets was of Rs.53,11,509/- which is 66% of this known source of income of the petitioner but the F.I.R. has been registered for disproportionate assets worth Rs.45,71,194/- which is 56.78% of his known source of income of the petitioner. Hence, this Court is of the considered view that the said F.I.R. is not the consequential action of the Hon’ble Lokayukta rather, it is the independent action of the Anti-Corruption Bureau based upon the findings in the preliminary enquiry. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of has enunciated the principles of law relating to exercise of the extraordinary power inter alia under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, of course by way of illustration by observing thus in paragraph no.102:- “102. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of has enunciated the principles of law relating to exercise of the extraordinary power inter alia under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, of course by way of illustration by observing thus in paragraph no.102:- “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” And the said principles of law has also been approbated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 118 . The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the said Judgment also approbated the principles of law enunciated in the case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1960 SC 866 paragraph-6 of which reads as under:- 6. “Xxxxxx It is well-established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the Court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the Court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceeding in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the allegations in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the first information report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under Section 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. In exercising its jurisdiction under Section 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained. Broadly stated that is the nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 561-A in the matter of quashing criminal proceedings, and that is the effect of the judicial decisions on the point (Vide: In Re: Shripad G. Chandavarkar [AIR 1928 Bom 184] , Jagat Chandra Mozumdar v. Queen Empress [(1899) ILR 26 Cal 786] , Shanker Singh (Dr) v. State of Punjab [(1954) 56 Punjab LR 54] , Nripendra Bhusan Ray v. Gobind Bandhu Majumdar [AIR 1924 Cal 1018] and Ramanathan Chettiyar v. K. Sivarama Subrahmanya Ayyar [ILR 47 Mad 722].” (Emphasis supplied) It is needless to mention that the contention of the petitioner that the allegation against him are false is certainly not a ground to quash the F.I.R. rather during the investigation, the petitioner who is already on bail can put forth appropriate document before the investigating officer to substantiate his contention and which can be taken care of by the investigating officer during the investigation of the case. 10. Accordingly, as none of the parameters either in the case of R.P. Kapur Vs. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1960 SC 866 and State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. (supra) could be made out by the petitioner to substantiate his prayer for quashing of the First Information Report or for that matter the entire criminal proceeding, this Court is of the considered view that there is no justifiable reason to quash the entire criminal proceeding including the F.I.R. being Vigilance Case No. 16 of 2017, corresponding to Anti-Corruption Bureau (A.C.B.) P.S. Case No.14 of 2017. Accordingly, the said prayer for quashing the entire criminal proceeding including the aforesaid F.I.R. is rejected. 11. This writ petition is disposed of with the aforesaid observation. 12. Perusal of the record reveals that the Lower Court Record was called for from the Office of the Lokayukta, Jharkhand. 13. Accordingly, the said prayer for quashing the entire criminal proceeding including the aforesaid F.I.R. is rejected. 11. This writ petition is disposed of with the aforesaid observation. 12. Perusal of the record reveals that the Lower Court Record was called for from the Office of the Lokayukta, Jharkhand. 13. Let the Lower Court Record be sent back to the respondent no.2 along with a copy of this order.