JUDGMENT : P.N. PRAKASH, J. This criminal appeal is directed against the judgment and order of acquittal dated 28.09.2021 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Mahila Court, Cuddalore, in S.C.No.70 of 2019. 2. The prosecution story runs thus: 2.1. It is the case of the prosecution that the appellants are mother and daughter and they were living separately, but in the same village. Valarmathi [A2] borrowed Rs.50,000/- from Meenakshiammal [deceased] and had executed a promissory note for that. Meenakshiammal was a flower vendor. Meenakshiammal appears to have lost the promissory note and was requesting Valarmathi [A2] to issue a fresh one. Therefore, when Meenakshiammal came to the house of Valarmathi [A2] on 28.10.2017, it is alleged that appellants committed murder by attacking her with an iron pipe on her head and thereafter, strangulating her, relieving her of gold ornaments and abandoned the body in a place opposite to their house. 2.2. On a complaint given by Banu Naidu [PW-1]/son of Meenakshiammal, the police registered a case in Crime No.426 of 2017 for the offences u/s.397 and 302 IPC at 10.30 p.m. on 28.10.2017 against the appellants. 2.3. After examining various witnesses and collecting the reports of the experts, Nagarajan [PW-12], Inspector of Police, completed the investigation and filed a final report in P.R.C.No.14 of 2018 in the Court of Judicial Magistrate III, Cuddalore, for the offences u/s.120-B, 302, 404 and 201 IPC, against the appellants. 3. On appearance of the appellants, the provisions of Section 207 Cr.P.C. were complied with and the case was committed to the Court of Session in S.C.No.70 of 2019 and was made over to the Sessions Court [Mahila Court], Cuddalore, for trial. The trial Court framed charges u/s.120- B, 302, 404 and 201 IPC against the appellants and when questioned, the appellants pleaded 'not guilty'. 4. To prove the case, the prosecution examined 12 witnesses and marked 18 exhibits and 16 material objects. When the appellants were questioned u/s.313 Cr.P.C. on the incriminating circumstances appearing against them, they denied the same. No witness was examined from the side of the appellants nor any document marked. 5. 4. To prove the case, the prosecution examined 12 witnesses and marked 18 exhibits and 16 material objects. When the appellants were questioned u/s.313 Cr.P.C. on the incriminating circumstances appearing against them, they denied the same. No witness was examined from the side of the appellants nor any document marked. 5. After considering the evidence on record and hearing either side, the trial Court, by judgment and order dated 28.09.2021 in S.C.No.70 of 2019, acquitted the appellants, aggrieved by which, Banu Naidu [PW-1] has filed the present appeal under the proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C. It appears that the State has not filed any appeal challenging the acquittal. 6. Heard Mr.I.Abrar Mohamed Abdullah, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr.R.Muniyapparaj, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, appearing for the respondent State. 7. Mr.I.Abrar Mohamed Abdullah, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that the trial Court has failed to appreciate the incriminating evidences against the appellants and had acquitted them on flimsy grounds. 8. We carefully went through the records. 9. This case is based on circumstantial evidences. The first circumstance in this case is the extra judicial confession [Ex.P4], which is said to have been given by the appellants to Santhanakrishnan [PW-6], Village Administrative Officer, on 30.10.2017 at 10.30 a.m. confessing to the crime. The trial Court has rejected the extra judicial confession [Ex.P4] in paragraph No.17 on the ground that Banu Naidu [PW-1], the de facto complainant, has clearly stated in the cross-examination that on 29.10.2017 itself he had seen the appellants in the police station. Therefore, the case of the prosecution that the appellants surrendered before Santhanakrishnan [PW- 6], Village Administrative Officer, on 30.10.2017, gave an extra judicial confession and thereafter, Santhanakrishnan [PW-6], Village Administrative Officer, produced them before the police falls flat. 10. As regards the recovery of gold jewels of Meenakshiammal allegedly from the house of the appellants, the recovery witness - Ramadoss [PW-5], has been disbelieved by the trial Court by giving cogent reasons in paragraph No.18 as under: '18. ... As stated earlier, P.W.5 has stated, at the time of cross-examination, that on 28.10.2017, the police brought A1 and A2 to their house and after sniffer dog arrived, the police took them inside their house. P.W.5 has further stated, in cross-examination, that he did not know as to what were taken by the police from the house of the accused. As stated earlier, P.W.5 has stated, at the time of cross-examination, that on 28.10.2017, the police brought A1 and A2 to their house and after sniffer dog arrived, the police took them inside their house. P.W.5 has further stated, in cross-examination, that he did not