JUDGMENT : 1. This is a defendants' second appeal, arising out of a suit for specific performance of contract. 2. Om Singh and Jay Bhagwan, who are the two respondents to this appeal, instituted Original Suit No. 769 of 1998 against Bhawar Singh, Suresh Pal, Rajpal, Tejpal, Babu Ram and Jagpal, all of whom are the appellants here, seeking a decree for specific performance of contract. It was the plaintiffs’ case that defendant no. 1 to the suit, Bhawar Singh is the bhumidhar of agricultural land comprising plot no. 248(M) admeasuring 0.008 hectares, plot no. 250 admeasuring 0.010 hectares, plot no. 251(M) admeasuring 1.354 hectares, plot no. 252/1 admeasuring 0.086 hectares, plot no. 252/2 admeasuring 0.020 hectares and plot no. 253 admeasuring 0.089 hectares, aggregating an area of 1.567 hectares, situate at Village Harchandpur, Tehsil and District Baghpat. Out of the said plots, he had sold away on 15.06.1994, a substantial part in favour of the plaintiff-vendees, leaving a residue of 0.237 hectares. The defendant-vendor Bhawar Singh executed a registered agreement to sell, relating to the remainder of 0.237 hectares of land in the plots above detailed, in favour of plaintiff-vendees Om Singh and Jay Bhagwan, covenanting to sell the said property for a total sale consideration of Rs. 48000/-. Bhawar Singh received in earnest a sum of Rs. 5000/-out of the contracted sale consideration. 3. The agreement to sell was admitted to registration by the Sub-Registrar on 15.06.1994. It was covenanted that the conveyance in terms of the suit agreement shall be executed by Bhawar Singh (hereinafter referred to as the ‘defendant-vendor’) within a period of 1 year and 3 months, that is to say, by 15.09.1995. The plaintiffs, Om Singh and Jay Bhagwan pleaded that they have been ever ready and willing to get a conveyance executed and registered in accordance with the suit agreement and have never neglected to perform their part of the contract. Om Singh and Jay Bhagwan shall hereinafter be referred to as the ‘plaintiff-vendees’. 4. The plaintiff-vendees requested the defendant-vendor many a times over by word of mouth to come forward and execute the sale deed as covenanted after receipt of the balance sale consideration of Rs. 43,000/-, but the defendant-vendor would ward off responding to his obligation. The plaintiff-vendees, faced with inaction, caused a registered notice dated 14.08.1995 to be served upon the defendant-vendor through their learned Counsel Mr. 43,000/-, but the defendant-vendor would ward off responding to his obligation. The plaintiff-vendees, faced with inaction, caused a registered notice dated 14.08.1995 to be served upon the defendant-vendor through their learned Counsel Mr. Chashmveer Singh, an Advocate at Baghpat, calling upon the defendant-vendor to appear before the Sub-Registrar’s office at Baghpat on 15.09.1995 and execute the requisite sale deed in terms of the suit agreement, upon receipt of the balance sale consideration. The notice aforesaid was served upon the defendant-vendor in due time and on 15.09.1995, the plaintiff-vendees attended the office of the Sub-Registrar at Baghpat, but the defendant-vendor did not appear to fulfil his obligation under the suit agreement. The plaintiff-vendees, on 15.09.1995, reached the Sub-Registrar’s office at Baghpat, along with balance sale consideration and waited outside the office throughout the day for the defendant-vendor. The plaintiff-vendees got their attendance marked with the Sub Registrar in accordance with rules. The defendant-vendor got the plaintiff-vendees' notice dated 14.08.1995 replied to through his Counsel vide a memo dated 23.08.1995, carrying incorrect facts. The defendant-vendor’s reply to the notice dated 14.08.1995 assured the plaintiff-vendees that the former had turned dishonest and was disinclined to execute a sale deed in terms of his obligations under the suit agreement. 5. Accordingly, the plaintiff-vendees instituted Original Suit No. 769 of 1998 before the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Meerut on 20.08.1998, seeking a decree of specific performance, ordering the defendant-vendor to execute the requisite sale deed in terms of the suit agreement after receipt of the balance sale consideration. It was further prayed that in the event the defendant-vendor does not comply with the decree within the time provided by Court, sale deed be executed in favour of the plaintiff-vendees through process of Court in accordance with law and actual physical possession over the suit property be delivered to them. The plaint, as originally drawn up, arrayed the defendant-vendor alone as the defendant and it was against him alone that the relief was sought. 6. A written statement dated 23.11.1998 was filed by the defendant-vendor, traversing the plaintiff-vendees’ case. He denied executing the suit agreement or receiving any earnest. It was pleaded that on 15.06.1994, that is to say, the date when the suit agreement is said to have been executed, the defendant-vendor had executed a sale deed of all his agricultural holding in favour of the plaintiff-vendees, under the pressure of his son. He denied executing the suit agreement or receiving any earnest. It was pleaded that on 15.06.1994, that is to say, the date when the suit agreement is said to have been executed, the defendant-vendor had executed a sale deed of all his agricultural holding in favour of the plaintiff-vendees, under the pressure of his son. The suit property was all that had been left with him. The defendant-vendor’s son was given to vices and had subjected the defendant-vendor to undue influence, asking him to execute a conveyance on 15.03.1994 in favour of the plaintiff-vendees. In deference to his son’s wishes, the defendant-vendor executed a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff-vendees, but was not paid any sale consideration. All that is shown as consideration in the sale deed would have been paid to the vendor’s son. The vendor did not receive anything towards consideration. It was denied that any notice was served upon the defendant-vendor, asking him to appear before the Sub-Registrar and further that he never caused a reply to that notice to be sent to the plaintiff-vendees through his Counsel. He never instructed any Counsel to answer the plaintiff-vendees' notice. It was the defendant-vendor's case that he never instructed any Counsel and if a reply had been sent to the plaintiff-vendees, it was a got up one, which the plaintiff-vendees got served upon themselves through Counsel, set up on the defendant-vendor’s behalf, without the latter’s authority. 7. It was further pleaded that the defendant-vendor is an illiterate and a poor man. He has a lone son, who is given vices and stays away from the village. The son brought undue influence to bear upon the defendant-vendor, forcing him to sell his land. Acting under his son’s pressure and influence, the defendant-vendor parted with 16 bighas (kachcha) of his agricultural holding in favour of the plaintiff-vendees through a registered sale deed dated 15.06.1994. The sale consideration set forth in the sale deed was never received by the defendant-vendor. He does not know how much money was paid. Whatever consideration was paid by the plaintiff-vendees was received by the defendant-vendor’s son, who never accounted for it. It is pleaded that the defendant-vendor had a total of 19 bighas (kachcha) of agricultural holding, out of which he had a remainder of three bighas after execution of the sale deed last mentioned. Whatever consideration was paid by the plaintiff-vendees was received by the defendant-vendor’s son, who never accounted for it. It is pleaded that the defendant-vendor had a total of 19 bighas (kachcha) of agricultural holding, out of which he had a remainder of three bighas after execution of the sale deed last mentioned. He had retained the said land in order to feed his cattle. On the date the sale deed was executed in favour of the plaintiff-vendees, they had got a number of papers thumb marked by him and out of those papers, some were utilised to manufacture the suit agreement. The defendant-vendor came to know of all this transaction carried in the suit agreement, when he was served with the Court’s summons dated 19.08.1998 on 16.10.1998, asking him to appear and put in his written statement. 