JUDGMENT : M. S. Sonak, J. 1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2. Rule. The rule is made returnable forthwith at the request and with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties. Even otherwise, we had made it clear that this petition will be disposed of finally having regard to the timeline set out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Election Commissioner of India Vs Bajrang Bahadur Singh and others, 2015 (12) SCC 570 . 3. This petition was instituted on 01.12.2020 and taken up before the learned Single Judge until 27.01.2022. On this date, the learned Single Judge after noticing the directions in paragraph 67 of Bajrang Bahadur Singh (supra) directed the registry to place this matter before the Division Bench. Accordingly, this matter was taken up by the Division Bench on 31.01.2022 and with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, the matter was posted for final disposal on 01.02.2022 at the end of the admission board subject to overnight part-heard matters. The matter was then heard extensively on 01.02.2022 and 02.02.2022 and reserved for orders. 4. The petitioner, by instituting this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India challenges the following orders:- (a) The order dated 09.09.2017 made by His Excellency Governor of Goa in the exercise of powers under Article 192(2) of the Constitution of India dismissing the petitioner's petition seeking disqualification of respondent No.4 inter alia for having breached Article 190(3)(a), 191(1)(a) of the Constitution of India read with Sections 8-A and 9-A of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 (the RP Act); (b) The order dated 04.08.2020 made by His Excellency Governor of Goa, dismissing the petitioner's petition seeking review of the aforesaid order dated 09.09.201 PLEADINGS AND INTRODUCTORY FACTS 5. The elections to the Goa State Legislative Assembly for the term March 2017-March 2022 were held in the months of February-March 2017. The last date for filing the nominations was 04.02.2017. Respondent No.4 was elected as MLA from Margao Constituency in March 2017. 6. On 28.04.2017, the petitioner instituted a petition before H. E. Governor of Goa seeking a declaration that respondent No.4 stands disqualified in terms of Article 190(3)(a), 191(1)(a) read with Sections 8-A and 9-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (RP Act). Respondent No.4 was elected as MLA from Margao Constituency in March 2017. 6. On 28.04.2017, the petitioner instituted a petition before H. E. Governor of Goa seeking a declaration that respondent No.4 stands disqualified in terms of Article 190(3)(a), 191(1)(a) read with Sections 8-A and 9-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (RP Act). The invocation of ground under Section 8-A of the RP Act does not appear to have been pursued and in any case, no contentions based on these grounds were raised before us in this petition. 7. In the petition dated 28.04.2017, the petitioner, referred to the constitution and reconstitution of the partnership firm M/s. Bharat Construction Engineers & Builders (the said firm) for the period between 09.12.1980 i.e. the date on which the said firm was founded and 13.02.2006 i.e. the date on which the business of the firm was taken over by a company named Apollo Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd., (the said company). The petitioner pointed out that initially Mr. Kiran Naik, respondent No.4, and some others were partners in the said firm. In 1996, respondent No.4 retired from the said firm, and his wife Asha Kamat was inducted in his place. On 01.04.2005 even Asha Kamat retired from the said firm and Satish Lavande, her brother was inducted in her place. The petitioner also pointed out that the said company was incorporated to take over the assets and liabilities of the said firm and Mr. Kiran Naik and Satish Lavande, brother-in- law of respondent No.4 were its two directors and shareholders. 8. In the petition dated 28.04.2017, the petitioner also pointed out that the said firm and thereafter the said company had contracts with Government. In particular, the petitioner pointed out that the said company had entered into a contract with the Government on 12.12.2016 for “improvement and resurfacing of internal roads in Fatrade in V.P. Varca” and this contract was subsisting on 04.02.2017 which was the last date for filing nominations for elections to the Goa Legislative Assembly for the term March 2017-March 2022. 9. 9. The petitioner also pointed out that with effect from 25.06.2013, Yogiraj Kamat was inducted as a director of the said company in place of Satish Lavande and this means that after the election the said company comprising of Kiran Naik and Yogiraj Kamat, son of the respondent No.4 had a subsisting contract dated 12.12.2016 with the Government of Goa. The petitioner also alleged that Yogiraj Kamat was only a front and the real management of the said company vested in respondent No.4. The petitioner also alleged that respondent No.4 was the “key person” in the management of the said company and consequently in the execution of the contracts entered into by and on behalf of the said company. 10. Based on the aforesaid allegations, the petitioner contended that respondent No.4 was disqualified for being a member of the Legislative Assembly as provided in Article 191(1)(e) read with Section 9-A of the said Act. 11. H. E. Governor of Goa requested the Election Commission of India (ECI) to furnish its opinion on the allegations contained in the disqualification petition in terms of Article 192(2) of the Constitution. Such opinion was furnished by the ECI opining that respondent No.4 had not incurred any disqualification. Based upon the same, H. E. Governor of Goa by the impugned order dated 09.09.2017 dismissed the petitioner’s petition. 12. On 28.06.2019 i.e. after almost 21 months from the date of the impugned order dated 09.09.2017, the petitioner instituted a review petition before H. E. Governor of Goa seeking a review of the order dated 09.09.2017. The petitioner invoked the provisions of Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code read with Articles 137 and 145 of the Constitution of India in support of this review petition. The petitioner claimed that he had obtained certain additional documents through the RTI process and based thereon the review petition was filed. The petitioner also claimed that there were errors apparent on the face of the record of the said order. 13. H. E. Governor of Goa once again sought for opinion of ECI in terms of 192(2) of the Constitution. The ECI, at the outset, opined that the review petition was not maintainable and in any case, opined that there was no merit in the review petition. Based on this opinion of ECI, H. E. Governor of Goa, dismissed the review petition vide impugned order dated 04.08.2020. 14. The ECI, at the outset, opined that the review petition was not maintainable and in any case, opined that there was no merit in the review petition. Based on this opinion of ECI, H. E. Governor of Goa, dismissed the review petition vide impugned order dated 04.08.2020. 14. The petitioner then instituted this petition on 28.11.2020 to challenge the impugned orders dated 09.09.2017 and 04.08.2020 made by H. E. Governor of Goa. RIVAL CONTENTIONS 15. Mr. Nigel Da Costa Frias, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that both in the said firm as well as in the said company, respondent No.4 was the key person having substantial interest through his proxies Asha Kamat (wife), Satish Lavande (brother-in-law) and son (Yogiraj Kamat). He submitted that the said company had entered into a contract dated 12.12.2016 with the Government of Goa and such contract, was subsisting on 04.02.2017 the last date of filing of nominations, and even thereafter when respondent No.4 was elected as an MLA in March 2017. He submitted that on such basic facts about which there was ample evidence, respondent No.4 stood disqualified as MLA. 16. Mr. Costa Frias submitted that the object and intent of Section 9-A of the said Act is to maintain the purity of the Legislature and avoid conflicts between duty and interest of the members of the Legislative Assembly. He submitted that this object is sought to be achieved by ensuring that a person who has entered into a contract with the State Government and therefore liable to perform certain obligations towards the State Government, is not elected as an MLA lest he should use his influence to dilute the obligations or to seek and secure undue advantages and benefits in respect of the subsisting contracts. He submitted that this provision seeks to ensure that the personal interest of the MLA will not override his duties and obligations as a member of the Legislative Assembly. He submitted that the provisions of Section 9-A of the said Act cannot be frustrated by a person by entering into a contract with the State Government through a proxy or under the corporate veil. He submitted that in such a situation corporate veil must be pierced to subserve public interest and maintain the purity of Legislature. He submitted that the provisions of Section 9-A of the said Act cannot be frustrated by a person by entering into a contract with the State Government through a proxy or under the corporate veil. He submitted that in such a situation corporate veil must be pierced to subserve public interest and maintain the purity of Legislature. He submitted that in the present case, there is an infraction of this principle and both, the letter and spirit of the provisions of Section 9-A of the said Act. He relied on Election Commission, India Vs Saka Venkata Rao, AIR 1953 SC 210 . Election Commission of India Vs Bajrang Bahadur Singh and others, (2015) 12 SCC 570 . Shrikant Vs Vasantrao and others, (2006) 2 SCC 682 . Konappa Rudrappa Nadgouda Vs Vishwanath Reddy and another, AIR 1969 SC 447 . Sewaram Vs Sobaran Singh, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 46. State of Rajasthan and others Vs Gotan Lime Stone Khanij Udyog Private Limited and another, (2016) 4 SCC 469 . Subhra Mukherjee and another Vs Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and others, (2000) 3 SCC 312 . 17. Mr. S. R. Rivankar, learned Senior Advocate appearing for ECI, and Mr. P. Rao, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4 submitted that this petition is barred by limitation prescribed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bajrang Bahadur Singh (supra). They refer to para 66 of this judgment and pointed out that the petition to challenge the decision of the H.E. Governor under Article 192 must be instituted within eight weeks from the date of the decision of the Governor. They submitted that this petition was instituted much beyond the period of eight weeks from the dates of both the decisions i.e. the decision dated 09.09.2017 and the decision dated 04.08.2020 and therefore, this petition should be dismissed as barred by limitation. 18. Mr. Rivankar and Mr. Rao pointed out that since by order dated 04.08.2020, the petitioner’s review petition, which was not even maintainable, was dismissed, there could be no merger of the orders dated 04.08.2020 and 09.09.2017. They rely on the Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs Yashwant Singh Negi, (2020) 9 SCC 815 in support of this contention. 19. Mr. Deep Shirodkar, learned Additional Government Advocate relied on DSR Steel (Private) Limited Vs State of Rajasthan and others, (2012) 6 SCC 782 in support of this contention. They rely on the Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs Yashwant Singh Negi, (2020) 9 SCC 815 in support of this contention. 19. Mr. Deep Shirodkar, learned Additional Government Advocate relied on DSR Steel (Private) Limited Vs State of Rajasthan and others, (2012) 6 SCC 782 in support of this contention. The learned counsel submitted that by filing a review petition which was itself not maintainable, the period of limitation to challenge the order dated 09.09.2017 could not be extended and the petition ought to be dismissed as barred by limitation. 