know as to what were taken by the police from the house of the accused. When this evidence of P.W.5 is taken into account, a doubt is cast on the case of the prosecution with regard to the recovery of M.Os.1 to 3 and 6 on 30.10.2017. Further, a doubt is raised on the prosecution case as to the recovery of M.Os.7 to 13, which are blood-stained clothes. It would be the connection of the prosecution that M.Os.7 to 13 were the clothes, which the accused used to remove the blood-stains from the house of A2. This version of the prosecution could not be accepted because it is highly unbelievable that there was no trace of blood-stains in the house of A2. It is also not found mentioned in Ex.P-2, observation mahazar, that there were blood-stains in the house of A2. It may again be noted that though the investigating officer seized blood-stained earth and sample earth from the place where the deceased was lying dead, he had not chosen to seize any blood-stained objects as would have been found in the house of the accused. ...' Thus, even according to Ramadoss [PW-5], the recovery witness, the appellants were with him on 28.10.2017 and therefore, not only the recovery is vitiated but also it gives rise to a serious doubt on the extra judicial confession [Ex.P4], which is said to have been given on 30.10.2017. 11. As regards the evidence of Gowri [PW-2], who is said to have seen Meenakshiammal going to the house of the appellants, the trial Court has given the following finding in paragraph No.14: '14. ... This evidence of P.W.2 shows that the deceased told her that she was proceeding to the house of A2. Though P.W.1 has stated that P.W.2 told him that she saw the deceased entering the house of A2, P.W.2 has not stated so; but, she has only stated that the deceased told her that she was proceeding to A2's house. P.W.1 has also stated that P.W.3 told him that she saw the deceased entering the house of A2. Though P.W.1 has stated that P.W.2 told him that she saw the deceased entering the house of A2, P.W.2 has not stated so; but, she has only stated that the deceased told her that she was proceeding to A2's house. P.W.1 has also stated that P.W.3 told him that she saw the deceased entering the house of A2. But, however, P.W.3 has turned hostile, as she has merely stated that the deceased was going along the School Street towards east. At this stage, Ex.P-13, rough sketch, may be referred to. In Ex.P-13, it is found noted that in row-houses, the house of A2 is situated last at the northern side in the street, and that Athimoolam School Street runs south-north. If the evidence of P.W.3 is taken into account that the deceased was proceeding towards east, then it could be said that the deceased was going on the opposite direction to the house of A2. Anyhow, P.W.3 has not supported the prosecution case, as she has turned hostile. Even if the available evidence through P.Ws.1 and 2 is taken into consideration, it could only be said that P.W.1 saw the deceased at 05.30 p.m. in his house, and that the deceased told P.W.2 that she was proceeding towards the house of A2. No other witnesses have spoken about the deceased having been seen alive by them, before the death, on the fateful day. ...' 12. In V. Sejappa vs. State, (2016) 12 SCC 150 , wherein, the Supreme Court, after considering the earlier judgments, has broadly catalogued the parameters to be borne in mind by the Court while dealing with an appeal against acquittal. The said parameters laid down by the Supreme Court are profitably extracted hereunder: “23. . .. . ...' 12. In V. Sejappa vs. State, (2016) 12 SCC 150 , wherein, the Supreme Court, after considering the earlier judgments, has broadly catalogued the parameters to be borne in mind by the Court while dealing with an appeal against acquittal. The said parameters laid down by the Supreme Court are profitably extracted hereunder: “23. . .. . Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the appellate court must bear in mind the following: (i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court; (ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal; (iii) Though, the powers of the appellate court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanour of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified; and (iv) Merely because the appellate court on re-appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court.” 13. This case does not pass muster the test laid down in the aforesaid judgment. It is trite that when there are two views possible on a set of evidence, the view that supports the accused merits acceptance. This case does not pass muster the test laid down in the aforesaid judgment. It is trite that when there are two views possible on a set of evidence, the view that supports the accused merits acceptance. In this case, the trial Court has given cogent reasons for disbelieving the evidences of the prosecution witnesses and we find that there is no perversity in the judgment and order of the trial Court warranting interference. In the result, this Criminal Appeal stands dismissed in limine.