8. It is the vendor’s case that the plaintiff-vendees had got the suit agreement executed by playing fraud, taking undue advantage of his lack of understanding. They got the papers carrying the suit agreement thumb-marked by practising fraud and on the basis of that fraudulent agreement, they have instituted the present suit. The vendor never consciously executed the suit agreement nor did he come to know of this fraud in good time. It is also the defendant-vendor’s case that he is a humble farmer and had no occasion to purchase land or so to speak, experience of transacting sale/ purchase of land. 9. The plaintiff-vendees are natives of village Sunheda. They had their land in Village Harchandpur, which they have sold off and purchased land from the defendant-vendor worth the proceeds that they received from the sale of their land. The defendant-vendor agreed to sell that land in deference to his unworthy son’s wishes. He never wished to sell his land, but did not have the courage to disoblige his son. He was left with three bigha (kachcha) land (the suit property) that he utilizes to earn his livelihood. He owned a buffalo that yielded milk, but the same was not sufficient to feed himself and his ageing wife. He has purchased, therefore, a bullock-cart after selling off his buffalo to make his ends meet. 10. He was left with three bigha (kachcha) land (the suit property) that he utilizes to earn his livelihood. He owned a buffalo that yielded milk, but the same was not sufficient to feed himself and his ageing wife. He has purchased, therefore, a bullock-cart after selling off his buffalo to make his ends meet. 10. It appears that pending suit, on 16.09.1998, the defendant-vendor sold off the suit property through a registered conveyance in favour of Babu Ram, Jagpal, Tejpal and Rajpal, all sons of Preetam Singh and Suresh Pal son of Dalel. In order to avoid any legal complication, these defendant-purchasers pendente lite were applied to be impleaded as defendants to the suit by the plaintiff-vendees and necessary amendment sought to the plaint, both of which were granted. Accordingly, appellant nos. 1 to 5 to this appeal were impleaded as defendant nos. 2 to 6 to the suit. The defendants-appellant nos. 1 to 5 shall hereinafter be referred to as the defendant-purchasers. It appears that pending suit, the suit property, in relation whereto, the suit agreement was executed, was the subject matter of consolidation, in consequence whereof the plot numbers mentioned in the suit agreement were assigned a new number bearing khasra no. 530. Therefore, along with the amendment sought to implead the defendant-purchasers and bringing on record facts about the sale deed in their favour, an amendment was also sought to the plaint, pleading that the old plot numbers, subject matter of the suit agreement, have been assigned a new khasra number bearing no. 530 during consolidation with an identical area. 11. The written statement filed by the defendant-vendor was amended twice; once on 12.10.2000 and the other on 11.04.2001. By the amendment of 12.10.2000, it was pleaded that the plaintiff-vendees never expressed their willingness to purchase the suit property and never demanded execution of a conveyance on the basis of the suit agreement. 12. By the other amendment dated 11.04.2001, it was pleaded that the defendant-purchasers have purchased the defendant-vendor's entire land comprising plot no. 530 admeasuring 0.237 hectares, whereof the defendant-vendor was the sole bhumidhar, the said land being allotted to him under Section 30 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, exclusively, and in relation whereto, he had complete rights under the law to transfer in favour of the defendant-purchasers. 530 admeasuring 0.237 hectares, whereof the defendant-vendor was the sole bhumidhar, the said land being allotted to him under Section 30 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, exclusively, and in relation whereto, he had complete rights under the law to transfer in favour of the defendant-purchasers. It was pleaded that the transfer made in favour of the defendant-purchasers was valid and the said conveyance does not entitle the plaintiff-vendees to any compensation from the defendant-vendor. A plea was further incorporated to the effect that the suit is barred by limitation. 13. A separate written statement was filed on behalf of the defendant-purchasers jointly on 10.04.2000, in substance, pleading a case that they were the bona fide purchasers for value without notice. The other pleadings raised are the same as those raised by the defendant-vendor that the suit agreement was secured by the plaintiff-vendees through the practice of fraud etc. which does not confer any right upon them. 14. On the pleadings of parties, the Trial Court framed the following issues (translated into English from Hindi): “1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get a sale deed executed in their favour on the basis of the disputed agreement to sell dated 15.06.1994 as pleaded in plaint? 2. Whether the disputed agreement was executed by Bhawar Singh in favour of the plaintiffs is without consideration as pleaded in paragraph no. 11 of the written statement bearing paper no. 18 ka-1, if yes, its effect on the suit? 3. Whether the disputed agreement to sell dated 15.06.1994 was got executed by the plaintiffs by defrauding the defendant, as pleaded in paragraph no. 13 of the written statement? 4. Whether defendant nos. 2 to 6 are bona fide purchasers for value without notice as pleaded in paragraph no. 18 of their written statement bearing paper no. 31 ka-1? 5. Relief, to which the plaintiffs are entitled? 6. Whether the suit is time barred? 7. Whether defendant no. 1 has exclusive right to the suit property? 8. Whether defendant nos. 2 to 6 in their capacity as the transferees of the disputed land have exclusive right to it, if yes, its effect?” 15. The plaintiff-vendees, in support of their case, have led documentary evidence that inter alia includes the suit agreement in original, marked Ex. ka-2, the notice dated 14.08.1995 in original, marked as Ex. ka-1, registered postal receipt paper no. The plaintiff-vendees, in support of their case, have led documentary evidence that inter alia includes the suit agreement in original, marked Ex. ka-2, the notice dated 14.08.1995 in original, marked as Ex. ka-1, registered postal receipt paper no. 10-ga, the A.D. Card paper no. 11-ga, the reply to the notice dated 23.08.1995, paper no. 12-ga, a certified copy of the application for attendance, paper no. 13-ga Ex. ka-3, a certified copy of the application for attendance Ex. ka-4, a certified copy of CH-Form Ex. ka-1, a certified copy of CH-Form-41, Ex. 2. In addition, oral evidence was led on behalf of the plaintiff-vendees comprising PW-1 Om Singh, PW-2 Shiv Charan and PW-3 Virendra Kumar. 16. The defendant-vendor and the defendant-purchasers filed the sale deed in original executed by the defendant-vendor in favour of defendant-purchasers dated 16.09.1998 paper no. 43ka. In their oral testimony, the defendant-vendor and the defendant-purchasers examined DW-1 Bhawar Singh and DW2 Babu Ram. 17. The Trial Court, by its judgment and decree dated 08.05.2002, decreed the plaintiff-vendees' suit for specific performance of contract, ordering the defendant-vendor to execute the requisite sale deed in favour of the plaintiff-vendees within a month after receiving the balance sale consideration. 18. The defendant-purchasers and the defendant-vendor together carried an appeal to the learned District Judge, Meerut from the Trial Court’s decree. The appeal was numbered as Civil Appeal No. 130 of 2002 and came up for determination before the learned District Judge, Meerut on 11.02.2003. The learned District Judge, Meerut dismissed the appeal with costs, affirming the Trial Court. 19. Aggrieved, this appeal from appellate decree has been carried by the defendant-vendor and the defendant-purchasers together. The appeal was admitted to hearing on 22.05.2003 and by a separate order of the said date, operation of the decree for specific performance was stayed. Since the order of admission made on 22.05.2003 did not formulate the substantial questions of law involved, but admitted the appeal with reference to the question no. 9-B as framed at the foot of the appeal, this Court, before the opening of hearing, proceeded to formulate the substantial questions of law involved vide order dated 01.09.2021. The substantial questions of law involved in this appeal read : (1) Whether a suit for specific performance can be decreed without an issue about readiness and willingness being framed? 9-B as framed at the foot of the appeal, this Court, before the opening of hearing, proceeded to formulate the substantial questions of law involved vide order dated 01.09.2021. The substantial questions of law involved in this appeal read : (1) Whether a suit for specific performance can be decreed without an issue about readiness and willingness being framed? (2) Whether a suit for specific performance can be decreed without an issue of readiness and willingness being framed where the issue is substantially suited between parties? (3) Whether specific performance can be granted in relation to agricultural land that has been the subject matter of consolidation operations where the vendee has been moved to different plots, different from those that are subject matter of the suit agreement (4) Whether the Court while granting specific performance ought to exercise discretion according to the principles settled under Section 20 Specific Relief Act? 20. Heard Mr. Ashutosh Mishra, learned Counsel for the defendant-vendor and the defendant-purchasers. Ms. Pooja Agarwal, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-vendees, has been heard in answer. 21. Substantial Questions of Law Nos.1 and 2 are essentially the same, with the second question carrying the essence of the proposition involved to its last detail. As such, both the questions are being dealt with together. 