20. Mr. Rivankar and Mr. Rao submitted that the H.E. Governor, acting under Articles 191 and 192 of the Constitution does not have any powers to review his own decision. They submitted that powers of review in such matters are never inherent but have to be conferred specifically or at least by implication. They submitted that the petitioner cannot claim an extension to the period of limitation based on the order dated 04.08.2020 made in a review petition which was itself not maintainable. They rely on Dr. Kashinath Jalmi and another Vs The Speaker and others, (1993) 2 SCC 703 . Dr. (Smt.) Kuntesh Gupta Vs Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, (1987) 4 SCC 525 and Patel Narshi Thakershi and Ors. vs Shri Pradyumansinghji, (1971) 3 SCC 844 in support of this contention. 21. Mr. Rivankar and Mr. Rao submitted that even the main petition instituted by the petitioner on 28.04.2017 was not at all maintainable before H.E. Governor because the entire foundation of this petition was a pre-existing disqualification allegedly incurred by respondent No.4 as on the last date of filing of nomination papers i.e. 04.02.2017. They submitted that in such a situation the petitioner could have challenged the election of respondent No.4 only by instituting an election petition under the said Act and not by instituting a disqualification petition before H.E. Governor under Article 192 of the Constitution. They rely on Saka Venkata Rao (supra), Bajrang Bahadur Singh (supra), and Mohinder Singh Gill and another Vs The Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405 . 22. Mr. Rivankar and Mr. Rao, without prejudice to the aforesaid submitted that even otherwise the provisions of Section 9-A of the said Act were not at all attracted in this case because the direct involvement of a candidate is a sine qua non. 22. Mr. Rivankar and Mr. Rao, without prejudice to the aforesaid submitted that even otherwise the provisions of Section 9-A of the said Act were not at all attracted in this case because the direct involvement of a candidate is a sine qua non. An indirect interest, which in any case is not made out, does not attract disqualification under Section 9-A of the said Act. They submitted that in this case, respondent No.4 was neither a director nor a shareholder in the said company that had a contract with the Government of Goa, and even otherwise, the said company is a juristic entity different and distinct from its shareholders and directors. They rely on Ranjeet Singh Vs Harmohinder Singh Pradhan, (1999) 4 SCC 517 . Indumati Laxman Bhakare Vs State of Maharashtra and others, 2004(3) Mh. L.J. 6. Bacha F. Guzdar, Bombay Vs Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 74 and Jagan Nath Vs Sohan Singh Basi and another, I.L.R. (1968) 1 (P & H) 439 in support of this contention. 23. Mr. Rivankar and Mr. Rao submitted that the petitioner had instituted an almost identical petition on 02.11.2016 before the H.E. Governor and the same was dismissed on 27.01.2017 after the ECI opined that the same lacked merit. The petitioner has suppressed this relevant and vital fact and therefore this Court should not exercise its extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction and entertain the present petition. 24. Mr. Rivankar and Mr. Rao finally submitted that findings of fact recorded by the ECI in both its opinions are based on the material on record. They submitted that the jurisdiction of this Court to review the orders made by the H.E. Governor and ECI is quite limited and in the exercise of such limited powers of judicial review, no case is made out to interfere with the impugned orders. 25. Mr. Costa Frias, in rejoinder, submitted that there is a merger of the order dated 09.09.2017 with the order dated 04.08.2020. He submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court by orders dated 23.03.2020 and 10.01.2022 made in Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No.3 of 2020 has extended the period of limitation having regard to the COVID pandemic. 25. Mr. Costa Frias, in rejoinder, submitted that there is a merger of the order dated 09.09.2017 with the order dated 04.08.2020. He submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court by orders dated 23.03.2020 and 10.01.2022 made in Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No.3 of 2020 has extended the period of limitation having regard to the COVID pandemic. He, therefore, submitted that the present petition was instituted well within the period of limitation prescribed in para 66 of the Bajrang Bahadur Singh (supra) assuming without admitting that such a limitation at all applies. 26. Mr. Costa Frias submitted that the H.E. Governor being a Constitutional functionary has plenary jurisdiction when he/she decides on the question as to the disqualification of the MLAs. He submitted that there is nothing either in the Constitution or RP Act to suggest that the powers of review are unavailable to the H.E. Governor. He, therefore, submits that the review petition was maintainable and was in fact entertained by the H.E. Governor. 27. Mr. Costa Frias submitted that the disqualification petition instituted by the petitioner was maintainable before H.E. Governor because Article 191 provides that a person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of the Legislative Assembly if he so disqualified by or under any law made by the Parliament. He submits that the disqualification is for being elected and for continuing as an MLA for so long as there subsists a contract entered into by him with the appropriate Government. He submitted that the respondents were misinterpreting certain observations in Saka Venkat Rao (supra) and Bajrang Bahadur Singh (supra). 28. Mr. Costa Frias submitted that the order dated 27.01.2017 by which the petitioner’s previous petition was dismissed did not pertain to the election of respondent No.4 for the term March 2017 to March 2022 and therefore dismissal order was not relevant to the issues raised in the present petition. He pointed out that in any case, there was a reference made to this petition and order made therein in the chronology of dates and events of this petition. He, therefore, submitted that this was not at all a case of suppressing relevant or vital material or orders. POINTS FOR DETERMINATION 29. He pointed out that in any case, there was a reference made to this petition and order made therein in the chronology of dates and events of this petition. He, therefore, submitted that this was not at all a case of suppressing relevant or vital material or orders. POINTS FOR DETERMINATION 29. Upon considering the rival contentions, according to us, the following points arise for determination:- (A) Whether the present petition is barred by limitation prescribed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 66 of Bajrang Bahadur Singh (supra)? (B) Whether H.E. Governor exercising powers under Article 192 of the Constitution has the powers to review his/her decision made under Article 192(2) of the Constitution? (C) Whether the petition dated 28.04.2017 instituted by the petitioner before H.E. Governor under Article 192 of the Constitution was at all maintainable because the same was based on an allegation of a “pre-existing disqualification” and not a “supervening disqualification”? (D) Whether on the facts alleged and established, a case was made out for disqualification of respondent No.4 under Section 9-A of the RP Act? LIMITATION 30. There is no period of limitation as such prescribed either under the Constitution or under any other law for challenging the decision of H.E. Governor under Article 192(2) of the Constitution. The learned counsel for the respondents however rely on Bajrang Bahadur Singh (supra) and the limitation prescribed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 66 of the said judgment. 31. In Bajrang Bahadur Singh (supra) the Governor of Uttar Pradesh, by his decision dated 29.01.2015 made under Article 192 of the Constitution declared that Bajrang (MLA) incurred disqualification stipulated under Section 9-A of the RP Act. As a consequence, the seat held by the said MLA was declared as vacant vide order dated 17.02.2015 issued by the Secretariat of the Legislative Assembly. On 20.03.2015 the ECI issued a press note by which the elections scheduled for filling up seven casual vacancies in seven different assembly constituencies, including the one represented by Bajrang was notified. Bajrang challenged the Governor's decision dated 29.01.2015 before the High Court of Allahabad and obtained an interim order dated 20.03.2015, staying the election process in the constituency earlier represented by him. Aggrieved by the interim order, the ECI instituted a Special Leave Petition before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 32. Bajrang challenged the Governor's decision dated 29.01.2015 before the High Court of Allahabad and obtained an interim order dated 20.03.2015, staying the election process in the constituency earlier represented by him. Aggrieved by the interim order, the ECI instituted a Special Leave Petition before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 32. One of the issues before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bajrang Bahadur Singh (supra) was therefore the re-conciliation of the two conflicting constitutional obligations, (i) of the High Court to adjudicate the dispute regarding the legality of the Governor’s decision under Article 192, and, (ii) the Commission’s obligation to hold the election within a period of six months from the date of occurrence of the vacancy. 33. In the aforesaid context, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held the following at paragraphs 66 and 67 of the SCC report:- “66. Unfortunately, there is no period of limitation prescribed by law within which a person aggrieved by the decision of the Governor under Article 192 can approach the High Court. Until such law is made, we deem it appropriate to hold that any person aggrieved by a decision of the Governor under Article 192 must approach the High Court by initiating appropriate proceedings (if he is so desirous) within a period of eight weeks from the date of the decision of the Governor. 67. Such proceedings must be heard by a Bench of at least two Judges and be disposed of within a period of eight weeks from the date of initiation without fail. The Chief Justice of the High Court concerned will make an appropriate arrangement in this regard. If the abovementioned time-frame is strictly followed, the ECI would still be left with another eight weeks of time to comply with the obligations emanating from Section 151-A of the RP Act.” 34. Article 141 of the Constitution provides that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India. Further, Article 144 of the Constitution provides that all authorities, Civil and Judicial, in the territory of India shall act in aid of the Supreme Court. Article 141 of the Constitution provides that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India. Further, Article 144 of the Constitution provides that all authorities, Civil and Judicial, in the territory of India shall act in aid of the Supreme Court. Therefore, it is clear, that until a law is made prescribing some forum and a period of limitation to challenge the decision of the Governor under Article 192 of the Constitution, any person aggrieved by such a decision of the Governor can approach the High Court by initiating appropriate proceedings within 8 weeks from the date of the decision of the Governor. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further directed that such proceedings must be heard by a bench of at least two judges and must be disposed of within 8 weeks of initiation without fail. 35. The aforesaid observations were made in the context of the Governor disqualifying an MLA under Article 192 of the Constitution and the ECI proceeding to hold a by-election within six months from the date of the vacancy. That is why, a timeline was set out within which the MLA if he so desires, must approach the High Court by initiating appropriate proceedings within 8 weeks from the Governor's decision. Thereafter, directions were issued that such proceedings must be disposed of within 8 weeks from the date of initiation without fail. This would then leave the ECI with another 8 weeks to comply with the obligations emanating from Section 151-A of the RP Act of holding by- elections within six months from the date of occurrence of the vacancy. 