JUDGMENT : [Anil Kumar Choudhary, J.] 1. Heard the parties through video conferencing. 2. This petition has been filed invoking the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with a prayer to quash the F.I.R. bearing A.C.B P.S. Case No.09 of 2021 dated 03.11.2021 registered for the offence punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 13 (1) (a) and 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 pending in the court of Special Judge, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Ranchi wherein it has inter alia been alleged that by way of cheating and fraudulent documents, the petitioners have acquired the right, title, interest and possession of the land belonging to the persons of Scheduled Tribe community. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the allegation against the petitioners is that the petitioners, in criminal conspiracy with the coW. accused public servants have committed cheating, forgery and also the offences under the penal provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 by making fraudulent persons to be the claimant of the ownership of the land of a member of Scheduled Tribe and created forged documents with the help of said fraudulent claimants. It is next submitted that the F.I.R. has been lodged in violation of the order dated 21.05.2021 passed in W.P.(C) No.1791 of 2021. It is then submitted that the allegations made against the petitioners are false. The petitioners claim that they are the real owners of the land in question. It is next submitted that the petitioners have also filed a contempt petition registered as Contempt Case (Civil) No.776 of 2021 before filing of this writ petition as has been mentioned in paragraph-15 of this writ petition and therein the petitioners have categorically mentioned that the petitioners have also filed a contempt petition which has been registered as Contempt (Civil) No.776 of 2021. So the words “have also filed” show that the said Contempt (Civil) No.776 of 2021 was filed prior to filing of the instant writ petition. So the words “have also filed” show that the said Contempt (Civil) No.776 of 2021 was filed prior to filing of the instant writ petition. It is next submitted that the proceeding initiated by the learned court of the Presiding Officer-cum-Minister, Revenue, Registration and Land Reforms Department, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi is illegal and without jurisdiction and challenging that order much before filing this writ application, the petitioners have filed a separate writ petition vide W.P.(C) No.1791 of 2021 which is sub judice before a co-ordinate Bench of this Court. 4. It is next submitted that as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Inder Mohan Goswami & Another Vs. State of Uttranchal and Others reported in (2007) 12 SCC 1 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in order to bring home the charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, it is necessary to show that the accused had fraudulent and dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. It is next submitted that no offence punishable under Sections 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code is made out against the petitioners. It is next submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Rattan Singh & Others Vs. Nirmal Gill & Others reported in 2020 SCC OnLine SC 936, has reiterated that a document is presumed to be genuine if it is a registered document and the onus to prove otherwise is on the person who has challenged the same. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners next relies upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of M. Subramaniam & Another Vs. S. Janaki & Another in Criminal Appeal No.102 of 2011 dated 20.03.2020 and submits that in that case when the F.I.R. was registered notwithstanding with the stay order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the Hon’ble Supreme Court gave liberty to first respondents of that appeal to file documents and paper with the police pursuant to the complaint in connection with that case and observed that the police on being satisfied that a criminal offence is made out would have liberty to register an F.I.R. It is next submitted that the petitioners are not public servants, hence, the offence under the penal provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is not made out against the petitioners. Hence, it is submitted that the F.I.R. bearing A.C.B P.S. Case No.09 of 2021 dated 03.11.2021 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 13 (1) (a) and 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 pending in the court of Special Judge, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Ranchi be quashed. 6. Mr. Manoj Kumar-learned G.A III on the other hand vehemently opposes the prayer for quashing the F.I.R. bearing A.C.B P.S. Case No.09 of 2021 dated 03.11.2021 registered for the offence punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 13 (1) (a) and 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 pending in the court of Special Judge, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Ranchi and submits that there is specific and direct allegation against the petitioners that the petitioners in criminal conspiracy with the co-accused public servants have committed the offence of cheating, forgery and allied offences which are of serious nature by creating false documents and by creating fraudulent claimants and by fraudulent process. It is next submitted that that the grounds for quashing of the F.I.R. as contended by the petitioners are basically of three types:- (i) the proceeding initiated by the learned court of the Presiding Officercum-Minister, Revenue, Registration and Land Reforms Department, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi is illegal and for which the petitioners have already filed a separate writ application vide W.P.(C) No.1791 of 2021 much before filing of this criminal writ petition which is sub judice before a co-ordinate Bench of this Court. (ii) the F.I.R. was instituted after stay order passed by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court and for which also a contempt petition registered as Contempt (Civil) No.776 of 2021 has also been filed before a co-ordinate Bench of this Court before filing this criminal writ petition and that matter is also sub judice before the co-ordinate Bench. (iii) the allegation against the petitioners are false. 7. It is next submitted by Mr Kumar that even though the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of M. Subramaniam & Another Vs. (iii) the allegation against the petitioners are false. 