22. It is submitted by Mr. Ashutosh Mishra, learned Counsel for the defendants that in a suit for specific performance, it is essential that the plaintiffs must show their readiness and willingness at all times. Readiness connotes financial capacity of the one who seeks to enforce specific performance, whereas willingness distinctly refers to his personal or mental inclination to enforce performance of the contract. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 mandates 'readiness' and 'willingness' on the plaintiffs' part and is a condition precedent to the grant of relief of specific performance. The law requires that the plaintiffs must allege and prove a continuous 'readiness' and 'willingness' from the date of the contract till the institution of the suit. It is emphatically argued that the Trial Court's failure to frame an issue with regard to the plaintiffs' 'readiness' and 'willingness' renders the decree passed by the two Courts below unsustainable in law. The law requires that the plaintiffs must allege and prove a continuous 'readiness' and 'willingness' from the date of the contract till the institution of the suit. It is emphatically argued that the Trial Court's failure to frame an issue with regard to the plaintiffs' 'readiness' and 'willingness' renders the decree passed by the two Courts below unsustainable in law. It is pointed out by the learned Counsel for the defendants that failure of the Trial Court to frame a proper issue with regard to 'readiness' and 'willingness' and the resultant failure of justice was culled out as a ground in the memorandum of appeal lodged before the Lower Appellate Court, that has been asserted in Paragraph No.8 thereof. 23. Elaborating these submissions, it is argued that the plaintiff-vendees have failed to establish their 'readiness' in view of the specific averments carried in Paragraph No.14 of the written statement filed on behalf of the defendant-purchasers. In support of his submission on this score, Mr. Ashutosh Mishra has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. J.P. Builders and another v. A. Ramadas Rao and another, (2011) 1 SCC 429 . It is next submitted that without framing an issue about readiness and willingness, the Trial Court has returned a finding about willingness alone, with nothing said on the point of readiness. To this end, learned Counsel for the defendants has drawn the attention of the Court to the findings of the Trial Court recorded on Issue Nos.1 and 2. 24. It is submitted by Mr. Mishra that the plaintiff-vendees have failed to prove their readiness and willingness from 15.09.1995 (the date when they appeared before the Sub-Registrar) to 20.08.1998 (the date of institution of the suit). The Courts below, in the submission of the learned Counsel for the defendants, have failed to take into consideration the plaintiff-vendees' failure to prove their ‘readiness’ and ‘willingness’ throughout the aforesaid period of time. Instead, the Lower Appellate Court has returned a perverse finding that the suit can be filed even on the last date of limitation with a remark that people tend to avoid litigation. It is urged that the Lower Appellate Court has committed a manifest error of law in not appreciating the fact that ‘readiness’ and ‘willingness’ had to be established on the last day of limitation also. It is urged that the Lower Appellate Court has committed a manifest error of law in not appreciating the fact that ‘readiness’ and ‘willingness’ had to be established on the last day of limitation also. The Lower Appellate Court, according to the learned Counsel for the defendants, has confounded the limitation prescribed for instituting the suit with the requirement of readiness and willingness to get a conveyance executed in terms of the contract, a matter generically different from limitation. In support of his contention, learned Counsel for the defendants has further placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Atma Ram v. Charanjit Singh, (2020) 3 SCC 311 , the decision of this Court in Dhanu v. Ajai Kant and others, 2019 SCC OnLine All 5148and the authority of the Karnataka High Court in Channayya & another v. Annapurna, 2006 SCC OnLine Kar 24. 25. The learned Counsel for the plaintiff-vendees, Ms. Pooja Agarwal, has refuted the submissions advanced on behalf of the defendants on the questions under consideration. She submits that a perusal of the record indicates that the plaintiff-vendees have categorically averred in the plaint that they are ever ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and had given notice to the defendant-vendor to appear in the Office of the Sub-Registrar, Baghpat on 15.09.1995 to execute the covenanted sale deed. It was the defendant-vendor, who was in breach and did not turn up all through the day before the Sub-Registrar. It is pointed out that oral and documentary evidence have been led by the plaintiff-vendees to establish the twin facts of readiness and willingness. She submits that by deciding Issue No.1 along with Issue No.7, the Trial Court has wholesomely tried the issues of readiness and willingness. Upon consideration of the relevant evidence, the Trial Court has found the plaintiff-vendees ready and willing to perform their part of the contract under the suit agreement. It is the learned Counsel's submission that a finding has been recorded by the Trial Judge that the notice dated 14.08.1995 was received by the defendant-vendor, but he did not appear before the Sub-Registrar on 15.09.1995 to execute the sale deed. It has also been found that the plaintiff-vendees had appeared and their attendance was recorded by the Sub-Registrar, Baghpat on 15.09.1995. 26. It has also been found that the plaintiff-vendees had appeared and their attendance was recorded by the Sub-Registrar, Baghpat on 15.09.1995. 26. It is urged that the Lower Appellate Court has also recorded a finding of fact that the plaintiff-vendees were ready and willing to perform their part of the suit agreement. The learned Counsel for the plaintiff-vendees has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Official Liquidator, Supreme Bank Ltd. v. P.A. Tendolkar (dead) by LRs and others, (1973) 1 SCC 602 and further upon the authority of their Lordships in P. Purushottam Reddy and another vs. Pratap Steels Ltd., (2002) 2 SCC 686 It is submitted by Ms. Pooja Agarwal that failure to frame a specific issue on ‘readiness’ and ‘willingness’, may be an irregularity, but in a case like the one here, where both parties have led oral and documentary evidence, bearing on the issue directly, which has been adjudicated by both Courts of fact below, the decree of specific performance, resultant on those findings, cannot be held vitiated. 27. This Court has given a thoughtful consideration to the very detailed submissions addressed by both the learned Counsel. 28. It is true that generally, in a suit for specific performance, an issue about readiness and willingness ought to be framed so that parties lead evidence in support of and against the case. The substantial requirement, however, is that the plaintiff- vendees, who seek relief of specific performance of contract must aver and prove their readiness and willingness to perform their part of the contract throughout from the date the performance falls due under the contract and until the decree is passed. If the parties go to trial, conscious of the other side's case and wholesomely lead evidence on the point of readiness and willingness, mere failure to formally frame an issue about readiness and willingness would not be fatal. 29. The submissions of the learned Counsel for the defendants that ‘readiness’ and ‘willingness’ is an issue that is imperative to frame, draw support from the following remarks of the Karnataka High Court in Channayya (supra): “9. 29. The submissions of the learned Counsel for the defendants that ‘readiness’ and ‘willingness’ is an issue that is imperative to frame, draw support from the following remarks of the Karnataka High Court in Channayya (supra): “9. It is well-settled that in a suit for specific performance, the person who is seeking specific performance should aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract, which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant, in view of the provisions of Section 16(c) of the Act and in the absence of proof of the said fact, specific performance of the contract cannot be enforced in favour of the person seeking specific performance. It is clear from the issues framed by the Trial Court that no specific issue has been framed regarding the readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff in performing his part of the contract. Similarly, the first Appellate Court has also not framed any point for determination regarding the readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff in performing his part of the contract. However, both the Courts below have proceeded on the basis that in view of the fact that Rs. 7,162-50 Ps., was paid in the execution of the decree in O.S. No. 181 of 1980, the plaintiff has paid the consideration amount. The said reasoning of the Courts below without framing an issue or point for determination regarding the readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff in performing his part of the contract and without considering the question as to whether it was stipulated in the agreement of sale that the plaintiff should pay the amount due to the Bank and as to whether the said payment of Rs. 7,162- 50 Ps., is pursuant to the agreement of sale, is erroneous and cannot at all be sustained. 