36. However, Mr. Rivankar and Mr. Rao submitted that the expression used in paragraph 66 quoted above is “any person aggrieved by the decision of the Governor under Article 192”. Based on this expression, they submit that even a person who is aggrieved by the decision of the Governor dismissing his disqualification petition under Article 192 must approach the High Court, if he so desires, within 8 weeks from the date of the decision of the Governor. Mr. Based on this expression, they submit that even a person who is aggrieved by the decision of the Governor dismissing his disqualification petition under Article 192 must approach the High Court, if he so desires, within 8 weeks from the date of the decision of the Governor. Mr. Costa Frias did not dispute this position and therefore, without deciding the issue conclusively one way or the other, we proceed based on the premise that the period of limitation prescribed in paragraph 66 above will apply even to a person whose petition seeking disqualification of an MLA is dismissed by the Governor under Article 192 of the Constitution. 37. In this petition, the petitioner has challenged the orders dated 09.09.2017 and 04.08.2020 by which the H.E. Governor has dismissed his petitions seeking disqualification of respondent No.4. 38. Insofar as this petition challenges the order dated 09.09.2017, the same is undoubtedly instituted way beyond the period of 8 weeks prescribed in paragraph 66 above. This petition was instituted on 28.11.2020 i.e. after almost three years and two months from the date of the order dated 09.09.2017. 39. Insofar as this petition challenges the order dated 04.08.2020, by which the H.E. Governor has dismissed the petitioner's petition seeking review of order dated 09.09.2017 is concerned, again, the same was instituted almost 58 days beyond the period prescribed in paragraph 66 above. However, insofar as the challenge to the order dated 04.08.2020 is concerned, Mr. Costa Frias relies on the order dated 10.01.2022 made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Misc. Civil Application No.21/2022 in Misc. Civil Application No.665/2021 in Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No.3 of 2020 (in Re: Cognizance for extension of limitation). 40. In the order dated 10.01.2022, the Hon'ble Supreme Court issued the following direction:- “I. The order dated 23.03.2020 is restored and in continuation of the subsequent orders dated 08.03.2021, 27.04.2021 and 23.09.2021, it is directed that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall stand excluded for the purposes of limitation as may be prescribed under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasi judicial proceedings. 41. 41. Having regard to the aforesaid direction amongst others, issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, this petition, insofar as it challenges the order dated 04.08.2020 is concerned, can be said to have been instituted within the extended period set out in the order dated 10.01.2022 or for that matter, the previous orders made in the Suo Motu proceedings by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 42. Based on the contention raised by Mr. Rivankar and Mr. Rao that the extension granted in the Suo Motu proceedings was restricted only to the extension of the period of limitation prescribed “in any general or special laws”, we do not think that this petition, insofar as it relates to the challenge to the order dated 04.08.2020, can be said to be barred by the period of limitation prescribed in paragraph 66 above. Ultimately, as noted earlier, Article 141 of the Constitution provides that the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India. Besides, since even the periods prescribed under the general or special laws came to be extended after taking cognizance of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Hon'ble Supreme Court could not have intended to not extend the benefit of similar extension, where the period of limitation came to be prescribed in a judicial order. 43. But in this case, H.E. Governor, by his order dated 04.08.2020 dismissed the petition seeking review of his earlier order dated 09.09.2017. Since the review petition, assuming that the same was at all maintainable, was dismissed and not allowed, there was no merger of the orders dated 09.09.2017 and 04.08.2020. In the absence of any merger, the petition insofar as it challenges the decision of H.E. Governor under Article 192 (2) of the Constitution is concerned, is barred by the period of limitation prescribed in paragraph 66 above. 44. In DSR Steel (Private) Ltd. (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that different situations in the context of merger may arise in relation to review petition filed before a Court or Tribunal. One of the situations near to the facts at hand is where a review petition is filed before the Tribunal but the Tribunal refuses to interfere with the order earlier made. It simply dismisses the review petition. The original order, in such a case, suffers neither any reversal nor an alteration or modification. One of the situations near to the facts at hand is where a review petition is filed before the Tribunal but the Tribunal refuses to interfere with the order earlier made. It simply dismisses the review petition. The original order, in such a case, suffers neither any reversal nor an alteration or modification. It is an order by which the review petition is dismissed affirming the earlier order. In such a contingency there is no question of any merger and anyone aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal or Court shall have to challenge within the time stipulated by law, the original order and not the order dismissing the review petition. The time taken by a party in diligently pursuing the remedy by way of review may in appropriate cases be excluded from consideration while condoning the delay in the filing of the appeal, but such exclusion or condonation would not imply that there is a merger of original order dismissing the review petition. 45. The aforesaid observations apply to the case of the petitioner before us. Besides, the review petition was itself filed almost 21 months after the original order. There is no proper explanation for this delay. The petitioner has not demonstrated any diligence on his part. Based on the above observations as well, this petition is beyond the period of limitation prescribed in paragraph 66 Bajrang Bahadur Singh (supra). 46. Therefore, unless the petitioner can demonstrate that powers of review are indeed vested in H.E. Governor, and further that there is merit in such review petition, this entire petition will have to be held as barred by the limitation prescribed in paragraph 66 of Bajrang Bahadur Singh (supra ). REVIEW 47. Article 191(1)(e) provides that the person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of the Legislative Assembly of a State if he is so disqualified by or under any law made by the Parliament. 48. Section 9-A of the RP Act, which is the law made by the Parliament, provides that a person shall be disqualified if, and for so long as, there subsists a contract entered into by him in the course of his trade and business with the appropriate Government for the supply of goods to, or for the execution of any works undertaken by, that Government. 49. 49. Article 192(1) provides that if any question arises as to whether a member of a house of the Legislature of a State has become subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in Article 191(1), the question shall be referred for the decision of the Governor and his decision shall be final. Article 192(2) provides that before giving any decision on any such question, the Governor shall obtain an opinion of the Election Commission and shall act according to such opinion. 50. In this case, at the behest of the petitioner and in pursuance of his petition dated 28.04.2017, H.E. Governor, acting on the opinion tendered by ECI, dismissed the petitioner's petition dated 28.04.2017 by order dated 09.09.2017. Thereafter, the petitioner, on 28.06.2019 i.e. after almost 21 months from the date of the order dated 09.09.2017 instituted a review petition before H.E. Governor. 51. The petitioner invoked the provisions of Order XLVII, Rule 1 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 r/w Articles 137 & 145 of the Constitution of India, in support of the maintainability of such review petition. The petitioner claimed to have obtained certain additional information, including a report dated 10.05.2019 from the State Registrar cum Head of Notary Services, Goa, through RTI and submitted that such additional information was sufficient to review the order dated 09.09.2017. The petitioner also claimed that there were errors apparent on the face of the order dated 09.09.2017 and this also warrants a review of the order dated 09.09.2017. 52. Now some reference is necessary to the statutory and constitutional provisions invoked by the petitioner for instituting and urging the maintainability of the review petition. 53. Firstly, the petitioner had invoked the provisions of Order XLVII Rule 1 (1) of CPC, 1908. 52. Now some reference is necessary to the statutory and constitutional provisions invoked by the petitioner for instituting and urging the maintainability of the review petition. 53. Firstly, the petitioner had invoked the provisions of Order XLVII Rule 1 (1) of CPC, 1908. This provision states that any person considering himself aggrieved by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, or by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order. 54. On a plain reading of the aforesaid provision, it is clear that the same will not apply to a decision of the Governor under Article 192(1) of the Constitution, particularly since such decision has been accorded a finality. Besides, the provisions of CPC do not ipso facto apply to the proceedings under the Constitution. Therefore, the source of power to exercise review jurisdiction, if any, cannot be traced to Order XLVII Rule 1(1) of CPC. 55. Mr. Costa Frias however submitted that the principles of Order XLVII Rule 1(1) of CPC will apply. If a review petition was maintainable, then perhaps some sustenance could be drawn from the grounds or the procedures prescribed in CPC. But we do not think that the source of power to entertain a review petition can be found in the principles of Order XLVII of CPC particularly after finality is accorded to the decision of the Governor under Article 192 (1) of the Constitution. In terms of the law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, only a limited judicial review is available against the decision of the Governor under Article 192 (1) of the Constitution. By implication, therefore, power of review by the Governor would stand excluded. 56. In terms of the law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, only a limited judicial review is available against the decision of the Governor under Article 192 (1) of the Constitution. By implication, therefore, power of review by the Governor would stand excluded. 56. However, even if we assume that the principles apply, in this case, the petitioner has not even bothered to plead, much less establish, that the exercise of review jurisdiction is warranted on account of the discovery of a new and important matter or evidence which, after exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him when the order was passed or made. The petitioner has failed to also make out any case of an error apparent on the face of the record. The petitioner’s attempt was to re-urge the very same contentions based upon what he chooses to describe as additional material. This is not permissible even in cases where there is no dispute about the availability of review jurisdiction. 57. The invocation of Article 137 of the Constitution which deals with the review of the judgments or orders by the Hon'ble Supreme Court or Article 145 of the Constitution which empowers the Hon'ble Supreme Court to make rules for regulating generally the practice and procedure before it, is misconceived. Neither of these Articles applies to H.E. Governor when he decides on questions as to disqualification of members of Legislative Assemblies under Article 192 of the Constitution. Therefore, based on these two Articles, the petitioner cannot contend that his review petition was properly instituted or that the same was maintainable. 