JUDGMENT : Heard the parties through video conferencing. 2. This petition has been filed invoking the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with a prayer to quash the F.I.R. bearing Peshrar P.S. Case No.03 of 2020 registered for the offence punishable under Sections 7, 11 and 13 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and further proceedings consequent thereof. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the allegation against the petitioner is that the petitioner while being posted as Block Programming Officer, MANREGA at Block-Peshrar has received bribe of Rs.1,40,000/- from the supplier in respect of the work relating to construction of well under the MANREGA Scheme. It is further alleged that the petitioner demanded commission against the supply of articles relating to construction of irrigation well and the said bribe amount was paid through banking transaction vide a cheque deposited in the account of the petitioner. It is submitted that the allegation against the petitioner is false. It is further submitted that the petitioner, after joining as Block Programming Officer, MANREGA at Peshrar Block issued direction to all the Mukhiyas and related officials of Panchayat of Peshrar not to make payment of the bills to suppliers/vendors without physical verification of the materials supplied by them. As the suppliers/vendors were not pleased with the aforesaid strong action of the petitioner, hence, after hatching a conspiracy with the help of In-charge of the Establishment Section, MANREGA, Lohardaga, one of the suppliers namely Kamal Sahu was made instrumental to implicate the petitioner in a false case of bribery and accordingly, this case has been registered. 4. It is then submitted that the petitioner accepts that he has received payment of Rs.1,40,000/- from Kamal Sahu through a cheque being badly in in need of money for treatment of his ailing mother. It is further submitted that the services of the petitioner were earlier terminated and in the appeal being preferred by the petitioner before the Divisional Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi, the said Kamal Sahu gave statement on oath that he has given personal loan to the petitioner for treatment of his ailing mother and he has not given any bribe/ commission to the petitioner. The order of the termination of the services was set aside in Service Appeal No.07 of 2019. The order of the termination of the services was set aside in Service Appeal No.07 of 2019. Hence, it is submitted that without making proper verification of the facts, the Block Development Officer, Peshrar has lodged this F.I.R., hence, the same be quashed. 5. Mr. Sachin Kumar-learned A.A.G. II appearing for the State vehemently opposes the prayer for quashing the F.I.R. and submits that all the grounds raised by the petitioner are, at best, the defence of the petitioner which can be put forth by the petitioner at the relevant time but certainly none of them amounts to any of the grounds for which the F.I.R. of a case can be quashed more so because there is documentary proof as well as the admission of the petitioner that he has received Rs.1,40,000/- from the supplier Kamal Sahu, who was the supplier. Hence, it is submitted that this petition, being without any merit, be dismissed. 6. Having heard the submissions made at the Bar and after carefully going through the materials in the record, it is pertinent to mention that the grounds for which the F.I.R. can be quashed, has been settled, in the case of State of Haryana and Ors. Vs. Bhajan Lal and Ors. reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, of course by way of illustration, paragraph-102 of which reads as under:- 102. “In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 7. After carefully going through the materials in the record, this Court is of the considered view that none of the grounds or for that matter any other justifiable ground could be put forth by the petitioner for quashing the First Information Report. The undisputed fact remains that the petitioner has taken huge amount of Rs.1,40,000/- from a supplier. After carefully going through the materials in the record, this Court is of the considered view that none of the grounds or for that matter any other justifiable ground could be put forth by the petitioner for quashing the First Information Report. The undisputed fact remains that the petitioner has taken huge amount of Rs.1,40,000/- from a supplier. There is no material in the record to suggest that a public servant can do so more so, when a person from whom he is receiving money is a supplier whose bills will come to him for payment. It is a settled principle of law that the fate of a criminal trial does not depend merely upon the testimony of the informant of this case. There are instances galore where even after the informant became hostile, still the accused persons have been convicted of the charges on the basis of the evidence put forth by the other witnesses of the case, which were sufficient to bring home the charges against the accused persons. It is needless to mention that apart from the defence agitated by the petitioner, which is certainly not a ground to quash a First Information Report, the only other ground agitated by the petitioner in this petition, is that the informant of this case has retracted from the statement made in the First Information Report, in a departmental proceeding initiated against the petitioner. Under such circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that merely because the informant has retracted from his statement made in the first information report in a departmental proceeding, is not as sufficient ground to quash the First Information Report. Thus this is not a fit case where the F.I.R. bearing Peshrar P.S. Case No.03 of 2020 registered for the offence punishable under Sections 7, 11 and 13 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 be quashed. 8. Accordingly, this petition, being without any merit, is dismissed.