7,162- 50 Ps., is pursuant to the agreement of sale, is erroneous and cannot at all be sustained. The decisions relied upon by the Courts below lay down that if the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, he is entitled to decree for specific performance and readiness and willingness cannot be treated as a strait-jacket formula and the same have to be determined from the entirety of facts and circumstances relevant to the intention and conduct of party concerned and when the entire consideration amount has been paid after obtaining receipt of last payment, necessary allegations have to be presumed and literal compliance of language of provision of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act is not imperative. However, in view of the fact that both the Courts below have not framed any issue or point for determination regarding readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff in performing his part of the contract, it is clear that they were not justified in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff without framing an issue on the said condition precedent required to be satisfied for entitlement of decree for specific performance, which has caused prejudice to the defendant as parties have not led any evidence regarding the said issue. Therefore, it is clear that the substantial question of law has to be answered in the affirmative by holding that the Courts below were not justified in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff for specific performance without framing an issue or point for determination regarding the readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff in performing his part of the contract in the absence of any issue and finding on the basis of the evidence led on the said issue, it is clear that the decree passed for specific performance cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act………...” 30. The principle in Channayya has been laid down in the context that on account of the failure of the Trial Court to frame an issue regarding readiness and willingness, prejudice had been caused to the defendants, as parties did not lead any evidence regarding the said issue. This is not the case here. The Court has framed Issue No.1 in the following terms (translated into English from Hindi): “1. This is not the case here. The Court has framed Issue No.1 in the following terms (translated into English from Hindi): “1. Whether the plaintiff are entitled to get a sale deed executed in their favour on the basis of a disputed agreement to sell dated 15.06.1994 as pleaded in plaint?” 31. This issue has been tried together with Issue No.7. The Trial Court on this issue has recorded a finding about readiness and willingness of the plaintiff-vendees and the circumstances attending it in the following words: ^^mDr eqgk;nkc; esa fnukad 15-9-95 rd iz'uuxr~ 3 ch?ks dPph tehu dk cSukek Hkoj flag dks oknhx.k ds i{k es dj nsuk FkkA Hkoj flag us mDr tehu dk cSukek oknhx.k ds i{k es djus gsrq dHkh dksbZ bPNk tkfgj ugha dh ftlds dkj.k fnukad 14-8-95 dks vius vf/kork ds ek/;e ls oknhx.k us uksfVl Hkoj flag dks izsf"kr fd;k ftldh izfr izn'kZ d&1 dks lk{kh vkse flag crkSj ih-MCY;w us fl} fd;k gSA mDr uksfVl Hkoj flag dks Hksth xbZ ftldh jlhn 'kkfey fe'ky gSA mDr uksfVl Hkoj flg dks izkIr gqvk ftldh ckor 'kkfey fe'ky 11x gSA ftls vkse flag lk{kh us viuh eq[; ijh{kk es rLnhd fd;k gSA bl lk{kh us crkSj ih-MCY;w-1 viuh eq[; ijh{kk es dgk gS fd ;g ,xzhesaV fnuakd 15-9-95 rd gqvk FkkA bl chp es esjs gd esa cSukek ugha fd;k rks eSus ,d uksfVl fnukad 14-8-95 dks p'eohj ,MoksdsV ckxir }kjk fnyok;kA bl xokg us dkxt la[;k 9x dks ns[kdj dgk fd ;g ogh uksfVl gS ftls mlus vius vf/koDrk ls fnyk;k Fkk ftls mUgs fy[krs iढ+rs ns[kk gS vkSj mls rLnhd fd;kA ;g uksfVl Hkoj flag dks izkIr gqvkA^^ 32. It has been recorded by the Trial Court in its finding on Issues Nos.1 and 2 thus: ^^izfrokni= dh /kkjk 17 es dgk x;k gS fd dfFkr bdjkjukes ds fo"k; es mlus uksfVl ugha HkstkA ijUrq mDr uksfVl ds QthZ gksus dh ckor mlus dksbZ Hkh mYys[k dgha ugha dgkA oknhx.k }kjk mls izkIr izfroknh laŒ1 dk mUgksusa isij la[;k 12x dks rLnhd fd;k gS fd mDr uksfVl muds uksfVl fnukafdr 14-08-95 ds mŸkj es mUgs izkIr gqvk Fkk fd fnukad 15-09-95 dks jftLVªh vkWfQl es vkdj iz'uxr Hkwfe dk cSukek dj nsa ftldh ckor bdjkjukek izn'kZ d&2 es r; ik;k x;k FkkA fnukad 15-09-9 dks oknhx.k lcjftLVªkj dk;kZy; es mifLFkr gq,] mUgksus viuh gkftjh ntZ djk;h ftldh ckor izys[k izn'kZ d&3 o izn'kZ d&4 fu"ikfnr fd;k x;kA izys[k izn'kZ d&3 o izn'kZ d&4 fnukad 15-6-94 dks mifuca/kd ckxir es jftLVMZ djkbZ xbZ ftlls fl) gksrk gS fd vkse flag o t;Hkxoku iz'uxr fookfnr laifŸk dk bdjkjukek egk;nk c; fnukad 15-6-96 ds vk/kkj ij cSukek djkus gsrq mifLFkr jgsA ijarq izfroknh laŒ1 mifLFkr ugha gqvkA vkse flag oknh crkSj lk{kh ih-MCY;w1 us viuh eq[; ijh{kk es dgk gS fd fnukad 15-9-95 dks ge jftLVªh ckxir x, vkSj Hkoj flag dk bartkj djrs jgsA tc og ugha vk;k rks geus jftLVªh es viuh gkftjh djkbZA igys 11&12 cts djk;h fQj 3 cts djk;hA bl lk{kh dk dFku fd mlds }kjk nkf[ky izys[k izn'kZ&3 o izn'kZ&4 ls Hkh fl) gksrk gS fd og iz'Ukxr Hkwfe dh jftLVªh djkus fnukad 15-8-94 dks mifuca/kd dk;kZy; esa mifLFkr gqvk] ftl fnu mDr bdjkjukek dh fe;kn [kRe gks jgh FkhA ijarq Hkoj flag jftLVªh djkus mifLFkr ugha gqvkA mDr bdjkjukes ds vk/kkj ij viuh gkftjh dh ckcr fu"ikfnr izn'kZ&3 o izn'kZ&4 izys[kks ls ;g Li"V gksrk gS fd oknhx.k ges'kk cSukek djkus ds fy, bPNqd jgsA ijarq Hkoj flag cSukek djkus gsrq lcjftLVªkj dk;kZy; ckxir es mifLFkr ugha gqvkA tcfd mld o oknh x.k ds e/; 5]000@& :i;s izfrQy dh /kujkf'k izkIr djrs gq, fnukad 15-6-94 dks bdjkjukek esa eqgk;nk c; mifuca/kd dk;kZy; esa iathd`r gqbZ Fkh] ftldh fe;kn fnukad 15-9-95 dh FkhA bl izdkj fnukad 15-9-95 frfFk rd oknhx.k mDr laifŸk ds cSukek djkus ds ges'kk bPNqd jgs vkSj og oknhx.k mDr laifŸk ds cSukek djkus ds ges'kk bPNqd jgs vkSj og iz'Ukxr laifŸk dk cSukek izfroknh laŒ&1 ls djkus ds gdnkj jgsA^^ 33. In his examination-in-chief, PW-1 Om Singh, who is one of the plaintiff-vendees, has testified on oath as follows: ^^eS bl ,xzhesaV okyh tehu dks ysus ds fy, lnSo rS;kj jgk gwa vkSj le;≤ ij bUgs cSukek djus ds fy, Hkh dgrk jgk gwa rFkk vkt Hkh cSukek djkus dks rS;kj gwA^^ In his cross-examination, this witness has stated about his financial means on the date he purchased the larger part of the defendant-vendor's holding, that is on 15.06.1994, and also on the day that he went to the Sub-Registrar's office to get a sale deed executed, after calling upon the defendant-vendor in terms of the suit agreement. He has clearly mentioned that on the date he went to the Sub-Registrar's office and got his attendance marked, he had with him a sum of Rs.48,000/-that his brother had brought along from Delhi. These facts are recorded in the cross-examination of PW-1, in the followings words: ^^gekjs gd esa Hkoj flag dk cSukek 15&6&94 dks gqvk FkkA LVsV cSad ckxir es esjk [kkrk gSA Hkoj flag ls tks cSukek geus fy;k Fkk mldk :i;k geus viuh tehu csp dj fn;k FkkA gekjh tehu ढkbZ yk[k dh fcdh Fkh mrus dk gh cSukek djk;k FkkA ftl fnu geus cSukek fd;k ml fnu gekjs 212000@& Qkyrw FksA ;g dguk xyr gS fd ml jkst gekjs ikl ftrus dk cSukek fy;k gks mlls T;knk :i;k u gksA Hkoj flag dk cSukek o ek;nk Hkoj flag dk ,d fnu igys cSukek gqvk fQj mlh fnu bdjkj ukek gqvkA ge ml fnu Hkh rS;kj Fks mlus dg fn;k Fkk fd cksus dks pkfg;s dqN fnu ckn cSukek d:axkA jftLVªh gkftjh ij ge 43 gtkj mls nsus dks rFkk 5000@& [kpZ ds ysdj x, FksA ml fnu tc ge tc t;Hkxoku] f'kopj.k] ohjsanz izhro x, FksA ml fnu 48000@& esjk HkkbZ fnYyh ls yk;k FkkA HkkbZ bdVBs djds yk;k FkkA oga ekax dj yk;k Fkk ;k mlds ikl FksA eq>s mlds [kkrs ds ckjs es ugh irk fdl cSad es gSA^^ 34. The aforesaid evidence is eloquent about the fact that the parties were not at all prejudiced about the plaintiffs' case of readiness and willingness for the Trial Court's failure to specifically frame an issue, mentioning those words. The aforesaid evidence is eloquent about the fact that the parties were not at all prejudiced about the plaintiffs' case of readiness and willingness for the Trial Court's failure to specifically frame an issue, mentioning those words. The parties went to trial conscious of the case about readiness and willingness, where evidence was also led on the point and the plaintiff and his witnesses were subjected to cross-examination. Therefore, the principles enunciated in Channayya would not be attracted at all to the facts here. Likewise, the decision of the Supreme Court in Atma Ram (supra) also does not apply to the facts obtaining here. In Atma Ram, the remarks of their Lordships bearing on the point, which the defendants moot, read: “9. Coming to the second aspect revolving around Section 16(c), a look at the judgment of the trial court would show that no issue was framed on the question of readiness and willingness on the part of the petitioner-plaintiff in terms of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The fact that the petitioner chose to issue a legal notice dated 12-11-1996 and the fact that the petitioner created an alibi in the form of an affidavit executed before the Sub-Registrar on 7- 10-1996 (marked as Ext. P-2) to show that he was present before the Sub-Registrar for the purpose of completion of the transaction, within the time stipulated for its performance, was not sufficient to conclude that the petitioner continued to be ready and willing even after three years, on 13-10-1999 when the plaint was presented. No explanation was forthcoming from the petitioner for the long delay of three years, in filing the suit (on 13-10-1999) after issuing a legal notice on 12-11-1996. The conduct of a plaintiff is very crucial in a suit for specific performance. A person who issues a legal notice on 12-11-1996 claiming readiness and willingness, but who institutes a suit only on 13-10-1999 and that too only with a prayer for a mandatory injunction carrying a fixed court fee relatable only to the said relief, will not be entitled to the discretionary relief of specific performance.” 