58. In the case of Dr. Subramaniam Swamy (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has analyzed the provisions of Article 192 of the Constitution and held that if any question arises as to whether a member of the House of Legislature of the State has become subject to any of the disqualification mentioned in Article 191(1), the question shall be referred for the decision of the Governor and such decision is made final. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has also held that it is obligatory to obtain the opinion of ECI and the further stipulation that the Governor “shall act” according to such opinion leaves no manner for doubt that the Governor is bound to act according to that opinion. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has also held that it is obligatory to obtain the opinion of ECI and the further stipulation that the Governor “shall act” according to such opinion leaves no manner for doubt that the Governor is bound to act according to that opinion. In effect and substance, the decision of the Governor must depend on the opinion of EC and none else, not even the Council of Ministers. 59. From the aforesaid as well as considering the nature of powers exercised by H.E. Governor under Article 192 of the Constitution, it is clear that H.E. Governor, in deciding on a question of disqualification of an MLA exercises quasi-judicial functions. A general test sometimes adopted for determining whether the proceedings are quasi-judicial is that any person or body having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of the subject and having the duty to act judicially, acts in a quasi-judicial manner. 60. In Radeshyam Khare Vs State of M.P., AIR 1959 SC 107 the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that three requisites must be fulfilled so that the act of body may be a quasi-judicial act, namely, that the body of persons (i) must have legal authority, (ii) to determine question affecting the rights of the parties, and (iii) must have the duty to act judicially. The dictionary meaning of the word “quasi” is “not exactly” and it is just in between a judicial and administrative function. The existence of a lis is not always necessary between two contending parties. Mr. Nigel Costa Frias did not even contend that the proceedings before H.E. Governor were not quasi-judicial proceedings. 61. In Kuntesh Gupta (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that it is now well established that the quasi-judicial authority cannot review its order unless the power of review is expressly conferred on it by the Statute under which it derives its jurisdiction. Similarly, in Patel Narshi Thakershi (supra) it was held that it is well settled that the power to review is not inherent. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. 62. Mr. Costa Frias however contended that the aforesaid general principles will not apply to a Governor, who is a Constitutional Authority when exercising powers under Article 192 of the Constitution. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. 62. Mr. Costa Frias however contended that the aforesaid general principles will not apply to a Governor, who is a Constitutional Authority when exercising powers under Article 192 of the Constitution. He submitted that the Constitutional powers are plenary and unless any limitation is provided in the Constitution itself, powers of review cannot be denied to H.E. Governor when deciding on questions as to disqualification of members. 63. The contention very similar to that which is now raised by Mr. Costa Frias was turned down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Kashinath Jalmi (supra) inter alia by relying upon Patel Narshi Thakershi (supra). There, the issue involved was whether the Speaker of a Legislative Assembly, when exercising powers under the Xth Schedule to the Constitution to determine whether a member had incurred disqualification on the ground of defection had the power to review his own decision. Initially, the Speaker made orders dated 13.12.1990 disqualifying two MLAs, under the Xth Schedule. However, later on, the Speaker passed orders on 07.03.1991, purporting to exercise the powers of review, whereby the orders dated 13.12.1990 were reviewed and set aside. Admittedly, there was no express provision conferring the power of review on the Speaker in Xth Schedule. Therefore, the issue that squarely arose for determination before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was whether the Speaker acting as the Authority under the Xth Schedule has the power of review by necessary implication, empowering him to set aside the earlier order of disqualification made by him on merits. 64. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in no uncertain terms, held that no such power of review can be said to inhere in a Speaker acting as an Authority under the Xth Schedule. Reference was made to the decision of the Constitution Bench in Kihoto Hollohan Vs Zachilhu [(1992) Supp. (2) SCC 651 and (1992) 1 SCC 309 ], in which it was held that the Speaker's order is final being subject only to judicial review, according to the settled parameters of the exercise of the power of judicial review in such cases. The existence of judicial review against the Speaker's order of disqualification is itself a strong indication to the contrary that there can be no inherent power in the Speaker, read in the Xth Schedule by necessary implication. The existence of judicial review against the Speaker's order of disqualification is itself a strong indication to the contrary that there can be no inherent power in the Speaker, read in the Xth Schedule by necessary implication. The need for correction of errors in Speaker's order made under the Xth Schedule is met by the availability of judicial review against the same, as held in Kihoto Hollohan (supra). 65. In Bajrang Bahadur Singh (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that notwithstanding the finality accorded to the Governor's decision under Article 192(1) of the Constitution, any person aggrieved by a decision of the Governor under Article 192 can approach the High Court by initiating appropriate proceedings within eight weeks from the date of the decision of the Governor. Such proceedings have to be heard by a Bench of at least two Judges and dispose of within eight weeks from the date of initiation without fail. 66. Thus, even the decision of the Governor under Article 192 is final being subject only to judicial review, according to the settled parameters of the exercise of the power of judicial review in such cases. This is a strong indication that there can be no inherent power of review in the Governor that can be read into the provisions of Article 192 of the Constitution by necessary implication. As pointed out earlier, the provisions in the CPC or the provisions in Articles 137 and 145 confer no powers of review on a Governor acting under Article 192 of the Constitution. 67. From the aforesaid discussion, we hold that no power of review is vested in H.E. Governor when deciding a question as to disqualification of an MLA under Article 192 of the Constitution. This means that the review petition instituted by the petitioner almost 21 months after H.E. Governor dismissed his petition seeking disqualification of respondent No.4 on merits, was not at all maintainable and was not even required to be entertained or decided by H.E. Governor. 68. The H.E. Governor, on receipt of the petitioner's review petition dated 28.06.2019, made a reference to ECI seeking its opinion. 68. The H.E. Governor, on receipt of the petitioner's review petition dated 28.06.2019, made a reference to ECI seeking its opinion. The ECI did examine the issue of whether any power of review is available in such matters, and opined as follows:- “i. POWER OF REVIEW Order XLVII, Rule 1(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 r/w Article 137 & 145 of the Constitution of India does not apply to the proceedings before the Election Commission of India in Reference Cases and as such, the Election Commission does not possess the power to review an Opinion already acted upon by the Hon'ble Governor. However, since the present Reference has been made by the Hon'ble Governor under Article 192, it is treated as a fresh reference and the present Opinion is being returned as per the mandate of Article 192 of the Constitution of India.” 69. This means that even the ECI believed that the review petition was not maintainable. Simply because the ECI chose to treat the reference made by H.E. Governor on the petitioner's review petition as a fresh reference, that does not mean that even the ECI agreed that any review powers are available under Article 192 of the Constitution. Mr. Rivonkar for ECI was quite clear in his submission that the review petition was not maintainable. 70. Therefore, we hold that H.E. Governor exercising powers under Article 192 of the Constitution has no power to review his own decision made under Article 192(2) of the Constitution, and consequently the petitioner's review petition dated 28.06.2019 was not maintainable and was not required to be entertained by H. E. Governor. Even assuming that the same was maintainable, we hold that there was no error in dismissing the same on merits. 71. As a further consequence, even for the aforesaid additional reason, there is no merger between the orders dated 09.09.2017 and 04.08.2020, and this petition is barred by the limitation provided in paragraph 66 of Bajrang Bahadur Singh (supra). Maintainability of original petition dated 28.04.2017 before h.e. Governor . 72. 71. As a further consequence, even for the aforesaid additional reason, there is no merger between the orders dated 09.09.2017 and 04.08.2020, and this petition is barred by the limitation provided in paragraph 66 of Bajrang Bahadur Singh (supra). Maintainability of original petition dated 28.04.2017 before h.e. Governor . 72. In Saka Venkata Rao (supra) one of the issues which arose before the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was whether the Governor was empowered to entertain a petition under Article 192 of the Constitution where the allegation was that an MLA had incurred a pre-existing disqualification i.e. a disqualification for being chosen as an MLA on account of an event before the last date for filing nominations or before being elected as an MLA as opposed to a supervening disqualification i.e. on account of an event after the election of the member to the Legislative Assembly. 73. In the case before the Constitution Bench, the MLA's conviction and sentence in 1942 disqualified him both for being chosen as, and for being, a member of the Legislative Assembly under Article 191(1)(e) read with Section 7 of the RP Act, 1951 passed by the Parliament, the period of five years since his release on 15.08.1947, not having elapsed before the date of the election. The contention was that the MLA was not only disqualified for being chosen as such but since the disqualification continued even after the election, the MLA “has become” subject to disqualification within the meaning of Article 192. The Constitution Bench noted that the rival contentions of the parties centered around the true interpretation to be placed on the expression “has become” in the context of the provisions of Articles 190 to 193 of the Constitution. 