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2022 DIGILAW 372 (CHH)

Sushil Chandra Pagariya S/o Late Shri Maangilal Pagariya v. Gajraj Pagariya

2022-08-26

DEEPAK KUMAR TIWARI

body2022
ORDER : 1. Heard. 2. his revision petition has been filed against the order dated 3.12.2018 passed by the Ninth Civil Judge Class-II, Raipur (CG)in MJC (unregistered), by which, the Court below has rejected an application under Section 152 read with Sections 153 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for modification of the compromise decree dated 13.2.2018 passed in Civil Suit No.245-A/2017, on the ground that the same is not maintainable. Hence, this revision. 3. The brief facts of the case are that Civil Suit No.245-A/2017 was filed by non-applicants 1, 2 & 3 against the applicants and non-applicant No.4 for declaration that the suit property is in their exclusive ownership and for permanent injunction. The plaint was filed on 7.9.2017 and the suit was listed on 9.3.2018 for filing of the written statement/issues. Meanwhile, an urgent hearing application as also an application under Order 23 Rule 3 read with Section 151 of the CPC along with the annexures were filed on 13.2.2018. On the said date, applicant No.1 was in custody and his bail application was pending before the High Court. Applicant No.1 was brought to the concerned court from jail in another Arbitration Case scheduled in the Court of District Judge on 13.2.2018. Applicant No.2 was also not in Raipur on 13.2.2018 as he was in Bilaspur for hearing of his father's bail petition listed before the High Court. However, applicant No.2 reached Raipur in the late evening and he was directly called in the Civil Court. Applicant No.1 was produced at about 4:00 p.m. on 13.2.2018 before the Court. The applicants were assured and allured that the non-applicants/plaintiffs are willing to settle the family dispute and further, if the dispute ends , applicant No.1 will also be released from custody. Hence, the applicants had no choice but to sign such application as it was a question of life and death for applicant No.1. On the same day, plaintiffs Gajraj Pagariya and Smt. Ugam Devi and defendant/applicant No.1 Sushil Chandra Pagariya were examined and the compromise decree was passed on 13.2.2018 itself. 4. The criminal case against applicant No.1 finally came to an end on 6.7.2018 and thereafter, the applicants started scrutinising the details of the properties contained in the compromise application. On the same day, plaintiffs Gajraj Pagariya and Smt. Ugam Devi and defendant/applicant No.1 Sushil Chandra Pagariya were examined and the compromise decree was passed on 13.2.2018 itself. 4. The criminal case against applicant No.1 finally came to an end on 6.7.2018 and thereafter, the applicants started scrutinising the details of the properties contained in the compromise application. The following major illegalities were found in the compromise application : (i) One property situated at Vile Parle , Mumbai was originally in the name of a Company i.e. Shreyansh Finvest Pvt. Ltd. and as per the earlier family settlement, it was agreed that this property would be sold and its sale proceeds would be used in discharging the debts of the family. After passing of the compromise decree on 13.2.2018, Arbitration Case No.29/17 was settled in the Lok Adalat, in which, a compromise decree was passed on 22.4.2018 in the Court of District Judge, Raipur. (ii) In the compromise application dated 13.2.2018, many properties were illegally put in the share of the plaintiffs/non-applicants, which were not even in the names of the family members and were recorded in the names of various others. Neither the consent of such owners was obtained nor their respective signatures were taken on the compromise application. Therefore, the applicants were given in share such properties which could not even be parted with in the compromise application. 5. For such properties, the Assistant Commissioner, Income Tax, (Benami Prohibition), Raipur has issued an order of provisional attachment under the provisions of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 on 27.2.2019. When such major irregularities came to the notice of the applicants, they have moved an application for modification of the compromise decree on 1.9.2018, which was dismissed by the impugned order. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. Indisputably, the matter was settled between the parties on the basis of an application under Order 23 Rule 3 read with Section 151 of the CPC and thereby, a consent decree was passed in Civil Suit No.245-A/2017 on 13.2.2018. 8. As the law is well settled in a catena of judgments rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court and recently in the matter of Sree Surya Developers & Promoters Vs. 8. As the law is well settled in a catena of judgments rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court and recently in the matter of Sree Surya Developers & Promoters Vs. N. Sailesh Prasad (2022) 5 SCC 736 , Hon’ble the Supreme Court has reiterated the view that a party to a consent decree based on a compromise to challenge the compromise decree on the ground that the decree was not lawful i.e. it was void or voidable, has to approach the same Court, which recorded the compromise and a separate suit is not maintainable. The said judgment referred the earlier judgment rendered in the matter of Pushpa Devi Bhagat Vs. Rajinder Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 566 , in which the following was held vide para 17 : “17. The position that emerges from the amended provisions of Order 23 can be summed up thus: (i) No appeal is maintainable against a consent decree having regard to the specific bar contained in Section 96(3) CPC. (ii) No appeal is maintainable against the order of the court recording the compromise (or refusing to record a compromise) in view of the deletion of clause (m) of Rule 1 Order 43. (iii) No independent suit can be filed for setting aside a compromise decree on the ground that the compromise was not lawful in view of the bar contained in Rule 3-A. (iv) A consent decree operates as an estoppel and is valid and binding unless it is set aside by the court which passed the consent decree, by an order on an application under the proviso to Rule 3 Order 23. Therefore, the only remedy available to a party to a consent decree to avoid such consent decree, is to approach the court which recorded the compromise and made a decree in terms of it, and establish that there was no compromise. In that event, the court which recorded the compromise will itself consider and decide the question as to whether there was a valid compromise or not. This is so because a consent decree is nothing but contract between parties superimposed with the seal of approval of the court. The validity of a consent decree depends wholly on the validity of the agreement or compromise on which it is made. . ……………………..” 9. This is so because a consent decree is nothing but contract between parties superimposed with the seal of approval of the court. The validity of a consent decree depends wholly on the validity of the agreement or compromise on which it is made. . ……………………..” 9. In view of the aforesaid legal aspect, the revision is disposed of reserving liberty to the parties to move a fresh application, if so advised, before the competent Court in accordance with law. 10. Consequently, all the pending applications are also disposed of.