35. A person who issues a legal notice on 12-11-1996 claiming readiness and willingness, but who institutes a suit only on 13-10-1999 and that too only with a prayer for a mandatory injunction carrying a fixed court fee relatable only to the said relief, will not be entitled to the discretionary relief of specific performance.” 35. Atma Ram was a case, where the plaintiff had instituted a suit after a delay of three years, which carried a relief for mandatory injunction alone, though court fee for specific performance without amending the suit to bring in a relief of specific performance was sought. It was in that context that the absence of an issue about readiness and willingness to a plea under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act was held fatal. Here, the facts are absolutely different, where the suit was instituted properly framing a relief of specific performance. There is a clear averment in the plaint to the effect that the plaintiff-vendees, in accordance with the suit agreement, have always been ready and willing to get a sale deed executed. This averment and related facts are specifically pleaded in Paragraph No.5 of the plaint. The omission by the Trial Court, therefore, to frame an issue about readiness and willingness, is no more than an irregularity arising from oversight or the Court's casual approach. However, the issue substantially is part of Issue No.1 and parties have consciously gone to trial, bearing in mind the case about readiness and willingness urged by the plaintiff-vendees. The parties, particularly the plaintiff-vendees, have led evidence on the point of readiness and willingness and have been cross-examined. Thus, by application of no principle or yardstick, can it be said that it is a case where failure to frame an issue about readiness and willingness has prejudiced the parties' case, particularly of the defendants. 36. Further reliance that has been placed by the learned Counsel for the defendants on the decision of this Court in Dhanu (supra) does not also lead to a favourable perspective for the defendants on the substantial questions of law under consideration. In Dhanu, I held: “24. This Court is not unmindful of the well established legal principle that ‘readiness’ and ‘willingness’ are matters that have to be proved substantially and not left to mere ceremony and form. In Dhanu, I held: “24. This Court is not unmindful of the well established legal principle that ‘readiness’ and ‘willingness’ are matters that have to be proved substantially and not left to mere ceremony and form. About readiness also, therefore, it has been said on high judicial authority that there should be consistent proof of capacity to pay the sale consideration, which this Court thinks should be there throughout, and it is not necessary that the plaintiffs should be carrying around requisite money with him at all times after performance falls due and till such time that a decree is passed. But those authorities do not absolve the plaintiffs of proving their capacity at all times after performance has fallen due, by leading appropriate evidence in the circumstances obtaining. The aforesaid principle of substantial compliance in the matter of establishing readiness and willingness is most eloquently exposited by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in A. Kanthamani v. Nasreen Ahmed , where their Lordships held thus in paragraphs 24, 25 & 26 of the report: “24. The expression “readiness and willingness” has been the subject-matter of interpretation in many cases even prior to its insertion in Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. While examining the question as to how and in what manner, the plaintiff is required to prove his financial readiness so as to enable him to claim specific performance of the contract/agreement, the Privy Council in a leading case which arose from the Indian courts (Bombay) in [Bank of India Ltd. v. Jamsetji A.H. Chinoy, 1949 SCC OnLine PC 81 : (1949-50) 77 IA 76 : AIR 1950 PC 90 ], approved the view taken by Chagla A.C.J., and held inter alia that “it is not necessary for the plaintiff to produce the money or vouch a concluded scheme for financing the transaction to prove his readiness and willingness.” 25. The following observations of the Privy Council are apposite: (Jamsetji case [Bank of India Ltd. v. Jamsetji A.H. Chinoy, 1949 SCC OnLine PC 81 : (1949-50) 77 IA 76 : AIR 1950 PC 90 ], SCC OnLine PC) “… Their Lordships agree with this conclusion and the grounds on which it was based. The following observations of the Privy Council are apposite: (Jamsetji case [Bank of India Ltd. v. Jamsetji A.H. Chinoy, 1949 SCC OnLine PC 81 : (1949-50) 77 IA 76 : AIR 1950 PC 90 ], SCC OnLine PC) “… Their Lordships agree with this conclusion and the grounds on which it was based. It is true that Plaintiff 1 stated that he was buying for himself, that he had not sufficient ready money to meet the price and that no definite arrangements had been made for finding it at the time of repudiation. But in order to prove himself ready and willing a purchaser has not necessarily to produce the money or to vouch a concluded scheme for financing the transaction. The question is one of fact, and in the present case the appellate court had ample material on which to found the view it reached. Their Lordships would only add in this connection that they fully concur with Chagla A.C.J. when he says: “In my opinion, on the evidence already on record it was sufficient for the court to come to the conclusion that Plaintiff 1 was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. It was not necessary for him to work out actual figures and satisfy the court what specific amount a bank would have advanced on the mortgage of his property and the pledge of these shares. I do not think that any jury--if the matter was left to the jury in England--would have come to the conclusion that a man, in the position in which the plaintiff was, was not ready and willing to pay the purchase price of the shares which he had bought from Defendants 1 and 2.’ For the foregoing reasons, their Lordships answer Question (4) in the affirmative.” (emphasis supplied) 28. The decisions above referred are expressions of high judicial opinion, and for whatever is said there, there cannot be any quarrel. But, it has to be seen on the facts obtaining in the case in hand, which includes pleading as also the evidence, in what manner the principles relating to substantial compliance with the requirement of proving readiness and willingness would operate. It is for the Courts of fact again to determine this question. Illustratively, in A. Kanthamani (supra) the agreement to sell was executed between parties on 5th March, 1989 for a total sale consideration of Rs. It is for the Courts of fact again to determine this question. Illustratively, in A. Kanthamani (supra) the agreement to sell was executed between parties on 5th March, 1989 for a total sale consideration of Rs. 3,43,200/-. A sum of Rs. 1,30,000/- was paid by the vendee to the vendor as earnest. Close on heels, a sum of Rs. 20,000/- was further paid towards sale consideration on 03.04.1989, Rs. 10,000/- on 04.05.1989, Rs. 15,000/- on 03.07.1989, Rs. 15,000/-on 06.07.1989 and Rs. 16,000/- on 16.08.1989, aggregating a sum of Rs. 76,000/-. This figure added to the initial earnest of Rs. 1,30,000/-, would make the advance payment, a figure of Rs. 2,06,000/-. It was also found there that the vendor orally agreed to transfer to the vendee, an additional area of 132.25 square feet, at the ground floor, and, an undivided share. In relation to the additional property covenanted to be sold, the vendee paid his vendor a sum of Rs. 46,000/-, as earnest. Upon the total advance money paid, the Courts of fact in that case found that the vendee had paid more than Rs. 2 lacs to the vendor, of the total agreed sale consideration, where a balance sum of Rs. 1,47,200/-remained to be paid. Added to it was the conduct of the vendee, sending the vendor, a draft sale deed on 10.11.1989, for an area admeasuring 847.25 square feet and one ½ undivided share. It is also noticed that the vendor had orally agreed to sell an additional area of land, but on receipt of the draft sale deed, she refused to do so and returned the draft sale deed to the vendor on 04.12.1989 for his approval, asking him to treat the sum of Rs. 46,000/-paid by him for the additional area, as further advance, paid in relation to the registered agreement dated 05.03.1989. Thereafter, on 15.12.1989, the vendor sent another draft sale deed for approval of the vendee, effecting necessary changes there.” 