74. After analyzing the provisions and the scheme in Articles 190 to 193 of the Constitution, the Constitution Bench in paras 14 to 16, held as follows:- “14. The Attorney General argued that the whole fasciculus of the provisions dealing with "disqualifications of members", viz., Articles 190 to 193, should be read together, and as Articles 191 and 193 clearly cover both pre-existing and supervening disqualifications, Articles 190 and 192 should also be similarly understood as relating to both kinds of disqualification. According to him all these provisions together constitute an integral scheme whereby disqualifications are laid down and machinery for determining questions arising in regard to them is also provided. According to him all these provisions together constitute an integral scheme whereby disqualifications are laid down and machinery for determining questions arising in regard to them is also provided. The use of the word "become" in Articles 190 (3) and 192 (1) is not inapt, in the context, to include within its scope pre-existing disqualifications also, as becoming subject to a disqualification is predicated of "a member of a House of Legislature", and a person who, being already disqualified, gets elected, can, not inappropriately, be said to "become" subject to the disqualification as a member as soon as he is elected. The argument is more ingenious than sound. Article 191, which lays down the same set of disqualifications for election as well as for continuing as a member, and Article 193 which prescribes the penalty for sitting and voting when disqualified, are naturally phrased in terms wide enough to cover both pre-existing and supervening disqualifications; but it does not necessarily follow that Articles 190 (3) and 192 (1) must also be taken to cover both. Their meaning must depend on the language used which, we think, is reasonably plain. In our opinion these two articles go together and provide a remedy when a member incurs a disqualification after he is elected as a member. Not only do the words “becomes subject" in Article 190(3) and "has become subject" in Article 192(1) indicate a change in the position of the member after he was elected, but the provision that his seat is to become thereupon vacant, that is to say, the seat which the member was filling theretofore becomes vacant on his becoming disqualified, further reinforces the view that the article contemplates only a sitting member incurring the disability while so sitting. The suggestion that the language used in Article 190(3) can equally be applied to a pre-existing disqualification as a member can be supposed to vacate his seat the moment he is elected is a strained and far-fetched construction and cannot be accepted. The Attorney General admitted that if the word "is" were substituted for "becomes" or "has become", it would more appropriately convey the meaning contended for by him, but he was unable to say why it was not used. 15. The Attorney General admitted that if the word "is" were substituted for "becomes" or "has become", it would more appropriately convey the meaning contended for by him, but he was unable to say why it was not used. 15. It was said that on the view that Articles 190(3) and 192(1) deal with disqualifications incurred after election as a member, there would be no way of unseating a member who became subject to a disqualification after his nomination and before his election, for, such a disqualification is no ground for challenging the election by an election petition under Article 329 of the Constitution read with Section 100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. If this is an anomaly, it arises out of a lacuna in the latter enactment which could easily have provided for such a contingency, and it cannot be pressed as an argument against the respondent's construction of the constitutional provisions. On the other hand, the Attorney General's contention might, if accepted, lead to conflicting decisions by the Governor dealing with a reference under Article 192 and by the Election Tribunal inquiring into an election petition under Section 100 of the Parliamentary statute referred to above. 16. For the reasons indicated we agree with the learned Judge below in holding that Articles 190(3) and 192(1) are applicable only to disqualifications to which a member becomes subject after he is elected as such, and that neither the Governor nor the Commission has jurisdiction to enquire into the respondent's disqualification which arose long before his election.” 75. Thus, it was clearly held by the Constitution Bench that the provisions of Articles 190(3) and 192(1) apply only to disqualifications to which a member becomes subject after he is elected as such and that neither the Governor nor the Commission has jurisdiction to enquire into an MLA's disqualifications which arose long before his election. This means that only supervening disqualifications and not pre-existing disqualifications can be agitated before the Governor by invoking the provisions of Article 192 of the Constitution. 76. The aforesaid legal position was reiterated in Bajrang Bahadur Singh (supra) where the Governor of Uttar Pradesh made a declaration under Article 192 of the Constitution about said Bajrang having incurred disqualification stipulated under Section 9-A of the RP Act. 76. The aforesaid legal position was reiterated in Bajrang Bahadur Singh (supra) where the Governor of Uttar Pradesh made a declaration under Article 192 of the Constitution about said Bajrang having incurred disqualification stipulated under Section 9-A of the RP Act. Such declaration came to be made on an undisputed finding of fact that Bajrang entered into four contracts (culprit contracts) with the State of U.P., sometime in the year 2013 after he was elected an MLA on 06.03.2012. Despite there being no scope to dispute this clear finding of fact, his counsel contended that the disqualification prescribed under Section 9-A of the RP Act operates only at the threshold thereby rendering a person ineligible for contesting any election contemplated in the RP Act. In other words, it was contended that Section 9-A prescribes only a pre-existing disqualification and is not concerned with a supervening disqualification. 77. Again, the Hon'ble Supreme Court on detailed analysis of the Constitutional provisions and by reiterating the law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Saka Venkata Rao (supra) held that Bajrang had incurred the disqualification under Section 9-A of the RP Act and since the same was incurred after his election i.e. supervening disqualification, the Governor was the proper authority to declare Bajrang as disqualified. 78. The discussion in the aforesaid regard is to be found in paragraphs 21 and 22 of the SCC report that read as follows:- “21. The scope of authority of the Governor acting under Article 192 first fell for the consideration of this Court in the case of Saka Venkata Rao (supra)( AIR 1953 SC 210 ). By a unanimous decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court, it was held :- (AIR p.215. Para 16) "16. For the reasons indicated we agree with the learned Judge below in holding that Articles 190 (3) and 192 (1) are applicable only to disqualifications to which a Member becomes subject after he is elected as such, and that neither the Governor nor the Commission has jurisdiction to enquire into the respondent's disqualification which arose long before his election.” This Court took note of the fact that a person can incur any one of the disqualifications contemplated in Article 191 either before the election or after the election - elegantly classified by the then Attorney General M.C. Setalvad as "pre-existing disqualifications" and "supervening disqualifications". Dealing with the scope of Article 192, this Court concluded that the authority of the Governor to examine the question of disqualification extended only to the second of the abovementioned two categories of disqualification i.e., the supervening disqualifications acquired subsequent to the election of a person to the legislature. 22. In the case on hand, the disqualification, if any, is only supervening disqualification. As we already noticed, that all the relevant facts on the basis of which the petitioner is declared disqualified are facts which occurred subsequent to the election of the petitioner. Therefore, the Governor necessarily has the authority to examine the question.” 79. In Bajrang Bahadur Singh (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court also held that a member of the House of Legislature becomes subject to any of the disqualifications in Articles 191(1) or 191(2), his seat shall thereupon become vacant. In other words, the vacancy occurs the moment a person incurs disqualification by the operation of law. The duration of the currency of the disqualifying event is irrelevant. The acquisition of a disqualification contemplated under Article 191 is an incident that entails a legal consequence of rendering the seat occupied by such a legislature to acquire the disqualification vacant by operation of law. Article 192 only prescribes the forum and stipulates the procedure for determination of the fact whether a legislature has incurred the disqualification. The removal takes place by operation of law on the happening of the event, that is, the acquisition of the disqualification. The fact that the disqualification under Section 9-A subsists only for a limited period of time makes no difference to the consequences flowing from the occurrence of such a disqualifying event. 80. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also noted that there are two classes of disqualification contemplated under Article 191, (i) disqualifications which last only for a limited period, that is, during the currency of certain events specified under Article 191, and (ii) statutory disqualifications prescribed under Section 8, 8A, 9 and 10-A which render a person ineligible for a period specified under each of the abovementioned provisions. The disqualifications under Sections 9-A and 10 of the Act are akin to the disqualifications contemplated under clauses (a) to (d) of Article 191(1) where the period of disqualification is co-terminus with the currency of the event which renders a person ineligible both for being chosen as or for being a Member of the Legislature. The disqualifications under Sections 9-A and 10 of the Act are akin to the disqualifications contemplated under clauses (a) to (d) of Article 191(1) where the period of disqualification is co-terminus with the currency of the event which renders a person ineligible both for being chosen as or for being a Member of the Legislature. Nonetheless, on the acquisition of the disqualification by a legislator, he ceases to be a legislator forthwith by operation of law. However, the cessation of the disqualifying factor cannot put such a person back in the legislature without his being elected once again, of course, such a person is entitled to contest any election under the R.P. Act, the moment the disqualifying factor ceases to exist as the disqualification is co-terminus with the disqualifying event. 81. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also interpreted the expression “if and for so long as there subsists a contract” in paragraph 40 of the SCC report which reads as follows:- “40. The language of Section 9-A which declares that a person shall be disqualified "if and for so long as there subsists a contract", must be understood in the background of the scheme of Chapter III of the R.P. Act. All other provisions except Sections 9-A and 10 of the Chapter prescribe a fixed tenure of disqualification. That tenure has nothing to do with the duration of the currency of the event which brings about the legal consequence of disqualification. Only Section 9-A and Section 10 limit the tenure of disqualification and make it coterminus with the currency of the EVENT which creates a disqualification. Therefore, the clause "if and for so long as" in our view, in these two provisions must be understood only to convey (in the context of a Legislator who incurs a disqualification) that he is not debarred from contesting any election under the Act including a by-election arising as a direct consequence of his vacating the seat in the Legislature if the EVENT (the subsistence of which brought about the consequence of disqualification) ceases to subsist by the relevant date. The interpretation such as the one sought to be placed by the petitioner would amount to Parliament nullifying the constitutional declaration contained in Article 190(3) read with Article 191.” 82. The interpretation such as the one sought to be placed by the petitioner would amount to Parliament nullifying the constitutional declaration contained in Article 190(3) read with Article 191.” 