7. It is next submitted by Mr Kumar that even though the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of M. Subramaniam & Another Vs. S. Janaki & Another (supra) but even in that case also the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India did not quash the F.I.R. It is further submitted that the other grounds agitated by the petitioners for quashing of the F.I.R. is that the allegation against the petitioners are false, which are, at best a defence of the petitioners and the same is certainly not a ground to quash the F.I.R. by way of conducting a mini trial when the investigation is at the nascent stage and yet to be completed. Relying upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Others reported in (2020) 10 SCC 118 , Mr. Manoj Kumarlearned G.A. III wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has concluded as under in paragraph-23:- 23. Relying upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Others reported in (2020) 10 SCC 118 , Mr. Manoj Kumarlearned G.A. III wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has concluded as under in paragraph-23:- 23. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, our final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether the High Court would be justified in passing an interim order of stay of investigation and/or “no coercive steps to be adopted”, during the pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in what circumstances and whether the High Court would be justified in passing the order of not to arrest the accused or “no coercive steps to be adopted” during the investigation or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under: i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence; ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences; iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on; iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ‘rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty). v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint; vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage; vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule; viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere; ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping; x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences; xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice; xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure; xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court; xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint; xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR; xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted” and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order. xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by “no coercive steps to be adopted” as the term “no coercive steps to be adopted” can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied. It is submitted that only in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the court should interfere and the judicial process should not be interfered with at the stage of investigation of offences. 8. It is next submitted by the learned G.A. III that none of the grounds agitated by the petitioners comes under any of the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India either in the case of R.P. Kapur (supra) or in the case of State of Haryana and Ors. Vs. Bhajan Lal and Ors (supra). Hence, it is submitted that there is no justifiable reason to quash the F.I.R. more so when the legality of the order passed by the Presiding Officer-cum- Minister, Revenue, Registration and Land Reforms Department, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi is yet to be decided by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court. Hence, it is submitted that this petition, being without any merit, be dismissed. 9. Having heard the submissions made at the Bar and after carefully going through the materials in the record, it is pertinent to mention here that admittedly the issue of legality of the order passed by the Presiding Officer-cum- Minister, Revenue, Registration and Land Reforms Department, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi is sub judice before a coordinate Bench of this Court. Hence, this Court restrains itself to pass any observation regarding the same. 10. Hence, this Court restrains itself to pass any observation regarding the same. 10. The contention of the petitioners that the F.I.R. was lodged in contempt of the order dated 21.05.2021 of the co-ordinate Bench, is also sub judice before the co-ordinate Bench. Hence, this Court also restrains itself from making any observation regarding the same. 11. So far as the prayer for quashing of the F.I.R. is concerned on the ground that the allegation against the petitioners is false, this Court is of the considered view that the same is certainly at best a defence of the petitioners and for that ground by way of conducting a mini trial, the F.I.R. certainly cannot be quashed. 12. After carefully going through the evidence in the record, this Court is of the considered view that the petitioners have failed to put forth any ground as enunciated in the case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1960 SC 866 paragraph-6 of which reads as under:- 6. “Xxxxxx It is well-established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the Court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceeding in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding on that ground. If the criminal proceeding in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the allegations in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the first information report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under Section 561- A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained. Broadly stated that is the nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 561-A in the matter of quashing criminal proceedings, and that is the effect of the judicial decisions on the point (Vide: In Re: Shripad G. Chandavarkar [AIR 1928 Bom 184] , Jagat Chandra Mozumdar v. Queen Empress [(1899) ILR 26 Cal 786] , Shanker Singh (Dr) v. State of Punjab [(1954) 56 Punjab LR 54] , Nripendra Bhusan Ray v. Gobind Bandhu Majumdar [AIR 1924 Cal 1018] and Ramanathan Chettiyar v. K. Sivarama Subrahmanya Ayyar [ILR 47 Mad 722] .” (Emphasis supplied) Or in the case of State of Haryana and Ors. Vs. Bhajan Lal and Ors. reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has observed as under in paragraph 102: 102. “In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that there is no justifiable reason for which the F.I.R. can be quashed. 13. Thus, this petition, being without any merit, is dismissed. 14. In view of the disposal of the instant petition, interlocutory application, if any, stands disposed of being infructuous.