37. Admittedly, there are two Courts of facts here, who, after consideration of evidence about readiness and willingness, have reached a plausible conclusion about it. Moreover, Dhanu was not a case where the Court was confronted with the proposition about the effect of a formal failure of the Court to frame an issue about readiness and willingness, notwithstanding its substantial consideration with parties pleading about it and leading evidence. Moreover, Dhanu was not a case where the Court was confronted with the proposition about the effect of a formal failure of the Court to frame an issue about readiness and willingness, notwithstanding its substantial consideration with parties pleading about it and leading evidence. The principles there were laid down in the context of what readiness and willingness occurring in Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act oblige a plaintiff to prove, before he can get a decree of specific performance. The said decision, for the aforesaid reason also, is not of much assistance to the defendants on the substantial questions of law under consideration. 38. The principle that governs the answer to the substantial questions of law under consideration finds eloquent enunciation in the holding of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in P. Purushottam Reddy (supra), where it has been observed: “11. ……….. It is true that a specific issue was not framed by the trial court. Nevertheless, the parties and the trial court were very much alive to the issue whether Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act was complied with or not and the contentions advanced by the parties in this regard were also adjudicated upon. The High Court was to examine whether such finding of the trial court was sustainable or not - in law and on facts. Even otherwise the question could have been gone into by the High Court and a finding could have been recorded on the available material inasmuch as the High Court being the court of first appeal, all the questions of fact and law arising in the case were open before it for consideration and decision. 12. Assuming that there was any deficiency in the pleadings and also an omission on the part of the trial court to frame a specific issue, the present one is a case where the applicability of the law laid down by this Court in Nagubai Ammal v. R. Shama Rao [ AIR 1956 SC 593 ] was squarely attracted. In Nagubai case [ AIR 1956 SC 593 ] this Court was called upon to examine if the plea of lis pendens was not open to the plaintiff on the ground that it had not been raised in the pleadings. Neither the plaint nor the reply statement of the plaintiff contained any averment that the sale was affected by the rule of lis pendens. Neither the plaint nor the reply statement of the plaintiff contained any averment that the sale was affected by the rule of lis pendens. There was no specific issue directed to that question. However, evidence was adduced by the plaintiff on the plea of lis pendens and not objected to by the defendants. The question was argued and tested by taking into consideration the evidence that the proceedings were collusive in character with a view to avoid operation of Section 52 of the TP Act. This Court felt satisfied that the defendants went to trial with full knowledge that the question of lis pendens was in issue, had ample opportunity to adduce their evidence thereon and fully availed themselves of the opportunity. This Court formed the opinion that in the circumstances of the case, absence of a specific pleading on the question was a mere irregularity which resulted in no prejudice to the defendants. After having noticed the rule of pleadings as applicable to civil law that “no amount of evidence can be looked into upon a plea which was never put forward”, this Court held: (AIR p. 598, para 12) “The true scope of this rule is that evidence let in on issues on which the parties actually went to trial should not be made the foundation for decision of another and different issue, which was not present in the minds of the parties and on which they had no opportunity of adducing evidence. But that rule has no application to a case where parties go to trial with knowledge that a particular question is in issue, though no specific issue has been framed thereon, and adduce evidence relating thereto.” 39. Thus, the principle on which the answer to these questions would turn, given the way the parties have pleaded their case and led evidence on the issue of readiness and willingness, is that a substantial compliance with the requirement of proving readiness and willingness at the trial by the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance would not vitiate the decree for the mere failure of framing a specific issue; of course, this would be so where the parties had notice of the case about readiness and willingness and had opportunity to lead evidence about it, with no prejudice being occasioned to the defendants on account of the failure to specifically frame that issue. 40. 40. Therefore, Substantial Question of Law (1) is answered in the affirmative, in terms that a suit for specific performance can be decreed without an issue about readiness and willingness being framed, provided readiness and willingness are substantially pleaded and proved by the parties' evidence, where the parties have gone to trial conscious of the plea, with opportunity to the defendants, to dispel the same. Substantial Question of Law No.2 is also answered in the affirmative, accordingly. 41. So far as the third substantial question of law is concerned, the same appears to be fairly well crystallized that where, in relation to the agricultural land subject matter of consolidation operations, the plaintiff-vendees have moved to different plots different from those that are subject matter of the suit agreement, the contract would frustrate. Learned Counsel for the defendants has placed emphatic reliance upon the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Piarey Lal v. Hori Lal, (1977) 2 SCC 221 to submit that once consolidation takes place and the subject matter of the contract moves out of the plaintiff-vendees' hands, who are given a different parcel by allotment of a chak, the contract frustrates under Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. In Piarey Lal (supra) interpreting Section 30 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 together with Section 54 and 55(1)(d) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, it has been held: “5. As is obvious, clause (a) of Section 30 does not bear on the question in controversy because it only provides for the cessation of the rights, title, interests and liabilities both of the tenure-holder to whom the “chak” has been allotted, and of the former tenure-holder of the plots comprising the “chak” in their respective “original holdings”. There is no controversy that this was so in the present case. It is also nobody's case that the rights, title, and interests of the tenure-holder entering into possession of his “chak” have any bearing on the controversy relating to the specific performance of the agreement for sale, for all that has been urged before us is that the defendant, as the tenure-holder of the new holding or “chak” had the same “liabilities” in that “chak” as he had in the original holding. What therefore remains for consideration is whether, on the defendant's entering into possession of his new land or “chak”, there was the same liability “in” the new land as “in” the original holding. It has therefore to be examined whether, by virtue of the agreement for sale, any liability accrued “in” the original holding? 