82. Thus, the legal position laid down by the Constitution Bench in Saka Venkata Rao (supra) stands affirmed in Bajrang Bahadur Singh (supra) that H.E. Governor, acting under Article 192 of the Constitution, is empowered only to go into the question as to a supervening disqualification incurred by an MLA and not a pre-existing disqualification. In case of a pre-existing disqualification, the remedy to unseat the MLA is to institute an election petition as contemplated by RP Act. The very acceptance of a nomination of a person who is not qualified to be chosen as an MLA affords a cause of action to institute an election petition. Therefore, if it is a case of the petitioner in the present matter that respondent No.4, on account of the contract entered into on 12.12.2016 i.e. much before his election as an MLA in March 2017, had incurred the disqualification provided under Section 9- A of the RP Act, then, the petitioner could have agitated this issue by instituting an election petition under the RP Act and not by instituting a petition under Article 192 of the Constitution before H. E. Governor. 83. Now it was not seriously disputed that the allegations in the petitioner's petition dated 28.04.2017 are based on a pre-existing disqualification alleged to have been incurred by respondent No.4. The only contention was that since the contract entered into on 12.12.2016 continued even after the election of respondent No.4 as an MLA in March 2017, respondent No.4 was disqualified and a petition under Article 192 before H.E. Governor was a proper remedy. This contention about the remedy stands answered against the petitioner in both Saka Venkata Rao (supra) and Bajrang Bahadur Singh (supra). 84. The petitioner in his original petition dated 28.04.2017, had alleged the following at paragraph 38 : “38. This contention about the remedy stands answered against the petitioner in both Saka Venkata Rao (supra) and Bajrang Bahadur Singh (supra). 84. The petitioner in his original petition dated 28.04.2017, had alleged the following at paragraph 38 : “38. The petitioner states that at the time of filing nomination for the recently held elections on 12/1/2017, at the time of Scrutiny of nominations on 19/1/2017 and on the day of general elections to Goa State Assembly on 4/2/2017, Apollo Engineers and Contractors Pvt. Ltd., whose one director was the proxy of the Respondent, (Candidate for 31-Margao Assembly segment), had subsisting contract for PWD-VI (R/S), PWD, Fatorda, Margao Goa, for improvement & resurfacing of internal roads in Fatarpe in V. P. Varca under Benaulim Constituency. The said contract was awarded on 17/12/2016 and the same is still ongoing the day of filing of this petition. The petitioner states that the Respondent is thus disqualified for subsisting with Government Contracts at the time of filing of his nomination on 12th January 2017, on the day of scrutiny of nomination on 19th January 2017 and on the day of his election on 04the February 2017 and on the day the election result were declared on 11th March 2017. The respondent continues to subsist with the work and is in progress till the day of filing this petition on 28th April 2017. The Respondent Mr. Digambar Vasant Kamat is thus disqualified with immediate effect under Sn.9-A of the RP Act 1951 for Government Contracts through proxy of his son. Annexed hereto as per Exhibit “U” Colly is the work contract dated 17/12/2016 awarded by the PWD-VI (R/S), PWD, Fatorda, Margao Goa, for improvement & resurfacing of internal roads in Fatarpe in V. P. Varca under Benaulim Constituency and subsisting during the nomination filed in February 2017.” 85. Similarly, even in paragraph 36 of the review petition dated 28.06.2019, the petitioner alleged the following:- “36. Similarly, even in paragraph 36 of the review petition dated 28.06.2019, the petitioner alleged the following:- “36. The petitioner states that it is needless to state that from the various paras of the Original Petition dated 29/04/2017 it is abundantly clear that the accused MLA is guilty of executing Government contracts by proxy which subsisted on 12/01/2017, the day he filed his nomination; 19/01/2017, the day of scrutiny of nominations; and on 04/02/2017, the day of General Elections for the current term as a MLA and was a Contractor of the department on the day of the election and hence is liable to be disqualified as MLA for the next 6 years from today.” 86. From the aforesaid, it is quite clear that the petitioner's original petition had alleged a pre-existing disqualification. The petitioner, in terms, had a grievance about the acceptance of the nomination papers of respondent No.4, because according to the petitioner, respondent No.4 was not qualified for being chosen as an MLA. In such circumstances, the proper remedy that could have been availed by the petitioner was that of instituting an election petition and not instituting a petition under Article 192 before H. E. Governor. 87. Significantly, even the ECI in its opinion based on which H. E. Governor dismissed the petitioner's original petition dated 28.04.2017 had referred to the decisions in Saka Venkata Rao (supra) and Brundaban Nayak Vs Election Commission of India and Anr.,[ AIR 1965 SC 1892 ] and observed that the provisions of Article 192 read with Articles 190(3)(3) and 191(1) apply only to disqualifications to which a member of the State Legislature becomes subject after he is elected as a member or after being elected as such. (See para 17 of the order dated 09.09.2017 at pages 314 and 315 of the paper book ). This position was reiterated by Mr. Rivonkar for the ECI. 88. For all the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the petitioner's original petition dated 28.04.2017 was not maintainable before H. E. Governor because the same was based on allegations of pre- existing disqualification allegedly incurred by respondent No.4 much before his election as an MLA for the term March 2017 to March 2022 and not on allegations of any supervening disqualification. MERITS & JUDICIAL REVIEW 89. MERITS & JUDICIAL REVIEW 89. As noted in paragraphs 7 and 8 of this judgment and order, the main allegation of the petitioner is that on 12.12.2016 Apollo Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd. (said company) entered into a contract with the Government for the improvement and resurfacing of internal roads in Fatrade, Varca Goa and that such contract was subsisting on 04.02.2017, the last date for filing nominations and even after respondent No.4 was elected as an MLA in March 2017 for the term March 2017-March 2022. The petitioner also alleged that as of 12.12.2016 one Mr. Kiran Naik and Satish Lavande, the brother-in-law of respondent No.4 were the two shareholders and directors of the said company. The petitioner also alleged that with effect from 25.06.2013, Yogiraj Kamat-the son of the respondent No.4 was inducted as director- shareholder of the said company in place of Satish Lavande. The petitioner also alleged that respondent No.4 was the “key person” in the management of the said company and consequently in the execution of the contract dated 12.12.2016 entered into by the said company with the Government. 90. Based on the aforesaid allegations, the petitioner urged that an order be made by H. E. Governor that respondent No.4 had incurred the disqualification provided under Section 9-A of the RP Act and that the seat held by respondent No.4 be declared as vacant. 91. At this stage, it will be appropriate to refer to the Legislative history that led to the enactment of Section 9-A of the RP Act. 92. The disqualification based on a subsisting contract with the Government was initially provided in Section 7(d) of the RP Act at the time of its enactment in 1951. This provision reads as follows:- “7. A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of either House of Parliament or of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Counsel of a State- (d) if, whether by himself or by any person or body of persons in trust for him or for his benefit or on his account, he has any share of interest in a contract for the supply of goods to, or for the execution of any works or the performance of any services undertaken by the appropriate Government.” 93. Section 7(d) of the RP Act was amended in 1958 and the amended Section reads as follows:- “7. Section 7(d) of the RP Act was amended in 1958 and the amended Section reads as follows:- “7. A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of either House of Parliament or of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State- (d) if there subsists a contract entered into in the course of his trade or business by him with the appropriate Government for the supply of goods to, or for the execution of any works undertaken by, that Government.” 94. The amended Section 7(d) was then replaced by Section 9- A by the 1966 Amendment Act which entered into force on 14.12.1966. Section 9-A of the RP Act reads as follows:- “9-A. Disqualification for Government contracts, etc. - A person shall be disqualified if, and for so long as, there subsists a contract entered into by him in the course of his trade or business with the appropriate Government for the supply of goods to, or for the execution of any works undertaken by, that Government. Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, where a contract has been fully performed by the person by whom it has been entered into with the appropriate Government, the contract shall be deemed not to subsist by reason only of the fact that the Government has not performed its part of the contract either wholly or in part.” 95. In Prakash Khandre Vs Dr. Vijay Kumar Khandre and others, (2002) 5 SCC 568 the Hon'ble Supreme Court after referring to the objects and reasons for substituting Section 7(d) of RP Act with Section 9-A of RP Act as it presently stands held that it is clear that an unduly strict view about the Government contract in the present day is not required to be taken and the change became necessary to do away with the disqualification that attaches to a person for being chosen as or for being a member of Parliament or State Legislature even after he has fully performed his part of the contract. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court noted that initially Section 7(d) of the RP Act was very wide. A person having any share or interest in a contract or such person having interest by any person in trust for him or for his benefit or on his own account was also disqualified to contest an election. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court noted that initially Section 7(d) of the RP Act was very wide. A person having any share or interest in a contract or such person having interest by any person in trust for him or for his benefit or on his own account was also disqualified to contest an election. This disqualification was first narrowed down in 1958 and even further narrowed down in 1966 by Section 9-A of the RP Act which substituted Section 7(d) of the RP Act. 96. In Ranjeet Singh Vs Harmohinder Singh Pradhan, (1999) 4 SCC 517 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that Section 9-A is a statutory provision that imposes a disqualification on a citizen. It would, therefore, be unreasonable to take a general or broad view, ignoring the essentials of the section and the intention of the Legislature. Purposive interpretation is necessary. Even in Dewan Joynal Abedin Vs Abdul Wazed, 1988 Supp SCC 580 Section 9-A was narrowly construed and such construction was approved in Ranjeet Singh (supra). 97. In Kartar Singh Bhadana Vs Hari Singh Nalwa and others, AIR 2001 SC 1556 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that Section 9-A of the RP Act requires (a) that there should be a contract entered into by the candidate; (b) that it should be entered into by him in the course of his trade or business; (c) that it should be entered into with the appropriate Government; (d) that it should subsist; (e) that it should relate to works undertaken by that Government and (f) that it should be for the execution of such works. The provisions of Section 9-A disqualify a citizen from contesting an election; a citizen may, therefore, be disqualified only if the facts of his case squarely fall within the conditions prescribed by Section 9-A. 98. In Indumati Bhakare (supra), learned Single Judge of this Court (Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J as His Lordship then was) compared the provisions of Section 16(1)(i) of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act, 1965 and Section 9-A of the RP Act, to emphasis that the provisions of Section 16(1)(i) were of a considerably wide import unlike the provisions of Section 9-A of RP Act that were of a considerably narrow import. 