6. A cross-reference to Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act shows that a contract for the sale of immovable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties. It has however been specifically provided in the section that such a contract “does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property”. It would therefore follow that the agreement for sale in the present case did not give rise to any interest “in” the original holding of the defendant as the tenure-holder. That being so, there could be no occasion for the transfer of any such liability “in” the new land or “chak” of the defendant so as to attract clause (b) of Section 30 of the Act. In fact what the defendant was bound to do under Section 55(1)(d) of the Transfer of Property Act was to execute a proper conveyance of “the property” which was the subject-matter of the contract for sale, and not of any other property. So when he lost that property as a result of the scheme of consolidation and his rights, title and interests ceased in that property by virtue of clause (a) of Section 30 of the Act, the agreement for sale became void within the meaning of Section 56 of the Contract Act, and it is futile to urge that they were saved by clause (a) or clause (b) of Section 30 of the Act.” 42. As already noted, there is little quarrel about the proposition that if the entire identity of land changes in consequence of consolidation, the suit agreement would frustrate. But the moot question is whether there has been such a change of identity of land between what was contracted to be sold by the defendant-vendor to the plaintiff-vendees through the suit agreement and what has remained with the defendant-vendor post consolidation, when the action came up for trial. While Mr. But the moot question is whether there has been such a change of identity of land between what was contracted to be sold by the defendant-vendor to the plaintiff-vendees through the suit agreement and what has remained with the defendant-vendor post consolidation, when the action came up for trial. While Mr. Ashutosh Mishra submits that the identity of the plot, subject matter of the suit agreement, is completely different from what has been allowed to the defendant-vendor, as a result of consolidation, Ms. Pooja Agarwal urges the contrary case. She submits that in consequence of consolidation, there has been a marginal or slight change to the identity of the land that is subject matter of the suit agreement. According to her, the land remains substantially unchanged. The only change is that for the six plot numbers, that are subject matter of the suit agreement, five from amongst the same have been allotted, slightly varying their areas, but maintaining the total area of 0.237 hectares. Both the learned Counsel, in this connection, have drawn this Court's attention to the plots that are subject matter of the suit agreement and those that figure in CH Form 41, where out of the six old plot numbers with their specified areas, five are shown allotted, with a slightly individual plot-wise adjusted area, to the defendant-vendor as part of his consolidated holding/ chak and assigned a new number, being Plot No.530. The total area remains unchanged. It would be of immense profit to compare the plot numbers subject matter of the suit agreement and those allotted to the defendant-vendor post consolidation, that figure in CH Form-41 relating to the defendant-vendor. This comparison can best be depicted in tabular form as shown below: Plot nos. of agreement to sell Plot nos. constituting new plot no.530 Plot No. Area (in hectares) Plot No. Area (in hectares) 248M '0.008 250/1 '0.005 250 '0.010 252/1 '0.086 251M '1.354 252/2 '0.005 252/1 '0.086 251M '0.131 252/2 '0.020 253M '0.010 253 '0.089 Total minus the area earlier sold = 0.237 '0.237 43. Now, a comparison of the plots that are subject matter of the suit agreement and those left back in the hands of the defendant-vendor post consolidation, would lead one to notice the following facts: Out of the land that was subject matter of the suit agreement, one Plot No.248M alone has been omitted. Now, a comparison of the plots that are subject matter of the suit agreement and those left back in the hands of the defendant-vendor post consolidation, would lead one to notice the following facts: Out of the land that was subject matter of the suit agreement, one Plot No.248M alone has been omitted. The other five have remained back with the defendant-vendor. Plot No.250 shown in the suit agreement and 250/1, where the area has been reduced from 0.010 to 0.005 hectares, are essentially the same plot with a subdivided number. Plot No.251M continues as such in the consolidated holding with a reduced area. Plot No.252/1 is there in CH Form-41 without any change. Plot No.252/2 is part of the consolidated holding. Plot No.253 also continues with the defendant-vendor. No doubt there is a change in area, but this is also attributable to the land already sold by the defendant-vendor to the plaintiff-vendees. The total area of the consolidated holding as shown in CH Form-41, also remains the same. 44. It is not a case where the land that was agreed to be sold through the suit agreement has gone out of the defendant- vendor's hand as a result of consolidation operations and a new holding allotted to him, relieving him of his earlier obligations by virtue of Section 30 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953. Once the chak allotted to the defendant-vendor is substantially the same land, that is subject matter of the suit agreement, the contract would not frustrate. The above principle has the endorsement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Baikunthi Devi and others v. Mahendra Nath and another (1977) 2 SCC 496 . The facts and holding in Baikunthi Devi (supra) read: “3. In the present case, the facts are brief and the law is clear. One Jeewa Ram, who had a half share in a tract of land Ac. 6-00 in extent with a small house thereon, had entered into an agreement to sell his share for a consideration of Rs 3000 to Respondent 1. This agreement dated June 16, 1960 was sought to be enforced by a suit for specific performance although by that time Jeewa Ram had passed away and his daughter, the present Appellant 1 became his legal representative. This agreement dated June 16, 1960 was sought to be enforced by a suit for specific performance although by that time Jeewa Ram had passed away and his daughter, the present Appellant 1 became his legal representative. The demand for specific performance was made by the plaintiff-first respondent who, incidentally, happens to be the nephew of the late Jeewa Ram. The suit itself was filed after the consolidation proceedings had come to a close. It so happened that as a result of the consolidation proceedings precisely the same land which was the subject-matter of the agreement to sell, less a tiny bit of Ac. 0-06, was included in the chak allotted to Jeewa Ram and the first respondent. 4. The High Court took the view that since substantially the same land as was the subject- matter of the agreement to sell (plus some other plot with which we are not concerned) has been allotted in the consolidation proceedings to Jeewa Ram there was no difficulty at all in enforcing specifically the agreement which was the basis of the suit. Nor do we see any valid objection to the view on the law and the facts taken by the High Court. 5. The only contention urged before us by Shri B.R.L. Iyengar, appearing for the appellants, is that on account of the consolidation proceedings even though the same lands may have been allotted in the new chak there was nevertheless a loss of identity, the emergence of a new character, the incarnation of a new entity as it were. On account of this consequence, he urged that specific performance could not be granted as a discretionary relief. We are unable to perceive any force in this submission. Actually, a tiny bit of Ac. 0-06 of land was also due to the first respondent which he gave up. Section 12(2) of the Specific Relief Act covers such a situation. The result is that the first respondent is entitled to enforce specifically the contract in his favour. The consolidation proceedings having concluded there is no bar to a decree being granted in his favour. In this view, there is no merit in this appeal.” 45. The principle, to the understanding of this Court, is about the substantial identity of the land subject matter of the suit agreement remaining unchanged in consequence of consolidation, that would save the contract from frustration. In this view, there is no merit in this appeal.” 45. The principle, to the understanding of this Court, is about the substantial identity of the land subject matter of the suit agreement remaining unchanged in consequence of consolidation, that would save the contract from frustration. Minor adjustments in the area of the plots or exclusion of a plot number of negligible area from the consolidated holding would not, in any manner, change the identity of the subject matter, so as to frustrate the contract by virtue of Section 30 of the of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 read with Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. 46. In the opinion of this Court, therefore, Substantial Question of Law No.3 must be answered in the negative, in terms that where agricultural land subject matter of consolidation, that is agreed to be sold, is consolidated and the defendant-vendor is moved to different plots, the contract would frustrate; but it would not frustrate where substantially, the subject matter of the suit agreement remains the same, with minor or negligible changes. 