99. The relevant discussion is to be found in paragraphs 7, 8, 9, and 16 which read as follows:- “7. 99. The relevant discussion is to be found in paragraphs 7, 8, 9, and 16 which read as follows:- “7. Before considering the tenability of the rival submissions which have been urged before the Court, it would, at the outset, be necessary to set in contrast the provisions of Section 16(1)(i) of the Act with the provisions of Section 9A of the Representation of People Act, 1951: "16. Disqualifications for becoming Councillor-(1) No person shall be qualified to became a Councillor whether by election or nomination who,- (i) save as hereinafter provided, has directly or indirectly, by himself or his partner, any share or interest in any work done by order of a Council or in any contract with or under or by or on behalf of a Council ?” "9A. Disqualification for Government contracts, etc.- A person shall be disqualified if, and for so long as, there subsists a contract entered into by him in the course of his trade or business with the appropriate Government for the supply of goods to, or 3 for the execution of any works undertaken by, that Government. Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, where a contract has been fully performed by the person by whom it has been entered into with the appropriate Government, the contract shall be deemed not to subsist by reason only of the fact that the Government has not performed its part of the contract either wholly or in part.” 8. A comparison of these two provisions will show that a disqualification under the Representation of the People Act. 1951 is attracted if and so long as a contract entered into by a person in the course of his trade or business with the appropriate Government for the supply of goods to, or for the execution of any work undertaken by the Government subsists. The explanation provides that once the contract has been fully performed it is deemed not to subsist by reason only of the fact that the Government had not performed its part of the contract wholly or partially. Section 16(1)(i) of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act, 1965 is significantly wider in its scope and content. First and foremost, under Section 9-A, the disqualification is attracted if there is a subsisting contract. If the contract had come to an end before the submission of the nomination, there is indeed no disqualification. Section 16(1)(i) of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act, 1965 is significantly wider in its scope and content. First and foremost, under Section 9-A, the disqualification is attracted if there is a subsisting contract. If the contract had come to an end before the submission of the nomination, there is indeed no disqualification. Moreover, where a contract has been fully performed by the person by whom it had been entered into with the government, it shall be deemed not to subsist even if Government has not performed its part of the contract fully or in part. 9. Clause (i) of Sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act, 1965, on the other hand, can be divided into two parts. The first is where a person has directly or indirectly by himself or his partner, any share or interest in any work done by order of a Council. The second is where a person has directly or indirectly by himself or his partner, any share or interest in any contract with or under or by or on behalf of a Council. The second part of Clause (i) refers to the existence of a share or interest in a contract with the Municipal Council. Arguably, the expression "any contract" would refer to a subsisting contract. However, the disqualification that is contemplated under Clause (i) of Sub-section (1) of Section 16 is on grounds which are ex-facie significantly wider than those prescribed by Section 9A of the Representation of People Act, 1951. The first ground which is spelt out in clause (i) of Sub-section (1) of Section 16 namely, of having directly or indirectly any share or interest in any work done by order of a Council does not find place in Section 9A of the Representation of People Act, 1951. Moreover, as distinguished from Section 9A, under Section 16(1)(i), the share or interest in work done by order of a Council or in any contract with or under or by or on behalf of the Council may be direct or indirect. The share or interest may be of the person himself or for that master of his partner. 16. Moreover, as distinguished from Section 9A, under Section 16(1)(i), the share or interest in work done by order of a Council or in any contract with or under or by or on behalf of the Council may be direct or indirect. The share or interest may be of the person himself or for that master of his partner. 16. While construing the provisions of Section 9A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the Supreme Court held that if there is no subsisting contract on the date on which a candidate filed his nomination papers, the disqualification would not be attracted. In S. Munishamappa v. B. Venkatarayappa, (1981) 3 SCC 260 , the Supreme Court held that even if the candidate had committed a breach of contract, the contract could not be said to subsist thereafter. The contract would be discharged by breach on the part of the candidate leaving the party aggrieved to take steps to recover damages for the breach. This principle was reiterated in Prakash Khandre v. Vijaya Kumar Khandre, 2002 AIR SCW 2499. That was again a case where the appellant before the Supreme Court had terminated the subsisting contract and the Department had accepted the termination. The Supreme Court held that the question as to whether a contract was subsisting or not is a question of fact to be determined from the evidence on record. Therefore, for the purposes of Section 9A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the Supreme Court held that once a contract has been terminated, the disqualification that has been provided by Section 9A would not be attracted even if the termination was occasioned by breach of the contract on the part of the elected candidate. The provisions of Section 16(1)(i) of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act, 1965 have been compared with Section 9A in the earlier part of the judgment. As already noted earlier, the disqualification which is contemplated in Section 16(1)(i) is on grounds which are significantly wider than in Section 9A. The disqualification arises not only when there is a subsisting contract but where a person has a share or interest in any work done by order of a Municipal Council.” 100. As already noted earlier, the disqualification which is contemplated in Section 16(1)(i) is on grounds which are significantly wider than in Section 9A. The disqualification arises not only when there is a subsisting contract but where a person has a share or interest in any work done by order of a Municipal Council.” 100. Thus, the allegations made by the petitioner, which are not even held as fully proved by the petitioner on two occasions in the impugned orders, will have to be evaluated by applying the aforesaid principles concerning the strict interpretation of the provisions in Section 9-A of the RP Act. Only if the facts of the MLA's case squarely fall within the conditions prescribed by Section 9-A of the RP Act, can it be said that the MLA has incurred disqualification under Section 9-A of the RP Act and not otherwise. 101. Now going even by the allegations made by the petitioner it is clear that the contract dated 12.12.2016 was entered into by the said company (Apollo) with the Government and not by respondent No.4. Further, it is also clear that as on 12.12.2016 or for that matter at any time even before the said date or even after the said date, respondent No.4 was neither a director nor a shareholder of the said company. Therefore, it is quite clear that the contract dated 12.12.2016 cannot be regarded as a contract entered into by the “candidate” which is the first condition to attract the disqualification under Section 9-A of the RP Act as held in Kartar Singh Bhadana (supra). Even the plain reading of the provisions of Section 9-A of the RP Act makes it clear that the disqualification attaches to the person who enters into a specified contract with the appropriate Government. Such contract must have been entered in the course of “his” trade or business with the appropriate Government. The explanation to Section 9-A of the RP Act also makes it clear that where such contract has been fully performed by “the person by whom it has been entered into”, the contract shall not be deemed to subsist merely because the Government may not have performed its part either wholly or in part. Therefore, unless it is clear that the contract dated 12.12.2016 was entered into by respondent No.4, there is no question of respondent No.4 incurring any disqualification. 102. Therefore, unless it is clear that the contract dated 12.12.2016 was entered into by respondent No.4, there is no question of respondent No.4 incurring any disqualification. 102. The allegation that Satish Lavande, the brother-in-law of respondent No.4 was one of the two shareholders and directors of the said company as of 12.12.2016 or that Yogiraj Kamat, the son of respondent No.4 became a shareholder and director in the said company in place of Satish Lavande from 2013, is by no means sufficient to disqualify respondent No.4 by invoking the provisions of Section 9-A of the RP Act. There is no evidence that respondent No.4 was the key person to the founding of the said company and its operations. The finding of fact to this effect in the impugned orders is by no means perverse to warrant any interference. There is no evidence of Satish Lavande and Yogiraj Kamat being proxies for respondent No.4 and again the finding of fact to this effect in the impugned orders is by no means perverse to warrant any interference. The petitioner has made the allegations but failed to make them good by adducing proper evidence or material. The concurrent findings on this aspect warrant no interference. 103. In any case, as noted earlier, there is sea change after Section 9-A replaced Section 7(d) in the RP Act. Earlier, possibly even a direct or indirect share or an interest might have attracted a disqualification. The provisions of Section 9-A of the RP Act have to be strictly construed because ultimately what the petitioner seeks is to overturn the will of the majority of the Constituency that has democratically elected and returned respondent No.4 to the Legislative Assembly. In this case, even a liberal construction of the Constitutional and statutory provisions cannot assist the case of the petitioner who has failed to establish the allegations about proxy or about respondent no. 4 being the key person qua such contract. 104. In Jagan Nath Vs Sohan Singh Basi, ILR (1968) 1 Punj. 439, learned Single Judge (A. N. Grover, J as His Lordship then was ) was called upon to decide whether a director of a private limited company entering into a contract with the appropriate Government incurs disqualification under Section 9-A of the RP Act. 105. 104. In Jagan Nath Vs Sohan Singh Basi, ILR (1968) 1 Punj. 439, learned Single Judge (A. N. Grover, J as His Lordship then was ) was called upon to decide whether a director of a private limited company entering into a contract with the appropriate Government incurs disqualification under Section 9-A of the RP Act. 105. Learned Single Judge after taking note of the legal position after the amendment of Section 7(d) of the RP Act in 1958 and its substitution by Section 9-A of the RP Act in 1966 and the legal or juridical status of a company, held that the company is a distinct juridical person and hence contracts entered into by private companies with the appropriate Government during the course of their trade and business cannot be said to be so entered by their shareholders or directors. The director of a private company cannot be identified with the company even if he is the real motivating force and represents the company actively while entering into contracts with the appropriate Governments. Such a director cannot be disqualified for being chosen and being a member of either House of Parliament or the State Legislature. 