47. So far as the fourth substantial question of law is concerned, it is submitted by the learned Counsel for the defendants that grant of relief of specific performance is discretionary with the Court, where all circumstances should be taken into consideration, before a decision is taken about granting the said relief. Learned Counsel points out that defendant-purchasers are bona fide purchasers of the suit property, which is now a new plot bearing No.530, admeasuring 0.237 hectares. They had no knowledge of the suit agreement when they entered into the transaction of sale. The sale deed in favour of the defendant-purchasers was executed by the defendant-vendor on 16.09.1998 for a total sale consideration of Rs.68,000/-and ever since, they are in possession. It is pointed out that this Court protected their possession, initially by an interim order dated 22.05.2003 on an absolute basis, which was subsequently modified on 23.07.2004, directing the defendants to deposit Rs.6500/-annually with the Trial Court pending appeal. It was further ordered that the deposit so made shall be subject to final orders, that may be passed at the hearing of this appeal. It was further ordered that the deposit so made shall be subject to final orders, that may be passed at the hearing of this appeal. It was also ordered that the first annual deposit shall be made by the defendants by the of 1st September, 2004 and subsequent annual deposits shall be made by the 1st September of each succeeding year. 48. It is submitted that the said sum of money can be utilized to refund the earnest paid to the plaintiff-vendees in lieu of specific performance. It is urged that the value of the property has increased manifold over the period of time that the suit was instituted and has remained pending through appeals, whereas the relative value of money has dwindled. It is argued that execution of the sale deed, at this stage, would result in great injustice to the defendant-purchasers, who are in possession of the suit property after bona fide purchasing the same from its recorded bhumidhar, that is to say, the defendant-vendor. It is submitted on behalf of the plaintiff-vendees that the decision to grant specific performance is essentially a question of fact, where discretion has to be exercised by the Courts of fact on the evidence available. It is pointed out that unless the discretion has been perversely exercised, the same ought not to be interfered with. 49. This Court must remark that the exercise of discretion in the matter of specific performance, according to the current trend of authorities, has been the subject matter of consideration in higher and limited jurisdiction of this Court and their Lordships of the Supreme Court on subtle principles about adjustment of equities. Particularly, there is much emphasis about the legal principles that are designed to eschew arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. So far as the present case is concerned, this Court is of opinion that it does not pose much of a problem about adjustment of equities that invariably arise when a suit for specific performance goes through a long period of pendency to reach its terminus. Here, there is one fact that is very different, and that is that the suit was instituted by the plaintiff-vendees on 20th August, 1998 and the defendant-vendor executed a registered sale deed relating to the suit property in favour of the defendant-purchasers on 16.09.1998. Here, there is one fact that is very different, and that is that the suit was instituted by the plaintiff-vendees on 20th August, 1998 and the defendant-vendor executed a registered sale deed relating to the suit property in favour of the defendant-purchasers on 16.09.1998. Thus, the sale deed here is hit by the principle of lis pendens. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 reads: “52. Transfer of property pending suit relating thereto.-During the pendency in any Court having authority within the limits of India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir or established beyond such limits by the Central Government any suit or proceeding which is not collusive and in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the Court and on such terms as it may impose. Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, the pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed to commence from the date of the presentation of the plaint or the institution of the proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction, and to continue until the suit or proceeding has been disposed of by a final decree or order, and complete satisfaction or discharge of such decree or order has been obtained, or has become unobtainable by reason of the expiration of any period of limitation prescribed for the execution thereof by any law for the time being in force.” 50. It is clear that a transfer pendente lite confers title upon the purchaser, who takes the risk subject to the rights of his vendor. If the vendor fails in the litigation, the purchaser pendente lite has no right of his own or equities to plead. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in A. Nawab John and others v. Subramaniyam, (2012) 7 SCC 738 , where it has been held: “18. If the vendor fails in the litigation, the purchaser pendente lite has no right of his own or equities to plead. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in A. Nawab John and others v. Subramaniyam, (2012) 7 SCC 738 , where it has been held: “18. It is settled legal position that the effect of Section 52 is not to render transfers effected during the pendency of a suit by a party to the suit void; but only to render such transfers subservient to the rights of the parties to such suit, as may be, eventually, determined in the suit. In other words, the transfer remains valid subject, of course, to the result of the suit. The pendente lite purchaser would be entitled to or suffer the same legal rights and obligations of his vendor as may be eventually determined by the court. “12. … The mere pendency of a suit does not prevent one of the parties from dealing with the property constituting the subject-matter of the suit. The section only postulates a condition that the alienation will in no manner affect the rights of the other party under any decree which may be passed in the suit unless the property was alienated with the permission of the court.” (Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy [(2006) 13 SCC 608 : AIR 2007 SC 1332 ] , SCC p. 612, para 12.)” 51. There is only one eventuality under which the transferee pendente lite may acquire rights that would not be affected by the decree, and that is if the transfer has been made with permission of the Court, where the suit about rights of parties is pending. This is the direct consequent words in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which say “except under the authority of the Court and on such terms as it may impose”. If a purchaser pendente lite has purchased with permission of the Court and subject to the terms that it imposes, some kind of a right independent of the result of the suit pending between parties, may be claimed. Else, a purchaser pendente lite has no rights under the law. He has no equities either. Admittedly, the defendant-purchasers have not taken the suit property through a sale deed that was executed with the permission of the Court. Else, a purchaser pendente lite has no rights under the law. He has no equities either. Admittedly, the defendant-purchasers have not taken the suit property through a sale deed that was executed with the permission of the Court. The date of the sale deed is certainly one after institution of the suit. In fact, the suit property appears to have been transferred very shortly after the suit was instituted. The temporal placing of events almost suggest an unsavoury hurry on part of the defendant-vendor, that is reminiscent of the typical case of a debtor transferring property to defraud creditors. As soon as the suit here was instituted on 20.08.1998, the sale deed in favour of the defendant-purchasers was executed by the defendant-vendor. It appears to have been executed to defeat the rights of the plaintiff-vendees in the situation that obtains here. 52. This Court is of clear opinion that the discretion to grant specific performance has been rightly exercised by the two Courts below. 53. So far as the defendant-vendor is concerned, there is hardly any right based on law or in equity that arises in his favour. He has sold off the suit property to the defendant-purchasers for a valuable sale consideration of Rs.68,000/-, as would be evident from a perusal of the registered sale deed dated 16.09.1998. He has nothing to lose by the approval of a decree of specific performance passed by the Courts below. Of course, anything said here would not affect the rights and liabilities inter se the defendant-vendor and the defendant-purchasers on the basis of conveyance dated 16.09.1998, that would stand effaced in consequence of the decree of specific performance passed in favour of the plaintiff-vendees. 54. Substantial Question of Law (4) is answered in the aforesaid terms. 55. In the result, this appeal fails and stands dismissed with costs throughout, to be borne equally between the defendant-vendor and the defendant-purchasers. 56. The interim order dated 22.05.2003 in the terms made absolute on 23.07.2004, is hereby vacated. The sum of money deposited by the defendant-purchasers shall be paid to the plaintiff-vendees together with any accrued interest, if earned, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order by the Trial Court. 57. Let a decree be drawn up accordingly. 58. The sum of money deposited by the defendant-purchasers shall be paid to the plaintiff-vendees together with any accrued interest, if earned, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order by the Trial Court. 57. Let a decree be drawn up accordingly. 58. The records of the Courts below shall be sent down at once along with a certified copy of this judgment.