106. Learned Judge considered the argument that in Chatturbhuj Vithaldas Jasani Vs Moreshwar, AIR 1954 SC 236 the Hon'ble Supreme Court by referring to Section 7(d) of the RP Act had held that the purpose was to maintain the purity of the Legislature and to avoid a conflict between duty and interest, rejected the contention that the director of a private limited company entering into a contract with the appropriate Government would incur disqualification under Section 7(d) of the RP Act (as amended in 1958) or Section 9-A of the RP Act where it was established that such director had been taking a principal part as a “contact man” for negotiating and finalizing such contracts with the Government. 107. The learned Judge held that where words are used in the Statute are plain and there is no doubt about their grammatical meaning, the Section cannot be construed in the manner suggested looking to the alleged spirit behind the statutory provisions. 107. The learned Judge held that where words are used in the Statute are plain and there is no doubt about their grammatical meaning, the Section cannot be construed in the manner suggested looking to the alleged spirit behind the statutory provisions. The learned Judge referred to the State of Rajasthan Vs Leela Jain, AIR 1965 SC 1296 in which it is held that unless the words are unmeaning or absurd, it would not be in accord with any sound principle of construction to refuse to give effect to its provisions on the very elusive ground that to give them their ordinary meaning leads to consequences which are not in accord with the notions of propriety or justice entertained by the Courts. Therefore, on the ground that the contracts in question were not entered into by the MLA but were entered into by a private limited company of which the MLA was only a shareholder or director, the MLA could not be said to have incurred the disqualification under Section 9-A of the RP Act. 108. In Satya Prakash Vs Bashir Ahmed Quresh, AIR 1963 MP 316 a Division Bench of the MP High Court has also held that the shareholder of the company having a contract with the Government is not disqualified under Section 7(d) of the RP Act as amended in 1958. The Division Bench held that the general consideration that the disqualification under Section 7(d) is to ensure that there is no conflict between interest and duty when a person is chosen as a member of the Parliament or State Legislature is not a sufficient reason for wresting the clear words used in Section 7(d) from their plain meaning. 109. Even otherwise, it is well settled that there is nothing in the Indian law to warrant the assumption that a shareholder who buys shares, buys any interest in the property of the company which is a juristic person entirely distinct from the shareholders. The true position of a shareholder is that on buying shares an investor becomes entitled to participate in the profits of the company in which he holds the shares if and when the company declares, subject to the Articles of Association, that the profits or any portion thereof should be distributed by way of dividends among the shareholders. The true position of a shareholder is that on buying shares an investor becomes entitled to participate in the profits of the company in which he holds the shares if and when the company declares, subject to the Articles of Association, that the profits or any portion thereof should be distributed by way of dividends among the shareholders. The position of shareholders in a company is not analogous to that of partners in a partnership firm inter se. A partnership is merely an association of persons for carrying on the business of the partnership and in law, the firm name is a compendious method of describing the partners. Such is, however, not the case of a company that stands as a separate juristic entity distinct from the shareholders. (See Bacha Guzdar Vs Commissioner of Income Tax, AIR 1955 SC 74 ). 110. In this case, as noted earlier, there is not even an allegation that respondent No.4 is a director or shareholder of the said company which has entered into a contract with the Government on 12.12.2016. In the absence of any such allegations, even if we were to accede to the request for lifting of the corporate veil, what would emerge is that the brother-in-law of respondent No.4 was one of the two directors when the contract was entered into and the son of respondent No.4 replaced him sometime in the year 2013. Based on such premises, respondent No.4 cannot be held to be disqualified under Section 9-A of the RP Act. 111. There is, in our judgment, no case is made out for lifting of the corporate veil in the first place. All the decisions relied upon by Mr. Costa Frias operate in an entirely different context and based thereon the corporate veil, in this case, cannot be lifted. In any case, as noted above, even the lifting of the corporate veil will not be sufficient to disqualify respondent No.4 under Section 9-A of the RP Act. The wide interpretation pressed by Mr. Costa Frias has been specifically rejected by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and High Courts on several occasions. 112. In Sewaram Vs Sobaran Singh, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 46 on facts, it was found that the candidate had entered into a contract with PWD with a stipulation against assignment or subletting of this contract without the written approval of the authority concerned. 112. In Sewaram Vs Sobaran Singh, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 46 on facts, it was found that the candidate had entered into a contract with PWD with a stipulation against assignment or subletting of this contract without the written approval of the authority concerned. At a later point in time, a partnership firm claimed to have been constituted comprising the contractor - candidate himself as a partner for continuing the execution of the contract. A little later, the firm was claimed to have dissolved and the new partnership was constituted by replacing the contractor candidate with his brother. The Court found that no approval was obtained from PWD for the transfer or assignment of the original contract by the contractor candidate. On facts, the Court concluded that the contractor candidate never intended nor in fact put an end to the contract, and therefore, the contract with the contractor candidate was subsisting but was sought to be continued through his proxy. Such gross facts are not involved in the present case. Therefore, Sewaram (supra) can be of no assistance to the petitioner's case. 113. In Gotan Lime Stone Khanij (supra) the issue was about the transfer of mining lease, where strict compliance with the rules of transfer was the norm because minerals were vested in the State and the doctrine of public trust was applicable. On facts the Court found that the corporate veil had to be lifted to give effect to the law that was sought to be circumvented. Again, such a principle is not attracted in the facts of the present case. 114. In Konappa Rudrappa Nadgouda Vs Vishwanath Reddy and another, AIR 1969 SC 447 on facts the Court found that the contracts entered into by a candidate were very much subsisting since they were not fully performed and under clause 20 the contractor was yet to complete his part of the obligation. Therefore, the Court disqualified the candidate under Section 9- A of the RP Act. Again this is not the issue involved in this case. 115. The ECI on two occasions has analyzed and evaluated the material placed on record by the petitioner and recorded a finding of fact that respondent No.4 cannot be disqualified under Section 9-A based on the contract dated 12.12.2016, which is incidentally not even entered into by the respondent No.4 with the Government. 115. The ECI on two occasions has analyzed and evaluated the material placed on record by the petitioner and recorded a finding of fact that respondent No.4 cannot be disqualified under Section 9-A based on the contract dated 12.12.2016, which is incidentally not even entered into by the respondent No.4 with the Government. There is no perversity in the findings of fact recorded by ECI and accepted by H. E. Governor having regard to the provisions in Article 192(2) of the Constitution. 116. In the context of the President of India deciding the disputes under Article 217(3) of the Constitution determined the age of the High Court judge or the Supreme Court, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India Vs Jyoti Prakash Mitter, 1971 (1) SCC 396 has held that the President has to decide the matter himself and not act on the advice of his ministers. Further, notwithstanding the declared finality of the order of the President, the Court has jurisdiction in appropriate cases to set aside the order, if it appears that it was passed on collateral consideration or the rules of natural justice were not observed, or that the President's Judgment was colored by advice or representation made by the executive or it was founded on no evidence. But the Courts will not sit in appeal over the judgment of the President, nor will the Courts determine the weight which should be attached to the evidence. Appreciation of evidence is entirely left to the President and it is not for the Courts to hold that on the evidence placed before the President on which the conclusion is founded, if they were called upon to decide the case they would have reached some other conclusion. 117. Even in this matter, though, judicial review is available, the same is quite different and distinct from sitting in appeal over the decision of H.E. Governor, who, in terms of Section 192(2) has acted according to the opinion of ECI. In the exercise of such limited powers of judicial review, we do not think that any case has been made out to interfere with the impugned orders. This is not a case of ‘no evidence’ or any perversity in reaching the findings of fact. 118. In the exercise of such limited powers of judicial review, we do not think that any case has been made out to interfere with the impugned orders. This is not a case of ‘no evidence’ or any perversity in reaching the findings of fact. 118. At this stage, we must also clarify that since this was a matter concerning the disqualification of an elected representative, we have evaluated the material placed on record by the petitioner and on such evaluation, we are quite satisfied that no case for interference is made out with the impugned orders even if we were to exercise appellate jurisdiction, that in any case is not available to us in this matter. This is because the petitioner's case fails both on facts as well as on law. CONCLUSIONS & ORDER 119. For all the aforesaid reasons, we hold as follows: (A) The present petition, in so far as it challenges the order dated 09.09.2017 is barred by limitation prescribed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 66 of Bajrang Bahadur Singh (supra). Further, though the challenge to the order dated 04.08.2020, by itself may be within limitation, the entire petition is barred by the aforesaid limitation since there was no merger between the orders dated 09.09.2017 and 04.08.2020. (B) H.E. Governor exercising powers under Article 192 of the Constitution does not have the power to review his/her decision made under Article 192(2) of the Constitution. Accordingly, the review petition dated 28.06.2019 was not maintainable and need not have been even entertained. Even otherwise, there was no error in dismissing the review petition. (C) The petition dated 28.04.2017 instituted by the petitioner before H.E. Governor under Article 192 of the Constitution was not maintainable because the same was based on an allegation of a “pre-existing disqualification” and not a “supervening disqualification”. (D) Even on merits, no case is made out by the petitioner for disqualification of respondent No.4 under Section 9-A of the RP Act. 120. For all the aforesaid reasons, we find no merit in this petition and the same is liable to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order for costs.